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ABSTRACT 
The Role of Management Accounting Systems in Enhancing Organizational 
Effectiveness in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
The research looks at the nature of MAS in Jordan, and at its role in enhancing 
organizational effectiveness in Jordanian commercial banks. It looks into MAS, their 
design, the causes behind their design, the operation of MAS, and subsequently any 
effects on OE. The first part of the fieldwork is a case study on one of the nine 
Jordanian commercial banks that fonn the research population. Data was collected 
from 16 personal semi-structured interviews on the different aspects of MAS adopted 
in the case study. 
The second part of the fieldwork is a survey that covered the remaining eight 
Jordanian commercial banks. Data was collected from the eight banks through 
personal interviews based on the findings from the case study. 
The literature reviewed included areas of management accounting, management 
accounting research, management accounting systems, and organizational 
effectiveness 
Key words: MAS theory, MAS design, OE, Jordanian commercial banks 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE KINGDOM OF JORDAN 
This research investigates management accounting systems [MAS] in Jordan and their 
role in enhancing organisational effectiveness rOE] in commercial banks. It asks how 
well does the MAS work, and how why and with what consequences does MAS seem to 
impact on OE in this particular segment ofthe Jordanian economy. 
This broad question, of course, embraces a number of others, viz: 
• How are MAS constructed in the given context of commercial banking? 
• What kind of information do these systems generate, and to the benefit of what users? 
• How are these systems and the information they deliver evaluated by professional and 
managerial staff(users) in banks? 
• Do these MAS deal primarily in historic data, or are they forward looking? 
• What management functions or activities are facilitated by MAS? 
• What are the specific contributions to OE, in different departments of the banks and 
at different levels? 
• Are any shortcomings in the causal nexus MAS-OE related to the tension between 
western MAS and the dominant Arab culture of Jordan, driven by deference, 
familism, the priority of personal relations, and the recognition that it is not entirely 
possible to shape outcomes by planning and control. 
The research proceeds by means of a rather extensive study of one particular bank, 
Phoenix bank, and is supported by mUltiple interviews in all other Jordanian 
commercial banks. 
Jordan is a small country and has not been the subject of a great deal of management 
research to date. Our study therefore, has a further value in that it illuminates the reality 
of organisational life and management behaviour in a stable, peaceful and moderate Arab 
sate. Thus, in a small way, this thesis is a contribution to the comparative management 
literature. 
1.1 JORDAN IN HISTORY 
The land which geographers call Transjordania or more simply Transjordan occupies an 
area of just over 90,000 sq. km. (Salibi, 1993, p. 3). The population of Transjordan has 
grown from 225,000 in 1922 (Wilson, 1990, p. 56) to 5.33 million today, nearly a quarter 
of them living in the capital Amman (Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, June 2003). 
From west to east the country consists of three natural regions, which converge in the 
south on the port of Aqaba on the Red Sea (Exhibit 1.1, Geographical Map of Jordan). 
The first natural region of Jordan comprises the eastern parts of the great rift valley of the 
Ghor (Meaning the sunken land) and Wadi Araba. The Ghor, the lowest point on earth 
(being 392 metres below sea-level), with its rich alluvial soil, is irrigated by the Jordan 
River and its tributaries, which makes it the green house ofthe region. 
Next are the highlands bordering the Ghor and Wadi Araba from the east. Geographically 
speaking it is principally this region that is called Transjordan. These highlands have 
been historically the most densely populated (Salibi, 1993, p. 5). 
The third natural region lies beyond the Transjordanian highland: the gravel plateau of 
the Syro-Arabian desert (Badyat Alsham) patched with areas of basalt and tilting 
gradually eastward towards the frontier with Iraq [Exhibit 1.1, Geographical Map of 
Jordan]. This desert today forms more than three quarters of the total area of Jordan. 
Amman, which in 1921 became the capital of Jordan, is situated on the headwaters of the 
Zarqa tributary of the Jordan River (Exhibit 1.1, Geographical Map of Jordan). Amman 
was a natural meeting point for the Syro-Arabian caravan trails which accounts for the 
prominence it enjoyed in antiquity (Exhibit 1.2, Trading Routes in Ancient Jordan). The 
modern revival of Amman began in 1908 when it became one of the principal stations of 
the new Hijaz railway constructed by the Ottomans to connect the Syrian city of 
Damascus with the Hijaz city of Medina (Hijaz a geographical area in the Arabian 
Peninsula located on the Red Sea, see Exhibit 1.3, Political Map of The Middle East). 
Down the ages, the strategic importance of the present land of Jordan has been derived to 
a great extent from its status as a major highway, and the natural connection between 
Syria and Arabia (Salibi, 1993, p. 7). Since the spread of Islam this same highway gained 
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special importance as Tareeq-al-Hajj (pilgrims' road) annually taken by Moslems 
travelling by land from various countries on their way to the holy land of Hijaz. 
1.1.1 The Foundation of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
The long and chequered history of Jordan involved several centuries of Ottoman 
(Turkish) rule, beginning in 15 I 7. By the early 20th century, however, the Ottoman 
empire was in decline, and finally disintegrated in the course of the First World War 
(1914-18), in part because of the Arab revolt against Turkish rule encouraged by the 
British for their own purposes. 
After the First World War territories that eventually became the state of Jordan and Israel 
and part of Iraq (Exhibit 1.3, Political Map of Middle East) were mandated to the British 
by the League of Nations. The territorial politics of this post First World War period are 
immensely complicated, but eventuated in the Emirate of Transjordan being formally 
recognised on 15 may 1922 as a national state being prepared for independence under the 
general supervision of the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. On 22 may 1946 a 
new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty was signed proclaiming the independence of 
Transjordan. 
This prompted the Transjordanian cabinet to take a decision to change the name of the 
country to The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and to change the title of the ruling Emir 
Abdullah to that of King Abdullah I. 
The key territorial development after this event concerns the area now known as the West 
Bank. The 1948 partition of Palestine that created the state of Israel left Jordan in an 
unchallenged occupation of the West Bank. In 1950 the Jordanian Parliament formally 
incorporated it, thereby significantly increasing Jordan's population. The Six Days War 
of 1967, led to the West Bank coming under de/acto Israeli control and created an acute 
refugee problem for Jordan. At the time writing (2005) the future of the West Bank is 
undecided, though a peaceful Israeli withdrawal from this area is greatly desired. 
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AN HISTORIC REVIEW OF JORDANIAN ECONOMY AND BANKING SECTOR 
A quick look at the developments in the Jordanian economy in general and the banking 
sector in particular follows. This provides some understanding of the background against 
which Jordanian commercial banks nowadays operate. The policies, attitudes and 
techniques that those banks adopt and use have their roots in banking practices that have 
evo Ived over the years. 
1.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JORDANIAN ECONOMY 
The Jordanian economy developed from a subsistence economy in the early 1900s In a 
space of 77 years to a modern economy, albeit having weaknesses, with industrial and 
services sectors, and financial institutions trying to copy and work alongside 
international banks. This economic review tries to show where the country was and 
where is it now and where it aims to be. 
Jordanian banks have played a role in the development of the Jordanian economy as both 
entities influence and are influenced by each other. We can see this interaction, for 
example, if we look at 1992 statistics, where we find that Jordanian banks had 90.8% 
direct investments in the industrial and services sectors out of their total domestic 
investments. Jordanian banks have also financed 90.7% of total imports in the same year 
(Akel, 1994, pp. 459, 460). 
The banking sector has also played a role in influencing the economy of Jordan by 
offering 45% of total credit facilities in 1992 as development credit to direct production 
sectors namely agriculture, industry, mining and construction (Malki, 1994, p. 580). In 
April 2003 the figure fell to 35% (CBJ, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 2003). 
Preliminary 2002 statistics show the single largest sector in the Jordanian economy is the 
financial services sector making 19.4% ofGDP (at 1994 prices) compared to 16.8% for 
manufacturing, and 11.5% for trade, restaurants and hotels (CBJ, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin, June 2003, Table 50). 
In looking at the Jordanian economy since the foundation of Jordan as a state, one can 
see that it went through the following stages: 
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• the period between 192 I - I 952 
• the period between 1953-1966 
• the period between 1967-1973 
• the period between 1974-1982 
• the period between 1983-1988 
• the period from 1989 onwards. 
1.2.1 The Foundation Years [1921- 1952] 
The beginnings of the Jordanian economy were characterised by low liquidity. Barter was 
the prevailing system of exchange (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 4). Transjordan was then an 
agricultural economy where the majority of the inhabitants worked the land and raised 
sheep. Agriculture depended on primitive agricultural tools and techniques, and rainfall 
was the only means of irrigation. Between the years 1928 _ 1933 the land that was 
actually farmed was 5% of the total arable land in Jordan, 0.6% of it was irrigated, 79% 
of the irrigated land was in the Jordan Valley and the rest depended on rainfall 
(Hamarneh, 1994, p. 2 I). 
The industrial sector was for all practical purposes, of no consequence. Cottage industries 
were only to be found for weaving woollen rugs and certain types of textiles that the local 
popUlation used. All other needs had to be traded from Syria and Palestine. 
The services and mining sectors were in no better state than agriculture or industry 
(Hamarneh, 1994, p. 30). Although phosphate was discovered in 1894, the mining 
sector's contribution to tIle economy was of little importance. A Jordanian company to 
excavate phosphate was not formed until 1945 (Hamarneh, 1994, p. 25). Economic 
activities in the modern sense began after the Second World War and the Proclamation of 
Independence in 1946 when money started playing a clear role. 
Transjordan at the time did not have a local currency. The Ottoman golden pound was 
the legal currency in Transjordan. Consequently, it was only natural for Jordan to be tied 
monetary-wise and banking-wise to Turkey and then to Britain after World War I. 
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After the defeat of the Ottomans the sterling pound and the Egyptian pound replaced the 
Ottoman Pound (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 16). In 1927 the British authorities unified the 
currency used in Palestine and Transjordan, and the Palestinian pound was put in 
circulation on I November 1927 and it was equal to a sterling pound. 
When Jordan gained independence in 1946 and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
became a recognised state, it was natural that Jordan must have its own currency. On I 
July 1950 the Jordan dinar was put into circulation as the only legal medium of exchange 
in the country, which was also directly tied to the sterling pound. By September 1950 the 
amount of Jordanian dinars issued to replace the Palestinian pound was JD 9.56 million 
from various denomination (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 18). 
By the same statute the Jordan Currency Board - mc - was formed to be responsible for 
the issue of the currency and the management of the Sterling reserves of Jordan. As the 
Palestinian Currency Board, ]BC headquarters were in London. The board was formed of 
two Jordanians and two other members in addition to the president who were British 
(Nabulsi, 1990, p. 18). 
In 1948 the Jordanian economy suffered a violent shock as a result of the civil war in 
Palestine and the proclamation of Israel. Jordan had to host a million Palestinian refugees 
and cope with its limited infrastructure in providing housing, health, and food 
requirements for the victims of the war. As a result Jordan, a country that desert made 
90% of its area was in a situation where 60% of the population was unemployed, and 
with cash reserves of JD 6.5 per capita (Hourani, 1994, p. 101). 
After the armistice and the decision of the Jordanian parliament to unify the West and 
East Banks of the Jordan River economy expanded - particularly the agriculture and 
tourism sectors. 
1.2.2 The Building Years [1953-1966J 
This period was marked by the ascension of the 17 years old King Hussein to the throne 
on I I August 1952 after the abdication of his father King Talal for health reasons. 
Construction expanded and the foundation of public institutions began. GDP grew by 
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11.5% annually between 1948 and 1961 with an inflation rate of just 2% (Abdul/ah, 
1994, p. 57) and by 9.1 % between 1962 and 1966 with a low inflation rate of 1% 
(Hourani, 1994, p. 104). This period could be considered the golden years of the 
Jordanian economy. 
By the early 1960$ Jordan started developing its potash, phosphate and cement industries 
with capital provided by the British and the Americans. An oil refinery _ the first of its 
kind in the country - was under construction in the town of Zarqa east of Amman (Salibi, 
1993, p. 205). 
On the monetary side the Jordan Currency Board (JCB) headquarters were moved to 
Amman in September 1957, and its board changed. The new board was formed of three 
Jordanian members and a representative of the Bank of England. 
This situation continued until the Central bank of Jordan - CBJ - was established in 1964. 
CBJ was formed to replace lCB and had three main objectives: (a) to maintain monetary 
stability, (b) to secure the convertibility of the Jordanian dinar (c) to encourage 
progressive economic growth as specified by government policies. 
1.2.3 The Turbulent Years (1967-1973J 
Economic development was hindered during this period. The main reasons were lack of 
political stability in the region and limited resources of Jordan. 
In 1967 and as a result of the Six Days War, Jordan suffered a severe economic crisis. 
The West Bank was occupied by Israel, a second wave of almost a million refugees came 
to Jordan. 
The Jordanian economy had to deal with the aftermath of the war in addition to the loss 
of major parts of its economic sectors. Jordanian banks in the West Bank were cut-off 
from the East Bank, and deposits were inaccessible at a time when most needed. Jordan's 
loss was estimated at JD 6.4 millions in market terms (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 12). During the 
five years that followed the 1967 war real economic growth receded to negative values 
(Hourani, 1994, p. 105). 
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Other crises followed in the years 1970, 1971 and 1972. The 1970 civil war in Jordan left 
long-lasting scars on the Jordanian society and economy. In 1971 the Jordanian dinar had 
to be devalued as a result of the devaluation of the sterling pound twice during that 
period. For the first time an inflation cycle started as a result of the devaluation. The cost 
of living index rose by more than 10% (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 12). 
The deficit in the balance of trade during this period remained at 47% of the GDP, with 
the same structural weaknesses that characterised the Jordanian economy during this 
period. The services sector formed 64% of GDP, and employed 63% of the labour force 
compared to agriculture, which formed 18%, and the remaining 18% for all other sectors 
(Hourani, 1994, p. 107). 
1.2.4 The Boom Years [1974-1982] c, 
From the mid-1970s till the mid-1980s Jordan enjoyed vigorous economic growth similar 
to the growth rates of the first half of the 1960s. Real growth was 8.5% (Hourani, 1994, 
p. 108), production increased annually at about 10%, and employment opportunities were 
close to full employment [Exhibit lA, Growth in GNP 1964-2002J. However, real 
growth slowed slightly to around 7.6% after 1980 and further slowed down in 1982 
(Dajani, 1984, p. 15). 
During this period Jordan continued to export skilled and educated manpower to the 
booming Arab Gulf states at the time. A new phenomenon was beginning to be noticed 
now, unskilled and semi-skilled workers began to flow into Jordan. A rapid increase in 
imports took place during 1981, producing a 34% increase in Jordan's chronic balance of 
trade deficit (Dajani, 1984, p. 18). Although inflation continued to rise in 1974 reaching 
20%, it was accompanied by a rise in the standard of living and real economic growth 
from 1976-1983. At the same time the government began its first three years econorr.ic 
development plan (1973 - 1975), which was followed by other five-year plans. 
Accompanying this economic growth was a similar growth in the banking sector [Exhibit 
1.5, Growth in Number of Banks 1965-2002]. Between 1975 - 1978 fifteen new banks 
were licensed (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 34) to try to cover the shortage of modern services that 
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existed in developed banking markets, such as financial mediation in capital markets, 
syndicated loans, and management of clients' financial portfolios which were lacking in 
the Jordanian financial market. CBJ also felt that, by encouraging international banks to 
open branches in Jordan, their advanced banking expertise could be introduced into the 
Jordanian Market. Specialised banks were founded during this period to help in the 
development process. The Housing Bank was established in 1974 to offer housing loans 
at low rates to limited income families in addition to operating as a commercial bank. In 
1979 Cities and Villages Development Bank was established to extend loans to town and 
village councils to finance their development projects. 
Jordan's economy during this period reached a stage where the need for a stock exchange 
was necessary, so in the year 1978, the Amman Stock Exchange was established to deal 
with local public companies' shares and financial papers. 
By the early 1980's Jordan was already in the front of the Arab development. In the 
course of barely 10 years Amman had grown from a relatively small provincial town into 
one of the finest and best organised cities in the Arab world. Due to the continuing civil 
war in Lebanon, the standing of Beirut as the business centre of the Arab World had gone 
into eclipse after 1975. This opened possibilities for Amman to replace the Lebanese 
capital as the centre of services for the area. Unfortunately this did not happen for many 
reasons, mainly due to limited infrastructure, shortage of resources, insufficient 
professional and highly-skilled labour force. Thereby Jordan lost a golden opportunity to 
become the preferred venue for the headquarters of many international and regional 
organisations. By 1978 CBJ felt that the Jordanian market was saturated with commercial 
banks and any increase in the number of the operating banks would have a negative effect 
on the banking sector as a whole. Overbanking and severe competition among banks 
characterised by small size eroded profit margins to unsafe levels as some banks were 
offering credit facilities to gain a share of the market without heeding safeguards. The 
first investment bank was established in 1978 with the objective of encouraging the 
economic development in Jordan, which CBJ.felt was not been undertaken satisfactorily 
by the commercial banks at the time. 
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At the same time CBJ stopped licensing foreign banks operating in Jordan. It allowed 
instead the opening of representative offices to maintain their financial relationship with 
Jordan. By the end of 1988 there existed eight such representative offices. 
1.2.5 The Declining Years [1983-1988] 
A major occurrence in the context of the increase of competition was in the year 1979 
when the Jordan Islamic Bank was formed by a special statute with Arab capital, which 
targeted a new sector of depositors. The negative feelings towards commercial banks 
dealing with interest were gaining ground. The establishing of an Islamic bank came to 
accommodate depositors who, for religious reasons, do not want to deal with banks that 
payor charge interest. There already existed a substantial number of depositors who 
deposited their money with banks and refused to receive any interest. These years 
represented the biggest challenge as the economy was in a critical stage. In 1989 the 
Jordanian dinar was devalued by 2604%o}he cost of living index rose by 25.8%, and the 
growth of GDP fell to -0.1 % in constant cost prices [Exhibit I A, Growth in GNP 1964-
2002; and Exhibit 1.6, A Comparative Table Of Some Economic Indicators]. 
Another reason that hindered the healthy economic growth in Jordan was the heavy 
foreign debts amounting in 2002 to JD 5350.5 millions in relation to total central 
government revenues for the same year of JD million 2029.5 millions, and total 
expenditure of2289.1 millions (CBJ, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 2003, p. 53, 44). 
The banking sector was affected as well: two banks declared bankruptcy (Petra Bank and 
Mashrek Bank), and others were facing serious financial problems, which called for the 
intervention of CBJ and managing committees were appointed to supervise those banks 
(Muheisen, 1994, p. 64). Naturally, such financial shocks had a deep impact on a 
relatively small economy such as the Jordanian economy. 
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Exhibit lA 
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Exhibit 1.6 
A Comparative Table of Some Economic Indicators [1964-2002] 
1963 1996 % 2002 % increase 
million million increase million 199610 
1963 to 2002 
Dinars Dinars 
1996 Dinars 
GNP 1352.6*' 5035.2' 272% 6669.1 32.45% 
Agricultural sector/GNP 16.6% 4.6% - 1.9% -
Mining & Industry/GNP 7.85% 14.7% - 16.6% -
Banking activities/GNP 0.65% 1.5% - N/A -
Total Exports 50.859 1039.801 1994% 1945.1 87.1% 
Total Imports 5.523 3043.556 55007% 3531.5 16.03% 
* at currenl market pnces 
** 1964 figure as 1963 is unavailable 
Source: CBJ 1964 Annual Report. CBJ 1997 Annual Report, CBJ Monthly Statistical Bulletin June 2003 
As a result CBJ reviewed banks' credit policy, and floated interest rates. Jordanian banks 
were asked to deposit reserves with CBJ as a percentage of their deposits in foreign 
currencies, and CBl's supervision was intensified. 
1.2.6 The Stagnation Years [1990 - 1996] 
The year 1990 when the first Gulf War broke out marked the beginning of the stagnation 
period. The Gulf War dealt a severe blow to the Jordanian economy, and compounded the 
effects of the decline in the economy in the late 1980s [Exhibit lA, Growth in GNP]. One 
of the biggest markets of Jord1n (Iraq) was closed to exports as a result of the Gulf war. 
The banking sector was naturally affected as the ratio of credit facilities/deposits fell to 
39.9% from 74.5% during the period 1976-1983 (Muheisen, 1996, p. 38). 
A second historical event took place during this period: in the summer of 1994 Jordan 
signed a peace treaty with Israel, whereby normal relations were established, and easier 
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passage of investment capital (whether foreign or local) was hoped to flow. Such hopes 
were crushed as implementation of the peace treaties with Jordanians, Palestinians, and 
Israelis began and the result was a further deepening of the economic slump than was 
caused by the first Gulf War. The regional political instability in the region in general, 
whether accentuated by the long years of blockade on Iraq, or during the period that 
preceded, during and following the second Gulf War, severely hindered any significant 
economic growth. In addition to the unstable situation in Palestine, given the proximity of 
the two countries and historical ties socially and economically, continue to negatively 
affect the Jordanian economy. 
Added to the political situation in the Middle East is the limited Jordanian market and the 
fact that access to Arab and western markets is restricted by custom barriers. There is also 
the shortage of trained labour in the industrial and services sectors where cultural and 
social factors play a part. One should keep in mind a historical perspective of Jordan as a 
political entity with an economy in the modern sense is relatively short, as geographic 
Jordan was always considered as agricultural and sheep grazing land. In spite of the 
growth of the industrial and mining sector in Jordan by 6.9% - as shown in Exhibit 1.6-
from 1963 to 1996, it is still comparatively small. 
1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE BANKING SECTOR IN JORDAN 
Before the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1922 no banking institutions existed 
in Transjordan. Absence of an economy in the modern sense of the word, limited 
economic resources, as well as limited banking awareness among the population 
prevailed in Transjordan and the neighbouring countries. A large portion of the 
population was hesitant to deal with banks for religious reasons, as 'Reba' (usury) is 
prohibited by the teachings of/slam. 
After serious efforts by the Tansjordan government the first commercial bank, a branch 
of the Ottoman Bank, was opened in Amman in 1925. It assumed the role of a financial 
agent for the Transjordan government and restricted its dealings during its first two years 
to the government and the British forces (Muheisen, 1994, p. 70). Prior to that date the 
existence of banking institutions in Transjordan was in the form of three branches of the 
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Agricultural Bank, which had its directorate in Damascus. The operations of these 
branches were restricted to giving small agricultural loans (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 18). 
The Arab Bank - established in Palestine - opened in the year 1934 a branch in Amman. 
This was followed by another branch in the town oflrbid in the north of Jordan [Exhibit 
1.1, Geographical Map of Jordan]. After the Palestinians lost the civil war in 1948 and 
the proclamation of Israel the Arab Bank moved its main branch from Jerusalem to 
Amman in the year 1949. 
In the same year the British Bank of the Middle East opened a branch in Amman, which 
was followed the opening of by the Umma Bank. The Arab Land Bank, which was 
formed by a decree from the Arab League, opened a branch in Amman in 1951. 
Consequently, by the end of 1951 the total number of banks in Jordan was four operating 
through five branches: one of which was a national bank, two British and one Egyptian. 
All branches were located in Amman except for one in Irbid. 
However, these banks did little to help the economic development of Jordan. Their role 
being limited to channelling savings abroad, particularly as British banks operated in the 
country as an integral part of the British banking system (Nabulsi, 1990, p. 20). 
Development in the economy and in the banking sector has gone hand in hand. The real 
development in the Jordanian banking sector was most evident in the last four decades 
[Exhibit 1.5 Growth in Number of Banks in Jordan]. During this period six new banks 
were established, three of them being foreign banks. Specialised banking institutions 
were also established in this period to promote development in certain sectors of the 
economy. The first was the Central Co-operative Union in 1954, which was replaced by 
the Co-operative Bank in 1971 to serve farmers and farming associations. Then came the 
Association of Agricultural Loans in 1959. The Industrial Bank was established in 1965 
to offer short and medium-term loans to industrial, mining and tourism sectors. 
During the period 1960 - 1970 no new banks were opened due to the hindered economic 
development and lack of political stability [Exhibit 1.5 Growth in Number of Banks in 
Jordan]. 
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Exhibit 1.5 The Growth in Number of Banks in Jordan 1965 - 2002 
300~--------------------------~ 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
(Ake1, 1994, p. 464; CBJ Annual Report, 1995, 2002) 
1965 1970 1975 
No. of banks' 8 8 12 18 
No.ofbranches -25 41 79 
'" does not include specialized credit institutions 
** number includes branches and cash offices 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 
18 22 21 21 
142 272 307 635 768 
2002 
(] banks 
Il!I branches 
Jordanian banks have grown rapidly since 1964 (the year 1964 was chosen as detailed 
statistics became available with the establishment of CBJ in 1964). Total assets of 
licensed financial institutions in 1996 increased by almost 1385 fold, from JO 63,958,000 
in 1964 (CBJ Annual Report, 1964, p. 36) to 10 8857.7 million in 1996 (CBJ Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin, September 1997, p. 19). 
Facilities extended by banks also increased, though not in the same proportion by 1339 
fold [Exhibit 1.7, Growth Of Deposits and Credit Facilities In Jordanian Banks 1965 _ 
2002J. 
A quick look at the growth of credit facilities, and of the number of banks and bank 
branches between 1964-2002, shows: 
(I) the continuous upward trend is evident in all three cases [Exhibit 1.5, Growth in 
Number of Banks in Jordan 1965-2002; Exhibit 1.4, Growth in GNP in Jordan 
1964-2002; Exhibit 1.7, Growth in Deposits and Credit Facilities in Jordanian 
Banks 1965- 2002]. 
(2) The shape of the upsurge, with big jumps in the years 1975, 1990, 1995, can be 
noticed in all three cases. 
(3) The growth of GNP (at current market prices) rose by 145% in 1975 compared to 
1964 (CBJ Annual Report 1964; IMF International Statistics, 1991; CBJ 1997 
Annual Report), and by 497% in 1990 compared to 1975 and by 101 % in 1995 
compared to 1990, and by 47% in 2002 compared to 1995 [Exhibit 1.4, Growth In 
GNP 1964 -2002J. 
(4) The growth in number of bank branches was respectively 215%, 289%, and 74% for 
the same periods (Akel, 1994, p. 464; CBJ 1995 Annual Report, p. 52). These 
jumps in growth can also be seen in loans and credit facilities that went up by 285%, 
1368%, and 94% respectively for the same periods (Akel, 1994, p.464; CBJ 1995 
Annual Report, p.56) [Exhibit 1.4, Growth in GNP; and Exhibit 1.8, Growth in 
Some Banking Sector Indicators 1965-2002J. 
Jordanian banks have tended in the past to offer short-term loans which do not 
accommodate the nature of industrial production where longer term loans are needed. 
It is only in recent years that Jordanian banks started offering medium and long-term 
loans for industries (Akel, 1994, p.444). 
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Exhibit 1.7 
Growth of Deposits and Credit Facilities in Jordanian Banks (million JD) 
10000-r--------------------------------------------· 
8000~----------------------------------------
70004t------------------------------------~'jK: 
60004t--------------------------------------~ 
50004t----------------------------------I~I~~'0'r~ 
4000...j.f-------------------------------- gflif--Fi! 
30004t--------------------------------~, 
2000-U-----------------------------iUIIr---I;:i 
1000-U-----------------------11;! 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 
13 deposites 
!llI facillities 
(Akel, 1 ]94, pA64; CBJ 1995 Annual Report, pp. 7, 56, CBJ Monthly StaUstical Bulletin, June 2003) 
Deposits 
Credit facilities 
1965 
44 
33 
1970 
58 
46 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 
169 808 1747 2623 5788 9368 
127 464 1274 1864 3706 5130 
Exhibit 1.8 
Growth in Some Banking Sector Indicators [1965-2002] 
% Increase % increase % increase % increase 
1965-1975 1975-1985 1985-1 995 1995-2002 
No. of banks 50% 50% 17% 0% 
No. of branches 216% 244% 133% 21% 
Deposits 284% 930% 228% 62% 
Credit facilities 285% 903% 191% 38% 
Nowadays the banking sector, in spite of its quick growth quantitatively and qualitatively 
suffers from a number of weaknesses which many researchers believe will slow down 
the growing trend (Nabulsi, 1990; Akel, 1994; Waked, 1997) as well as placing the 
banking sector in a state where it will be unable to fulfil the demands of the economy in 
the future. 
• The volume of bad debts is one major problem from which the Jordanian banks 
suffer. The banks have not made sufficient provisions to cover bad debts in the 
past, nor did they have a clear practice for classifying and amortising debts (Akel, 
1994, p. 442). This has resulted in serious state of low profitability, which means 
the inability of banks to expand their facilities to accommodate the growing 
economy not mentioning the risk of insolvency. 
• The absence of strict regulations for lending, which resulted in concentrating 
loans to a limited number of clients where personal relationships influence 
lending decisions (Nabulsi, 1990; Waked, 1997; Hindi, 1997). Particularly in a 
country like Jordan, where tribalism and family ties still play an important role 
[see Section 4.20.1, Cultural Effects on MAS in Planning for Marketing and 
Customers' Needs at PB]. 
• The lack of comprehensive and diversified services offered by Jordanian banks, as 
well as the absence of the new tools in banking such as: securitisation, 
derivatives, and global depository receipts. The reason behind this is the fact that 
18 
the banking sector in Jordan has always been marked by conservatism and limited 
financial resources. 
• Lack of trained labour and training facilities (Akel, 1994, p. 442) [see Section 
4.24, Epilogue]. 
• The lack of advanced information systems to raise the standardof services offered 
to clients (Wakked, 1997; Hindi, 1997) [see Section 4.24, Epilogue]. 
• Lack of strategic planning (Wakked, 1997) [see Chapter 4, Part III, The Role of 
MAS in Planning and Decision-Making at PB; and Chapter 5, Part lll, The Role 
ofMAS in Planning and decision-Making in Jordanian Commercial Banks]. 
• The inadequacy of capital, and liquidity problem facing some financial 
institutions (Akel, 1994, p. 442). 
• Concentration of branches in large cities. 
• Overbanking phenomenon and strong competition resulting in low profit margins 
and transgressions of sound banking practices. 
• Insufficientcapital adequacy (Akel, 1994, p. 442). 
• The collapse of some banks due to managerial malpractices and for not following 
sound banking practice (Akel, 1994, p. 442). 
lA Summary of Chapter I 
The modern historical development of Jordan since it was founded as a state in 1920 
greatly influenced the economic development in the country as well as the banking 
sector. A quick look at the historical developments and events will help in understanding 
the larger social context in which Jordanian commercial banks operate. 
In ancient times Transjordan (as it was called before its founding as a separate state) 
gained prominence as a trading route and later as Tareeq Alhajj (pilgrims' road to Mecca) 
after the spread of Islam in the region. 
Modern Jordan (the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan) remained under the British mandate 
from 1918 until its independence in 1946. In 1948 a civil war broke out after the British 
ended their mandate over Palestine without offering acceptable and feasible solutions for 
the Palestinians and a sizable minority of Jews whose immigration to Palestine was 
encouraged by the Balfour Declaration by the British government in 1916. 
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The civil war of 1948 resulted in Jordan having control over parts of Palestine later 
referred to as the West Bank of the River Jordan and the proclamation of Israel on the 
rest of Palestine. In 1950 the two banks of the River Jordan were united under King 
Abdullah. This gave a big boost to the industrial and tourism sectors in Jordan, which 
was predominantly agricultural. The period from 1953 - 1966 marked the building years 
in Jordan were seriously hindered by the 1967 War which ended with the occupation of 
the West Bank by Israel. ,.", 
The Jordanian economy was shocked by the 1948 civil war in Palestine, the 1967 war, 
the September war in Jordan in 1970, the first and second OulfWar in 1990 and 2003. 
All this political unrest in the region had serious repercussions on the economy and 
consequently the banking sector. Nevertheless the ONP grew by 145% in 1975 compared 
to 1964 (at current market prices), and by 497% in 1990 compared to 1975, and by 101% 
in 1995 compared to 1990, and by 47% in 2002 compared to 1995. 
The first financial institution to be opened in Jordan was a branch of the Ottoman Bank in 
1925. In 1950 the Jordan Currency Board was formed to be responsible for the issue of 
the first Jordanian currency. But it was not until 1957 that its headquarters were moved 
from London to Amman with a new board formation of three Jordanians and a 
representative of the Bank of England. 
The banking sector started to be regularised by the foundation of the Central Bank of 
Jordan (CBJ) in 1964. The banking sector continued to grow from eight banks in 1965 to 
21 in 2002 with deposits rising from 44 million Jordan dinars in 1965 to 9368 million JD 
in 2002. The financial services sector in 2002 was the single largest sector of the Jordan 
economy comprising 19.4% ofONP (at 1994 prices). 
Nowadays the banking sector, in spite of its quick growth quantitatively and qualitatively, 
suffers from a number of weaknesses such as: the volume of bad debts, the absence of 
strict regulations for lending, the lack of comprehensive and diversified services offered 
by Jordanian banks, the lack of advanced information system~, and lack of strategic 
planning. 
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CHAPTER 2 
APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH 
This research project has been developed in line with the importance we attach to context 
and sequence, and w.ith our belief that there is some advantage to a multilateral approach 
in social science research. This brief chapter will seek to offer some substance to these 
ideas. 
The empirical investigation was through a single case study of a Jordanian commercial 
bank followed by a survey of the whole population of JCB [Exhibit 2.1, Population of 
JCB]. It is an attempt to answer questions such as why do particular organisations 
develop the MAS which they currently use, how are MAS used, and what impact do 
MAS have on OE? Through the responses of the interviewees, the study provides a 
description of MAS in JCB, the factors that underlie the choice of design of the MAS 
employed, the justifications for the techniques and procedures used in practice. 
2.1 Context 
The research is deliberately and purposefully contexted on several levels: 
I. It is contexted in the adaptive development of management accounting, reflected in 
the MAS literature; this literature is reviewed in detail in the next chapter, and its 
impact on the research is highlighted. 
2. The study is situated historically in the economic development of Jordan as an 
independent state dating from the 1920s [see Section 1.1, Jordan in History]. The 
macro- and micro-environmental factors through which the JCB operate is 
considered. In particular PB, the case study bank, has a turbulent history which we 
have detailed to show its possible impact on the present [Section 4.1, Historical 
Background ofPB]. 
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Name of bank 
I Arab Bank 
2 Jordan National 
Bank 
3 Jordan Bank 
4 Cairo Amman 
Bank 
5 Housing Bank 
6 Jordan Kuwait 
Bank 
7 Jordan Gulf Bank 
8 Arab Banking 
Corporation 
9 Export & 
Finance Bank 
P If opu a IOn 0 
Year 
founded 
1930 
1956 
1960 
1960 
1974 
1977 
1987 
1989 
1996 
or aman ommerCla an s 
Exhibit 2.1 
fJ d . C . I B k 
Shareholders Branches Branches 
. equity in Jordan in (Millions) Palestine 
1167.9 83 14 
·69.3 48 5 
55.6 70 5 
25.4 50 19 
256.5 93 4 
75.9 35 3 
18.3 25 3 
27.6 16 -
37.4 2 -
Source: Annual Reporl200 1 of each bank 
STG 0.98 ~ JD 1 (CBJ, Annual Repor12001) 
Other 
Branches 
64 
8 
-
1 
-
1 
-
-
-
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3, It is contexted organisationally, The research is not mechanistic and it was nDt 
conducted in a vacuum and there is no pretence that it was, Rather it is: 
• Situated organizationally, 
• Takes cognisance of the workplace reality and work needs of professional 
employees, 
• In particular it shows the way MAS are developed in an organisational and 
cultural context, and details the forces that impact on the development of these 
systems, 
4, It is positioned managerially and corporately, i.e" the whole dynamic ~ MAS ~ 
Use ~ Outcomes ~ OE is set in a cDntext of structure, authority, executive 
perception, company culture and corporate needs, 
The PB case study in turn, focuses on four levels: The individual experiences and 
opinions of the managers interviewed; the organisation - PB -; the banking sector - in 
terms ofthis research JCB; and the societal context - in terms of this research, Jordan and 
the wider international environment (see Exhibit 2.2, Focus in the Research on the RDle 
DfMAS), 
All these levels were considered while carrying out the case study as organisations do not 
exist and operate in a vacuum (Preston, 1995, p, 274), Rather interaction exists between 
the environment and the organisation, Users of MAS, individual organisations and indeed 
whole industry sectors do not exist in closed cDmpartments. There is a continuous flow of 
influences in and out of each domain affecting and being affected by the others, 
The influence of forces, institutions, and persons found in the environment in which 
banks operate has been at times neglected by researchers, Environmental influences on 
MAS cannot be brushed aside in a study dealing with an information system such as 
MAS in JCB where there are important social aspects, Tinker et a1. (1982, p. 172) 
observe that trying to elevate 'the technical, factual and seemingly objective aspects of 
accounting masks the socially partisan role of accounting', which this research tries to 
avoid, Context is also of relevance to MAS as a socially constructed system, which 
cannot be mechanically transposed from one country to another without providing for 
contextual differences, 
Gordon & Narayanan (1984, p, 42) find the environment to be of paramDunt importance 
in designing MAS. The external environment can influence MAS by inter-related factors 
such as social, cultural, and economic which are common to all organisations in a country 
(Mitroff & Mason, 1983, p. 195; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984, p, 42; Glennerster, 1994, p. 
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Exhibit 2.2 
Focus of the Research on the Role of MAS 
in Enhancing OE in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
External Environment 
Jordanian Society 
Jordanian Banking Sector 
r-=Bank~ 
eid~ 
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140; Hopper et aI., 2003, p. 17). In addition to these factors there is the influence of the 
MAS design and operation in other countries brought into Jordan (Hall, 1972, p.9, 298; 
Hopwood, 1980, p. 401; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6) [see Exhibit 2.3, Factors Affecting the 
Role and Design of MAS in JCB; and Exhibit 2.4, External Factors Affecting the Role 
and Design of MAS in JCB; Exhibit 2.5, Internal Factors Affecting the Design and Role 
ofMASj. 
It is worth pointing out here that the external factors have a dynamic nature and interact 
with the internal factors within the organisation whereby they continuously change rank 
(Hall, 1972, p. 312). 
The sectoral level of analysis is becoming of increasingly important in MAR. In practice 
sectors acquire a common language and a common way of thinking and operation, which 
gives the sector its own distinguishing characteristics and way of operating (Smith et aI., 
1988). These commonly accepted beliefs characterising the banking sector are, in their 
turn, partly a result of the country's culture, social norms, economic standards and 
political system. The banking sector in turn influences and is influenced by the society of 
the country as a whole where common accepted beliefs will affect the type and roles 
expected of individuals and individual organisations. 
This leads to the fact that practices in a bank (the organisational level) that are a result of 
a number of factors, such as the organisation's culture, organisational structure, state of 
technology, and management style, affect and are affected by the banking sector (banking 
sector level) and wider society (societal level) (Hofstede, 1968, pp. 32, 36, 58; Driver & 
Mock, 1975, pp. 492, 499; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 215; Hopwood, 1983, p. 301; 
March, 1987, p. 163; Preston, 1995, p. 279). 
The organisational level could not be disassociated from the wider social context in 
which it is embedded. Organisations are shaped and at the same time play a role in 
constructing other organisations within and outside the industry. The interactions with the 
larger Jordanian environment where social, economic, cultural, and political forces work 
to shape and be shaped by the activities of the single organisation also play a part. 
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Exhibit 2.3 
Factors Affecting the Design and Role of MAS 
in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
External Environment 
[society & banking 
sector]' 
Internal Environment 
[single bank I # 
o Cultural 
o Economic 
o MAS practices 
in other 
countries 
o Competition 
o Technology 
\1 
MAS in Jordanian commercial banks 
Enhance OE in Jordanian 
commercial banks 
o Strategy 
o Organisational 
structure 
o Decision-making 
style 
o Size 
o Technology 
* refer to Exhibit 2.4 which should be read in conjunction with Exhibit 2.3 
# refer to Exhibit 2.5, which should be read in conjunction with Exhibit 2.3 
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Exhibit 2.4 
External Factors Affecting the Design and Role ofMAS in leB 
.... Cultural , 
f t 
r-- Economic 
r-
MAS Practices in 
" MAS in JCB 
other countries , 
. 
~ Competition 
4 Technology 
.... 
, 
Independent factors Dependent factor 
Exhibit 2.4 should be read in conjunction with Exhibit 2.3, Factors Affecting the 
Design and Role of MAS. 
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Exhibit 2.5 
Internal Factors Affecting the Design and Role ofMAS 
in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
Size 
-
t 
Organizational f-
structure 
~ 
MAS in ... Strategy ~ Jordanian 
commerCial 
~ C banks 
Decision-making I-
style/ corporate 
culture 
~ 
Information f-technology 
Independent factors Dependent factor 
Exhibit 2.5 should be read in conjunction with Exhibit 2.3 Factors 
Affecting the Design and Role of MAS. 
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2.2 Multi-Lateralism 
The study is informed by the conviction that the more ways one uses to generate 
knowledge and understanding of the researched entity the more substance and less bias 
the research understanding should have. 
This mUltiple approach was implemented by undertaking an in-depth case study on one 
Jordanian commercial bank, PB, followed by a survey of all the other commercial banks 
," 
in Jordan [see Exhibit 2.1, Population of JCB]. Each of the research methods used has its 
strong points and its limitations. Hopefully, however, one's realisation of the drawbacks 
by itself helps in partly neutralising the negative effects. 
2.2.1 The Phoenix Bank Case Study - Research Method 1 
The reasons for choosing a case study method for investigating the research question 
included: 
• A contextual approach is needed to understand the roles of MAS, (Otley & Berry, 
1994; Smith et aI., 1988; Roslender, 1990; L1ewellyn, 1992), the procedures used, 
and how MAS can contribute to enhancing OE in JCB. A case study enables the 
researcher to engage in 'observing things that happen, listening to what is said and 
questioning people, over some length of time. It also permits social interaction 
between researcher and informants in the milieu of the latter, during which data 
are systematically and unobtrusively collected' (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 44). 
• The use of a case study method is amenable to dealing with a wide variety of 
evidence that allows an investigator to address a broad range of historical, 
attitudinal and behavioural issues (Yin, 1994, p. 92; Choudhury, 1986, p. 28) and 
on many dimensions of the phenomenon, numerical information or otherwise 
(Kaplan, 1986, p. 436). 
• The need for adopting and reLaining a holistic approach to a contemporary 
phenomenon such as MAS in JCB can best be served by a case study method 
(Yin, 1994, pp. 1,3,42; Puxty, 1993, p. 78; Hofstede, 1968, p. 85). The use ofa 
holistic approach to studying MAS is in line with a contextual approach in 
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treating JCB as part of a unified social system whereby external and internal 
environments are studied (Scapens, 1992; Smith et aI., 1988; Llewellen, 1992). 
'human and social systems have a characteristic of wholeness which pervades the 
individual system elements ... we cannot understand the parts without studying the 
whole' (Tomkins, 1986, p. 454). 
Case studies examine 'intact settings' in detail with the understanding that a case 
study shares with some others some of its properties and some properties with no 
other (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 29). This can be observed in Chapter 4, where 
MAS employed at PB had certain characteristics unique to it and others which were 
shared by other JCB and indeed banks in other countries. 
The choice of a case study method is particularly suited to this investigation of MAS in 
JCB, because it involves studying a new area. 
While capitalising on the advantages of the use of a case study method in the research, 
the limitations of this method are acknowledged and appreciated, attempts were made to 
minimise them. Some of the criticisms directed to the use of case study method in 
research are: 
The reliability question which poses itself in a case study is based on the extent to which 
'two independent observers might produce a consistent analysis of a particular aspect of 
the same social situation' (Wilson, 1998, p .5). A case study by its nature should not have 
a rigid design. A researcher needs to follow leads and respond to feedback. This can be a 
limitation of the case study method as subsequent research might not be limited to the 
same variables investigated and, consequently, might not produce identical results. This 
can to some extent be alleviated by compiling a case study database and a research 
protocol (Yin, 1994, pp. 95, 63) to provide details to guide other researchers and explain 
the various stages of the research [see Section 4.4, Points on Validity and Reliability of 
the PB Case Study]. 
A large amount of detailed data emerging from the case study may render the research 
unreadable and lacking in theoretical orientation (Smith et aI., 1988). In the PB case 
study an attempt was made to minimise this by preparing a detailed plan before 
embarking on the case study, and by constantly linking data collected to the research 
questions, thereby curtailing digression white hopefully safeguarding against overlooking 
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relevant matters [see discussion in Section 4.4, Points on Validity and Reliability of the 
PB Case Study 1. 
As the case study was conducted on a single chosen bank, the degree of co-operation and 
involvement of the subject of the case study had a substantial impact on the conclusions 
of the case study. The question: to what extent are managers willing to share information 
on their operating systems? strongly poses itself. Managers might feel that, when 
answering in-depth questions, they will be exposing the weaknesses of the systems 
employed or might consider the information as their competitive edge over other banks 
and consequently refrain form discussing it in any detail. Extensive efforts were made to 
allay those fears through confidence building between the researcher and PB 
interviewees, and by trying to involve and interest the interviewees in the study [see 
Section 4.3.3, PB Interviews]. 
Reliability of data - in the sense of to what extent one can rely on the information 
provided- is another aspect to be considered as interviews of PB managers were the main 
source of information for the investigation. Answers given in interviews might be what 
the interviewees believe or hope to see happening in their organisations and not what 
actually takes place (Young, 1999, p. 82). One also cannot rule out the possibility of 
informal as well as formal systems operating side by side. 
To overcome this, a kind of triangulation of information was used in the PB case study 
and the survey for that matter, by interviewing more than one person from each of the 
three groups mentioned in the data collection, namely: compilers, movers and users 
[Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods]. The information collected through interviews 
was cross checked by documentation and observation. 
The time horizon of the case study is cross-sectional. This entails a description and 
evaluation of MAS in Jordanian banks as a result of certain environmental influences 
frozpn at a point in time. A longitudinal study will be much more informative but, for the 
sake of expediency, a cross sectional investigation is preferred. There is not enough scope 
for repeating the investigation at different future intervals of time for the purpose of this 
research. 
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Exhibit 2.6 
Data Collection Methods 
Data collection 
I 
Observation Documentation Interviews 
Compilers Movers 
Financial, R&D, and Executive Users 
financial planning management & 
departments financial managers 
Executive Heads of 
management departments 
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A limitation particular to this study is that few serious attempts were made to study 
certain aspects of MAS in JCB. No comprehensive research on MAS in Jordanian banks 
has been done before. Therefore there are no past reference cases to build on or with 
which to compare results. This drawback can be partly overcome by trying to be as 
comprehensive as the research boundaries permit, and by keeping an open mind with 
regard to different outlooks and interpretations. 
2.2.2 The Survey - Research Method 2 
A survey was chosen as a second method in this research for a number of reasons mainly: 
• Surveys may be used for descriptive, explanatory and exploratory purposes (Babbie, 
1983, p. 203). This fits well with the aim of the research - as it is with the case study 
that preceded the survey - to have a descriptive account of MAS for the population of 
the survey, to try to understand the characteristics of MAS employed, their 
implementation, and their operation. 
• Generally speaking, a survey's particular strength is its greater reliability. In this 
research a set interview guide was used to collect data and all the survey interviewees 
were asked the same questions in the same order [see Section 5.5, Survey Data 
Collection] . 
• A Survey offered flexibility in tackling the research question through asking different 
questions to cover different angles and different areas of the investigation [see 
Appendix 3, Survey Interview Guide]. 
Some of the limitations of using a survey method the research had to address: 
• Carrying out a survey might seem superficial and inadequate in dealing with a 
complex topic such as MAS in a contextual setting (Babbie, 1983, p. 232). A survey 
due to its nature cannot probe i'1-depth into a phenomenon and assess the effect of 
environmental factors compared to unstructured interviews where questions might 
provide more scope for following leads. Nevertheless, this drawback decreased in the 
interview guide used for the survey as personal interviews were carried out and a 
substantial number of open-ended questions were included [see Section 5.5.3, The 
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Survey Interview Guide]. Furthermore, subsequent analysis of data collected from the 
survey and related afterwards to the data from the PB case study might balance this 
weakness and offer added reliability, which a case study used in the first phase of the 
research might lack with its stronger emphasis on depth. 
• Another drawback of questionnaires used in surveys for data collection is the several 
and at times serious implications for the analysis of the survey when questions are 
badly formulated, or when questions do not cover sufficiently all the necessary areas 
of a study. An added complication is that, once the survey design and questionnaire 
has been decided upon, any subsequent realisation of neglected areas cannot be 
accommodated at a later stage. We tried to neutralise these drawbacks in the survey 
of JCB as the questions were answered in personal interviews thereby providing an 
opportunity to ask further questions and give clarification which is not possible when 
questionnaires are mailed to the respondents. 
• A further limitation of surveys is bias from both interviewers and interviewees 
(Zimmerman, 2001, p. 420; Johns et aI., 2002, p. 101), sample bias, and position bias 
(Johns et aI., 2002, 101) which require researchers to be more careful in drawing 
inferences from studies employing survey methods (Zimmerman, 2001, p. 420). We 
hope that this was minimised in the survey of JCB as all commercial banks were 
included. 
2.2.3 Multiple Interviews 
Multi-lateralism was also implemented in this research through offering explanations of 
the role of MAS in enhancing OE in the context of JCB deploying a miscellany of 
methods - case study v. survey; interview, observation, data collection, documentary 
analysis, reviewing external writing, etc. [see Section 4.3, Data Collection; and Section 
5.5, Survey Data Collection; and Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods). 
Multi-lateralism was implemented by: . 
1. Interviewing at a variety of organisational levels. In the PB case study 16 semi-
structured personal interviews were the main source of field data and included: the 
general manager, 12 senior head office managers, and 3 branch managers [see more 
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in Section 4.3.3, PB Interviews]. In the survey, interviews covered branch managers, 
sub-department managers, departmental managers, and deputy general mangers [see 
Section 5.6, Sources of Data; and Section 5.7, The Survey Sample; and Exhibit 5.3, 
Distribution of Survey Interviews according to Position]. 
2. Looking at the impact of MAS on OE in several departments/functions, viz credit, 
finance/financial control, deposits, branches. 
3. Taking the research into head office branches and distinguishing for operational 
purposes between lead branches and other branches to highlight the differences in 
terms of types of information, details, how and when MAS information was received. 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the main source of data collection since they 
have a decided advantage enabling: 
• observation as well as asking questions; 
• probing to elicit responses in situations when the respondent had more.to add to a 
question; 
• adapting questions as the situation arises; 
• clarifying doubts and rephrasing questions whenever needed; 
• picking up non-verbal cues from respondents that could not possibly be conveyed 
by any another method [see more in Section 5.5.2, The Survey Interviews]. 
To minimise the problem of reliability of the respondents' answers (Dixon et aI., 1987), 
triangulation of information was attempted with cross-referencing to other sources of 
evidence [see Section 4.3.3.3, Interview Guide; and Section 5.5.3, The Survey Interview 
Guide]. 
2.2.4 Document Analysis 
To ensure as much as possible the accuracy and h,mesty of the responses to the questions 
in the PB interviews, document analysis, a secondary method of data collection, was used 
in the case study to collect more information and to supplement and hopefully confirm 
the answers given through the interviews. Document analysis helped in studying human 
communications and social behaviour (Babbie, 1983). It has the added advantages of 
being economical, and unobtrusive. [See more in Section 4.3.2, Documentation]. 
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Document analysis also provided an insight into the orientations of management towards 
organisational issues. This opened possibilities to studying matters such as language used 
in MAS reports and memos, and the degree of details lIsed by both managers and 
subordinates. 
Discrepancies or contradictions found between what was mentioned in the interviews or 
between interviewees and the other data collection methods were investigated to try to 
get possible justifications and clarifications. 
2.2.5 Observation 
Observation of the managers interviewed at work was a third means of collecting data in 
the case study and survey. Careful observation and descriptiDn are essential for scientific 
research (Kaplan, 1986, p.435). Data cDllected through observation was assimilated in the 
analysis stage with data from the other sources thereby providing an outlook from a third 
perspective [see more in Section 4.3.1, Observation]. 
'the aggressive banter of the shop-floor is likely to give more insight by its form as well 
its manifest content, into how labour is experienced and understood, than any number of 
questionnaire responses, or even lengthy interviews' (Giddens,1995, p. 148). 
2.3 Sequence 
The research has a sequence which is both conceptual and operational, depicted in 
Exhibit 2.7, The Role of MAS Enhancing OE in JCB: Theoretical Research Framework. 
Through a funnelling process the focus was narrowed from a wider review of MA, MAR, 
and OE to reviewing literature on MAS in the banking sector and subsequently focus on 
MAS in JCB, to study their role in enhancing OE. Most importantly the research 
proceeds from in-depth case study to interview-based survey of the whole sample. 
Furthermore, there was a pilot study prior to undertaking this research. The pilot study 
was carried out on four banks chosen judgementally to gain some appreciation of the role 
of MAs. It looked into types of MAS information provided through MAS and MA 
techniques used in the pilot study sample of banks. 
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Exhibit 2.7 
The Role ofMAS in Enhancing OE 
in JCB: Theoretical Research Framework 
Literature review of developments in MA, 
MA theoretical bases, MAR and OE 
\ ~ 
MAS in services: 
role and design 
\ ~ 
MAS in banks: 
role and design 
, 1.1 
MAS in JCB: 
role and design 
\ 11 
Impact on 
OE 
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Finally, this research is itself in its modest way a part of the sequence of MAS research, 
and it has been shaped by what has preceded it as reflected in the literature: ideas 
developed in the next chapter [see Chapter 3, Part I, Historical Developments in MA; Part 
n, Theoretical Bases that influenced MA; and Part Ill, A Literature Review of MAR; Part 
IV, Literature Review of Management Accounting Systems (MAS) ; Part V, A Literature 
ReviewofOE]. 
The detailing of the research design and the way in which it is operationalised is shared 
between this chapter, and the first parts of Chapters 4 and 5, where the PB case study and 
the survey of the other banks is discussed. Data analysis follows a conventional and well-
trodden path, replete with checks and balances, and this is discussed in the first part of 
these two subsequent chapters, as is our attempt to reduce bias in the conduct and 
interpretation of the research [see more in Section 4.6, Analyses of Collected Data from 
PB; Section 5.8, Survey Data Analysis]. In the present chapter we wanted to concentrate 
on working out the principles that shaped the design and execution of the research. 
2.4 The Significance of the Research 
This research hopes to contribute to the MAS literature by: 
(l) Confirming or otherwise the findings of previous research on the contingent 
variables that affect MAS design as shown in Exhibit 4.12, Factors Affecting 
Design ofMAS. 
(2) Proposing the linking of MAS design to OE to explain the contribution of MAS 
employed in lCB via their users in running their organisations. Such a link to OE 
has been highly neglected. In addition to the direct objective of investigating the 
role of MAS in enhancing OE in lCB, investigating these systems will help 
practitioners understand their organisations better. [See more in Section 3.15, The 
Role ofMAS in Organisations]. 
(3) This research, in acknowledging the impact of culture on the design and operation 
ofMAS, attempts to throw some light on this issue. The importance of the setting or 
the context for the implementation of specific MA techniques is acknowledged by 
many researchers (e.g. Gurd & Thome, 2003, p. 21; Hopper et aI., 2003, p. 16; 
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Chenhall, 2003, p. 131), and is seen as being a topic that calls for more research 
(Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p. 10). 
(4) The research contributes to researching MAS in banks which represent a highly 
neglected sector. In my literature review I found that most of what has been written 
and studied on MAS is in manufacturing organisations, with very little related to 
banks (Rezaee, 1991, p. 31; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 247; Shields, 1997, p. 
6; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 29; ChenhalJ, 2003, p. 144). The research looks into the 
role, design, and operation of MAS in banks which hopefully will continue to 
initiate beneficial effective organisational changes (Choudhury, 1986, p. 21,24). 
(5) The research provides a basis for further MAS research in Jordan as a theme not 
previously researched and provides information about actual MAS practices in that 
country. This research into MAS seeks to contribute to MAS design in Jordan by 
giving it direction, penetration and congruency with other organisational 
components. To my knowledge no research of this breadth and depth has been 
previously done on MAS in JeB. 
MAS as part of management information systems employed by Jordanian banks 
are one of the factors enhancing the success of Jordanian banks by providing 'the 
central core of management information' (Otley, 1995, p. 46), as the better the 
information, the better the decision-making and power utilisation (Hall, 1972, p. 
292) hence the greater the OE. 
The days of closed and protected economies are ebbing. Jordan, as other countries 
in the world, will have to follow suit and join the universal trend and open up to 
global financial markets. This trend is already on its way: Jordan as a market-
oriented economic system joined bodies such as GATT and World Trade 
Organisation. International competition from foreign banks poses a threat to 
Jordanian banks in the local and regional markets. The Central Bank of Jordan has 
severely restricted the operations of foreign banks by restricting the number of 
foreign banks in Jordan. However, more Jordanian banks are slowly starting to 
operate outside Jordan. 
This calJs for a change in current policies which, up to now, have hindered the 
banking sector from taking advantage of opportunities in the late 1970s and the 
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1990s [see Section 1.3, Development of the Banking Sector In Jordan on 
weaknesses of the banking sector]. 
2.5 Summary of Chapter 2 
The research aims at offering explanations of the role of MAS in enhancing OE in the 
context of JCB. The research investigates the research question with reference to macro-
and micro-environmental factors: the individual, the organisation, the banking sector, and 
the wider societal contexts. It identifies external and internal factors that affect the role 
and design ofMAS, and looks into their impact. 
The study is informed by the conviction that the more ways that are used to generate 
knowledge and understanding of the researched entity the more substance and less bias 
the research will have. The research uses two research methods: a case study and a 
survey, and three methods of data collection (observation, document analysis, and 
interviews). Interviews covered different organisational levels and functions' in the banks. 
The research has a sequence which is both conceptual and operational. It reflects 
developments in the literature (see Chapter 3), and itself has a modest place in the 
sequence of MAS research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A LITERATURE REVIEW 
Preview 
Before plunging into the substance of the literature some orienting remarks may be 
helpful. First, as noted in Chapter 1, Jordan achieved statehood only in the second 
quarter of the last century. Jordan's industrial and commercial development is in 
consequence rather recent, and so Jordan has borrowed from other countries the 
institutional apparatus'that supports these developments. In particular Jordan had no 
accountancy tradition and little indigenous MA research, and drew on the West to fill 
these needs. In practice this means that it has drawn on Britain and the USA for MA 
methods and procedures, and for a supporting rationale. This in turn means that the 
review of the primarily Anglo-American literature which follows is wholly 
appropriate as an antecedent to our research in Jordan. 
Second, running through the literature is the increasing understanding that MA is a 
complex phenomenon, that exists in complex environments and organisations. In 
consequence the scope, orientation, and emphasis of MA has changed greatly in its 
history. In short, MA in both its theory and practice has been creative and adaptive: 
that is, it has generated new ideas and has adapted to changing professional 
exigencies. 
Third, a part of this creative and adaptive progress has occurred through MA 
embracing developments in contingent disciplines, including economics, sociology, 
psychology and organisational studies. 
Finally, the ensuing discussion of relevant literatures shows how MA has moved from 
a narrow and arguably mechanistic focus to a broad, multi-faceted and inclusive 
orientation. 
We will argue later that these issues have shaped our research. 
This chapter is divided into five parts, each part dealing with an aspect of the 
literature review [Exhibit 2.7, Theoretical Framework of the Research]. Part I 
discusses historical development of MA, and a review of philosophical and theoretical 
influences on MA development is offered in Part n. Part III reviews types of 
management accounting research (MAR) undertaken up to the early twenty-first 
century, and the different methods used in MAR. A separate section is assigned to 
MAR as this research is part of MAR, it is useful to look at extant MAR under a 
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separate heading in some detail, and identifY where does this research stand vis-a-vis 
what is discussed. Part IV of the chapter looks at how the roles of MAS in 
organisations evolved over time and how it relates to OE. Part V is a literature review 
of organisational effectiveness (OE) looking into the meaning and measures ofOE. 
PART I 
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF MANANGMENT ACCOUNTING (MA) 
3.1 Historical Development of MA Practices 
The use of the term MA or managerial accounting is comparatively new: according to 
Mattessich it started in the 1950s (Scapens 1984, p. 18). The term cost accounting 
(CA) and MA 'now tend to be used synonymously in textbook titles' (Scapens, 1984, 
p. 21). However, this is an inaccurate use of terms as the primary focus of cost 
accounting in early uses in manufacturing firms were the identification and allocation 
of costs, for pricing and rate-setting, employee and factory productivity efficiency 
(Noreen, 1987, p. 11). Wilson & Chua (1993, pp. 3,4) describe the use of the term 
cost accounting and its development to today's MA as: 
'Prior to 1950 the term 'management accounting' was used rarely ... people today do 
not only use the term to refer to practices that have developed in the last forty years. 
On the contrary, most people commonly include under the label practices that 
emerged earlier ... 
'Most accounting historians agree that the precursor of modern-day managerial 
accounting is the cost accounting that was practised by the mechanized, multi-
process, cotton textile factories that appeared in England and the United States around 
1800'. 
The development from CA to MA can also be seen in the change in the name of 
today's Chartered Institute of Management Accountants as it changed from The 
Institute of Cost and Work Accountants to Institute of Cost and Management 
Accountants to its current name. 
3.1.1 Early Uses of MA in the Nineteentl:! Century 
The earliest published researched use of a cost calculation technique reported in the 
accounting literature, as published in the English language, was in 1810 in the works 
of Wedgwood potteries, and in the early 1800s in the Soho Engineering Foundry of 
Bolton in Britain (Wardell & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 657). Other early practices of MA 
reported by western researchers in the USA was in textile mills and, in particular, the 
Waltham mechanised mill in 1815 (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 7) and Lyman Mill in 
1855 in New England (Kaplan, 1984, p. 391; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 24; 
Ezzamel et aI., 1990, p. 159). Managers, engineers and accountants in those firms 
devised new means to replace labour conversion cost supplied till then by the market 
and the price system in the form of piece-rates (Chandler & Daems, 1979, p. 3; 
lohnson, 1983, p. 141). 'This entirely new type of accounting system anticipated 
modem management accounting' (Johnson, 1983, p. 141). Noreen (1987, p. 111) 
considers it as an attempt by management to measure operational efficiency making 
early cost accounting have a managerial purpose [Exhibit 3.1, Historical Development 
of MA]. 
New development in MA took place in still another economic sector. In the 1860s 
and 1870s managements of railway companies needed more than the costing 
techniques then used in the manufacturing sector in their extensive planning and 
control procedures as well as 'for evaluating and controlling the performance of their 
sub-units' (Kaplan, 1984, p. 391, 392). The new cost system in railway companies 
was also used for administrative co-ordination and monitoring (Chandler & Daems, 
1979, p. 5) and for regulatory rate-setting purposes. By the 1920s, the transportation 
industry 'had evolved towards the measurement of marginal costs for particular 
classes of service' (Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 14). 
Cost accounting systems early uses at around the same time in the Camegie steel mills 
in 1872 aimed at co-ordination, control, and pricing (Kaplan, 1984, p. 392; lohnson & 
Kaplan, 1987, p.32; Loft 1995, p.25). However, costing procedures were still crude 
and concentrated on costing labour and material (Loft, 1995, p. 23). 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century management in mass production firms 
needed new types of information: in addition to cost determination, pricing decisions, 
and stock control, they needed to appraise the efficiency of workers and the 
productivity of the factories. (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 47). 
'At the turn of the century, however, a new form of non-market organization 
appeared. This new form, the vertically integrated firm, would lead to dramatic 
changes in MA practices. The vertically integrated firm did not concentrate 
exclusively on production. It combined marketing, purchasing and transportation also' 
(Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 142). Managements of vertically integrated firms wanted 
'to drive slack out of an entire industry' and not 'drive slack out of the labour 
conversion process', so new MA techniques to secure this task were developed 
(Johnson, 1983, p. 142; Loft, 1995, p. 25). 
36 
Exhibit 3.1 
M' H' . ID aJor lstonca . MAP eve opments In ractlces an dh'U t elr ses 
Period MA techniques and Uses 
practices developments 
1800s Prime cost of production To replace labour conversion cost /piece-rates 
to (Chandler & Daems, 1979; Johnson, 1983). 
1850s To measure operational efficiency (Noreen, 
1987). 
1860s Marginal costing for Planning, evaluating and controlling sub-units 
to particular products (Kaplan, 1984). 
1870s Administrative coordination and monitoring 
(Chandler & Daems, 1979). 
Cost determination and Coordination, control and pricing (Kaplan, 
stock control 1984; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Loft, 1995). 
1880s Early standard costing Appraise efficiency of workers and 
to productivity of factories (John son & Kaplan, 
1890s 1987). 
1900s Return on investment Evaluation of performance of multi-process, 
to Performance evaluation multi-product, and multi-divisional companies 
1950s schemes (Chandler & Daems, 1979). 
Budgets for employees Investment decisions (Kaplan, 1984). 
and divisional companies 
1960s Responsibility accounting Managerial control (Scapens, 1984). 
1970s Provide managers with information for 
planning and control (Jaggi & Mensah, 1995). 
1980s Activity-based costing Allocation and control of costs 
(Innes & Mitchell, 1995). 
The use of MA information to rationalise past 
actions (Hayes, 1983). 
Growing uses of MA in service industries 
(Ashton et aI., 1995). 
1990s Strategic MA Increased focus on strategic and environmental 
Environmental MA considerations (Ashton et aI., 1995). 
Influence employees' behaviour (Hiromoto, 
1991). 
MA as an agent of change (Burns & Scapens, 
2000). 
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What followed from this and was achieved by management in the Du Pont Powder 
Company was the evaluation of the perfonnance of the entire organisation and the 
effectiveness of administrative coordination and not only processes of production 
(Chandler & Daems, 1979, p. 9; Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 14). Du Pont's centralised 
accounting systems enabled top management to plan the allocation of new investment 
among competing economic activities (Kaplan, 1984, p. 397). 
The next big development in cost accounting was the result of 'scientific 
management' [Exhibit 3.1 Historical Development in MA]. In the 1920s methods for 
standard costing were perfected (Kaplan, 1984, p. 391; Loft 1995, p. 24; Jaggi & 
Mensah, 1995, p. 14). By 1931 half of the largest manufacturing finns in the USA 
(Wardell & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 659) were using standard costing, budgeting and 
perfonnance reports. 
The cost information used, in addition to controlling the efficiency of the 
manufacturing processes, was to control by 'comparing the actual efficiency with this 
potential', and to simplify the valuation of stock and work-in-progress (Loft 1995, p. 
28). The scientific management advocates also' started the practice of measuring and 
allocating overhead costs to products' (Kaplan, 1984, p. 394). This practice was later 
strongly criticised by Johnson & Kaplan (1987) who saw it as a move from cost 
management to cost accounting. What characterised the period was that 'such 
development stemmed primarily from radical innovations by managers and engineers 
and were relatively uninfonned by academic work' (Ashton et al.. 1995, p. 5). 
Industrial societies were greatly affected by the new innovations and technologies and 
the term scientific became synonymous with the correct and true and any thing else 
was questionable. What added to the strength of that argument was that it worked for 
those managers who adopted it and produced results at a time where 'from the 1920s 
to the 1960s, a period when America's domestic market was relatively isolated from 
world competition' and the emphasis was on the ability to produce more and not on 
selling what firms can produce (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 129). 
3.1.2 MA Developments with Large-Scale Manufacturing 
New market realities that dominated the USA by now were large-scale manufacturing 
in vertically-integrated companies. 'Capital markets and markets for managerial talent 
were not well developed' and in search of improved resource allocation, 'these finns 
generated within themselves those two markets for capital and for talent' (Johnson, 
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1983, .. pp. 144-145). Measures such as return on investment (Chandler & Daems, 
1979, p. 9), internal incentive schemes for performance evaluation, and budgets for 
employees and the company's divisions were implemented. By doing this, cost 
accounting left the shop floor for the larger domain of the division and the whole 
company (Johnson, 1983, p. 143; Loft 1995, p. 29) when, traditionally, MA 
techniques had focused on supporting middle mangers to control shop floor workers 
(Atkinson et aI., 1997, p. 88). Be that as it may, MAS were 'only loosely integrated 
with management planning and control systems' (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 2). However, 
this moved MA to a new era where MA information served purposes not only of shop 
floors but also of the whole organisations' planning and control functions. 
In Europe less attention was given to determining costs (Chandler & Daems, 1979, p. 
11), MA became fashionable in UK manufacturing firms during the 1950s (Scapens, 
1984, p. 19). The reasons causing MA to lag behind in the UK, as seen by Johnson & 
Kaplan (1987, p. 142), were the state of the economy and the single process 
technology adopted by UK manufacturing firms. The explanation by Johnson & 
Kaplan (1987, p. 143) for the different development of MA practices in the UK from 
the way it developed in the USA emphasises the importance of the perception of 
managers of the needs of their environment. British industrialists operated in 
extensive market opportlmities: 'there was little need for British industrialists to co-
ordinate economic exchanges within firms. Relying on market prices, the 
industrialists coordinated a far higher percentage of their exchanges among firms than 
did their American counterparts' (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 143). This underlines 
the changing nature of MA practices to suit the needs of MAS users that is influenced 
by factors such as changes in the economy, structure of organisations, products, 
processes, and the markets in which organisations operate. However, Johnson & 
Kaplan's (1987, p. 143) discussion of differences between MA practices in USA and 
Britain seem to ignore all that and strongly criticise the MA practices used in 
organisations as not developing further beyond practices developed in the early 
twentieth century. 
3.1.3 Development of MA from Shop Floor to Boardroom 
Before the Second World War the primary focus of MA was cost determination 
(Scapens, 1984, p.l9) in manufacturing firms. Managements were interested in 
determining the full cost of products. By the mid-1950s the discounted cash flow was 
38 
heralded as a replacement of return on investment [ROIl and payback methods 
(Kaplan, 1984, p. 402). In the 1960s, responsibility accounting developed rapidly. 'Its 
development and popularity was a major step in the movement from cost control to 
managerial control which typified the emergence of MA' (Scapens, 1984, p. 28). 
In the 1970s attempts were made to differentiate between MA and CA. '[Tlhe concept 
of MA was characterized as "performance accounting", and the main objective of MA 
was considered to be providing managers with information which could be used for 
planning and control activities' (Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 15). In the early 1970s 
technological innovation impacted on the manufacturing processes, administration, 
the processing of information and creation of significant new markets (Ashton et aI., 
1995, p. 3). 
This was followed by another important development in MA, the emergence of 
activity-based costing [ABCl, which became popular in the latter half of the 1980s 
(Innes & Mitchell, 1995, p. 115). One other use of MA information that emerged in 
that decade was the political use of MA information selectively to rationalise past 
actions (Hayes, 1983, p. 245-246). During that time economic developments affected 
MA with the relative decline in importance of the manufacturing sector and growth in 
the service and financial services sectors (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 3). This meant that 
MA with its origins in the factory shop floor was evolving to meet the information 
needs of a work environment that was different in many respects. 
What distinguished the development in MA during the 1980s was that developments 
came predominantly from practice and from consultants whereas the earlier 
suggestions tended to originate from academics and were championed by them in the 
1950s - 1970s resulting in MA practices lagging behind (Kaplan 1984, p. 40 I; 
Bromwich, 1998, p. 387; Wardell & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 656). 
In practice, management accountants have adopted their techniques, mainly by trial 
and error (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 46), much in the same way as in the late 
nineteenth century und early twentieth century in responding to the needs of 
management and available resources as well as cost and benefit principles, and not 
always corresponding with more advanced and sophisticated techniques developed by 
academics [see discussion on this in Section 3.2, MA Practitioners and MA 
Academics: Diverging Agendas]. 
In the 1970s and 1980s managers commonly relied on financial numbers and balance 
sheets alone that led to the term of 'managing by numbers' (Johnson & Kaplan 1987, 
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p. 126; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p. 14). MA practices emphasised the functional 
features in MA, regulation and the status quo (Cooper, 1983, p. 271). 
In 1987 Johnson & Kaplan published their book 'Relevance Lost' where they found 
information provided by MA to management to be 'too late, too aggregated, and too 
distorted to be relevant for managers' planning and control decisions' (p. 1). They 
argued that MAS failed to keep pace with the evolution of product and process 
technologies (p. 13). They believed that by 1925 all MA practices 'had evolved to 
serve the informational and control needs of the managers of increasingly complex 
and diverse organizations (Kaplan, 1984, p. 390; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 12). 
Johnson & Kaplan (1987, p. 14) also expressed their surprise that, as great advances 
in information technology occurred, no corresponding change occurred in MA 
practices towards 'more relevant and more timely' use of MA. Johnson & Kaplan 
(1987, p. 2) concluded that managers' horizons contracted to the short-term cycle of 
the monthly profit and loss statement. 
Johnson & Kaplan's (1987) book prompted many responses. Their opinions \\i·ere not 
shared by all MA researchers. The responses ranged from partial agreement (Drury et 
aI., 1993; Homgren, 1989, p. 26; Ezzamel et aI., 1990, p. 161) to a cautious one and a 
call for more investigation of the issues (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989), to offering 
different explanation for the state of affairs of MA described by Johnson & Kaplan. 
Homgren (1989, p. 26) wrote: 
'1 am not upset as he (Kaplan) evidently is, why? Many of the companies do not find 
an investment in a detailed cost accounting system worthwhile'. 
Bromwich & Bhimani (1989, p. 3) published their findings in an empirical study 
sponsored by CIMA and concluded that '[nlo general crisis has been identified within 
the management accounting profession ... and therefore no radical reforms are 
recommended at this stage'. 
By the late 1980s, it was evident that academics realised that MA research needed a 
new direction, focus and theoretical framework. The general agreement at the time 
was that matters then were not satisfactory, but opinions on the explanation of the 
reasons that led to the status quo of MA showed no general agreement. The 
epistemological positions of each researcher, whether it was a normative functional 
position as deciding for MA practitioners how to use MA techniques and why and 
what is best for them or an interpretivelhermeneutic approach influenced each 
researcher's explanation. 
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With the benefit of hindsight one can argue that MA as a social process interacted 
with social change from the mid nineteenth century to the late twentieth century, as 
well as with developments in related disciplines. MA moved from a fixation with 
mathematical calculations that characterised management science and MA textbooks, 
to a greater interest in the more difficult measurement aspects (OtJey & Pollanen, 
2000, p. 495). On another level, MA moved towards more liberal and pluralist social 
values, which reflected itself in more openness to different interpretation and away 
from a 'best way' of doing things. 
Projecting from this, and with the knowledge of more than 150 years of MA practice, 
one thing we can be certain about is that research and practice will continue to evolve 
with a mutual influence of all aspects of societal evolution be it social, political, 
economic or technological. Certain techniques and processes will rise and fall and that 
on its own is of no intrinsic value but what is important is how to put MA to the best 
use as a support mechanism for rationalising decisions of its users, while keeping in 
mind that rationalising of decisions changes with time and place, 'MA as a field can 
be used to reflect changes in reality of every day life' (Vamosi, 2000, p. 43). 
3.1.4 MA in the Late Twentieth Century - A New Domain 
CIMA (1993) defined the purposes that a management accountant has to achieve in 
Standards of Competence in Management Accountancy as: provide planning services, 
guide management decisions, analyse, report and interpret the organisation's 
performance to management, and present reports and accounts for investors. The 
scope of contemporary MA has widened 'encompassing a growing body of 
techniques which have been developed in the light of the needs which managements 
have to plan, control and make decisions. MA is presented as a far superior entity to 
cost accounting which is best understood as only one aspect of MA' (Roslender 1992, 
p. 13 5). But for the MA profession to maintain its relevance as a key ingredient in 
successful enterprise management, 'the continuous dynamic experimentation and 
implementation of MA techniques has to be encouraged' (Bromwich & Bhimani, 
1989, p. 89). 
'The last few years have seen a renaissance in the theory and practice of MA. MA 
has been forced out of the moribund state in which it largely addressed the problems 
of the technology of the nineteenth century'. (Ashton et aI., 1995, p.l). The change 
was once again as it was in the nineteenth century, influenced by markets, social and 
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political changes in the environment which meant increased focus on strategic and 
environmental considerations (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 2) [Exhibit 3.2, Factors 
Influencing Development of MA; and Exhibit 3.3, The Interrelationships among 
Influences on the Development of MA]. 
Exhibit 3.2 
Factors Influencing Development of MA 
Factor Reference 
1 Social developments Loft, 1986; Warden & Weisenfeld, 1991; 
Jones,1992 
2 Political developments Loft 1986 
3 Economic developments Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Loft, 1986; 
Warden & Weisenfeld, 1991; Hiromoto, 
1991 
4 Cultural characteristics Hopwwod & Bromwich, 1983; Warden & 
Weisenfeld,1991 
5 Market developments Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Loft, 1986; 
Warden & Weisenfeld, 1991; Hiromoto, 
1991 
6 Technological developments 
7 Organisational changesl type Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Jaggi & Mensah, 
of firms 1995;Kaplan, 1986; Scapens & Bromwich, 
2001; Atkinson et aI., 1997 
8 Developments in related Jaggi & Mensah, 1995 
disciplines 
Culture was also perceived as a factor influencing the emergence and spread of MA 
(Loft, 1986, p. 138; Warden & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 663; Bromwich & Bhimani, 
1989, p. 36; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 14) as trading became 'transnational, plarming and 
control systems need to pay attention to different cultures and traditions' (Ashton et 
aI., 1995, p. 4). Warden & Weisenfeld (1991, p. 656) explain the difference between 
the USA and UK historical practices of MA as being reflected in cultural reasons vis-
a-vis 'the industrial relations of the two countries, in particular management styles 
and labor activism'. Hopwood (1983, p. 289) recognised this when he wrote: 'both 
MA and financial accounts are characterised by an amazing diversity, ':loth within a 
national culture and even more so across different national contexts' [see discussion 
in Chapter 4, Part V, The Effects of External and Internal Cultures on MAS at PB; 
and Chapter 5, Part V, The Internal and External Cultures' Effects on MAS in JCB]. 
McMann & Nanni (1995, p. 340) observe that most of the ideas used in Japanese 
culture are not new to the practice of MA in other cultures, nevertheless, are 
implemented differently within different cultures. 
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Exhibit 3.3 
The Interrelationships among the Influences on the Development of MA 
Economic changes 
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developments 
Developments in 
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organisations 
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Cultural influences 
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related disciplines 
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MA 
practices 
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MA practices have evolved to meet the infonnation needs of management (Anderson 
& Lanen, 1999, p. 380). What started in the 1980s and continued to the current day 
showed a move away from the normative and best-way to a more than a contingent 
approach (Scapens, 1984, p. 61) emanating from a realisation that diversity is inherent 
in environments and individuals, and the belief that a nonnative best-way does not fit 
with such diversity. 
Bums & Vaivio (2001, p. 390) remark that, in the current times, traditional techniques 
are used alongside new and so-called advanced accounting techniques, but that MA is 
undergoing important changes as it 'is becoming more and more decentralized and 
being pushed out into core business areas' (Bums & Vaivio, 200 I, p. 390), and that 
management accountants are perceived today as more of 'business support' than 
'controllers'. Such a perception of MA is important for MA's continuing relevance to 
users' needs. Restricting MA solely to operative/feedback solely would undennine 
MA's role in operative as in other roles of control (feedback and feedforward), 
planning and decision-making. 
3.1.5 MA Education 
It took more than 100 years - according to history records known to us - for cost 
accounting to be introduced in higher education institutions in the UK. In 1918 
lectures in cost accounting were introduced into the curriculum of the London School 
of Economics (Loft, 1986, p. 146). Accounting students up to the end of World War I 
'had few alternative opportunities of being made aware of accounting and related 
issues of the day ... Financial reporting and auditing were always prominent: cost and 
management accounting much less so' (Lee, 1984 as quoted by Parker, 1999, p. 2). 
In 1961, Singer (p. lIS) advocated the introduction of a cost accounting course at an 
advanced level in the US college curriculum. The topics suggested by Singer (1961, p. 
116) came under planning and control. He wrote: 'because of the nature of text book 
theory and because of the influence of C.P.A. [certified public accountants) 
examinations on what is taught there is usually a need in the college curriculum in 
accounting for a course at an advanced level which may, and often is, called 
"management accounting".' 
Johnson & Kaplan (1987, p. 135) describe the education which accounting students 
received in universities in the USA as: 
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· 'Textbooks used in 1920s university accounting courses spoke of cost accounting 
strictly in terms of inventory costing for financial reporting purposes: only in the 
post-World War 11 era did academics' writings herald the "birth" of management 
accounting' . 
A much similar description of MA education is also expressed by Homgren (1989, p. 
21) as he described his experience as an accounting student in 1947 as a 'plodding 
excursion through product costing for the primary purpose of inventory valuation and 
income determination ... the second course in cost accounting at more than one state 
university was "Advanced Process Costing" '[Exhibit 3.4, Content of Cost 
Accounting Textbooks in US Universities in the Early 1970s]. 
Exhibit 3.4 
Content of Cost Accounting Textbooks in the Early 1970s 
1945-50 1951-60 1961-70 
Number of books examined topics 7 \3 14 
Inventory valuation (%) 73 64 46 
Cost control (%) 21 27 21 
Management decision-making (%) 6 9 33 
Total (%) 100 100 100 
Horngren (1989, p. 23), source: Foster (1971), Volume 11, p. 2 
In the early 1970s behavioural topics were introduced into accounting education as 
textbooks previously only discussed economic theories in accounting (Lord, 1989, p. 
133). Such a change in outlook of MA could also be observed in CIMA's numerous 
syllabus changes since its foundation in 1919 to correspond to changes in the uses of 
MA. 
In 1984, Scapens after examining a number of MA textbooks noted that textbooks 
gave 'particular attention to the classification of costs as fixed and variable. This 
reflects the short-run decision-making orientation of much current MA thought' 
(Scapens, 1984, p. 26). 
In June 1988 CMA: The MA Magazine (Canada) published: 'much of what is 
currently taught in management Icost accounting courses is unlikely to be of much use 
in managing contemporary operations or in guiding strategy' (Bromwich & Bhimani, 
1989, p. 2). This adds a further dimension to the intensive debate on the divergence of 
MA practitioners and MA academics since the early 1980s [see discussion in Section 
3.2, MA Practitioners and Academics: Diverging Agendas]. 
MA education in Jordan is greatly influenced by what is taught in US universities, 
where similar syllabi and textbooks are used as core references by teaching staff and 
students. Prior to the early 1960s when the first university was opened in Amman the 
influence was a mixture from British and American higher education institutions as 
students travelled to Egyptian, British and American business schools. 
3.1.6 MA Theoretical Literature 
As early as the 1900s articles describing the use of standard costing, budgeting, and 
perfonnance reports as a management tool appeared in the USA, 'yet similar articles 
did not appear in British literature until the mid-1900s' (Wardnell & Weisenfeld, 
1991, p. 657). 
The biggest thrust of MA literature was in the 1960s where literature introduced some 
new techniques and older techniques were further refined [see Literature Review of 
MAR in Part III of this chapter]. During the same period serious theoretical literature 
has developed (Puxty, 1993, p. 6): 'it has developed with such speed, and with so 
many changes of direction that easily recognized names for schools of thought have 
not grown commensurately with it'. Still there was no explicit statement of the 
underlying theory and there was significant concern among MA academics to 
establish a more complete theoretical basis for MA (Otley, 1984, p. 99; Scapens, 
1984, p. 20; Kaplan, 1986, p. 432) [see Theoretical Bases of MA, Part I1; and 
Literature Review of MAR, Part III of this chapter]. 
Kaplan (1986, p. 445) also found that not enough research was done to provide 
descriptions and systematic observations of MA and what referencing was available 
was predominantly of work by economists (Kaplan, 1984, p. 407). 
3.1.7 The Role of Professional Institutes in the Development of MA 
Professional institutes had an influence on the spread and organisation of the 
profession (Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 7) on both sides of the Atlantic. The early 
beginnings in the UK with the Institute of Cost and Works Accountant in 1919, now 
called the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA), and the National 
Accounting Association, now IMA in the USA. The then Institute of Cost and Works 
Accountants 'began to act as a focal point for the growth of discussion about the 
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nature of cost accounting knowledge and techniques, and the role which cost 
accountants should play in society' (Loft, 1986, p. 141). 
Professional bodies played a part in spreading MA education through their 
examination syllabi as they provided an interface with government agencies. The 
development in MA was reflected by professional bodies that encouraged change in a 
number of ways from name changing to changes in training and education 
programmes as in the case of Cl MA. 
However, professional accounting bodies and academic literature have diverging 
views on the role of management accountants. Professional bodies view it in very 
general terms as meeting managers' needs for financial-based information whereas, 
academic literature looks into MA issues 'in relatively self-contained packages- i.e. 
topics' (Scapens, 1984, p.74). 
3.2 MA Practitioners and MA Academics: Diverging Agendas 
Three years before 10hnson & Kaplan (1987) published' Relevance Lost', Hopwood 
& Bromwich (1984, p. 3) noted that: 
'the fact that practice has not changed in the name of the theory now is being seen as 
an interesting issue in itself rather than necessarily a manifestation of tradition, 
ignorance or the incapacity to change'. 
This posed an insightful question: 'why is practice the way it is?' In the same year 
Scapens (1984, p. 36) wrote that there was no coherent body of literature that 
described MA in practice [see Chapter 3, Part 11, Theoretical Bases of MA] and that 
there existed no comprehensive survey of the practices and techniques used at the 
time. Scapens also remarked that the impression of the divergence of practice and 
research was based on 'anecdotal evidence and impressions gained through informal 
contacts between academics and practitioners' . 
An example of this is described by (Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 403), 
'There is very little empirical awareness of the actual operation of MAS within 
organizations. As a consequence, theoretical developments are often (if not usually) 
unrelated to actual practice, so the need exists to bring these two aspects of MA close 
together as a priority' . 
A critical reading of MA history shows that MA developed as managers realised that 
it can be put into use in planning and control (Scapens, 1984, p.19). During the 1980s 
MA's nature was changing to correspond to changes in manufacturing and 
information technology to a role of decision-support system (OtJey, 1985, p. 19) as it 
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developed to meet planning and control needs of divisionalised companies in the 
1920s. 
For the past two decades or so the emphasis on reporting financial information 
(Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 16; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p.l6) has been 
changing. The importance of reporting non-financial information is now recognised 
in response to 'changes in the cost structure and the manufacturing and competitive 
environment' (Drury, 1996, pp. 5, 513). A related issue put forward and criticised by 
the interviewees in this research was the emphasis on short-termism which can be 
explained by reasons other than those suggested by Johnson & Kaplan (1987) i.e. due 
to the stagnation of loss of relevance. It can be explained by 'a principal-agent 
relationship and exigencies of performance evaluation as can still be found reported 
nowadays in management accounting research' (Currie, 1995, p. 344). 
Ezzamel et al. (1990, p. 161) took the position that "as essential to understanding of 
both its (MA) 'rise' and its 'fall', it should be understood that 'managing it by 
numbers' 'is not a 20th century 'subversion' of an originally 'useful' cost and 
management accounting -J&K's thesis ... - but was genetically implanted in the seed 
from which that accounting was generated". Still another explanation by Ward ell & 
Weisenfeld (1991, p. 667) is that MA, once introduced, 'remained relatively 
unchanged' because managers found it provided them with the control over the 
sought, in addition to the consideration of the cost and the benefit of information. 
Noreen (1987, p. 110) found that 10hnson & Kaplan's recommendation for improving 
the practice of MA vague and consequently difficult to operationalise, and that 'the 
proposition they push the hardest - full "tracing" of all costs to products - appear to be 
just another conceptually flawed full cost allocation scheme'. In addition Noreen's 
(1987, p. 113) critique is that 10hnson & Kaplan 'seem to disapprove of financial 
accounting allocations on the grounds that they arbitrarily allocate costs that cannot be 
traced (the orthodox criticism) they disapprove of them because they are not 
"accurate" enough for managerial uses'. 
Many researchers commented that MA research was removed from MA practices 
(e.g. McCosh & Howell, 1983, p. 280; Hopwood, 1983, p. 302; Hopwood & 
Bromwich, 1984, p. 2; Choudhury, 1986, p.2l; Johnson & Kaplan 1987, p.I4; 
Homgren, 1989, Atkinson & Shaffir, 1989, p. 59; p. 22; Ashton et al., 1995, p. 7). 
MA researchers were influenced strongly by economics' one product, one production-
process model of the firm. 
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Managers and MA practitioners in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s found the new techniques 
and models irrelevant to their organisations and still hung on to older techniques and 
measurements. A survey of MA practices in UK manufacturing companies by Drury 
et al. in 1993, did not unequivocally endorse Johnson & Kaplan's cry of diverging 
practices and techniques: 
'the analysis of the survey of the questionnaire replies indicated that a variety of 
different practices are lIsed many of which appear to correspond closely with theory. 
However, the replies to some questions also indicated that there was a considerable 
gulf between some aspects of theory and practice' (Drury et aI., 1993, Executive 
Summary, p. I). 
The survey showed though that over-simplistic overhead allocation methods are used 
for decision-making and that the gap between theory and practice was particularly 
wide for smaller businesses. 
In spite of active MA research in the 1950s and 1960s in the new roles of MA for 
improving decision-making (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 162), such research was not 
embraced with an equal enthusiasm by managers and management accountants. The 
research was based on micro-economic theory and operations research and, in spite of 
their complexity, they failed to capture the complex and dynamic nature of 
environments that faced managers in addition to the considerations of costs of and 
benefits from using them. This proved another aspect of the rift between MA practice 
and MA theory, which started early in the century by lack of MA academics 
contribution to MA practitioners and spread to interests in diverging directions. 
Zimmerrnan (1979 as quoted in Scapens, 1984, p. 58) provides a convincing 
explanation of why MA practitioners still held to techniques that Johnson & Kaplan 
(1987) and others strongly criticised: 
'so long as the derived benefits exceeded the information costs involved, rational 
individuals may be expected to use allocation techniques'. 
Watson & Marrett (1977 as quoted by Scapens, 1984, p. 36), in explaining the reasons 
why MA practitioners did not extensively use MA techniques, suggested these as 
being: the high cost of using them, the absence or unreliability of required data, the 
inability of some of the users to understand the techniques, and the long time-span 
needed to apply them. 
More than a decade later, Jones (1992, p. 250) concluded from the findings of his 
empirical study that management accountants had 'only a tenuous link between 
themselves and the accountancy profession', which underlines the need to give 
practitioners' needs and expectations proper attention (Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 
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526). MA as a mechanism to support MA infonnation users necessitates the 
interaction and relevance to MA practitioners. 
When considering why MA techniques and practices proposed and developed by 
academics were not used by practitioners, it seems the question should be flipped 
from why MA practices lag behind those techniques advanced by MA academics to 
why did MA academics knew little of the needs of MA practitioners and their 
complex work environments? 
This was remarked upon by Parker (1999, p. 27) remarks on how published 
accounting literature shows the demarcation between MA academics and MA 
practitioners: 
'The distinction between professional and academic accounting journal is today a 
very sharp one, illustrating very well the distinction between the literature of a 
technology and the literature of a science. Articles which are published in Accounting 
and Business Research would not be considered for Accountancy and vice versa'. 
Parker (1999, p. 27) continues to reflect that 'there is a danger that academic 
accountants are moving in increasingly small circles, ignorant of, and, one fears, 
sometimes even contemptuous of what is appearing in the journals they do not read'. 
The debate opened the door to discussing the future shape and fonn which MA should 
take. Hopwood & Bromwich (1984, p. 6) feel that the divergence between MA 
practitioners and academics is giving way as: 
'Both accounting researchers and practitioners are now aware that the potential of 
management accounting to further the economic rationality of organizational decision 
processes is dependent upon the analytical and technical components of accounting 
not only intersecting with the human and social fabric of the organization but also 
influencing it in very particular ways'. 
Looking back at the historical development of MA practice one finds that it was 
influenced by economic and market realities and changes (Loft, 1986, p. 151; Wardell 
& Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 656; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 6), by organisational changes/types 
of finns (Kaplan, 1986, p. 441; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 
14; Atkinson et aI., 1997, p. 80; Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 251); by social 
realit;es (Loft, 1986, p. 150; Wardell & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 656; Jones, 1992, p. 
253) affecting society in general and particular industries in particular; by political 
changes (Loft, 1986, p. 146) as well by cultural contexts (Hopwood & Bromwich, 
1983, p. 289, Wardell & Weisenfeld, 1991, p. 660); also by developments in related 
disciplines (Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 28). All these affect MA through its influence 
on the internal and external environments of finns such as management, operational 
research, sociology, psychology, and economics, and by technological innovations in 
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manufacturing and in information technology (Hiromoto, 1991, p. 3) [Exhibit 3.2, 
Factors Influencing the Development of MA). Those same factors will also continue 
to influence future developments in MA and MAS. 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that a number of issues need to be 
considered in understanding the development of MA practice and research: 
[1] the relevance of MA research to MA practice; 
[2] the needs of MA users including costs and benefits of information; 
[3] the environments in which firms operate; and perhaps 
[4] the role management accountants perceive themselves to play as agents of 
institutionalising the status quo or as agents of change. 
3.3 Challenges Facing MA 
Challenges that face MA can be broadly divided into three: 
[1] to ensure that management accountants are primary providers of information for 
planning, decision-making, and control to users at different levels, MA must respond 
to the needs of users of MA information, which is in itself formidable as 
environments and users evolve over time. MA needs to face accelerated developments 
and the dynamic nature of modem business environments whether in markets, 
products, competition, technology, innovation, or social changes. 
Within such a dynamic setting Cooper (1996, pp. 31, 32) sees that such an 
environment poses new challenges for management accountants who 'have to accept 
that their professional lives are going to significantly be altered' by the growing 
importance of cost management with the implication on qualifications needed by 
management accountants in broad business backgrounds (Cooper, 1996, p. 32; 
Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 409) and system design skills. 
[2] The second challenge is to maintain a theoretical framework that will enable those 
involved and interested in developing MA to do so in a satisfactory way. 
[3] Among the challenges that face MA is fostering a closer working and interactive 
relationship between MA researchers and MA practitioners, (Hopwood & Bromwich, 
1984, p. 6; Palmer 1992, p. 181; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 149; Wilson, 1995, 
p. 161) and providing information to managers to be used for strategic management 
and offer a way forward (AlIen, 2003, p. 12). 
From this follows the challenge to MA academics and practitioners to re-examine 
their methods and theories by becoming more involved in field-based research as 
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described by Mintzberg (1979 as quoted by Kaplan, 1984, p. 415) to 'capture the fun 
and excitement that have been missing from our managerial accounting research 
because of our reluctance to get involved in actual organizations and to muck around 
with messy data and relationships' . 
In the case study on a Jordanian commercial bank, I tried to address the challenges of 
responding to the MA information needs of MA users by a system for interaction 
among users, initiators and designers of MAS to maintain the relevance of MA 
information to their needs. The research also addresses the fourth and fifth challenge 
of getting involved in JCB and trying to understand the needs of practitioners and 
having a close working relationship between practitioners and academics. 
3.4 Who Needs to be Involved in MA Change Processes? 
Starting from the premise that MA change is a positive process a question arises 
whether it is a consciously planned process or subject to random influence (Bums & 
Vaivio, 2001, p. 394). One thing is for sure, MA change is not a neutral process 
(Bums & Scapens, 2000, p. 17; Bums & Vaivio, 2001, p. 395), and that the more 
widely practices are institutionalised the more difficult change is (Bums & Scapens, 
2000, p. 11) [see Chapter 4, Case Study of PB where the above was observed, 
described and the impact of change analysed]. 
Executive and/or top management as influencers of the design and roles of MAS 
are one party to instigate change (BurcheU et aI., 1980, p. 10; Bums & Vaivio, 2001, 
p. 395). Kaplan (1984, p. 409) and Johnson & Kaplan (1987, pp. 24,30,32, 47) 
explain that MA practices evolved from the demands of senior executives. 
Management accountants can also be agents of change by virtue of their position in 
the organisation and their exposure to development in the field of MA (Burchell et al., 
1980, p. 8; AlIen, 2003, p. 12). 
Management accountants by possessing well-developed technical and social skills 
(Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998, p. 381) and as information specialists might seek 
to influence or instigate change by virtue of their. 'problem-solving activities as a part 
of their role in a firm' or as they respond to uncertainty in the environment (Newman 
et a!. 1989, p. 128). Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 363) reported examples of 
what they and other researchers have stated before them, that management 
accountants show low interest in change even when it is apparent that they have the 
functional skills to assist in the programmes of change. A question asked by McCosh 
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& Howell (1983, p. 282) more than two decades ago but which is still very pertinent, 
is: 'are industrial accountants so totally in the grip of traditional methods that they 
lose the will to experiment, and/or are not permitted by their executive management?' 
MA change can also 'be regarded as a fundamentally local concern' (Burns & Vaivio, 
2001, p. 395). Local managers can be agents of change with their local knowledge 
with which top Isenior executive might not be in close contact. 
A fourth party inyolved in the process of change are professional institutes by 
providing fomms for debates from which change can begin (Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 
8; Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 12). 
In addition, MA research can also influence MA change through influencing all 
parties discussed above. Through recognising the need for change, whether in 
response to changes in the external or internal environments of firms, researchers 
could provide some answers to users of MA information and pmcticing management 
accountants. 
Notwithstanding the above, change could be hindered by a number of factors relating 
to managers' and management accountants' commitment to the need for change. 
Some of the factors that might hinder MA change are: costs (Bromwich & Bhimani, 
1994, p. 98); the lack of requisite skills and technology (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, 
p. 98; Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 17); managerial internal organisational factors 
[status structure, internal politics]; the financial and intellectual investments in 
existing systems (Gross, 1965, p. 211; Bariff & Galbrith, 1978, p. 15; Burns & 
Stalker, 1994, p. 101; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 98; Bums & Scapens, 2000, p. 
17); and internal politics within an organisation (Bums & Scapens, 2000, p. 17). [See 
Exhibit 3.5, Factors Hindering MA Change Process in Organisations; and Exhibit 3.6, 
The Interrelationships among Factors Hindering MA Change]. 3.5 Defining MA 
Defining what is MA is not an easy task. What characterises MA is its evolving 
dynamic complex nature, and multidisciplinary span of scope (Newman et a!. 1989, p. 
136). In a treatise in 1922 WilIiam Paton describes what he regarded as the cost 
accountant's chief activity: 
"the essential basis for the work of the cost accountant -without it, there could be no 
costing- is the postulate that the value of any commodity, service, or condition, 
utilized in production, passes over into the object or product for which the original 
item was expended and attaches to the result, giving it its value" (as quoted by 
Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p.136). 
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Exhibit 3.5 
Factors Hindering MA Change in Organisations 
Factor Reference 
1 Cost of change Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994 
2 Lack of requisite skills Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994; Bums & 
Scapens, 2000 
3 Unavailability of technology Bums & Scapens, 2000 
" 
4 Financial and technological Gross, 1965; Bariff & Galbrith, 1978; 
investment in existing Bums & Stalker, 1994; Bromwich & 
systems Bhimani, 1994; Bums & Scapens, 2000 
5 Internal politics Bums & Scapens, 2000 
Since then MA evolved into new domains [see discussion in Section 3.1, Historical 
Development of MA). Such an emphasis on financial information and allocation of 
costs in MA could still be found two decades later (Singer, 1961, p. 112; Kaplan, 
1984, p. 414). What MA meant to its practitioners in the middle of the eighteenth 
century is not the same as it was in the early twentieth century or the early twenty first 
century. 
The complex nature of MA comes from the collective context, the wider social and 
institutional forces that surround it (Bums & Vaivio, 2001, p. 393). The interlinkages 
of MA with the external and internal environments of organisations that are by their 
very nature evolving and changing renders defining MA problematic. MA is a 
mechanism that can be used in different ways by different people, it plays different 
roles relating to the different perspectives of stakeholders. 
MA, embedded in the social and organisational context means that it incorporates 
sociological, psychological, economic, and organisational facets, and in order to 
process information it incorporates statistical and quantitative techniques as well as IT 
[Exhibit 3.7, Attributes of MA). This further adds to the complexity that governs MA. 
Therefore, any definition of MA needs to reflect its multi-disciplinary nature. The 
dominant perspective of defining the role of MA is that of management (Singer, 1961, 
p. 113; McCosh & Howell, 1983, p. 282; Scapens, 1984, p. 18; lohnson & Kaplan, 
1987, p. 1; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p. 95; Puxty, 1993, p. 87; Wilson, 1998, p. 5) 
in their own capacity and as agents of capital providers. One explanation given by 
Wardell & Weisenfeld (1991, p. 662) for the dominance of a management perspective 
,---.. 
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Exhibits 3.6 
The Interrelationships among Factors Hindering 
MA Change Process in Organisations 
Costs ~ 
Lack of requisite 
skills and 
technology ~ 
Internal ~ organizational 
factors 
Financial and 
intellectual 
investment in 
existing systems· 
Internal politics ~ in organisations 
MA 
change 
process 
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is the context in which MA developed by management in the USA characterized by 
'an explicit concern for profit without regard for tradition or interpersonal 
relations ... in the latter half of the nineteenth century'. 
Attributes of MA 
Dynamic 
Multidisciplinary 
Evolving 
Complex 
Has a wider social scope 
Has an institutional scope 
Of public interest 
Multi users 
Political 
Has diverse practices 
Exhibit 3.7 
Attributes of MA 
Reference 
Stone et al. 2000 
Newman et al., 
Chua,1993 
This research 
This research 
1989; 
Bums & Vaivio, 2001 
Bums & Vaivio, 200 I 
Wilson 
Johnson, 1983; Lovell, 2002 
Loft, 1986 
Wilson & Chua, 1993; Drury, 1996 
Wilson, 1998 
Purposeful to achieving certain outcomes Wilson & Chua, 1993 
Collective context Bums & Vaivio, 2001 
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A broader perspective is 'the clients served' (Hopper, 1980, p. 401) whoever these 
clients might be. Different users of MA information can also be government agencies 
as Loft (1986, p. 141) explains the involvement of government agencies in World 
War II 'almost one could say as an unintended consequence of the way in which the 
government attempted to prevent profiteering and to price their contracts with 
manufacturers in the absence of a free market' and other government agencies 
nowadays still do. 
Such a broader perspective might seem at first incompatible with the initial early uses 
of MA. Nevertheless, MA information when available in organisations can be used 
and be of use not only to managers within organisations in line with the call for more 
transparency and social accountability of organisations. 
Accounting academics (Johnson, 1983, p. 145; Lovell, 2002, p. 158) believe that a 
public interest perspective needs to be adopted, given competitive and financially 
driven markets: 
'social and political pressures, moreover, may force MA to adopt a commitment that 
transcends commitment to employer and client, recognizing the public interest to be 
paramount, a matter which has not been a hallmark of MA practice, although the idea 
is not new' (John son, 1983, p. 145). 
<;4 
All this contributes to the difficulty that one faces in defining MA at a certain time 
and in a certain context. However, in this resides the power of accounting 'in its 
capacity to provide an orientation to both self and other as an object of use - as a 
commodity' (Smith et aI., 1988, p. 116). 
3.5.1 Defining MA through Duties Undertaken by Management Accountants 
In their attempts to capture the nature of MA and what it involves, researchers tried to 
describe the role of management accountants either in terms of the duties they 
undertake or the information with which they deal (Newman et aI., 1989, p.l27; Stone 
et aI., 2000, p. 698) [Exhibit 3.7, Attributes of MA]. 
Other researchers distance MA from the practices of management accountants in that 
MA can no longer be understood as a discrete knowledge set, mastered and practiced 
by MA specialists. Instead, MA in some organisations is becoming a dispersed 
knowledge set applied by non-accounting employees (Bums & Vaivio, 200]; 
Hiromoto, 1991). Therefore, defining MA as that which management accountants do 
becomes problematic. 
Newman et al. (1989, p.129) in an investigation undertaken in British Columbia 
(Canada) tried to identifY components of the role of MA as a function of position in 
the organisation's hierarchy from data collected from 350 questionnaire sent to 
middle-management accountants and controllers. The analysed data showed that 
although financial controllers spent more time on score keeping [20.5%], they did not 
percei ve it as the greatest contribution to their organization. That contribution came 
from providing management information [19.6% of their time] (Newman et aI., 1989, 
p. 131). Stone et al. (2000, p. 70]) share the same conclusion that 'higher-ranking 
accounting professionals have broader responsibilities (e.g. supervision, strategic 
planning)' . 
Hopper (1980, p. 405) found that core activities of management accountants from 
undertaken research were: 
'[I] preparing future budgets, [2] producing budget results and compiling actual, [3] 
providing special reports, [4J liaison with managers outside of formal meetings'. 
On tasks management accountants undertake, CIMA's listing is more specific than 
providing information to management or budgets and budgetary control to areas of: 
1. formulation of policies, 
2. planning and controlling the activities of the enterprise, 
3. decision taking on alternative courses of action, 
4. disclosure to those external to the entity (shareholders and others), 
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5. disclosure to employees, 
6. safeguarding assets' (Management Accounting Official Terminology, 1984, p. 10). 
This research adopts a similar understanding as CIMA' s in investigating and 
discussing the roles ofMAS in enhancing OE in JCB. 
A suggested definition by Institute of Management Accountants (1998) in the USA 
explains that 'the core technical knowledge of managerial accounting is much broader 
and includes budgeting and cost analysis, corporate financial management, decision 
, .' 
analysis, and information systems' (Hunton et aI., 2000, p. 752). Nevertheless, MA 
'as a set of practices .. .is enormously diverse ... inadequately captured by an 
enumeration of technologies, whether past or present' (Wilson, 1998, p. 5). 
3.5.2 Defining MA through Topics Included in Textbooks 
Some researches tried to define and explain MA by looking at the topics discussed 
and taught to students in MA textbooks. A perusal of MA textbooks shows an 
influence of research in the 1950s and 19608 (Scapens, 1984, p. 17). The major topics 
in the field of MA as found in textbooks are: planning, cost classifications, control, 
costing, and divisionalised organizations' (Scapens 1984, p. 22). An investigation of 
major MA textbooks used in US universities from 1945-1970, showed a change of 
emphasis from cost determination in 1945-1950 to management decision-making in 
the 1970s (Homgren, 1984, p. 23). [See discussion in Section 3.1.5, MA Education; 
and Exhibit 3.4, Content of Cost Accounting Textbooks in US Universities in the 
Early 1970sJ. 
On this Johnson & Kaplan (1987, p. 137) note that early in the twentieth century 
'glaringly absent from these textbooks is any mention of actual MA practices in 
contemporary industrial organizations'. Nevertheless, attempting to define MA 
through topics in MA textbooks cannot provide a satisfactory meaning of MA. As 
mentioned earlier, MA is characterised by a dynamic nature emanating from its 
contextual characteristic. 
3.5.3 Defining MA by Academics 
One interesting way suggested by Hayes (1983, p. 245) to understand MA, is by 
looking at it as 'a history, story of the organization in procedural form, a historical 
base upon which to build future actions. The reason for the action does not have to be 
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continually sought, for it has been done in the past'. However, building future action 
does not identitY domains for MA or the means available to it. 
Wilson & Chua's (1993, p. 17) definition of MA explains the future action -
discussed above - as making better decisions with the aim of enhancing OE. Wilson 
& Chua also give a broader identification of users of MA techniques and process by 
referring to people within an organisation, and types of MA information provided to 
users as financial and non-financial information. 
Drury's (1996, p. 660) description of the role or purpose of MA draws from the work 
of many researchers highlighting the diversity of opinions on what MA is. He lists it 
as being: a rational/instrumental purpose, a symbolic purpose, a politicallbargaining 
purpose, a legitimate/retrospective rationalising purpose, and a repressive/ 
dominating! ideological purpose. 
Within such varied approaches to defining MA and different perspectives In 
perceiving the function and role of MA, a proposed definition of MA should include 
relevant elements from the different definitions and needs to reflect four main areas: 
a.' the variety of multi disciplinary techniques and process used in MA, 
b. the important role MA has in providing information, 
c. a more effective serving of the different clients of MA, 
d. the differing as well as continuously evolving goals and interests of those 
clients which evolve and change in priority as the clients' environments 
continue to evolve. 
Consequently MA can be defined as: An accounting mechanism that works within an 
organisation with a forward orientation encompassing a wide variety of 
multidisciplinary techniques and processes that continuously evolve over time, to 
provide information -financial and non-financial- for decision-making, planning, and 
control to its clients, who exchange prominence as societies evolve politically, 
economically, and socially, to forward their changing goals and interests and each 
client's perception of effectiveness. 
PART II THEORETICAL BASES OF MA 
A number of researchers believe that there is no MA theory (Otley, 1984, p. 98; 
Scapens, 1984, p. 20; Kaplan, 1986, p. 441; Roslender, 1990, p. 354; Zimmerman, 
2001, p. 412). Otley (1984, p. 99) noted that 'It is only recently that significant 
concern has been shown with establishing a more complete theoretical basis for MA'. 
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Burchell et al. (1980) argue that it would have to be recognised that for the 
foreseeable future at least, the different theoretical influences on MA would produce 
not only insights, but problems and leads as well. Those different theoretical 
influences could help in allowing us to develop what Colville (1981 as quoted by 
Otley, 1984, p. 139) calls 'a theoretical framework which will allow us to develop 
. more different ways of thinking about accounting'. 
Notwithstanding the above, MA was influenced by three main theories: economic 
theories, behavioural theories, and social theories. Under each of the main theoretical 
heading a number of other theories informed MA thought [Exhibit 3.8, Main 
Economic Theories in MA; Exhibit 3.9, Main Behavioural Theories in MA; and 
Exhibit 3.10, Main Social Theories in MA]. Although the three theories influenced 
MA thought at different stages over the historical development of MA, all exist side 
by side in current times with each going through ups and downs in popularity . .3..&.. 
The Influence of Economic Theories on MA 
------------ _ ... _ ..... - ..... - .... 
Within economic theory, a number of theories influenced MA techniques and process 
such as: neo-classical theory, inforination economics theory, agency theory, and game 
theory [Exhibit 3.8, Main Economic Theories in MA]. 
Neo-classical economic theory, or MA conventional wisdom, influence is evident in 
MA textbooks (Otley, 1984, p. 98; Homgren, 1989, p. 32), in the decision models 
used by MA researchers (Scapens, 1984, p. 34; Drury 1996, p. 660), and in the 
emphasis on the technical orientation and the evaluation of technical efficiency of 
processes only. Anthony (1960 as quoted in Scapens, 1984, p. 24) believed that the 
major attraction of the economic theory model was that it permitted rigorous 
mathematical modelling of accounting problems, in addition to the influence by 
scientific management principles that pursued accuracy of measurement. 
Decision and control models in the conventional wisdom are prescriptive and operate 
in a closed system ignoring the external environment and assuming rationality of 
managers and the absence of power struggles. This was described by Puxty (1993, p. 
15) as ahistorical, apolitical, rationalistic, reductionist and problem-centred. Neo-
classical economic theory 'provisionally excluded organizational structure and 
imperfect information until about the third quarter of the twentieth century; it has 
provisionally excluded limits to human cognitive capacity until more recently' (Luft 
& Shields, 2002, p. 797). This present research in looking into the role of MAS in 
enhancing the planning, decision-making, and control in JCB and subsequently the 
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impact on OE, discusses the influence of the external environment, impact on 
organisational structure, power struggle, and internal politics and incorporate all these 
away from prescription. [See Chapter 4, Case Study of PB; Chapter 5, Survey of lCB; 
and Chapter 6]. 
Exhibit 3.8 
Main Economic Theories in MA 
o Neo-classical theory (1950s) 
o Information economics theory (1970s) 
o Game theory (1970s) 
o Agency theory (1970s) 
Exhibit 3.9 
Main Behavioural Theories in MA 
[AJ Sociological Approach: 
Organisation theory (1950s) 
Contingency theory (1970s) 
[B) Psychological Approach: 
Control systems theory 
-f Classical management Systems approach Decision-making approach 
Stimulus-response 
---I Conditioning 
I-Cognitive dissonance 
Exhibit 3.10 
Main Social Theories in MA 
• Structuration theory (1950s) 
• InteractionistlSocial Action theory (1970s) 
• Labour process approach (I970s) 
• Critical theory (I980s) 
The neo-classical perspective influenced the decision models more than behavioural 
theories in spite of the considerable behavioural research in budgeting and standard 
costing (Scapens, 1984, p. 31). This line of thinking in MA resulted in the view that 
MA practice: 
'is based on the assumption that budgets and standards for human and organizational 
performance can be set in a more or less objective and scientifically verifiable 
manner. To some extent this may be true for well understood tasks, although even 
here the fact that one is dealing with human beings rather than machines sets limits to 
what can be achieved' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 43). 
In the 1970s a more realistic concept of information costs and benefits was brought to 
MA by the work of information economists who provided a more fruitful approach 
(Scapens, 1984, pp. 46, 47). The conventional wisdom of MA that was embraced by 
MA researchers in the 1960s was successfully challenged (Scapens, 1984, p. 61) by 
behavioural theories. 
3.6.1 Game Theory 
'A significant development in the cost allocation literature took place in the latter part 
of the 1970s when game theory models were introduced' (Scapens, 1984, p. 59). 
However, game theory did not deal satisfactorily with two important factors that 
influence decision-making: uncertainty and asymmetric information. Ignoring 
uncertainty has serious implications for using MA information whether for planning, 
decision-making, or control. 
Uncertainty in modem times is one important characteristics of organisations' 
environments. To take one example relating to JCB, uncertainty in their external 
environment was one of the most relevant elements in planning, decision-making and 
control [see Section 4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at PB; and 
Section 5.9.2, Information on the External and Internal Environments of JCBj. 
Furthermore, such uncertainties may be inevitable because of the high costs of 
obtaining better measures of relevant factors (Scapens, 1984, p. 72). 
Asymmetry of information relates to this study in what is discussed in factors that 
hindered flow of information [see Section 4.10, Factors Hindering Diffusion of 
Information in PBj and game of budget [Section 14.17, Conflict ofInterest in Setting 
Goals and the Game of Budget Control at PBj. 
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Those shortcomings gave way to agency theory, which provided a better framework 
for multi-person information system choice (Scapens, 1984, p. 64; Johnson & Kaplan, 
1987, p. 174). 
3.6.2 Agency Theory 
'Agency theory stems from information economics research' (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 
1983, p. 254). Baiman (1982, as quoted by Scapens, 1984, p. 68) regards it 'as the 
foundation for a rigorous normative theory of management accounting' as it provides 
an analytic framework to model control systems in complex and decentralised 
organisations (Otley, 1985, p. 9; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 174). 
Agency theory is concerned with 'the role of information (including management 
accounting information) in contracts; in particular, the role of information in 
improving the firm's efficiency by reducing the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection' (Scapens, 1984, p. 66). 
In dealing with uncertainty an important distinction is made in agency theory 
between ex ante and ex post uncertainty (Scapens, 1984,p. 72). However, the role of 
post-decision information has received, and still does, the most attention in the agency 
theory literature (Scapens, 1984, p. 68). Ex post uncertainties arise because of 
imperfections in information systems. One point that needs to be noted when 
discussing moral agency is that agency theory endeavours to maximise the interests of 
the shareholders, which is an area of debate in the present time when social and public 
interest might conflict with shareholders' interest (as discussed in Section 3.1.4 MA in 
the Late Twentieth Century - A New Domain). 
Agency theory's contribution to MA is in emphasizing 'management accounting's 
role as a control system, as well as a decision-facilitating system which was the 
primary concern of earlier research' (Scapens, 1984, p. 72). It discussed the 
significance of the role of performance evaluation and motivation in achieving 
organisational objectives (Scapens 1984, p. 57). 
Agency theory in MA is criticised for being a normative economic model (Scapens, 
1984, p. 63) although it added behavioural constraints to the economic model 
(Scapens, 1984, p. 64). In addition to dealing with organisational situations as within 
'the two-person, single-period agency model cost allocation appears just as irrational 
as within management accounting's conventional wisdom' (Scapens, 1984, p. 71). 
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Furthermore, agency theory does not consider information costs or the cost of 
available alternatives. It assumes that information is available to both the principal 
and agent and emphasises the importance of risk-sharing between principal and agent 
in the design of accounting systems (Scapens, 1984, p. 68, 72), all of which contrast 
with real life situations. 
Despite the interest in agency theory applications in MA, there has been relatively 
little research on thiS area, in particular, calls for testing theoretical linkages in MA 
which draw on both agency theory and organization theory (Chia, 2000, p. 244) have 
not been answered. 
The analysis of data collected from the PB case study and the survey show elements 
of agency theory in areas such as a principal-agent relationship, asymmetry of 
information, and moral hazard, relating to planning, decision-making and control in 
an organisational context, as well as the impact of this on performance evaluation and 
motivation in goal attainment. 
3.6.3 Criticism of Economic Theory of MA 
The adoption of economic theory in MA has been strongly criticised in terms of 
ignoring the cost of information, assumed rationality of a decision-maker seeking 
profit maximising in isolation of others in an organisation, thereby ignoring individual 
differences and preferences. Economic theory in addition does not incorporate what 
actually happens in practice (Otley, 1984, p. 98; Drury, 1996, p. 661), and presents an 
objective view while accounting is not neutral and cannot be viewed as such. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter [Section 3.2, MA Practitioners and MA 
Academics: Diverging Agendas], many of the economic theory techniques were not 
widely used by practitioners (Scapens, 1984, p. 39, Kaplan & Johnson, 1987, p. 14; 
Homgren, 1989, p. 22). One explanation is the failure of the techniques to meet the 
needs of decision-makers even with the more complex multi-person theories such as 
,same theory (Scapens, 1984, p. 59). MA needs to assess the more important social 
and behavioural processes which underlie MA information usage rather than relying 
upon purely economic arguments. 
Covaleski et ai., (1996, p. 22) sum up the main criticism to economic theory as, 'these 
traditional approaches are problem driven and directed towards improving and 
refining the instrument that is management accounting to better serve exogenously 
given organizational goals and thus somewhat narrow in focus'. 
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3.7 Behavioural Theory in MA 
The employment of behavioural theory in MA started in the 1950s. However, its 
popularity rose in the 1970s with the failure of economic theory to explain or predict 
the decision models, and as more MA researchers started to realise the importance of 
incorporating the complexity of environments and mUltiplicity of factors within 
organizations (Hopwood, 1983, p. 302; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 47). 
The term 'behavioural,accounting' has no precise definition (Lord, 1989, p. 124), but 
it refers to behaviour of individuals within organisations and their interaction, as well 
as interaction between accounting systems and human behaviour (Otley & Pollanen, 
2000, p. 495). Earlier behavioural accounting research focused primarily on 
individual behaviour (Otley, 1984, p. 97) whereas later research focused on behaviour 
of the organisation (Sathe, 1978, p. 91; Otley, 1984, p. 97). 
Hopwood (1978, pp. 4-5) notes on the environmental influences on MA research 
within behavioural theory in the 1960s and the 1970s that: 
'virtually all the pioneering studies in the area, and the vast majority of the 
subsequent work to date has emanated from USA, or at least been strongly influenced 
by US approaches and concerns, it should not be surprising that the conceptual and 
methodological approaches that characterise behavioural enquiries undertaken in the 
accounting area should be related to the dominant concerns in the substantive (actual) 
areas of American Social Science ... contrast the more micro American orientation, 
with its focus on organizational psychology, with the more macro European 
approaches focusing on questions of organizational sociology'. 
Budgets and standard costing as with agency theory and traditional management 
theory received particular attention. 'The effects of behavioural research on the 
techniques that can be regarded as basic to management accounting's conventional 
wisdom have been minimal' (Scapens, 1984, p. 31). Notwithstanding this, budgeting 
and budgetary control gained a more comprehensive contextual approach, which 
refined its uses and implications in organisations such as in the works of Brownell 
(198 J), Brownell & Mclnnes (1986), and Abernethy & Brownell (1999). 
Three main behavioural theories informed the MA literature: organisation theory, 
contingency theory with a sociological approach, and control systems theory with a 
psychological approach [Exhibit 3.9, Main Behavioural Theories in MA]. 
3.7.1 Organisation Theory in MA 
The criticism for consistently dealing with humans within an organisation as 
machines whether in control or prediction and decision-making in the conventional 
MA wisdom, paved the way to introducing organisation theory into MA. The 
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recognition that the work situation involves 'both social and technological factors' 
was a clear shift of focus in MA (Scapens, 1984, p. 56; Otley, 1984, p. 97; Emmanuel 
et aI., 1990, p. 46). The influence of behavioural and organisation approaches on MA 
dates back to the 1950s and 1960s but it was only in the 19705 that significant work 
was done within those theoretical frameworks (Otley, 1984, p. 97). 
Some researchers were more inclined to use the term 'organisational behaviour' rather 
that 'organisational theory' (Otley, 1984, p. 103) as organizational theory has no clear 
boundaries which defines a subject of study, no particular set of research 
methodologies, or a coherent overall theory, rather a series of different yet related 
insights (Hopwood, 1983, p. 303; Otley, 1984, p. 96; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 38). 
Nevertheless, organisational theorylbehaviour gained prominence in studying MA 
practices as it 'has enormous potential to illuminate some of the more problematic 
aspects of the accounting craft' (Hopwood, 1983, p. 291). Organisation theory 
provides a contribution in the areas of decision-making processes and control systems 
with its use of socio-technical systems and open systems and 'by its knowledge of 
both the possibilities and limitations inherent in these perspectives' (Otley, 1984, p. 
131). 
Nevertheless, until the early 1980s 'very little empirical work has actually been 
performed using this perspective; the state of the art can perhaps best be illustrated by 
examining the development of the study of budgetary control' (Otley, 1984, p. 100). 
3.7.2 Systems Theory 
Systems theory underwent a substantial change in emphasis in the mid-1950s, but its 
impact on the study of MA was delayed until around 1975 (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 
46). Systems theory foundations lie in 'attempting to overcome reductionism. It views 
every problem as a whole' (Puxty, 1993, p. 31). 
Systems theory is more a way of thinking than a strict theory encompassing 'virtually 
everything that systems theorists want to include in it'. It spans from 'mechanical 
structure to ... the level of social organizations' (Hofstsede, 1968, pp. 85, 86-87). 
Gross (1965, p. 196) notes that in a general systems approach it is important to set 
aside 'the idea that a system is necessarily something that is fully predictable or 
tightly controlled. This impression is created whenever anyone tries to apply to a 
human organization the closed or non-human models used by physicists and 
engineers'. Cybernetics, a closed systems approach, 'has been strictly and narrowly 
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interpreted in the control literature' (Ansari, 1977, p. 102). It failed to recognise the 
impact of people on technology and structure and presumed that humans will react in 
a consistent and predictive way (Ansari, 1977, p. 102). 
An open systems approach was seen as being more relevant since those systems 
incorporate the wider environment of an organisation (Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 68; 
Scott, 1977, p. 74). The interaction started as a one-way influence with the 
environment but moved to a two-way influence. The strength of this approach is in its 
being characterised by internal and external relations of conflict and co-operation, 
providing feedback through multiple channels, changing, complex, loose, with 
variables that can only be described in qualitative terms, and subject to considerable 
uncertainty in terms of environment and decision-making (Gross, 1965, p. 197). 
Organizations can be seen as open systems 'comprising various subsystems that 
individually and jointly determine OE and also help (as one set of constituencies), to 
define the criteria ofOE"(Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 153). 
Yachtman & Seashore (1967, p. 897) comment on the use ofan open system approach 
as a 'promising theoretical solution' when applied to formal social organisations. The 
open system model emphasises the distinctiveness of the organisation as an 
identifiable social structure or entity and it emphasises the interdependency of 
processes that relate the organisation to its environment. 
Systems theory, however, suffer from carrying values of neutrality and objectivism 
(Puxty, 1993, p. 40). This led researchers within this line of thinking to present 
models that are to be viewed as 'transcendental, and work across historical eras and 
cross cultures' (Puxty, 1993, p. 141). 
3.7.3 Contingency Theory in MA 
From the mid-1970s and 1980s, the contingency theory of management accounting 
has become a main focus of attention (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 38; Wilson & Chua, 
1993, p. 53). '[TJhe use of concepts from organisation "lheory led to an interest in the 
contingency theory of organizational design; from this was developed a contingency 
theory of the design of management accounting and budgetary control systems' 
(Otley, 1984, p. 101). In contrast Gordon & Narayanan (1984, p. 33) believe that 
contingency approaches to MA relating to internal and external environments of 
organisations came from an information processing perspective. 
The contingency theory of organisation is described as: 
65 
'a loosely organized set of propositions which are committed to an open systems 
view of organization, which are committed to some form of multi-variate analysis of 
the relationship between key organizational variables as a basis for organizational 
analysis, and which endorse the view that there are no universally valid rules of 
organization and management' (Emmanuel et al. 1990, p. 48). 
Contingency theory as opposed to other theories that influenced MA is not 
universalistic in approach, seeking the one best organisational solution. Rather it 
advocates particular forms as best suited to particular environmental conditions. One 
important contribution of contingency theory and behavioural theories in general is 
providing insight into how MA techniques already in existence work for and within 
organisations, thereby refining them to enhance control and decision-making. Another 
important contribution is the understanding that MA models work in different ways in 
different situations if at all. Behavioural .. research has shown that the economic 
models which have been advocated may not work as expected when applied in 
particular situations (Drury, 1996, p. 854) and the impact such differences could have 
on overall organizational effectiveness (OtJey, 1984, p. 128). 
The two most researched contingent variables, which emerged from empirical work in 
the early days were: environment (Spicer & Ballew, 1983, p.75; Scapens, 1984, p. 57; 
Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6; Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 381) and technology (Spicer & 
Ballew, 1983, p. 75; Scapens, 1984, p. 57; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6). The importance 
of those two contingent variables comes from the effect they have on organisational 
structure and the activity of complex organisations (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 
66; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 39). But the effect of those variables was studied on 
broad features of organisational structure and control and their interaction with single 
characteristics of an organisation was largely ignored (OtJey, 1995, p. 52; Bhimani, 
1999, p. 416). A third variable was culture in cross-national research (Nath, 1986 as 
quoted by Bhimani, 1999, p. 416; Bhimani, 1999, p. 419; Chenhall, 2003, p. 152). 
Views on contingency theory in MA carried differing beliefs. Bhimani (1999, p. 434) 
notes that contingency theory has been criticised for its universalistic and functionalist 
views 'which are increasingly deemed to be conceptually untenable'. Spicer & 
Ballew (1983, p. 76) find two main limitations of contingency theory: [I] contingency 
theory models tend to be post hoc in nature, [2] 'little explicit attention has been given 
to organizational effectiveness'. A further criticism is that contingency theory is seen 
as a framework reconciling the results of a large body of empirical evidence, but 
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'little underlying consensus on its theoretical foundations' (Emmanuel et al. 1990, p. 
48). 
3.8 Social Theory in MA 
A number of theories which come under the heading of social theory [Exhibit 3.1 0, 
Main Social Theories in MAl influenced MA since the 1950s. Some researchers 
believe that a distinction between organisation theory and social theory seems false 
and arbitrary (Roberts and Scapens, 1985, p. 444). Yet discussing them separately 
serves in putting more emphasis on the larger societal environment with all its 
complexity which impacts on affecting the implementation of accounting (Gurd & 
Thome, 2003, p. 24). Tinker et al. (1982, pp. 167, 170) defend the sociological 
approach in accounting as accounting has a socially partisan role which is as 
important as its technical and factual aspects. 
The PB case study highlights the social environment of MA information through 
discussing issues such as communication channels and frameworks, and performance 
evaluation practices [see Section 4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at 
PB]. 
The keen interest for objectivity and positivism, interest in techniques and in the 
structuring of a normative model in MAS research as found in the classical approach, 
is balanced by 'a recovery of the subject without lapsing into subjectivism' (Giddens, 
1995, p. 44). 
3.8.1 Interactionist / Social Action Theory in MA 
Interactionistlsocial action theory, or the action frame of reference, is a perspective 
characteristic of the most subjective boundary of the functionalist paradigm (Burrell 
& Morgan, 1979, p. 189). It is particularly concerned with interaction among people 
in social situations (Puxty, 1993, p. 57). It is concerned with Verstehen i.e. 
understanding and making sense of others' behaviour but not through a 'normative' or 
'objective' account but rather through relating inner experience to outward actions 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 83). 
A perceptible difficulty in applying interactionism to MA is in the denial by 
interactionists of the possibility of replication (Puxty, 1993, p. 58). Interactionists also 
'deny that the notion of system is a useful or even a meaningful one in social analysis' 
(Puxty, 1993, p. 52). Understandably, non-replicability stands in the face of theory 
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testing.· This is perceived as one of the criticisms of interactionist studies for not 
providing 'means to move from the particular understanding of the situation to the 
broader social context' (Puxty, 1993, p. 73). 
But interactionism can be a useful perspective in areas such as play of power and 
internal politics, budgets and budgetary control, a matter that has been observed by 
MA research through the practice of MA in organisations (Gross, 1965, p. 211; 
Pettigrew, 1972, p. 188; MiIler, 1993, p. 126; Granlund, 2001, p. 162). 
It is also useful as it looks into what work means for the individual as practiced by the 
Chicago theorists. It tends to focus on process as opposed to static structure as means 
of characterising the principal features of the world of work and everyday life. 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, pp. 194,195). 
3.8.2 The Labour Process Approach in MA 
The Labour process approach influenced MA in terms of power relations between 
labour and management and in control processes such as budgeting and standards. 
The labour process approach perceived owners as 'depriving workers of the technical 
and financial knowledge of the production process' (Drury, 1996, p. 664). The labour 
process approach also illustrates 'the ambiguous role which managers and supervisors 
play in the capitalist labour process' (Roslender, 1995, p. 72). 
Historically MA has taken the perspective of management and owners which led to a 
management taken-far-granted perspective. Smith et a!. (1988, p. ll8) see it not as 
internal politics in work relations but as part of 'the class practices that constitute 
oppressive power from within capitalist work organizations', so does Roslender, 
(1990, p. 359): 
'the Labour process perspective sets out from the premise that in a capitalist society 
work and employment, the organisation and industrial relations are all shaped and 
structured to serve the interests of the capitalist class'. 
Consequently, traditional practice of MA, for adherents to the labour process is a 
means of disciplining and controlling the work force through accounting. 
Whether play of power comes as a result to class struggle - which is not evident in 
Jordan - or an organisational situation as this differs from one country to another, a 
proposition put forward by Iohnson (1983, p. 145) could provide a suitable 
framework for MA to adopt a commitment for public interest and not to an employer 
or client, thereby avoiding harm that could affect any of parties (employers, 
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employees, clients ... ) and society at large if and when MA practices go beyond the 
game spirit to a win-lose situation. 
3.8.3 Structuration Theory in MA 
Structuralism 'accentuate the importance of the 'system', social and linguistic as 
contrasted with the elements which compose it' (Giddens, 1995, p. 9), and formulates 
an understanding of the 'social totality' (Giddens, 1995, p. 47). Through structuralism 
structures within organisations are conceived as in a more explanatory role of the 
social action, which Giddens refers to as both enabling and constraining (Giddens, 
1995, pp. 60, 69). 
Giddens (1995, p. 62) wanted to make 'distinctions between structure and system 
(without questioning that these have to be closely connected),. This distinction and 
complementing nature of structure and system which he termed "duality of structure" 
is at the very core of structuration theory. MA academics employed it to describe and 
understand that 'it is impossible ... to separate the actions of knowledgeable agents 
from the structures which are both the medium and outcome of their actions' (Scapens 
& Macintosh, 1996, p. 683). 
MA processes informed by structuration theory can provide meaning and 
understanding to issues of MA change as an area governed by the action of change 
agents and the structure of the system (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998, p. 381; 
Abernethy & Brownell, 1999, pp. 192, 199; Bums & Scapens, 2000, p. 11; Norris, 
2002, pp. 233,234). 
The data collected from the PB case study and the survey shows the explanatory 
powers of structuration theory applied to MAS as a social and linguistic system, in 
addition to explaining the duality of both the actions of users and influencers of MAS 
and the operation and design ofMAS employed by the banks. 
3.8.4 Critical Management Theory 
'The move to critical management theory can in some part (be) understood as a 
logical progression from management accounting's earlier interests in behavioural 
accounting and organisational analysis' (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 65). Roslender (1995, 
p. 65) explains the objective of critical management theory as being: 
'to contribute to the development of an improved or enhanced form of management 
accounting one which is more balanced in emphasis and insightful in nature, critical 
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management theory breaks with the economic underpinnings, positivism using a 
broad range of social scientific perspectives'. 
Critical theory's contribution to MA is in its commitment to change and in explaining 
hidden meanings, historical and social to reveal forces which give rise to change 
(Roslender, 1995, pp. 75-76). As critical theory in MA views organisations in their 
historical and social context, these ideas influenced the way MA academics sought to 
understand organisational change by adding the influence of an organisation history to 
its social context (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 12). The interaction of the two is 
reflected in how change can be understood and expected in organisations and their 
systems. 
PART III 
A LITERATURE REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTlNG RESEARCH 
(MAR) 
MAR has been influenced by a number of ontological perspectives such as economic 
and behavioural theories and by a whole range of epistemological approaches from 
the strictly positivist to a phenomenological perspective. The differing directions of 
MAR reflect broadly the evolution of various social variables encompassing 
philosophical, political, economic, and technological evolution that has accompanied 
the development of MA practices. 
This review is not exhaustive but is meant to show directions in MAR. There are 
points of omission and under-representation of some, but it is the broadness, patterns, 
and directions that are aimed at. MAR that influenced this research is given more 
attention and comment as to how it relates to the research. 
The review follows a historical framework divided into decades up the 1990s. 
Naturally MAR did not follow a clear-cut pattern as the framework might suggest, 
there were inevitably overlaps as well as continuations. The framework is chosen as 
an indication of the obvious thrust in each decade. 
3.9 MAR up to the 1950s 
Informed by economic theories, MAR in its earlier periods attempted to provide 
models and teclmiques to progranune decision-making and control processes 
(Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 246). 'It was assumed that the objective of 
management decision-making is to maximize the wealth of shareholders and that 
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there is little uncertainty about either the decision alternatives or the decision 
outcomes' (Ashton et al., 1995, p. 6). 
Flowing from this rationale, models were developed to simulate decision-making in 
organisations (Otley, 1984, p. 162; Drury, 1996, p. 852; Scapens & Bromwich , 2001, 
p. 246). Otley (1984) describes it as: 
'management decision-making became the focus of research for academic scholars in 
business schools. Led by advances in microeconomic theory and by the emerging 
discipline of operations research, an impressive battery of analytic tools was applied 
to a broader array of management decisions. Of particular interest to management 
accountants were advances in capital budgeting, product mix and product profitability 
analysis, transfer pricing, cost control, and divisional control and evaluation'. 
Other areas of research during this period were: the financial evaluation of investment 
proposals, consideration of costs and cost detennination. In all of these areas research 
has had some direct impact on practice, and has influenced more general views of the 
possibilities for practice and the means for their appraisal that MAR in later periods 
introduced. 
Economic models portrayed decision-makers as rationally seeking to maximise their 
benefits and assumed that equilibrium prevailed. Those assumptions ignored 
uncertainty, organisational structure and imperfect infonnation until the third quarter 
of the twentieth century, and ignored as well the bounded rationality of decision-
makers (Luft & Shields, 2002, p. 797). Furthennore, models developed based on 
mathematical models for decision-making purposes were 'very complex and failed to 
recognize that infonnation is a costly resource' (Drury, 1996, p. 853). 
Economic theorists in MAR attempted to ignore internal organisational control 
problems, regarding the finn as essentially a single economic actor (Ashton et al., 
1995, p. 5). Little attention was given by early MAR to the importance of highly-
diversified and, at times unpredictable influences of the human element on the 
adoption, success and usefulness of the models. 
Through the initial work of Argyris (1952) on budget participation, accounting 
researchers adopted the human relations approach assessing the effects of budgetary 
participation (Covaleski et al., 1996, p. 23). The human relations tradition was the 
intellectual basis for the classic work of Argyris (1952) who found that budgetary 
participation tends to foster fuller control over budgetees [see Exhibit 3.11, Table of 
Main MAR up to 1999]. 
A second influence on MA literature during this period was the theory of scientific 
management with its tenets of rationality, maximisation, accurate measurements, and 
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Exhibit 3.11 
Table of Main MAR Up to 1999 
Time period MAR Topic , Theory Reference 
Before 1950s Break-even, make or buy, annuity, cost Neo-classical theory Singer, 1961 
calculations 
Capital budgeting, product mix, product Microeconomics Otley, 1984 
profitability analYSis, transfer priCing, cost 
control, divisional control and evaluation 
Cost determination Microeconomics Ashton, Hopper & Scapens 1995 
1960s Control Behavioural theory! Birnberg & Nath, 1967 
psychological 
perspectives 
1970s Markets and hierarchies model Information economics Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983 , 
Budgeting Organisation theory Otley, 1984 
Influence of information on individual Human information Puxty, 1993 
behaviour and ability to process information processing 
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Exhibit 3.11 (continued) 
MAR Topic Theory Reference 
1970s Input and effect of information in MAS Behavioural theories Lord, 1989 
Interpersonal effects on budgets within Behavioural theories/ Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978 
organizations psychological approach 
Decision models incorporating uncertainty Interactionist theory Cooper, 1983 
Design and operation of management information Interactionst theory Roslender, 1990 
and control systems 
Examined relations among environment, culture, Contingency theory Spicer & Ballew, 1983; Anderson & 
technology, size management style, and Lanen, 1999, Scapens, 1984, Ashton, 
organisational structure Hopper & Scapens, 1995; Otley, 1984, 
Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983 
Design of information and control systems Contingency theory Covaleski et aI., 1996 
1980s Effect of MA practices on people, significance of Social theories Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984 
human and social processes 
Significance of information in organisations, Foucauldian Theory Covaleski et al., 1996; Roslender, 
standard costing, budgets 1990 
71 B 
Exhibit 3.11 (continued) 
Period MAR Topic Theory Reference 
Participative budgeting Agency theory Baiman, 1982; Brownell & Mclnnes, 
1986 
Conflict, power, and exposing interests within Critical theory Roslender, 1990 
organisations 
Social implications of budgeting, budgetary control, Labour theory Hopper & Armstrong, 1991 
performance evaluation, and setting standards 
Organisational effectiveness Systems theories Scott, 1977; 
Quinn & Cameron, 1983 
1990s Process of change in MA Institutional economics Burns & Scapens, 2000 
Target costing, ABC, JIT, quality management, Economic theory Shields & Shaffir, 1997; Scapens & 
economic decision-making Bromwich, 2001 
Gap between MA theory and practice budgetary Behavioural theories, Scapens & Bromwich, 2001; 
participation and control, performance evaluation, socia I theories Hopwood, 2002; Shields, 1997 
information and control systems, 
MCS, cost accounting, cost management, cost Economic theory Shield, 1997 
drivers 
the view that design and organisational issues can be solved using mathematical 
formulae on paper, with little mention - if any - of the human side of organisation. 
MAR in accounting systems focused on the technical issues (Smith et al., 1988, p. 
96), as can be sensed from Kircher's (1961, p. 45) discussion of accountants' place: 
'Accountants cannot avoid the need for more training in mathematics and in the use 
of electronic and mechanical equipment'. 
Nevertheless, Kircher (1961, p. 49) acknowledges that accounting should be 
undeJstood in terms of reference to its larger framework. 
During the period prior to 1960 other. theoretical influences affected MAR. 
Functionalist perspectives as precursors to contingency theory were starting to be 
found (Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 22) much earlier than the 1970s when MAR was 
significantly influenced by contingency theory. 
In spite of the significant influence which economic theories had on MAR in this 
period, Kircher (1961, p. 44) believes that: 
'it is possible to take the position that there is as yet no "literature" in the field of the 
theory of management accounting. Articles are devoted mostly to practices that have 
been found effective, or those that the author believes would be effective, rather than 
fundamental to theory'. 
The same theme of lack of a theory in MA was and still is a centre of debate 
(Scapens, 1984, p. 20; Olley, 1984, p. 98; Kaplan, 1986, p. 441; Roslender, 1990, p. 
354; Zimmerman, 2001, p. 412 to mention just some). 
3.J 0 MAR in the 1960s 
With extensive MAR having been undertaken in the restricted circles of economic 
decision models, MAR was regarded in the early 1960s as: exhausted. Scapens (1984, 
p. 18) sheds light on the state of MAR in the 1960s and on how it was perceived: 
'In the early years of the 1970s when this writer became an academic researcher, 
there was a widely held view that research in financial accounting was potentially 
'more exciting' than management accounting research. It was suggested on several 
occasions that management accounting research was less rewarding because most of 
the interesting questions had already been answered (in the 1960s)'. 
Obviously, MAR - as can be seen from the following sections - evolved tremendously 
through the influence of behavioural and social theories and an ever-increasing 
number of interesting questions in MAR were open to investigation. 
In the 1960s MAR was still adopting an economic perspective and focused on a 
rigorous mathematical analysis of MA problems. Abbot (1988 as quoted by Covaleski 
et aI., 1996, p. 1 I) gives an explanation of why MA drew on economic theories during 
this period: 
72 
'professions seek to legitimise themselves to society by attaching their expertise to 
the widely held values of rationality, efficiency and science, and that a key 
characteristic lies in the use of power both externally to preserve an abstract system 
of knowledge and, more importantly, internally in terms of hierarchical stratification 
and differentiation'. 
The micro economics perspective adopted in MAR during this period was to be 
criticised later in MAR as being narrow in focus (Otley, 1984, p. 98; Scapens, 1984, 
p. 41; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p. 91; Drury, 1996, p. 661; Covaleski et ai., 1996, 
p. 22 to mention some). 
By the mid-1960s, the influence of behavioural dimensions in MAR were clearly 
observed in areas such as the input and effect of infonnation in MAS (Lord, 1989, p. 
127). The founding of the Journal of Accounting Research in 1963 was also a 
significant step in supporting the growth in behavioural accounting research (Lord, 
1989, p. 128). 
The study of budgetary control systems provided an early focus for MAR. Initially 
universal findings were sought that would suggest the 'one best way' of operating 
budgetary control system (Otley, 1984, p. 125). However, there were little efforts put 
into a clear understanding of the communication processes involved, budgetary and 
standards setting, and goal congruence (Bimberg & Nath, 1967, pp. 468-471). 
In control, a number of approaches within behavioural theory were researched, 
although mainly focusing on an individual psychological orientation such as 
aspiration levels, stimUlus-response, conditioning, and cognitive dissonance 
(Bimberg & Nath, 1967, p. 476), 
Lord (1989, p. 126) notes that long before 'the tenn behavioural accounting research 
(BAR) was in vogue, accountants indicated an interest in the behavioural aspects of 
accounting as early as 1920'. The sociological approach [Exhibit 3.9, Main 
Behavioural Theories in MAl developed during the 1960s reflected itself in 
"structural" approaches to organisational studies (Covaleski et ai., 1996, p. 3). Such 
an approach neglects the view of an organisation and systems within organisations as 
an entity interacting with its environment influencillg and being influenced by it 
[Exhibit 3.11, Table of Main MAR up to 1999]. 
3.10.1 MAR Methods up to the 1960s 
MAR methods used during this period reflect the economic theory thinking and 
scientific management approach adopted in MAR. MAR used methods that sought 
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illusions of objectivity and accuracy in field and laboratory methods that were 
believed to exist at the time and researchers needed just to find ways to identifY them. 
Laboratory experiments widely used by MA researchers used student subjects which 
raises questions as 'to the acceptability of the study results' (Birnberg & Nath, 1967, 
p. 472). Prior to the early-1960s, field studies comprised 'less than 5 percent of 
published research' (Birnberg & Nath, 1967, p. 472). 
MAR in trying to apply natural science rationale to complex situations of decision-
making in organisations ignores the influence of the complex internal and external 
environments decision-makers continuously face [see discussion of those issues in 
Section 4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at PB; Section 4.1 003, 
Internal Politics at PB; and Section 5.9.2, Information on the Internal and External 
Environments of JCB]. 
3.11 MAR in the 1970s 
The 1970s was a decade quite different from previous ones. A number of new theories 
influenced MAR in addition to economic theories, which were used in a more 
complex way in model building than in previous periods. Two theories, organisation 
theory and contingency theory, had a most profound effect on MAR and still have to 
this date, and much of the content of current MA textbooks is derived from MAR in 
the 1970s as well the 1960s (Drnry, 1996, p. 852). 
In the 1970s the move was towards the organisational and social roles of accounting 
compared to the earlier MAR which was influenced by psychological perspectives 
(Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 23; Lord, 1989, p. 128; Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 17). 
Burchell et al. (1980, p. 22) explain the significance and relevance of a sociological 
approach to studying accounting: 
'once implemented an accounting becomes an organizational and social phenomenon, 
there to be used for a variety of ends by a range of actors in an organization' . 
During this period behavioural research was fragmentary, as researchers tried to 
explain the possible effects which existing MA practices could have on employees 
and processes and produced little evidence for explaining the behaviour of individuals 
in MAS nor did quantitatively-inclined researchers (Scapens , 1984, p. 56). 
The research in looking at the role of MAS in enhancing OE discusses behavioural 
issues implicated in the design, implementation, and operation of MAS such as 
participation in the design of MAS and MAS reports, flow of information, internal 
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politics, and the use of perfonnance evaluation in motivation [see for example, 
Section 4.12.8, Participation in MAS Reports Design at PB; Section 4.10.3, Intemal 
Politics at PB; Section 5.12.1.9, Principles of Feedback and Feedforward Control in 
JCB; and Section 5.12.1.2, Psychology and Problems of Users in JCB]. 
Otley (1984, p. 97) explains that most accounting researchers who used behavioural 
approaches at the time had little training in the social sciences outside of economics, 
and 'tended to select seemingly appropriate concepts, theories and methodologies 
from social science disciplines on a purely pragmatic basis. The result has been that 
published work in behavioural accounting has been fragmentary and disjoined and, on 
occasion, severely criticized by social scientists' . 
3.1l.1 Infonnation Economics Approach in MAR 
An infonnation economics approach emerged in the 1970s [Exhibit 3.8, Main 
Economic Theories in MA], which added to the MA literature and extended models 
developed in the 1960s to incorporate uncertainty - but without looking into its 
source, and the cost of collecting and providing infonnation (Drury, 1996, p. 853; 
Cooper, 1983, p. 275). Nowadays, environmental uncertainty is a major factor 
affecting the managerial functions of planning, decision-making, and control as well 
as the design of MAS [see discussion in Section 4.8, External Envirornnent Factors 
Affecting Ability of Managers to Achieve Goals at PB; and Section 5.9.2, Infonnation 
on the Internal and External Environments of JCB]. 
The development of the infonnation economics model was part of research 'involving 
the comparison of the alternative accounting methods and the evaluation of simple-
versus-complex models' (Scapens, 1984, p. 49). However, during this period 
economics-based MAR 'has become less nonnative and more descriptive in an 
attempt more realistically to model and interpret managerial behaviour and the role of 
control systems' (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 7). 
Consequently, new decision models emerged aiming at adding more complexity to 
earlier models such as the markets and hierarchies framework of Tiessen & 
Waterhouse (1983, pp. 258-259). This framework realised the real situation faced by 
organisations as being much more complex and multi-faceted. The significance of 
those models was the acknowledgement of the relevance of bounded rationality paired 
with envirornnental complexity/uncertainty both within and outside organisations. 
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'The test of a 'good' normative theory has come to include its power in explaining 
existing practice' (Scapens, 1984, p. 55). 
3.11.2 Human Information Processing (HIP) Theory in MAR 
HIP was beginning to represent a significant portion of the behavioural accounting 
research published at the time, as part of research on the effect of accounting 
information in a managerial environment (Lord, 1989, p. 135; Puxty, 1993, p. 9). 
Most of the research in HIP had concentrated on the influence of available 
information upon an individual's behaviour and ability to process information to 
make decisions (Driver & Mock, 1975, p.493; Lord, 1989, p. 138; Puxty, 1993, p. 9). 
Understandably this ability to process information influences the design of MAS and 
MAS reports [see discussion in Section 4.11, The Design of MAS at PB; and Section 
4.12, Characteristics and Design ofMAS Reports at PBj. 
HIP theories contributed to MAS, but it became clear that generalisation on the ways 
in which people process information is problematic. At best HIP offered a differential 
assumption that categories of people with similar thought processes can be identified 
(Driver & Mock, 1975, p. 494) [see discussion in Section 5.12.1.2, Psychology and 
Problems of Users in JCB; and Section 4.11.1.6, Effects of Psychology of Users on 
MAS Design at PB]. 
3.11.3 Organisation Theory in MAR 
The MAR interest in explaining accounting systems' performance influenced by 
behavioural and organizational factors dates back to the 1950s and 1960s but it was 
only in the 1970s that a significant amount of work was performed (OtJey, 1984, p. 
97; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6). Organization theory became most prominent in the 
deVelopment of contingency theories of MA, and in research concerned with applying 
systems theory (OtJey, 1984, p. 124; Covaleski et ai., 1996, p. 2). 
Hopwood (1983, P. 293) describes the contribution of MAR informed by organisation 
theory as providing 'a basisJor appreciating the practitioners' worries' but that: 
'the insights that it provides reside in the realm of experience, only rarely being set 
aside the abstract and highly generalised claims that grace the manuals of technical 
accounting practice' (Hopwood, 1983, p. 291). 
In an evaluation of the use of organisation theory in MAR by the early 1980s, a 
similar opinion to that of Hopwood's (1983, p. 3), OtJey (1984, p. 129) finds that it 
brought 'an impressively wide range of concepts to bear on the issues of management 
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and "organizational control' but that it was not complemented by a similar amount of 
empirical work. 
The 1970s showed a more systematic study of the organizational aspects of 
accounting control (Otley, 1984, p. 97; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 65) focusing 
in MAR on budgeting at an organizational level of analysis, in addition to a second 
behavioural approach to budgeting systems, which focused 'on the psychological or 
interpersonal effects of budgets within organizations' (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, 
p.66). 
One topic related to budgetary systems that attracted research up to the present day is 
budgetary participation (Brownell, 1981; Brownell & McInnes, 1986;). Brownell & 
Dunk (1991, p. 703) note that the continuing stream of research devoted to budgetary 
participation constitutes, in their view, 'the only organized critical mass of empirical 
work in MA at present' . 
In addition to budgeting, modem organisation theory influenced MAR in areas such 
as performance measurement, planning and internal resource allocation, issues 
directly relevant to MA (Sathe, 1978, p. 90). As important a contribution as that is, 
organisation theory did not evaluate decision-making processes and managerial 
performance, as MAR tended to draw upon organization theory eclectically (Otley, 
1984, p.137). 
MAR, however, influenced by organisation theory reflected characteristics similar to 
neo-c1assical accounting [see discussion in Section 3.6.1, The Influence of Economic 
Theory on MA]. The research methods used in organizational studies were those of 
the natural sciences. Much of the research was concerned with testing a priori 
hypotheses. The exploratory studies within organisation theory generated little theory 
and are difficult to compare with other studies because 'of the high reliance placed on 
sUbjective interpretations of statistically generated dimensions' (Otley, 1984, p. 137). 
The majority of research in organization theory and MA corresponded to the 
regulation dimension. MAR emphasised 'stability, integration, co-ordination and 
consensus within societies and organizations' (Cooper, 1983, p. 272). Within that 
perspective organisations were viewed as ordered entities where 'issues of power and 
domination are marginal'. Cooper (1983, p. 272) sees this as perceiving MA as a 
'technical device which is inevitable in a movement towards organizational 
efficiency' . 
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However, this position does not take into consideration the fact that what might be 
functional for some members of an organisation might not be for others. Stability, 
integration, and co-ordination, and information systems in organisations such as MAS 
undergo a continuous process of adaptation towards stability, integration and co-
ordination not solely in response to technical developments but also as social 
adaptation process. Organisation and systems within organisations face two important 
phenomena: dynamic and complex internal and external environments, and. 
uncertainty, and both phenomena have social and technical dimensions. 
The advantages of the introduction of organisational research to MAR was in 
providing a better understanding of the meanings which are given to accounting in 
particular settings 'emphasising not the interpretation of an accounting given but the 
more active ways in which a particular account can shape mould and even play a role 
in constructing the setting of which it forms a part' (Hopwood, 1983, p. 298) [see 
discussion in Section 4.10, Factors Hindering Diffusion of Information at PB as an 
example]. 
However, Cooper (1983, p. 274) notes, m MAR in the 1970s the absence of 
consideration of 'how accounting systems or organizations might change', and the 
lack of interest in historical developments of MA practices to understand the logics of 
existing practices (Cooper, 1983, p. 283). 
3.11.4 Contingency Theory Research 
Contingency theory's contribution to MAR was important to issues of co-ordination 
and control and made important contributions to understanding issues in the design of 
information and control systems, budgeting and strategic planning (Covaleski et ai., 
1996, p. 2). It avoided earlier emphasis of technical facets in organisational and 
sociological models (Covaleski et ai., 1996, p. 9). 
MAR informed by contingency theory examined relations between a variety of 
'endogenous and exogenous contextual factors and management accounting p;3ctices' 
(Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 381) [Exhibit 4.14, Factors Affecting Design of MAS). 
Contingent factors in MAR are: competition (Anderson & Lanen, 1999,p. 382) which 
is part of the external environment, environmental uncertainty (Spicer & Ballew, 
1983, p. 75; Scapens, 1984, p. 57; Ashton, Hopper & Scapens, 1995, p. 6; Covaleski 
et ai., 1996, p. 3; Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 381), national culture (Anderson & 
Lanen, 1999, p. 381; Bhimani, 1999, p. 417; Chenhall, 2003, p. 152), technology 
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(Spicer & Ballew, 1983, p. 75; Scapens, 1984, p. 57; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6), size 
(Scapens, 1984, p. 57; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6; Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 3), 
management style (Otley, 1980, p. 413; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 6), and organisational 
structure (OtJey, I 980,p. 413; Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 252). 
Factors such as technology and environment were hypothesized to influence 
dimensions of organisational structure, thereby adding insights to the various 
contingent contextual factors (Scapens, 1984, p. 57; Spicer & Ballew, 1983, p. 75; 
Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 4). Planning (Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 381), control and 
performance appraisal (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 252; Anderson & Lanen, 
1999, p. 381; Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 4) were the subjects most researched within 
contingency research (Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 381; Bhimani, 1999, p. 417). 
Notwithstanding the above, the contingency variables identified and researched were 
ill-defined. The dimensions of organisational structure (and process) considered 
differed from study to study, the liuk with OE was largely unproven (Otley, 1980, p. 
419), and the relationship between organizational structures and MAS variables was 
not adequately studied (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 251) [see discussion in 
Section 4.11.1.4, Effects of Organisational Structure on MAS Design at PB; Section 
5.12.l.4, Organisational Structure in JCB]. 
Some researchers remain hesitant about the significance of contingency theory in MA, 
and in spite of MAR being influenced by contingency theory, 'insufficient, empirical 
evidence has emerged to indicate that a contingency-theory approach can explain 
current management accounting practice' (Drury, 1996, p. 854). 
3.11.5 InteractionistlSocial Action Theory in MAR 
Literature on interactionist theory started to attract attention during the 1970s, and 
provided a means whereby the design of MAS can be understood in a much broader 
and insightful way (Roslender, 1990, p. 355). Interactionism's concern for the power 
and politics of rationality add a further perspective to understanding accounting 
information (Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 7). Accounting information accordingly, is 
never a neutral independent instrument characterised by representational faithfulness 
(Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 11) and accuracy [see discussion in Section 4.11, 
Characteristics and Design ofMAS at PB]. 
However, MAR, drawing on interactionist theory is criticised for being uncritical and 
providing 'rich descriptions often accompanied by equally bland analyses' 
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(Roslender, 1990, p. 357). [See more discussion in Section 3.8.1, InteractionistlSocial 
Action Theory in MA;] 
3.1\.6 MAR Methods in the 1970s 
Methods used in the period were biased towards experiments (Lord, 1989, p. 132) and 
'arm's-length questionnaire-based techniques from which reliable results are expected 
to emerge by statistical analysis' (Otley, 1980, p. 419). Notwithstanding the above, 
with the popularity in MAR of behavioural theories and the fact that MA researchers 
did not have enough training in the social sciences, a need arose for a 'shift in 
academic training, combined with a dedicated effort by interested accounting faculty 
to enhance their backgrounds in these areas' (Lord, 1989, p. 133). This led to 
significant improvement in the research methods in behavioural accounting research. 
Otley (1984, p. 144) observing the methods used up to the early-1980s, encouraged 
the use of inductively-generated theories and qualitative methods as a neglected 
approach in MAR. Atkinson & Shaffir (1989, p. 42), Lord (1983, p. 59), and Kaplan 
(1986, pp. 431-432) also make a similar observation on qualitative research methods 
used in that period: 
'field research in MA invariably focuses on how people, either acting individually or 
in groups, react either to MA information, such as cost or productivity data, or MAS, 
such as control or planning systems' (Atkinson & Shaffir 1989, p. 42). 
MAR driven by the desire of academics to use "rigorous" research methods resulted 
in models or data not being representative of the phenomena in an organisational 
setting because of a bias towards internal validity (Otley, 1984, p. 102; Kaplan, 1986, 
p. 441). 'More generally there has been a retreat from field studies into the more 
predictable environment of laboratory experiments, albeit well-designed experiments. 
The net result is that, although the case for broader-based studies of the operation of 
management accounting systems has been convincingly argued, few researchers have 
been prepared to undertake such studies' (Otley, 1984, p. 102). 
Conclusions from laboratory experiments had limited external validity to actual 
organisational settings and the positive behavioural research particularly conducted in 
the USA and the extent the findings applied to other cultural environments is open to 
discussion (Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 22). This later became a centre of debate 
among MA academics on the divergence of MAR from MA practice in the early 
1980s [see discussion in Section 3.2, MA Practitioners and MA Academics: 
Diverging Agendas]. 
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Up to the 1980s there was still a call for more qualitative MAR 'processual, 
observational, interpretive and phenomological work' (Earl, 1983, p. 59), and for field 
experimentation, action research away from testing a priori theories and personal 
interpretation of statistically-generated dimensions and laboratory experiments (Otley, 
1984, p. 137). Kap1an (1986, pp. 431-432) describes the methods used in MAR during 
the 1970s and early 1980s as: 
'classification of MAR shows seven out of eight MAR papers have neither data from 
actual organizations nor are tested in actual organizations ... less than 5% of the papers 
are actual field studies and these tend to be concentrated in two areas: budgeting ... 
and miscellaneous performance evaluation'. 
In spite of the diversity of MAR in this period, Cooper (1983, p. 270) notes that the 
majority of the research took the perspective of 'tidying any muddle' and emphasised 
the role of MA practices in bringing orderliness to organisational activities. A further 
issue Cooper notes about MAR in the 1970s showed it centred more on description, 
actuality and current realities and not transcending characteristics of the subjects of 
the research undertaken (Cooper, 1983, p. 276). The fact prompted Cooper (1983, p. 
278) to encourage researchers to reflect more on future MAR and on critical theory. 
3.12 MAR in the 1980s 
MAR, drawing on organisational and sociological traditions in the period offered a 
relatively non-technical understanding of MA: 
'managerial accounting practices are not techniques that can be abstracted from the 
general milieu of social life but rather one strand in the complex weave that makes up 
the social fabric'(Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 22). 
There was also a call for more inter-disciplinary work with research teams having 
members drawn from different disciplinary backgrounds, whilst appreciating the 
problems as well as the potential that may arise (Otley, 1984, p. 147). Even so, 
Hopwood (1983, p. 302) and Choudhury (1986, p. 28) find that accounting research 
up to then has adopted an 'all too parochial perspective', and observe that MAR in the 
first half of the 1980s was conducted in an isolated, piecemeal fashion and useful 
ideas were not followed through. 
As was observed in studies on actual organisations in previous periods, Otley (1984, 
p. 148) comments on a paucity of theory development based on real-world 
observation, whether formally or informally undertaken, and the pressing need for 
more theoretical work that is grounded in real-world observation. 
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The 1980s was also a period for evaluation and taking stock by MA researchers who 
'became increasingly critical of the existing state of MA knowledge' (Ashton et 
a\.,1995, p. 7). MA academics started to realise the gulf between MAR and MA 
practice. Hopwood & Bromwich (1984, p. 3) describe how MAR started slowly: 
'to be interested in why practice was the way it is, the factors that do induce it to 
change and the consequences that accounting actually has. Practice, in other words, is 
coming to be seen in more appreciative terms. Instead of seeking only to reform it in 
the name of more general notions of what its concerns should be, researchers also are 
starting to investigate what the pragmatic craft of accounting might actually be 
about' . 
The divergence of MAR and MA practice became a centre of a debate during this 
period (Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p.4; Scapens, 1984, p. 36; McCosh & Howell, 
1983, p. 280; Hopwood, 1983, p. 280; Choudhury, 1986, p. 21; Lewin & Minton, 
1986, p. 526; 10hnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 14; Homgren, 1989, p. 22; Ashton et a\., 
1995, p. 7 to mention some). With hindsight it was a turning point in the history of 
MAR that could be described as a crisis of identity [see Section 3.2, MA Practitioners 
and MA Academics: Diverging Agendas]. MAR after this became wary of using 
methods unquestionably used up till the end of the 1970s when models and techniques 
were presented as definite solutions to organisational problems. It was a period of 
reflection that slowed down MAR while academics were reassessing past MAR and 
its future avenues. It still left its finger prints on current MAR at the beginning of the 
tWenty first century where researchers are much more attentive and careful in drawing 
conclusions as can be seen in Zimmerman's (2002) sharp comments on current MAR 
[see more in Section 3.13, MAR in The 1990s]. 
3.12.1 Behavioural Theories in MAR in the 1980s 
Behavioural theories [Exhibit 3.9 Main Behavioural Theories in MA] still continued 
to influence MAR by the 1980s. They had developed from 'the initial work by 
Argyris [1952] ... into a more mature and accepted accounting research area' (Lord, 
1989, p. 139). 
Drawing on behavioural theories, MAR looked into the impact members of 
organisations and accounting systems have on each other. MAR: 
'started to become more interested in the consequences that accounting actually has 
as well as those that it should have. Increasingly recognizing that accounting practice 
can only achieve its potential through mobilizing other human and social processes in 
the organization, many now realize that accounting cannot be seen in purely technical 
terms' (Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p. 3). 
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The PB case study and the survey of lCB show the significance and impact of human 
and social processes on the design and operation of MAS. They also show how the 
more technical aspects of MAS such as budgets, and variance analysis can be 
influenced and shaped by human and social processes [see more in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5]. 
3.12.2 Social Theories in MAR in the 1980s 
In the second half of the 1980s more papers bearing the influence of sociology were 
published, and a wider base of research was undertaken. The sociological perspective 
employed were in fact a series of sub-perspectives each of which has its own strengths 
and weaknesses (Roslender, 1990, p. 352,353). One important contribution of social 
theory to MAR is in providing a framework for MAR as an interaction between action 
and structure. The effect of organisational structure on systems and processes was not 
new to MAR nor the interaction between individuals and structure as it was found in 
behavioural research. However, the prominence of structure given by social theory is 
not as a contingent variable but as a basic part of organisational life: 
'structuration theory provides a potentially valuable framework for management 
accounting research. We argued that Giddens' analysis of the duality of structure 
allows us to conceptualise management accounting systems as modalities of 
structuration which mediate between action and structure' (Scapens & Mackintosh 
1996, p. 677). . 
What Scapens & Mackintosh (1996) are clearly describing is the way in which MAS 
as a structure, and compilers, movers and users of MAS as actors interact with the 
system/structure influencing it and, at the same time, how MAS as a structure 
influences the users' and compilers' actions either restricting or enhancing their 
actions [see discussion in Section 4.10.4, Centralisation ofInformation at PB; 4.10.1, 
Communication Channels at PB; 4.13.1, A Description of the IT System Used at PB; 
Section 5.10.1.1, Centralisation of Information in JCB; 5.11.3, Channels of 
Communication in JCB; and Section 5.14, The Use of Computers in MAS in JCB]. 
3.12.3 MAR Influenced by Critical Theory in the 1980s 
During the 1980s, MAR was influenced by critical perspectives and explored the roles 
of accounting practices in society. The critical perspectives deployed different 
theoretical approaches and methodologies and addressed a wide range of topics and 
issues (Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 12). 
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Accounting practices were explained in the light of issues of conflict, domination and 
power in organisations, in terms of class conflict, the hegemony of elites, and the 
power of experts and professional in an attempt to understand those practices 
(Covaleski et aI., 1996, p .. l3). Critical theory aimed to 'expose the interests behind 
knowledge and indeed the knowledge which exists behind interests' (Roslender, 1990, 
p. 361) [see discussion in Section 4.15.5, The Goal-Setting Process at PB; Section 
4.10.3, Internal Politics at PB; and Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCBj. 
Covaleski et al. (1996, p. 13) remark that critical theory avoided 'a consensus view of 
society that is the hallmark of both the functional and interpretive perspectives'. 
Covaleski's et al. (1996) comment should not be viewed as belittling in any way the 
contribution of critical theory to MAR. But that MAR informed by critical theory did 
not reach a certain level of consensus for carrying further theory development in areas 
of MA. The explanations and critical insights of organisational life offered by critical 
theory contributed to such development in covering areas left uncovered by other 
perspectives. Nevertheless, there is a need to incorporate contextual characteristics in 
theory development [see for example the significance of context in the discussion in 
Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB; Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing 
Information on Performance Evaluation at PB; and Section 5.17.1.5, Committees in 
JCB; and 5.20.2, Performance Evaluation in JCBj. 
3.12.4 Labour Process Theory in MAR in the 1980s 
MAR influenced by labour process perspectives tried to explain the role of MA in 
organisations through explaining the social relations of production, budgeting, 
budgetary control, performance evaluation and setting standards (Covaleski et aI., 
1996, p. 14). Hopper & Armstrong (1991, as quoted by Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 15) 
argue that 'some of the accounting and cost information was not used for making the 
production process more efficient but rather used to intensitY the extraction of labor 
from labor force'. 
MA information though can be perceived not only as extracting labour from labour 
force but it could be for other motives such as influencing behaviour as in MA 
change, or furthering managements' interest or the post rationalising of action. 
In the PB case study the use of MA information for other than efficiency reasons in 
budgets and budgetary control was discussed [see Section 4.17, Conflict of Interest in 
Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control at PB; Section 5.19, Conflict of 
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Interest in Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control at PB; and Section 5.20.1, 
Budgetary Control in JCB]. 
3.12.5 Foucauldian Social Theory in MAR in the 1980s 
MAR adopting a Foucauldian perspective explained the role of MA in organisations 
from a different angle than that of other sociological theories [Exhibit 3.10, Main 
Social Theories in MA]. It added a new perspective on designing and implementing 
MAS as a critical way of looking at what passes for knowledge within organisations 
and how that concept is imposed on members of an organisation (Roslender, 1990, p. 
363) [see more on this in the discussion in Section 4.9, Diffusion of Information at 
PB; and 5.10, Diffusion ofInformation in JCB; and Section 5.20.1, Budgetary Control 
in JCB). 
Miller & O'Leary (1994 as quoted by Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 17) argue that 
accounting practices such as standard costing and budgeting should be understood "as 
a technology of government". Aspects of what Foucauldian theory discusses is 
relevant to what can be observed in budgets in PB which served as a planning, 
controlling, and a punitive instrument for branch managers. Whereby achieving 
budgets is rewarded and those who fail to do so were penalised [see more in Section 
4.17, Conflict oflnterest in Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control]. 
With the move of MAR away from the influence of economic theories, MA and MAS 
came more and more to be regarded as a social practice examining the intricacies and 
richness in social relations rather than a technique (Covaleski et al. 1996, p. 18). 
3.12.6 Agency Theory in MAR in the 1980s 
Some MAR in the 1980s adopted an agency theory framework to generate additional 
insights into MA problems (Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 246). Agency theory 
extended the information-economics approach and incorporated some behavioural 
considerations into the economic model (Drury, 1996, p. 853). 
The agency model was used in MAR in areas such as the behavioural constraints 
imposed by the self-interest of the agent's employment contract and in the areas of 
information systems that will maximise the utility function of the principal (Cooper, 
1983, p. 280; Scapens, 1984, p. 65). Agency theory was also used in emphasising the 
value of participative budgeting arising from information transmission in 
organisations (Baiman, 1982, p. 203). An example of such a situation is when budget 
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targets were set in PB. Branch managers - as agents of PB's management in their 
geographical areas - withheld information to further their own interest and built 
around their person a network of relations which they try to move around as they 
moved to other positions. On the other hand, management acknowledging this tried to 
counteract in the annual negotiating process of budgeting [see discussion in Section 
4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB]. 
3.12.7 Methods Used in MAR in the 1980s 
Methods used in MAR in the 1980s included the use of descriptive field research, and 
field studies that 'focus on developing evidence that either supports or contradicts an 
existing theory' (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1989, p. 47) such as the works of Brownell 
(1981), Brownell & McInnes (1986) on budgetary participation, motivation and 
performance, as well as the use of fieldwork that develops a theory. 
Fieldwork in the 1980s was perceived as less elegant, less scientific and more time 
consuming (Kaplan, 1986, p. 430). While other researchers find that a positive 
empirical approach as 'a wholly inadequate epistemological basis for a social science' 
(Tinker -et aI., 1982, p. 167). There were also calls for opening up to different 
approaches in MAR and the use of more case studies as a 'valuable and under-
exploited research tool' (Tinker et ai., 1982, p. 147) in addition to the use of 
interpretive approaches: 
'most management accounting research has avoided the use of interpretive methods, 
either by deliberate choice or as a result of the use of methodologies that cannot 
easily accommodate it (for example, survey questionnaires). Yet the methods would 
seem to offer considerable insight into a number of interesting and important 
questions, such as why particular organizations have developed the accounting 
systems they currently use, and what they are used for' (Otley, 1984, p. 145). 
Young (1999, p. 80) finds, almost without exception, field researchers in MA 'have 
adopted an overt role of objectively studying an organisation. Young explains such an 
approach is due to field research in MA still in its infancy (Young, 1999, p. 80; 
McKinnon, 1988, p. 34) and 'many of these researchers have been schooled in the 
logical empiricist tradition and thus, apply this world view to their field work' 
(Young, 1999, p. 80). 
MAR informed by agency theory research used a deductive analytical approach, 
which required a number of restrictive assumptions so as to maintain the analytical 
tractability of the models (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 257). Chambers (1980) has 
commented on the development of accounting research in a wider context, in that 
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methodology seems to have taken precedence over substance, and it appeared easier 
to publish methodologically sound work having relatively little substantive interest 
than research that is interesting, but which may lack some methodological rigour. 
Quick studies using laboratory experiments and questionnaires rather than more 
intensive field observation methods, and focusing upon individual studies rather than 
on organizations were preferred (Otley, 1984, p. 122). 
3.13 MAR in The 1990s 
Researchers in the late 1980s saw that, for MA to evolve in new areas it had to 
respond to changes in the environment and in the perceived roles of MA (Bromwich 
& Bhimani, 1989, p. 86). A move away from conventional MA wisdom as it 'applies 
mainly to the stable, centralized firm of classical economics and organizational 
theory' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990), towards incorporating social (Burchell et aI., 1980, 
p. 21; Loft, 1986, p.l67; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p. 88), behavioural (Hopwood, 
1989, p. 2), and more managerial approaches (Earl, 1983, p. 61). 
The 1990s was an era when MAR took a more open and pluralist perspective after 
going through self-assessment in the 1980s and 'expanded with the introduction of 
new theoretical approaches and a growing use of field-based research methods' 
(Scapens & Bromwich, 200 I, p. 246). There was a drift away from normative 
economic research to more varied theoretical and epistemological approaches -
particularly in MAR in Europe. It was a move to incorporate descriptive approaches 
that seek to model the complexities of management control and the internal 
organisation of firms in economic, organisational and social terms (Ashton et aI., 
1995, p. 9). 
Notwithstanding the above, economics remains a primary theoretical basis for much 
MAR with a traditional managerial focus grounded in an economic decision-making 
perspective (Scapens & Bromwich, 200 I, p. 249). 
In an editorial Scapens & Bromwich (2001, p. 251) note the difference in 
understanding between US and UK writers about what management accountants are 
and what they do as one could most probably say of other countries as well. Their 
editorial shows the research topics in Management Accounting Research in its first 
decade were wide with no particular emphasis on specific areas and went far beyond 
the traditional areas of cost management and management control (Scapens & 
Bromwich, 2001, pp. 250, 251). Nevertheless, there was a clear interest in the first 
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five years in the gap between theory and practice, whereas papers in the second five 
years tended to be more concerned with the process of change (Scapens & Bromwich, 
2001, p. 247). 
There was a clear change in MAR transcending the simple economic decision-making 
approaches that dominated MAR until the early 1980s to an appreciation of the 
complexities of MA (Scapens & Brornwich, 2001, p. 251). 
Hopwood (2002, p. 782) reflected on the difficulties facing MAR due to the nature of 
MA in terms of the diverse areas it covers where each area on its own has its 
characteristics, and lends itself to certain theoretical approaches. This diversity of 
areas also explains the current use, and will continue to do so in the future, of 
different theoretical approaches in MAR: 
'management accounting is neither a unitary nor a homogenous 
phenomenon ... Costing, budgeting, planning, performance evaluation, investment 
appraisal and other procedures often operate in semi-autonomy of one another, 
capable of being linked in different ways in different organizations. Although recent 
enterprise-wide information systems might have imposed a greater degree of 
integration on them, in practice the extent of actual implementation and use can and 
does vary, making research even more difficult' (Hopwood, 2002, p. 782). 
Philosophical underpinnings of MAR were a centre of debate in the 1990s and up to 
this current day: 
'Economics-based research has its merit, but it is just one voice, and for the academic 
community to exist and develop a critical stance, the possibility of multiple voices is 
there. Though this is no doubt less visible in the North American academia, a global 
perspective shows that the management accounting research community in toto 
accepts a plethora of different approaches to conducting research' (Mouristen et al. 
2002, as quoted in Lukka & Mouristen, 2002, p. 806). 
Hopwood (2002) sees another difficulty in modem MAS stemming from 'the amazing 
speed' with which solutions were found to 'complex and fascinating' problems, which 
encourages a focus on the superficial and on the fashionable (Hopwood, 2002, p. 
782). This state most likely limits producing an integrated, substantive body of 
knowledge (Ittner & Larcker, 2002, p. 787; Hopwood, 2002, p. 782). 
The traditional focus of MAR on manufacturing industry continued to be a substantial 
interest in the 1990s (Rezaee, 1991, p. 31; Shields, 1997, p. 6; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 
29; Chenhall, 2003, p. 144). Helliar et al. (2002, p. 29) note that 'management 
accounting practices in the service sector in general, or the financial services sector in 
particular - especially in banks - have been largely ignored' . 
3.13.1 The Different European and North American Approaches to MAR in the 
1990s 
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The debate on the appropriateness of drawing on many theoretical perspectives in 
MAR - as published in English - elicits many points of view with a clear polarisation 
between European researchers and North American researchers as is clear in Lukka & 
Mouristen (2002, p. 806) and Hopwood (2002, pp. 779-780). 
Hopwood (2002, pp. 779-780) finds that a strong normative dimension in MAR in 
North American journals 'constitute a locus of power in an academic system that is 
characterized as much, if not more so, by careerist-oriented rather than curiosity-
oriented research'. As a consequence innovation is 'thereby much more difficult and 
extremely risky in career terms, often constrained to the established few'. 
Zimmerman's (2001, p. 422) view represent a strong view of MAR in North America 
in that MA studies have been purely descriptive, conducted without underlying theory 
and unguided by research hypotheses, with which European MAR disagree (Ittner & 
Larcker 2002, p. 788). Ittner & Larcker (2002, p. 788) believe that MAR in our 
current times are testing economic and non-economic theories about MA practice. 
Demski (2000, as quoted by Hopwood, 2002, p.780) encourages his North American 
colleagues to focus on a topic 'without reference to method, section, or interest group' 
-. so as to enhance interaction among disciplines and put accounting back in the centre 
of our scholarly activities. 
A shortcoming of the view of the need for dominance of 'a monolithic economics-
based paradigm' could threaten MAR progress (Lukka & Mouristen, 2002, p. 806) as 
well as losing benefits which insights from other theoretical perspectives can offer. 
Noting the individuality of cultural contexts. Shields' (1997, p. 5) review of MAR 
published in six North American leading journals in the 1990s showed that the topics 
most researched were on management control systems [incentives, budgets, 
performance measurement... 85/152 papers]. The second most researched topic but 
with a much lower number of studies was cost accounting [cost allocation, cost 
variances, activity-based costing ... 24/152], followed by cost management [quality, 
liT, use of costs for decision-making .. .l41152], cost drivers [11/152] management 
accounting information systems [7/152] research methods and theories [61152], 
capital budgeting and investment decisions [5/152]. This summary by Shields 
highlights the opinion that the most researched topics in North American MAR, 
which is a significant portion of MAR in the English language, are those that lend 
themselves to positivist and statistical methods. 
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The individuality of North American MAR as Shields (1997, pp. 6, 7, 9) notes is also 
reflected in the settings, theories and methodologies used. In the settings of MAR 
manufacturing was the most researched setting [57 studies / 152]. The small number 
of studies in the services, in particular in financial services, is of interest. The use of 
alternative research theories is supported by many MA academics as enriching MAR 
rather than causing it to reg~ess (Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 19; Hopwood, 2002, p. 783; 
Lukka & Mouritsen, 2002, p. 806; Ittner & Larcker, 2002, p. 790; Luft & Shields, 
2002, p. 797). MA is a discipline that needs examination of actual practices (Ittner & 
Larcker, 2002, p. 788) which reflects its complexity incorporating many areas within 
dynamic organisational life reflected in change in those areas and interaction among 
them. 
Studies drawing on economic theories were the most published [75/ 152], followed by 
organizational behaviour theories [15/ 152], psychology [12/152], production and 
operations management [10/152], and sociology, [7/152]. A noticeable feature of 
published MAR reviewed by Shields (1997, p. 8) is that most of the articles 'use a 
theory to provide ex ante motivation or structure either to develop or test a 
model. .. few articles have developed an ex post theory based on induction from the 
empirical evidence presented'. Shield (1997, p. 8) explains this might be a result of 
editorial styles and preferences of the six journals he reviewed. 
3.13.2 MAR Methods in the 1990s 
In addition to the wide range of topics in MA there was an increase in the variety of 
research methods used in the 1990s. Common to all the methods was a significant 
change brought about by the increased emphasis upon fieldwork and descriptive 
research directed to understanding practice, and away from developing normative 
and prescriptive models. Ashton et al. (1995, p. 9) note how 'academic concern over 
the perceived gap between theory and practice has led to major changes in economics-
based MAR and the development of other theoretical approaches'. 
Methodological differences, however, remain unresolved, leading to major 
methodological debates amongst accounting researchers regarding how research 
should be conducted and the philosophical bases which underpin it (Ashton et aI., 
1995, p. 8; Zimmerman, 200 I, p.; Ittner & Larcker, 2002, p. 789; Hopwood, 2002, p. 
782; Luft & Shields, 2002, p. 797 to mention some). 
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Shields' (1997, p. 9) review of research methods used in North American journals in 
the 1990s forwards showed predominantly analytic research [49/152], followed by 
surveys [28/152] compared to case studies/field studies [10/152]. Shields (1997, p. 
10) remarks on reasons why so few case/field study articles appear in these journals: 
lack of knowledge on researchers part as to how to do good studies; lack of colleagues 
to team with; lack of incentives to researchers due to the system currently employed 
by American universities; lack of access to good sites; and the American journals' 
editorial styles and preferences which may include reluctance to publish papers on 
topics, theories and research methods different to those which they currently publish. 
3.14 Future Agenda for MAR 
There is great scope for studies that describe how individuals behave in organisations, 
and how they take decisions (Otley, 1984, p. 132; Atkinson et aI., 1997, p. 80; 
Zimmerman, 2002, p. 419; Hopwood, 2002, p. 782) taking into consideration the 
business contexts in question. An example of this is a need in MAR for more 
empirical evidence on the factors that influence the use of MA techniques (Norris, 
2002, p. 224). MAR needs to concentrate on all aspects of MA as MA has a role in 
planning, decision-making and control, although those functions are defined by 
academics in different ways (Luft & Shields, 2002, p. 796) 
There is also future interest in developing and testing more theories within MA 
capable of explaining MA practice and predictions (Shields, 1997, p. 26; Zimmerman, 
2001, p. 412; !ttner & Larcker, 2002, p. 789) and in the increased interest in strategic 
MA (Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 251; Shields, 1997, p. 24). 
Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 383) believe future challenges for MA and 
management accountants stem from the changing nature and role of MA as in the 
way 'performance evaluation and non-financial measures have extended the 
boundaries of management accounting' (Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 251). 
Change in MA poses a number of questions regarding: how people attend to and 
think about MA change, and how they interact in organisational change, who initiates 
MA change? Such questions help in understanding and predicting change, speed of 
change and the difficulties accompanying it (Shields, 1997, p. 22; Atkinson et aI., 
1997, p. 80; Luft & Shields, 2002, p. 800). 
Increased globalisation reflected in global products and capital is affecting the nature 
of MA as 'managers need accounting systems to enable them to manage such diverse 
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organisations' (Ashton et ai., 1995, p. 8). As environments change and evolve, MA is 
seen to follow a trend of widening involvement. management accountants are getting 
involved directly or indirectly in the other areas of the business such as an combining 
knowledge of human resource management and MA (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 
1998, p. 383; Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p. 251). Changes in management 
accountants' roles is also occurring as organisation structures (Atkinson et ai., 1997, 
p. 80; Scapens & Bromwich, 2001, p.251) and new organisational forms (Scapens & 
Bromwich, 2001, p. 251) develop. Shields (1997, p. 26) sees that the term MA 'will 
increasingly become too limited a concept and will be replaced by organizational 
accounting, this broader concept will enable it to incorporate more types of 
accounting and accountabilities in organizations, organizational subunits, and inter-
organizational arrangements' . 
MA researchers also are realising, with the changing nature of MA [see more on the 
nature of MA in Section 3.5, Defining MA], that different and more dimensions need 
to be considered when studying areas in MA and MAS. Researchers are realising that 
they need to go beyond the calculation of standards, variance analysis, or methods of 
investment appraisal to dimensions such as the ways in which internal and external 
cultures affect the adoption of cost management systems (Young & Selto, 1991, p. 
285) as well as MAS. 
MA researchers push to the adoption of a mixed ontological and epistemological 
approach to specific MAR issues needs to be still pursued in future MAR, provided 
that the theoretical views of human nature are clearly recognised at the outset and an 
attempt made to resolve them (Otley 1984) p. 145; Shields, 1997, p. 28). Using wider 
methods and theoretical perspectives, cross-method, cross-discipline investigations, in 
itself is beneficial in gaining insight from different perspectives and offers 
tremendous opportunities for new discoveries rather than as problems. It 'is also in line 
with pursuing more pluralist and liberal values. 
3.14.1 Future Agenda for Methods in MAR 
The trend towards diversity in methods and drawing on different philosophical 
perspectives needs to be encouraged (Atkinson et ai., 1997, p. 81; Shields, 1997, p. 
20; Young & Selto, 1991, p. 288) for a number of reasons: 
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(a) to encourage pluralism and liberalism in research methods; 
(b) encouraging regionalism not only could harm scientific endeavours of MAR 
but could also encourage intellectual domination by a few over others; 
(c) MA is a complex phenomenon and exists in complex environments and 
organisations, consequently future MAR needs to appreciate the value of 
using multiple research methods to address the same question (Atkinson et aI., 
1997, p. 81; Kaplan, 1986, p. 448). 
PART IV LITERATURE REVIEW of MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING 
SYSTEMS (MAS) 
This research deals with MAS separately as a sub-set of MA that has its specific 
characteristics and theoretical bases and roles. The literature review of MA in Part I of 
this chapter does not look into the specifics of the different components of MAS. 
Consequently, a more detailed literature review of MAS is pertinent looking into what 
are MAS and the roles of MAS in organisations as the research looks into the role of 
MAS in enhancing OE in JCB. 
This review does not include a discussion on how literature viewed the different 
elements in MAS design as this is discussed in detail in Section 4.11, Characteristics 
and Design ofMAS at PB; and Section 5.12, The Design ofMAS in JCB. However, 
this section will look into theoretical influences on MAS design, and attempt to 
explain what MAS are. 
3.15 The Role ofMAS in Organisations 
In discussing the roles of MAS in organisations, the discussion is divided into two 
main sections: Section 3.15.1, The Role of MAS in Planning and Decision-Making; 
and Section 3.15.2, The Role ofMAS in Control. In discussing planning and decision-
making, first, it should not be understood that they carry more weight in an 
organisation than control. The three managerial functions not only complement each 
other in enhancing OE but they can be perceived as two sides of a coin (Emmanuel et 
aI., 1990). 
The roles that are reviewed below are also discussed in various sections in Chapter 4, 
Case Study of PB; and Chapter 5, Survey of ICB from the perspectives of data 
collected. 
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In discussing the role of MAS in planning, decision-making and control in 
organisations it is worth keeping in mind what Burchell et al. (1980, p. 19) noted that 
the roles accounting serves are not constant but are 'created, shaped, and changed by 
pressures of organizational life' [see more on this in Section 3.5, Defining MA]. 
As is discussed in Section 3.13, MAR in The 1990s, very little research has been done 
into the roles of MAS in banks (Rezaee, 1991, p. 31; Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 22; 
Shields, 1997, p. 6; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 29; Chenhall, 2003, p. 144). Most of the 
research, and that which is discussed here, are studies on manufacturing firms. Rezaee 
(1991, pp. 25,31) explains that previously bank accountants in American banks paid 
little attention to the use of MA in banks, as well as most small and medium-sized 
banks do not have the resources to develop a system internally. However, this 
approach has changed and banks are adding managerial accounting concepts and 
techniques to their existing reporting structure 
3.15.1 The Role ofMAS in Planning 
MAS have a role in enhancing planning from a number of aspects by providing 
strategic infonnation, in decision-making and problem-solving, communicating 
organisational climate, facilitating change, and collecting and diffusing information. 
Below is a review of each aspect separately. 
3.15.1.1 Role ofMAS in Providing Strategic MA Infonnation 
MAS have a role in 'supporting the strategic process, MAS should supply information 
that is more outward looking' (Rangone, 1997, p. 207). The same opinion is 
reiterated by other researchers (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1982, p. 12; Kaplan, 1984, p. 
414; Otley, 1980,p. 421; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 17; Palmer, 1992, p. 181; 
Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 60; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. I; Otley, 1995,p. 54; 
McMann & Nanni, 1995, p. 336; Slagmulder, 1997, pp. 103-104). 
Hiromoto (1991, p. 1) and Bromwich & Bhimani (1989, p. 42) describe how MAS are 
used and designed in Japanese firms to support corporate strategies by the way MAS 
are designed and implemented: 
'to support continuous innovation, which is a new common theme of management 
accounting systems design, and promote strategic management and motivating 
employees to act strategically. Compared to past designs aimed at optimization with 
respect to a given set of parameters' (Hiromoto, 1991, p. 1). 
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In discussing strategic MA information Palmer (1992, p. 182) rightly notes that 'one 
might encounter difficulty in separating the "strategic" items of a MAS from those 
that are operational or tactical in nature'. 
3.15.1.2 Role ofMAS in Communicating Organisational Climate 
Accounting has been implicated with the dominant economic and social distinctions 
(Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 19), which subsequently set the organisational climate. This 
role is through communicating corporate goals and other internal and external 
infomlation relating to the corporate culture and mission through providing and using 
organisational structure (Bate, 1984, p. 46) and communication structures within 
organisations. Consequently, MAS has a role in educating lower-level employees in 
terms of organisational strategies (Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 451; Palmer, 1992, p. 
187), and communicating organisational climate (Collins, 1982, p. 107). However, 
inculcating certain norms and values as part of the corporate culture to achieve 
corporate goals might entail changing, affecting or controlling values and norms of 
other organisational members, which is a task of enormous complexity (Collins, 1982, 
p. 111). 
This complexity becomes critical when a change of culture is introduced to 
organisational members who belong to different schools of management and sub-
cultures. A situation similar to the PB case study where the general manager and the 
new management team had, in addition to the task of turning PB into a profitable 
bank, the task of changing the previous corporate culture to suit the new goals and 
ways of work [see more in Chapter 4, Case Study ofPBj. 
Part of the process of influencing corporate culture was to use MAS at PB in the 
change process to shape the views which PB employees have of the significant, the 
problematic, the desirable, and the possible (Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p. 1). This 
included the type and ways of transmitting MAS information as MAS makes visible 
in the minds of users of the system 'a quite specific knowledge' about the activities of 
the organisation (Burchell, 1980 as quoted by Loft, 1986, p. l39). 
Budgeting was the second area MAS was used by the new management team at PB to 
inculcate the change of corporate culture as '[b judgets and accounting in general may 
not only shape the meaning given to events but might impact upon the culture of an 
organisation more generally' (Preston, 1995, p. 287). Furthermore, although MAS has 
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an internal orientation it shapes the opinion that society holds of the firm's activities 
(Johnson, 1983, p. 139). 
In attempting to fulfil their roles as designed by initiators and designers of the system, 
MAS have other non-designed roles as it produces what Christiansen & Mouristen 
(1995, p. 221) describe as 'new and even competing representations of the 
organisation' . 
3.15.1.3 Role ofMAS in Decision-Making and Problem-Solving 
By decision-making it is meant here the choice 'among various courses of action in 
order to ensure greater organizational effectiveness'. Problem-solving is used here in 
the meaning of choice-making, implementation, maintaining, monitoring and 
reviewing of decisions (Wilson & Chua, 1993, pp. 117,61.) 
MAS as other accounting information systems (AIS) have a role to facilitate decision-
making (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1982, p. 12; Gordon et aI., 1978, p.203; Gordon & 
Narayanan, 1984, p. 33; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 70; Miller, 1993, p. 127; Atkinson 
et aI., 1997, p. 81; Helliar et ai., 2002, p. 50; Chenhall, 2003, p. 146), problem-solving 
(Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 70), highlighting what is perceived as problematic 
(Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p. 1), 'what can be deemed a credible solution' and in 
choosing the criteria for their selection Burchell et al. (1980, p. 17). This is done by 
transmitting relevant information to the whole organisation (Spicer & Ballew, 1983, 
p. 82), and in the identification and measurement of the nature and extent of an 
organisation's present and future sources of competitive advantage (Palmer, 1992, p. 
187). [See discussion of the role ofMAS in planning, decision-making and problem-
solving in Chapter 4, Part Ill; and Chapter 5, Part Ill, The Role of MAS in Planning 
and Decision-Making). 
3.15.104 Role of MAS as an Agent of Change 
MAS, as discussed in Section 3.15.2.1, Role of MAS in Communicating 
Organisational Climate, contributes to the maintenance and stability of an 
organisation but they can also have a role as an agent or a facilitator of change 
(Gordon & Miller, 1976, p. 68; Atkinson et aI., 1997, p. 85; Chenhall & LangfieJd-
Smith, 1998, p. 382, Abernathy & Brownell, 1999, p.l92; Bums & Vaivio, 2001, p. 
395). MAS as a structure is an enabler of both change and non-change (Igor Ansoff as 
quoted by Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 111). 
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Burns & Scapens (2000, p. 13) link the roles of MAS as an agent of change and 
stabilisation to its role in maintaining organisational integrity [see Section 3.15.2.1 
Role of MAS in Maintaining Organisational Integrity] by stipulating that 'change will 
be influenced to some extent, by the existing routines, and as such the process is still 
path-dependent'. MAS can act as an agent of change to facilitate organisational 
performance (Gordon & Miller, 1976, p. 68) and OE [see discussion in Section 4.24, 
Epilogue, for a discussion of the change process at PB]. However, 'change does not 
come easily to such embedded systems' (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 98). 
3.15.1.5 Role ofMAS in Collecting and Diffusing MA Information 
As an information system MAS has a vital role in collecting, storing, processing, and 
communicating MA information to users. To a large extent the success of other roles 
depends on the success of MAS in this role as it is for other AIS (Emmanuel et aI., 
1994, p. 370). 
Through diffusing MA information MAS plays a role in enhancing planning and 
decision-making by counteracting some users from holding information thereby 
reducing intra-firm information disparities (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 261) [see 
more in Section 4.7, Availability and Diffusion ofInformation at PB; Section 4.7.2.1, 
Description of Availability ofInformation at PB; Section 4.15.5.2, Problems Relating 
to Lack of information for Planning; Section 5.9.2.2, How Did the survey 
Interviewees Get the Information Needed]. 
3.15.2 Role ofMAS in Control 
MAS has a number of roles in enhancing the different aspects of control in 
organisations, which are discussed separately below. But it should not be understood 
that the roles are independent of each other but complement and affect each other as 
can be seen for example in the effect of the role of MAS in measuring outputs, score-
keeping, rewarding and disciplining and its role in affecting employees' behaviour. 
3.15.2.1 Role of MAS in Maintaining Organisational Integrity 
MAS contribute to the maintenance of organisational integrity due to the salience of 
MAS (Coli ins, 1982, pp. 107, 116). It has a useful mediator role through exchange of 
MAS reports in affecting congruence between organisational members' expectations 
regarding the desired and the actual climate in organisations (Coli ins, 1982, p. 116). 
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MAS can influence the efforts of infonnation gatekeepers restricting the sharing of 
MA infonnation and thereby sharing power (Bariff & Galbrith, 1978, p. 15; 
Wetherbe, 1991, p. 55; Granlund, 2001, p. 162) through a cross-functional design and 
other structures of communication enabling the exchange of infonnation. 
3.15.2.2 Role ofMAS in Affecting Employees' Behaviour 
MAS influence employees' behaviour through both dimensions of control: 
feedforward and feedback control. Feedforward control is ex ante control that 
precedes events with the aim of ensuring goal attainment by planning ahead courses 
of action to avoid divergences from set plan objectives and targets before they occur, 
and by affecting employees' behaviour through inputs to users' decision processes 
(Bimberg & Nath, 1967, p. 468; Ansari, 1977, p. 103; Collins, 1982, p. 114; Tiessen 
& Waterhouse, 1983, p. 252; Homgren, 1989, p. 27-28; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 2). This is 
in addition to instances in which decision-makers wish to influence and shape other 
organisational members' views and attitudes. 
Feedback control is ex post control where vanances and divergences from plans, 
objectives and targets are reported after the events and correcting action is taken after 
the event. Examples of the role of MAS in feedback control discussed below are: in 
measuring output, rewarding and discipline, and in attention directing. 
Ex ante control for affecting employees' behaviour takes special importance in 
services where output is usually difficult to define (Homgren & Sundem, 1987, p. 9), 
and outcomes cannot be easily measured by management. This role of MAS as an 
infonnation system communicating infonnation from top-down in banks where 
outputs are intangible in tenns of quality and quantity and employees' perfonnance is 
measured by surrogate measures such as volume of loans granted, number of 
customer defaulting, or volume of small deposits. In such cases the most effective 
way is to affect the behaviour of banks' employees to comply with their 
managements' goals and plans. An example of this in the PB case study is to affect 
the attitude of branch managers to comply with procedures to control credit granting 
to risky clients through incentives [see Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches 
at PB]. 
3.15.2.3 Role of MAS in Communicating Responsibilities 
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In organisational settings MAS infonnation can contribute to reaching and enforcing 
agreements within organisation (Tiessen & Waterhouse ,1983, p. 252; Coil ins, 1982, 
p. 114). Budgets, as an example, have a role in clarifYing and reaching agreement 
between the budgeters and budgetees (Collins, 1982, p. 1l2), as well as in 
communicating to employees' role expectations (Collins, 1982, p. 107; Wilson & 
Chua, 1993, p. 367). 
Burchell et al. (1980, p. 14) theorise that the role of accounting practice is determined 
by two elements: [1] uncertainty of cause and effect; [2] uncertainty of objectives. 
MAS could contribute to both elements through providing MA information and 
through using communication channels and structures. 
3.15.2.4 Role ofMAS in Co-ordinating Organisational Activities 
Co-ordination is largely a function of control (Tannenbaum, 1968, p. 3 as quoted by 
Reinman & Negandhi, 1975, p. 476), and given the various different activities carried 
by organisational members and the division of corporate goals into smaller 
departmental and sub-departmental goal [see more on coordinative role of MAS in 
Section 5.17.1.4, Effects of Cocordination Problems on Planning and Decision-
Making in JCB] MAS contributes to the coordination of those activities as 'a 
powerful coordinative device. Particularly if the . degree of organizational 
differentiation is quite high' (Gordon & Miller, 1976, p. 62). 
A good example on this is the co-ordination of geographically dispersed branches of 
banks, and the highly differentiated work of deposits departments divided into sub-
departments and the different sub-departments of credit not to mention the 
interdependence of those sub-departments and other departments in PB and other 
JCB. 
3.15.2.5 Role ofMAS in Motivating Employees 
MAS's contribution is important to motivation (Coil ins, 1982, p. :07; Johnson & 
Kaplan, 1987, p. 4; Lynne, 1995, p. 238). Such a role can be fulfilled through 
providing feedback and feedforward control information to managers, and through 
reaching satisfactory performance evaluation measures and processes. As such the 
role ofMAS in motivation is tied to its role in score-keeping: 
Hofstede (1968, p. 6) points to the importance of the system used to motivate 
employees which 'depends strongly upon the leadership skills of the budgetee's 
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superior, but also upon the way the system is organized' and operates. The relevance 
of the design of MAS at PB and its fit with other systems and employees' perception 
of its outcomes demonstrates MAS's role in motivating [see Section 4.18, Role of 
MAS in Providing Information on Performance Evaluation at PB]. 
3.15.2.6 Role of MAS in Measuring Outputs, Score-Keeping, Rewarding and 
Disciplining 
Taking a Foucauldian approach, MAS have a role to generate and provide knowledge, 
which is power in organizations that can and is used to discipline. However, MAS 
themselves do not only generate power but are influenced by play of power (Loft, 
1986, p. 140). 
From the score-keeping role ofMAS (Newman et aI., 1989, p. 128; Emmanuel et aI., 
1990, p. 4) follows the roles of performance evaluation, rewarding and disciplining. 
MAS is a mechanism for performance evaluation (Coli ins, 1982, p. 114; Kaplan & 
Atkinson, 1982, p. 12; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 60; Lynne, 1995, p. 238; Chenhall, 
2003, p. 128) and administering rewards as they provide linkages between results and 
desired outcomes. 
MAS contribution in organisational life to budgetary control, setting of standards, and 
setting of performance evaluation measures, rewards, and the penalties (Coli ins, 1982, 
p. 113; Olley, 1995, p. 49) are such examples [see discussion in Section 4.17.1, 
Budgetary Control of Branches at PB; and Section 5.19, Budgets in JCB]. 
3.15.2.7 Role ofMAS in Attention Directing 
MAS contributes to highlighting the problematic (Burchell et al. (1980, p. 17; 
Hopwood & Bromwich, 1984, p. 1; Newman et aI., 1989, p. 128). Budgetary control 
in the PB case study and in other JCB was stressed whether by strict adherence to it or 
treating it as feedback control information to be used in directing attention to a 
situation and what needs to be done about it. 
MAS contribute to directing attention to what is happening in an organisation 
whether favourable or unfavourable, to opportunities to be grasped (Johnson & 
Kaplan, 1987, p. 4), and to cross-functional exchange of information as well as 
opinions [see discussion in Section 5.22, Adequate Feedback and Feedforward 
Information in JCBj. MAS provide for all this through the design of communication 
channels and structures for communication. Yet the 'identification of variances is of 
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no value in itself - the value lies in ascertaining the cause of the variance and acting 
to correct it.' (Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 322). 
This role in control is significant in achieving the other roles mentioned earlier as 
control does not only entail compliance with plans but also redirecting the plans so as 
to achieve set goals. 
From what is discussed above [Section 3.15, The Role of MAS in Organisations) on 
MAS roles in contributing to enhancing the activities of setting performance 
measures, defining and communicating responsibilities, communicating corporate 
goals and strategies among other activities, all those MAS roles can be linked to 
Exhibit 3.12, The Use of The Goal Model in OE: 
[1) contributing to choosing goals [see Section 4.15.5, The Goal-Setting process at 
PB; Section 5.16.1, Effects of the Goal-Setting Process in JCB; 
[2) contributing to identifYing criteria of OE [Part V of this chapter, Literature 
Review ofOE); 
(3) collecting, analysing and communicating MA information on res~lts to users 
[see Section 4.7, Availability and Diffusion of Information at PB; and Section 5.9, 
Availability and Diffusion of Information in JCB); 
[4) contributing to redefining desired goals [see Section 4.15.3, Departmental Goals 
at PB; 4.15.5, The Goal-Setting Process at PB; Section 5.16.4 Sufficient 
Relevant Information on which to Base Future Plans). 
Some researchers find there is no compelling evidence to suggest that such links exist 
to OE (Chenhall, 2003, p. 132). This is mainly due to the difficulty in measuring the 
impact of MAS on OE, as the influence of MAS cannot be studied in isolation of 
other systems in an organisation. Some studies tried to establish a link between design 
of MAS and OE, or the fit between MAS and organisational context leading to 
enhanced OE (Chenhall, 2003, p. 134). 
3.16 What are MAS? 
MAS are defined/described by researchers in a number of ways. Some definitions are 
too broad and stress a strictly functional orientation as 'a formal system designed for 
providing information to managers' (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000, p. 223), and a 
system to 'accumulate, classifY, summarize and report information that will assist 
managers in decision-making, planning and control activities' (Drury, 1996, p. xix). 
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Exhibit 3.12 * 
The Use of the Goal Model in OE 
--,---- - --.... -- - --. 
: indirectly : , 
~------I------.! 
Findings of OE 
measurement 
Definer's view 
ofOE 
directly 
Choice of 
criteria 
Choice and 
priorities of 
goals 
* Should be read in conjunction with Exhibit 3.16, Determinants of Choice of 
Attributes of OE. 
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Others defined MAS as referring 'to the systematic use of MA to achieve some goal' 
(Chenhall, 2003, p. 129). Or, '[m]anagement accounting systems provide information 
to assist managers in their planning and control activities' (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1982, 
p. 1). Some definitions stress certain roles of MAS as Homgren (1989, pp. 27-28) 
presents a predominant role of MAS in control, and identifies four questions MAS 
needs to address: [1] choices of responsibility centres; [2] choices of performance 
measures; [3] choices of rewards, [4] the role of non-pecuniary compensation. 
As important as control is for achieving desired performance, MAS has other 
contributions as a forward and outward-oriented information system. 
While other definitions show the subtleties of roles ofMAS in organisation as: 
'(1) interpretive schemes which management use to interpret past results, take actions, 
and make plans 
(2) norms which communicate a set of values and ideals about what is approved and what 
is disapproved, and 
(3) facilities which managers at all levels use to coordinate and control participants' 
(Scapens & Macintosh, 1996, p. 680). 
MAS design cannot be value-free or neutral but has a political dimension (Burchell et 
a!., 1980, p. 17, Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 18) to MAS users, designers and initiators 
who: 
'might be able to be influenced by particular participants, accounting systems can 
rarely, if ever, be the exclusive domain of a single interest. Rather they become 
mechanisms around which interests are negotiated counter claims articulated and 
political processes explicated' (Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 17). 
As important as the functional side of MAS such as score-keeping, variance analysis, 
communicating information, co-ordinating organisational activities, MAS have an 
implicit subtle side such as communicating corporate climate and culture, influencing 
values and attitudes, interpreting past performance, interpreting what is regarded as 
problematic, and what could be appropriate possible solutions, and influencing 
empolyees' behaviour. 
It seems insufficient to describe MAS as mechanistic systems with inputs, 
throughputs and outputs or even adding to that MAS's interaction with the external 
envirorment. MAS can influence the inputs and processes and consequently, the 
outputs. Processing in MAS is very complex and not totally controlled as inputs 
interact with internal structures to influence the production of certain output 
preferences. Inputs on the other hand, cannot be perceived as objective or neutral but 
are subject to a negotiated process that can influence process and outcomes as 
measured by the MAS. As aptly described by Johnson & Kaplan (1987, p. 4): 'an 
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excellent MAS will not on its own make a firm successful, but an ineffective MAS 
can undermine a firm's efforts' (stress added). 
Bums & Scapens, (2000, p. 4) commenting on research in the development of MAS 
find it has not been informative as it is premised on 'static' theoretical approaches, 
much of the existing research focuses on outcomes more than what causes change. 
Such research on the reasons behind the change and development in MAS through 
time and how users/decision-makers use them, is important in helping to understand 
what MAS are. 
To summarise the above discussion it can be said that, MAS are formal information 
systems encompassing structures, mechanisms, and procedures designed to satisfy 
three functional roles: 
[I] provide and communicate MA information (external and internal, financial and 
non-financial) to assist users in planning decision-making and control; 
[2] provide a mechanism for programmed and non-programmed decisions; 
[3] provide an information warehouse for users by collecting and storing information; 
with the aim of achieving a certain OE while satisfying implicit political roles 
through: 
[1] influencing the behaviour of system users; 
[2] changing values, norms, and attitudes of system users. 
Nevertheless, the link between the roles and outcomes cannot be seen as linear and 
measuring their impact in isolation of other information and control systems in an 
organisation can prove to be difficult but ought not to be abandoned. 
3.17 Theoretical Influences on MAS Design 
Puxty (1993, p. 143) makes a powerful remark on the outcome and use of research on 
MAS in that 'the project to create a grand theory for management accounting has 
ground to a halt: we no longer believe that through continued model building we 
reach a synthesis of knowledge with which to instruct the practitioner in the "right 
way" to design or use management accounting systems'. 
Perhaps future research on the design and use of MAS will look more into 
understanding and explaining the different aspects of MAS. This research attempts, in 
a small way, to offer some of explanations of the possible links and behavioural issues 
among elements of MAS design, internal and external context, perceived goals, 
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designers, and users. Such explanations would hopefully indicate a way to enhance 
design and ways of achieving organisational and individual goals. 
Theoretical influences on MA are discussed in Part 11 of this chapter, under 
Theoretical Bases of MA. This section is a review of some of the influences with a 
focus on MAS. Again the review is indicative rather than exhaustive, and attention is 
given to theories that informed this research. 
3.17.1 Economics Theories in MAS 
Economic-based theories influenced MAS design in laying emphasis on the technical 
orientation and evaluation of teclmical efficiency of processes [Exhibit 3.8, Main 
Theories in MA]. Scientific management and traditional management as exemplified 
by the works of Taylor (1911) and Weber (1947) influenced approaches to MAS 
design (Ansari, 1977, p. 103) theoretically and practically [see discussion in Section 
3.6, The Influence of Economic Theory on MA]. This influence can be seen in the 
emphasis on structure in MAS design where MAS as an information system is viewed 
in a mechanical way as inputs of information processed by users in a specified way 
with predictable outputs. 
The information evaluation approach to MAS based on normative economics, 
attempts to establish 'a general analytical framework for the rational choice of 
information alternatives'. As opposed to the descriptive approach which attempts to 
'determine the information requirements of different organizations and people'. The 
descriptive approach helps in understanding the conditions under which prescriptions 
from normative models are feasible, the causal pressures affecting information in 
MAS reports in organisations and the effects of various choices (Tiessen & 
Waterhouse, 1983, p. 251). 
3.17.1.1 Information Economics Theory in MAS 
The introduction of information economics in the 1970s to MA highlighted the costs 
and benefits of information systems, and information systems design (Scapens, 1984, 
pp. 46, 47, 48). The theory yields useful insights into the economics of information 
and choices in designing MAS, and possesses a level of analytical rigour (Spicer & 
Ballew, 1983, p. 74) necessary when making choices in characteristics of information 
in MAS information. 
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However, Spicer & Ballew (1983, p. 75) acknowledge that an information evaluation 
approach has its shortcomings in multi-person control situations as in large, complex 
organisations. Information economics as other prescriptive economic approaches to 
MAS ignored the external environment and assumed rationality of managers in 
decision-making. 
This research explains how decisions related to the design of MAS and characteristics 
of MAS information are not exclusively decided by rational decision-making and that 
the history ofPB and of the MAS employed in PH affects the same two issues as does 
the external and internal environments of PB [see discussion in Section 4.11, 
Characteristics and Design ofMAS at PB]. 
3.17.1.2 Agency Theory 
The employment of agency theory in the 1970s into MAS, provided a better 
framework for multi-person information system choice than other economic theories 
(Scapens, 1984, p. 64; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987, p. 174) as well as acknowledging the 
problems of uncertainty and asymmetry of information between principal and agent 
[see more on agency theory in Section 3.6.2]. 
MAS design influenced by agency theory aims 'to determine which contract will 
result in an optimal sharing of risks and payoffs' (Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 
255). However, agency theory has its limitations when used to explain the demand for 
information in MAS (Kaplan, 1984, p. 405). It does not take into consideration the 
complexity of situations in organisation, and therefore in MAS design, where there is 
asymmetry of information, where organisational members do not pursue 
maximisation in each situation in isolation, where 'increased environmental 
dynamism, heterogeneity and hostility' exist, and increased decentralisation of power 
and responsibilities (Gordon & Miller, 1976, p. 61). Therefore, possibilities of 
increased moral hazard and asymmetry of information. One example is the issue of 
giving more power to branch managers of JCB on the one hanJ, and the possible 
moral hazard and asymmetry of information ensuing on the other. 
Another relevance of agency theory in this research is in control and performance 
evaluation, as it emphasises the role of MAS as a control and decision-facilitating 
system (Scapens, 1984, p. 72) more than other main functions of management. One 
needs to consider that incentives based upon variables measured and communicated 
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by MAS (Gietzmann, 1995, p. 259) could create a 'moral hazard' or 'hidden action 
mode' when the agent has the freedom to self-select effort (Gietzmann, 1995, p. 262). 
3.17.2 Behavioural Theories in MAS 
A behavioural approach on the other hand 'emphasizes the human and social process 
by which an organization achieves its goals' (Ansari, 1977, p. 103). What followed 
from traditional management and behavioural approaches was the influence on MAS 
design incorporating technical elements of a system with the social influences of the 
human element i.e. a socio-technical system (Ansari, 1977, p. 104). [See more on 
behavioural theories in Section 3.7]. 
3.17.2.1 System Theories in MAS 
Within system theories organisations are seen as 'open systems comprising various 
subsystems that individually and jointly determine organizational effectiveness' 
(Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 153), and are highly interdependent with their 
environments (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 393; Scott, 1977, p. 74). The open 
system approach when used in research on MAS provides insights that allow dealing 
with design issues (Ansari, 1977, p. 107) in a way which overcomes the weaknesses 
of cybernetic closed systems. Nevertheless, an open systems approach to MAS is 
criticised by Scott (1977, p. 74) as being more oriented to the study of processes than 
inputs, throughput, outputs, and structures [see more on systems theory, Section 
3.7.2]. 
The analysis of the data collected from the PB case study and the survey show the 
relevance the external environment and the interaction of the various sub-systems 
such as performance evaluation, goals setting/standards, and budgetary control 
operating within MAS. It also shows the nature of inputs to MAS in terms of 
costlbenefit, the influence of the human element in all processes and structures, and 
the effects of inputs and throughputs on the outputs within an organisational structure. 
3.17.2.2 Contingency Theory 
Contingency theory/theories is used to explain and predict the conditions and best fit 
under which particular designs of MAS can be deemed more appropriate. Some 
researchers view it as a major breakthrough in studying MAS: 
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'a contingency theory of MIS and MAS design might not only be a major 
contribution to our MA theory development in general, by helping to explain the role 
and use of accounting in organisations. It also would be a great value in practice, for 
it would provide a powerful counter to the universalistic, tool-kit prescriptions and 
principles which fill our text-books and under-pin much of our professional discourse 
and practice' (Earl, 1983, p. 32). 
In applying contingency theories to MAS design, some researchers have sought to 
uncover direct relationships between contextual factors and organisations' accounting 
and infonnation systems and design effectiveness (Hopper, 1980, Ashton et aI., 1995; 
Gordon & MiIJer, 1976, p. 59; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 65; Tiessen & 
Waterhouse, 1983, p. 252; Covaleski et aI., 1996, p. 5; Reid & Smith, 2000, p. 430; 
Chenhall, 2003, p. 128 to mention a few). Technology and environment (dynamism, 
heterogeneity and hostility) were the first variables identified. Strategy national 
culture, national history (Bhimani, 1999, p. 429), sub-unit interdependence, national 
culture and competitive strategy, and corporate culture are more variables introduced 
by researchers to affect MAS design [Exhibit 3.13, Contingency Variables in MAS 
Design). This gradually came as researchers more and more started to realise that 
certain designs of MAS fit certain organisational contexts more than others in 
affecting employees' behaviour into better perfonnance, (Ansari, 1977, p. 104) and as 
more contingent variables were identified and researched [see more in Section 3.7.7, 
Contingency Theory in MA). The design of MAS therefore becomes, more 
specifically tailored to meeting both internal and external contextual needs of 
organisations (Gordon & Miller, 1976, p. 60; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 89), 
which explains the variety of MAS actually observed in practice (Otley, 1980, p. 
425). 
The part of research in MAS influenced by organisation theory takes a functionalist 
contingency approach to the design of MAS to achieve organisational outcomes or 
organisational goals (Chenhall, 2003, pp. 128,157). On this Scapens (1984, p. 57) 
argues that the contingency approach and 'most of the organisation-theory-based 
approaches, view the management accounting systems as a means of achie':ing 
organizational control' . 
Chenhall (2003, p. 155) identifies within contingency theories three fonns of 
theoretical fit between MAS studies and contingent variables: 
[1) Selection studies which, examine the way contextual factors are related to aspects 
of MAS with no attempt to assess whether this association is linked to perfonnance. 
Such studies neglect the fact that users and designers of MAS employ them to serve 
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Exhibit 3.13 
on mgency ana es m C to V °hl 0 MASD eSlgn 
Contingent Variab le Reference 
I Environment Gordon & Miller, 1976; Hopper, 1980; Otley, 
Dynamism, 1980; Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983; Gordon & 
heterogeneity, hostility Naraynan , 1984; Ashton et aI., 1995; Anderson 
& Lanen, 1999 
2 Technology Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Burns & Stalker, 1994; 
Covaleski et aI., 1996; Chenhall, 2003 
3 National culture Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Anderson & Lanen, 
1999; Chenhall,2003 
4 National history Bhimani, 1999 
5 Sub-unit interdependence Reid & Smith, 2000 
6 Competitive advantage Anderson & Lanen, 1999; Chenhall 2003 
7 Corporate culture! Christiansen & Mouritsen, 1995 
management style 
8 Decision maker style & Hofstede, 1969; Mason & Mitroff, 1973; Driver 
psychology of users & Mock, 1975; King & Cleland, 1975; Gordon & 
Miller, 1976; March, 1987 
9 Established power Markus & Pfeffer, 1983 
distributions 
10 Strategy Spicer & Ballew, 1983; Palmer 1992, po179; 
Chenhall 2003 
11 Performance appraisal Ashton et aI., 1995 
system 
12 Organisational structure Gordon & Miller, 1976; Hopper, 1980; Gordon & 
Naraynan, 1984 
13 Interrelation of man and Simon, 1977; Driver & Mock, 1975 
machine 
14 Occupational culture Hopper 1980 
15 Principles of feedback Wilson, 1998 
& feed forward control 
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certain purposes, which at the same time might not be congruent. Consequently, it is 
pertinent to study the relation of contextual factors to MAS in the ability of MAS to 
serve users' and designers' purposes interpreted by many researchers as improved OE 
[see discussion in Section 3.19, Perspectives in Defining OE]. 
[2] Interaction approaches include studies that examine how organisational context 
moderates the relationship between MAS and organisational performance. 
Organisational context needs to be understood here as external and internal factors in 
the environment. 
[3] Systems models with social, behavioural, and technical aspects combine in a 
variety of ways with aspects of control, information systems, and dimensions of 
context to enhance performance. 
In this research a number of contingent variables were found to influence MAS design 
producing certain outcomes in the form of goal attainment through planning, decision-
making and control processes [see Exhibit 4.12, Factors Affecting the Design ofMAS 
at PB]. 
Contingency-based research covered a number of aspects of MAS such as meeting 
budgets, bu~ge;~;Y participation, budget slack, variance analysis, formality of 
communications and systems sophistication, links to reward systems, non-financial 
performance measures (Chenhall, 2003, p. 129). The contingency approaches to MAS 
design are built on two fundamental and therefore common premises: 
'These are that: (i) there is no universally appropriate managerial accounting system 
that applies equally to all circumstances, (ii) The choice of a particular accounting 
system will depend on an appropriate match between the features of an accounting 
system and the circumstances under which it is to operate' (Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 
52). 
Waterhouse & Tiessen (1978, p. 74) caution, however, that contingency theories have 
no conceptual and methodological absolute clarity. Environment does not mean the 
same in all studies, nor include the same aspects as in the case with technology, or 
centralisation for example. Consequently, measures of variables and empirical 
relationships among variables are not clearly establ;shed, a shortcoming this research 
attempts to avoid by describing variables and relationships. 
Another criticism of contingency theory is in its relying on traditional, functionalist 
theories and not applying more interpretive and critical views as sociological 
processes affect MAS in practice (Chenhall, 2003, p. 159, 161). This criticism seems 
to be directed to the way contingency theory has been used rather than the principles 
108 
of the theory itself In this research into the role of MAS in enhancing OE, the 
relevance of social interaction to the design, structures, and processes within MAS 
and the action of users, designers and initiators/movers of MAS came out clearly. It 
affected aspects of MAS such as type and quantity of information inputs, diffusion of 
information, interpretation of information both as inputs and outputs [see for example, 
Section 4.7:2, Factors Affecting Acceptability of MAS Information at PB; Section 
4.10, Factors Hindering the Diffusion of Information at PB; Section 4.13.2, Factors 
that Hindered the Use of IT in MAS at PB; Section 5.10.1, Factors Hindering 
Diffusion of Information in leB; Section 5.12.1.2, Psychology and Problems of Users 
in JCB]. 
3.17.2.3 Organisation Theory in MAS 
Organisation theory recognises the importance of both the social and the technical 
aspects in MAS (Scapens, 1984, p. 56; Otley, 1984, p. 97; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 
46). Researchers inthe mid-1970s adopted 'theories developed in organization theory, 
as they appeared to be uniquely suited to explain observed variations in the operations 
of management accounting systems' (Otley, 1984, p. 127) [see more on organisation 
theory in Section 3.7.1]. 
Good examples are the studies on the use of budgets and budgetary control within 
organisation theory (Otley, 1984, pp. 131,100). It also provided a helpful theoretical 
background for studying causal relationship between accounting systems and 
effective organisational performance (Burchell et aI., 1980, p. 12). 
3.17.3 Sociological Theories in MAS 
-----'--_ .. - -~. ,.--".-- - -
Bimberg & Nath (1967, p. 472) highlight the need for MAS design to consider the 
sociological structure of organisations as the information needs of organisations can 
differ. Sociological approaches see MAS as being more active compared to the more 
conventional and contingency approaches that take MAS as 'a passive tool' designed 
to assist managers in decision-making (Chenhall, 2003, p. 129), planning and control. 
The link between society and MAS and the socio-economic dimension of MAS 
explains the employment of sociological theories in MAS research (Ansari, 1977, p. 
104; Olley, 1984, p. 131; Puxty, 1993, p. 78): 
'because the link between the nature of the socio-economic system and the nature and 
function of the management accounting system in the organization that we have to 
pay attention ... to a theorizing of society as a whole and cannot fall back on a 
reductionist focus on the organization and its participants alone' (Puxty, 1993, p. 78). 
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The main social theories.that influence MAS design are the labour markets approach, 
the structuration theory, and interactionistlsocial action theory [see Section 3.8, Social 
Theory in MA j which are discussed in more detail below. 
3.17.3.1 Internal Labour Markets Theory in MAS 
Tiessen & Waterhouse (1983, p. 261) argue that MAS are an integral part of internal 
labour markets as a system were power relations between labour and management and 
where control process such as budgets and setting production standards, and 
performance evaluations measures are implicated [see more discussion in Section 
3.8.2, The Labour Process Approach in MA]. Examples of those aspects can be 
observed in the PB case study [see Section 4.17, Conflict ofInterest in Setting Goals 
and the Game of Budget Control at PB; and Section 5.19, Budgets in JCB]. 
An important contribution of internal labour markets theory to MAS is in addressing 
ex ante and ex post uses of MAS information compared to previous theories that 
concentrated on ex post information for enhancing control while ex ante information 
not only enhances control but also can contribute to employees' co-operation in 
implementing plans. Furthermore, it reduces friction between levels of management 
as it informs and empowers employees [see Section 3.15.1, The Role of MAS in 
Planning; Section 3.15.2, The Role of MAS in Control; and Section 3.16, What are 
MAS]. 
3.17.3.2 Structuration Theory in MAS 
Scapens & Macintosh (1996, p. 677) note the potential of social theories in providing 
a framework for research in MAS as an interaction between action and stmcture: 
'structuration theory provides. a potentially valuable framework for management 
accounting research ... Giddens' analysis of the duality of structure allows us to 
conceptualise management accounting systems as modalities of structuration which 
mediate between action and structure'. 
An area that benefits from the explanatory power of stmcturation theory is in 
explaining the duality of actions of users of MAS and initiators of MAS on the one 
hand and of MAS and organisational structure on the other [see more on stmcturation 
theory in Section 3.8.3; and Section 4.11.1.4, Effects of Organisational Stmcture on 
MAS Design at PB; Exhibit 5.5, Elements in Organisational Stmcture in Enhancing 
the Role of MAS in Enhancing OE; and Section 5.16.1, Factors Hindering Flow of 
Information in JCBj. 
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3.17.3.3 InteractionistlSocial Action Theory in MAS 
Interactionism provides a basis for exploring, and understanding the implicit subtle 
roles of MAS in organisations as well as influencing its operation [see more in 
Section 3.8.1, InteractionistlSocial Action Theory in MA]. Interactionism can be a 
useful perspective in MAS in areas such as play of power, internal politics, budgets, 
and budgetary control (Gross, 1965, p. 211; Pettigrew, 1972, p. 188; Miller, 1993, p. 
126; Granlund, 2001, p. 162). 
The acknowledgment by researchers of the undeniable social aspect of MAS 
(Bimberg & Nath, 1967, p. 472; Puxty, 1993, p. 78; Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 
261; Scapens, 1984, p. 56; Otley, 1984, p. 97) provides theoretical space for social 
theories to contribute to the design and operation of MAS. This should not deny 
however contribution from related disciplines such as organisational behaviour and 
social psychology [see Section 4.12, Characteristics and Design of MAS at PB; 
Exhibit 4.14, Factors Affecting the Design of MAS; Section 4.9, Diffusion of 
Information at PB; Section 4.1 0, Factors Hindering Diffusion of Information at PB; 
and Section 5.10.1, Factors lEndering Diffusion ofInformation in JCB]. 
PART V LITERATURE REVIEW OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
(OE) 
This section reviews the literature on OE as the research question investigates the role 
of MAS in enhancing OE. It looks at some of the problems in defining OE, and the 
different criteria used in assessing it, followed by models and attributes of OE. As this 
research adopts a goal attainment approach to assessing OE, further elaboration of the 
goal approach is discussed looking into the nature of goals as discussed in the 
literature, and lastly measures of OE as a construct that has not only different 
meanings and attributes but is measured in different ways. 
3.18 Controversy over Defining OE 
Hannan & Freeman (1977, p. 106) describe OE as 'one of the strongest and most 
persistent themes in the literature on organisations'. Research earnestly on OE began 
in the 1960s (Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 63) still, decades later, it remained controversial, 
elusive and ill-defined (Benson, 1974, p. 273; Campbell, 1977, p. 15; Lowe & Soo, 
1980, p. 63; Quinn & Cameron, 1983, p. 41; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983, p. 363; Kraft 
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et aI., 1996, p. 102), and with little agreement on what are the criteria of OE (Quinn & 
Cameron, 1983, p. 41; Kraft et aI., 1996, p. 102). 
Researchers offer different explanations to the controversy and ill-definition as 
resulting from: 
'lack of interdisciplinary approaches, which leaves economists, sociologists, and 
psychologists unaware of each other's contributions, view points even within the field 
of organizational theory are widely different and often reveal, implicitly or explicitly, 
/ 
basically different assumptions about the nature of organizations' (Pennings & 
Goodman, 1977, p. 147). 
Another explanation offered is that OE relates to the concept of organisational 
goals, which is 'one of the most complex and controversial topics in organizational 
theory' (Scot!, 1977, p. 64). 
Furthermore, inconsistency arises from discrepant conceptions of OE (Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967, p.892) and different values in the conception of OE (Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh, 1983, p. 375; Campbell, 1977, p. 23). 
Nevertheless, '(d)espite the ambiguity and confusion surrounding it, the construct of 
OE is central to the organizational sciences and cannot be ignored in theory and 
research' (Cameron, 1986, p. 540). 
3.19 Perspectives in Defining OE 
There are different perspectives from which OE can be defined and more than one 
way of evaluating and comparing OE from the perspectives of different groups of 
individuals (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 895). Definitions of OE differ as 
researchers' perspectives differ [Exhibit 3.14, Perspectives in Defining ~El. 
OE is defined from a micro economic perspective as 'the maximization of return to 
the organization by all means' (Katz & Khan 1966as quoted by Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967, p. 901). Thus, focusing attention exclusively on profit and 
productivity (Steers, 1975, p. 546) to the neglect of other outcomes such as 
employees' satisfaction and social interests. Furthermore, maximisation of return 
cannot be regarded as applicable at all times and to all organisations (Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967, p. 90 I; Hall, 1972, p. 65). 
A different definition of OE suggested away from the principle of maximisation is a 
goal perspective as a desirable aim and a tool that 'measures the extent of goal 
achievement and reflects the state of affairs at a point in time' (Wilson, 1998, p.6). 
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Exhibit 3.14 
erspectlves m e mmg P . D fi' OE 
Perspective Definition Reference 
I Micro economic The maximization of return to the Katz & Khan, 
organisation by all means. 1966 
2 Goal Measures the extent of goal Hall, 1972; 
achievement achievement and reflects the state of Pennings & 
affairs at a point in time. Goodman, 1977; 
Wilson, 1998 
3 Social Achieving organisational goal without Georgopoulos & 
incapacitating its means and resources Tannen baum, 
and without placing undue strain upon 1957; Yuchtman 
its members. & Seashore,1967 
4 Resource Effective organisations are those that Yachtman & 
acquisition and acquire resources to match their needs Seashore, 1967; 
allocation through the strength of their bargain ing Cunningham, 
positions. 1977; Pfeffer, 
Or the extent to which organisations 1977; Pfeffer & 
optimally distribute resources among Salancik, 1978 
sub-units. 
5 Psychological An effective organisation is which Cummings, 1977 
satisfies the greatest percentage of 
participants. 
6 Financial Financial viability of an organisation Price & Mueller, 
1986 
Jl2A 
Within this perspective OE needs to be defined and measured at two levels: the micro-
level (organisationalleveJ), and the macro level (societallevel). The micro-level looks 
at OE as effective and efficient utilisation of available resources to achieve desired 
short and long-range outcomes/goals. The macro-level looks at OE in effective and 
efficient acquisition of social resources and balancing optimisation in the short-term 
with the long-term interests of the external environment. 
The degree of goal achievement (Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 64) is also relevant to the goal 
perspective as 'the degree to which an organization realizes its goals' (Hall, 1972, p. 
96), or as when 'organizational results approximate or exceed a set of referents for 
multiple goals' (Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 160). 
The third perspective is a social perspective where OE is defined as 'the extent to 
which an organization as a social system, given certain resources and means, fulfils its 
objectives without incapacitating its means and resources and without placing undue 
strain upon its members' (Georgopoulos & Tannenbaum, 1957, p. 535). The two main 
strands here, achieving organisational goals and social goals, are pulled together as a 
necessary condition to achieving OE as 'a clear understanding of an organization's 
functional and environment uniqueness as a prerequisite to assessing its effectiveness' 
(Steers, 1975, p. 551). 
Advocates of the social perspective believe the appropriate frame of reference is 
society, and OE is to be measured according to the organisational outcomes which 
benefit society (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 895; Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 64; 
Pfeffer, 1977, p. 142) and the individual (Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 64). However, this 
perspective raises the problem of measurement of efficient exploitation of social 
resources, and the same difficulties that face the goal perspective in measuring goal 
achievement. 
However, other researchers see that it is preferable to look at OE from 'the point of 
view of the system itself- of the total organization in question rather than from the 
standpoint of some of its parts or of the larger society' (Georgopoulos & 
Tannenbaum, 1957, p. 535; Georgopoulos, 1965, p. 155). 
The fourth perspective is OE as resource acquisition in terms of an organisation's 
absolute or relative ability to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and 
valued resource (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 898; Pfeffer, 1977, p. 143). Pfeffer 
& Salancik (1978, p. 47) see that problematic conditions of resources come from the 
environment, therefore, the extent to which organisations have 'discretion over the 
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allocation and use of a resource possessed by another social actor' determines that 
organisation's OE. However, the resource acquisition perspective fails to propose 
ways to evaluate the utilisation of acquired resources by organisations. 
The fifth perspective define an effective organisation from a psychological 
perspective as·' one in which the greatest percentage of participants perceive 
themselves as free to use the organisation and its sub-systems as instruments for their 
own ends' (Cummings, 1977, p. 60). The psychological perspective brings up the 
question offrom which stakeholder's perspective is OE to be viewed and evaluated? 
The sixth perspective, the financial perspective, defines effectiveness in a much 
specified way as 'the financial viability of an organization' (Price & Mueller, 1986, as 
quoted by Kraft et aI., 1996, p. 103). Although financial viability is necessary for an 
organisation to survive and develop, it is not sufficient to evaluate the effectiveness of 
its operations in the absence of a referent or referents. 
Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 103) believe that 'the excellent companies are among 
the most fiscally sound of all. But their value set integrates the notions of economic 
health, serving customers, and making meanings down the line. As one executive said 
to us, "Profit is like health. You need it, and the more the better. But it's not why you 
exist". 
Due to differences -as discussed above- as to which perspective to use to define OE, 
the establishing of a relationship between achieving goals and achieving OE, the 
different disciplinary approaches to OE, the lack of agreement on referents/values for 
assessing OE, it has been difficult to reach a single definition of OE (Campbell, 1977, 
p. 15; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983, p. 375 ). Some researchers such as Pondy (1977, 
pp. 233, 234) are against finding a common definition or theory of OE in the fear that 
it will impose a single path to OE. 
Mahoney (1967, p. B-77) observes that managers in business and industry compared 
to academics 'make frequent judgements about the relative effectiveness ... despite the 
lark of consensus among writers discussing organizational effectiveness. Judgements 
of effectiveness are made explicitly or implicitly, whenever budgets are formulated, 
projects and tasks are assigned, and whenever organizations' shifts of resources are 
considered' . 
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3.20 OE a Concept or a Construct? 
Another controversy is centred on the nature of OE. Quinn & Rohrbaugh (1983, p. 
374) explain that OE is not a concept but a socially constructed abstract notion carried 
about in the heads of organisational theorists and researchers and one can add 
managers. There has also been no agreement among researchers as to the relevant 
dimensions of the attributes (Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969, p. 357) to be included in the 
construct and how they are to be related (Steers, 1975, p. 546; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 
1983, p. 364; Goodman & Pennings, 1977, p. 2). [See Exhibit 3.15, Characteristics of 
OE Construct]. 
3.20.1 Characteristics ofOE as a Construct 
OE as a multidimensional construct with attributes relating to many domains of 
activity in an organization is widely acknowledged (Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969, p. 
357; Cameron, 1986, p. 543; Steers, 1975, p. 347; Davis & Pett, 2002, p. 87), 
although not adequately researched (Davis & Pett, 2002, p. 87). Cameron (1986, p. 
543) in referring to work previously done by him in 1978 and 1982, show that 80% of 
the criteria used by researchers in the evaluation of effectiveness did not overlap 
with those used in other studies and 'no specifiable construct boundaries exist' 
(Cameron, 1986, p. 541). 
Exhibit 3.15 
Characteristics of OE Construct 
Characteristic Reference 
Multidimensional Cameron, 1986; Steers, 1975; Davis & 
Pett,2002 
Lack of consensus over attributes Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969; Cameron, 
1986 
Attributes selected on the basis of an Cunningham, 1977; Campbell, 1977 
author's particular interest or speciality 
Problem of measuring qualitative Peters & Waterrnan, 1995; Rangone, 
attributes 1997 
Dynamic nature Humphrey, & Olson, 1994; Hall, 1972 
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Attributes of OE are selected on the basis of an author's particular interest or 
speciality and using personal value judgment (Cunningham, 1977, p. 463; Campbell, 
1977, p. 23) [Exhibit'3.l6 Determinants of Choice of OE Attributes]. 
'which, and whose, criteria we choose to emphasize in our studies of organizations 
will depend on our own interests in undertaking the study. The important thing is to 
state clearly what we wish to employ and to recognize that whatever they are, and 
whoever espouses them, they are always normative, will serve some interests more 
than others, and are likely to be controversial' (Scott, 1977, p. 72). 
There is also the problem of measuring qualitative attributes as when measuring 
key success factors that are linked to OE when those are qualitative in nature such as 
innovation (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. xxiv; Rangone, 1997, p. 208). 
OE as goal attaimnent is a dynamic notion changing with the change in social values 
and the contexts in which organisations operate and corporate effectiveness is socially 
constructed (Likert & Seashore (1965, as quoted by Hofstede, 1968, pp. 50-51; Hall, 
1972, p. 82; Humphrey, & Olson, 1994, p. 346; Hopwood, 1979, as quoted by 
Humphry & Olson, 1995, p. 364) 
'managerial perceptions of organizational effectiveness (is expected) to vary with 
industry, size of firm, organizational level of the manager, growth pattern of the firm, 
and related characteristics. It is not clear, however, which of these characteristics is 
likely to have the greatest impact upon managerial perceptions of organisational 
effectiveness' (Mahoney, 1967, p. B-84). 
Scott (1977, p. 89) and Hannan & Freedman (1977, p. 112) correctly argue that the 
choice of attributes will affect the findings. Within the goal approach, goals define the 
criteria and preference ordering of outcomes (Hannan & Freedman, 1977, p. 112). A 
definer's view of OE influences the choice of goals and their ranking, which in turn 
influences the attributes of OE the definer aims at achieving. In measuring and 
evaluating OE, the definer's view will influence what a definer will look for and 
evaluate. Through a circular process the measurements of OE used and the findings 
influence a definer's choice and ranking of the goals to be achieved, and indirectly a 
definer will reassess hislher view of how (s)he perceives OE [Exhibit 3.16, The Use 
of the Goal Model in OE]' 
A study by Steers (1975, pp. 551-554) of 17 models of evaluation criteria of OE 
concludes by identifying eight characteristics, which should not be viewed as 
problems in understanding and investigating OE: [I] construct validity, as there is a 
problem in identifying the domain of the construct; [2] criterion stability due to the 
evolving and changing nature of OE, [3] time perspective, [4] multiple criteria which 
can also conflict with each other; [5] precision of measurement to quantify the 
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Exhibit 3.16 
Determinants of Choice of OE Attributes 
Which activities 
a definer wants to 
evaluate -> 
Definer's understanding ~ 
of what is OE as pertaining 
to the situation 
Definer's 
view 
of 
OE 
-3> Attributes ofOE 
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concept accurately and consistently; [6) generalisability to all and any organisation; 
[7) theoretical relevance of OE models; [8) level of analysis as many models take an 
organisation's macro level and ignore 'the critical relation between individual 
behavior' and the organisation. 
Steers (1975, p. 549) found that out of the 17 evaluation criteria multivariate models 
of OE he investigated 'there is surprisingly little overlap across the various 
approaches'. His conclusions show that only three evaluation criteria were mentioned 
repeatedly: adaptability-flexibility [1 0/17 times), productivity [6/17 times], and 
satisfaction [5 117 times]. All other evaluation criteria were mentioned two or three 
times. This, Steers (1975, p. 549) explained as resulting from using different 
perspectives, or different levels of evaluation. Steers (1975, p. 549) concluded from 
his study 'that the effectiveness construct is so complex as to defy simple attempts at 
model development. Perhaps more flexible, comprehensive models are required'. 
In another study, by Mahoney (1967) on managers in various industries, examining 
the empirical relationships among 114 characteristics that are often considered criteria 
of OE by literature and managers (Mahoney, 1967, p. B-79), he concluded that 
efficient perfonnance explained as efficient perfonnance - mutual support - utilisation 
of personnel, 'which most closely approximates the achievement of ultimate goals', 
accounted for approximately the same proportion as the combination of the remaining 
three dimensions of OE (planning, reliability, and initiative) reported in the study 
(Mahoney, 1967, p. B-83). 
The two studies of Steers (1975) and Mahoney (1967) separated by less than 10 years 
show different conclusions. Steers' study shows that adaptability-flexibility is the 
most mentioned criterion of OE, while the other study shows efficient perfonnance as 
the most used criterion. Some of the reasons for the difference in the two studies' 
conclusions could be the effect of change in perceptions of OE from 1967 to 1975, or 
the different perspectives of definers who were managers in Mahoney's study while 
Steers used OE models from the literature. 
3.21 Why Definitions Differ 
Differences in defining OE by researchers are mainly due to different views of the 
nature of organizations (Goodman & Pennings, 1977, p. 3), defined from different 
perspectives of definers, evaluated and compared in more than one way and 
measured from the frame of reference of the measurers (Yuchtman & Seashore, 
, ,~ 
1967, p. 895; Steers, 1975, p. 552; KirchhDff, 1977, pp. 347, 348; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978, p. 33; Khan, 1977, p. 239; Kraft et aI., 1996. p. 103). 
Definers can be Dwners, community, government, custDmers, suppliers, creditDrs, and 
emplDyees (Kirchhoff, 1977, p. 351), in additiDn to managers (Wilson & Chua, 1993, 
p. 14). ThDse different definers carry different values of OE and use different 
measures tD assess it. TD this Dne could add that in the end organisatiDnal 
effectiveness is what the relevant parties decide it should be. There is no higher 
authDrity to which we can appeal (Campbell, 1977, p. 52). 
Lewin & Minton (1986, p. 515) stress a cDntingent approach tD a theDry of OE in the 
futility of seeking a universal, Dverarching theory of effectiveness. SchDols Df thDught 
in OE such as scientific management, human relations, sDcio-technical, DrganisatiDnal 
development, and classical eCDnDmic theDry of the firm (Miles, 1980 as quoted by 
Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 519) each defines OE from its own perspective. Steers 
(1975, p. 553) find multiple criteria in assessing OE an advantage and a weakness at 
the same time and argue that in such a case organisations by definition cannot be 
effective. Steers' (1975) discussion is suggestive that he is working with an a priori 
definitiDn Df OE to which multiple criteria dD nDt cDnform. 
The use of different criteria in assessing OE produced a number of models fDr 
assessing OE that can be broadly categorised as normative, descriptive and 
universalistic models [Exhibit 3.17, Main Models for Assessing OE]. Most models of 
OE are normative (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 107). Universalistic models of OE 
(Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 393) are more abstract and more theoretical as they 
perceive OE as the ability of an organisation to exploit its environment in the 
acquisitiDn of scarce resources (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 393). Descriptive 
models perceive OE as achieving what an organisation sets out to achieve (Wilson & 
Chua, 1993, p. 316). Cunningham (1977, p. 463) advocates developing models for 
each approach to assessing OE amDng uncertainty of OE criteria, unclear conclusion 
of assessing OE, the use of different frameworks for particular organisational 
situations, whether what is assessed is: the organisational structure, the organisation's 
human resources, or the impact of organisational functions or activities. 
Exhibit 3.17 
Main Models for Assessing OE 
. jRational goal model /Ooal model 
(I) Rational model L 
Internal process modellDecision process model 
Open systems model 
t---,Natural systems model 
,--_______ + __ Systems resource model 
(2) Natural model L-_ Participant satisfaction model 
'--__ N"'atural model/Human relations model 
Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983, pp. 364, 373 
3.22 Criteria for Assessing OE 
There ar~five main criteria suggested by researchers to assessing OE. Each is 
discussed separately in the sub-sections below. 
3.22.1 Allocation of Resources as a Criterion for Assessing OE 
According to this approach OE is the extent to which an organization optimally 
distributes resources among its subsystems and that, 
'optimality is the key word ... The organization according to the proponents of this 
approach, strives to survive and satisfY the needs of its components ... 
'Each subsystem's needs should be evaluated from two focal points - efficiency and 
stress' (Cunningham 1977, pp. 465, 466). 
Some researchers find the issue of using a goal approach versus resource allocation is 
in many ways an argument over semantics (Oeorgopoulos & Tannenbaum, 1957, 
p.535; Hall, 1972, p. 100; Cunningham, 1977, p. 466) as resource allocation is also 
concerned with the ability of the organisational system to accomplish goals eventually 
measured in the optimal distribution of resources. 
3.22.2 Survival of Organisations as Criterion for Assessing OE 
This approach argues the plausibility of explaining and measuring OE in terms of 
survival (Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 64; Hannan & Freeman (1977, p. 128). Hannan & 
Freeman (1977, p. 128) note that 'it is not true that organizations that fail to achieve 
their goals or fail to make progress in that direction will fail to survive'. Survival 
versus goal attainment according to Hannan & Freeman (1977, p. 1.09) is important to 
keep apart and neither is a surrogate for the other. By that they refer to two different 
organisational processes, and this implies using different strategies and structures. 
Furthermore, when survival is considered as an organisational goal 'all of the 
problems enumerated with respect to other goals arise' (Pfeffer, 1977, p. 139). 
3.22.3 Adaptability and Flexibility as a Criterion for Assessing OE 
Effectiveness according to an open systems approach implies 'adaptability or 
flexibility ... and maximization of bargaining position' i.e. for an organisation to 
exploit its environment (Scot!, 1977, p. 74). 
Nevertheless, adaptation is not conceptually different from survival or resource 
acquisition. One way to achieving goals is the ability of an organisation to incorporate 
flexibility and adaptability in its processes to accommodate changes in the internal 
and external environments adaptation can be seen as well 'as a dynamic aspect of goal 
attainment' (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, pp. 109, 110). 
3.22.4 Resources Acquisition as a Criterion for Assessing OE 
This criterion looks for the ability of an organisation to optimise the exploiting of its 
environment in the acquisition of scare resources to sustain its functioning (Seashore 
& Yuchtman, 1967, pp. 393-394; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 898; Davis & Pett, 
2002, p. 87) through a continuous process of exchange and competition. Lowe & Soo 
(1980, pp. 67, 68), however, see the systems acquisition perspective of organizations 
remaining as a goal model, and the definition of 'scarce' and 'valued' resources 'may 
be ambiguous in the absence of more specific goals', and does not 'help to focus on 
the relationship between an organization and its environment' as an open systems 
approach does. 
This criterion of OE can be further criticised as lacking in a specification of the 
determinants of effectiveness as optimisation in exploiting the environment needs to 
be translated into more concrete goals. It is also lacking a specification of how the 
environment serves as a determinant of effectiveness (Pennings & Goodman, 1977, 
pp. 176, 177). 
Yachtman & Seashore (1967, p. 897) advocate the use of a systems resource as a 
criterion to assessing OE as it: '(I) takes the organization itself as the focal frame of 
reference, rather than some external entity or some particular set of people; 
(2) explicitly treats the relations between the organization and the environment as a 
central ingredient in the definition of organisational effectiveness' . 
3.22.5 Goal Achievement as a Criterion for Assessing OE 
The use of the term 'goal' in a goal model of OE equates "goal", "objective", 
"purpose", "mission", "aim", and "task" (Price, 1972, p. 3). Goals are an important 
element in organisational reality. They give guidance and improve people's 
performance (Hofstede, 1968, p. 37). Writers who discuss OE as goal attainment see 
it as Khan (1977, p. 236) the raison d'etre of organisations. This criterion has its roots 
'in the Weberian concept offunctional rationality' (Cunningham, 1977, p. 465). 
'The "goal approach" has been the traditional way to assessing OE, (Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967, p.892; Price, 1972, p. 3; Georgopoulos & Tannenbaurn, 1957, p. 534; 
Mahoney, 1967, p. B-76; Kirchhoff, 1977, p. 349; Lowe & Soo, 1980, p. 64; 
CampbeIl, 1977, p. 23; Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 177; Wilson & Chua, 1993, 
p. 316; Drury, 1996, p. 655) notwithstanding all the points raised in the literature 
against goal attainment as discussed in this section [see more in Section 3.23.2, 
Criticism of Goal Achievement Model]. 
Pennings & Goodman (1977, p. 161) identify components of the goal criterion as: 
goals and referents. Goals 'mayor may not approximate a referent' and OE can be 
assessed by the degree to which a goal approximates or exceeds a referent [see more 
in Section 3.25, Characteristics of Goals Used in ~El. 
Assessing OE is enhanced by 'recognizing the political nature of the goal 
effectiveness establishment process and the assessment process itself (Cummings, 
1977, p. 58). This can be noticed in both the PB case study and in the banks surveyed 
where the goal-setting process involved internal politics, play of power, and 
dominance of top management over lower levels of management, later used in 
employees' performance evaluation [see discussion in Section 4.15.5, The Goal-
Setting Process at PB; and Section 5.16.1, Effects of the Goal-Setting Process on 
Planning and Decision-Making in JCB]. 
3.23 Criticism to the Goal Model for Assessing OE 
Criticism of the goal approach to assessing OE can be divided mainly into: 
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[i] criticism of the model itself where it is rejected on a theoretical level; and [ii] 
criticisms of how the model is applied to OE and to areas in operationlising 
assessment ofOE neglected by the goal approach. 
3.23.1 Criticism ofthe Goal Model on a Theoretical Level 
The goal model has been criticised because 'organizational goals are essentially 
n~thing more than courses of action imposed on the organization by various forces in 
its environment, rather than preferred end-states toward which the organization is 
striving' (Starbuck, 1965 as quoted by Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 894). 
This criticism, although correct in some respects, is aimed at defining what a goal is 
rather than the use of the goal approach to evaluating OE. It also does not distinguish 
between goals as ends representing preferred end-states and goals as means necessary 
to achieve end-states. 
The goal approach to assessing OE is rejected also on theoretical grounds, as goals do 
not offer the possibility of a realistic assessment. Using goal achievement as a 
measure of OE 'is not as objective as it seems to be' and organisations as social 
systems adopt goals influenced by cultural factors from the outside environment 
(Etzioni 1960, as quoted by Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 893). 
Some of the shortcomings of the goal approach identified by Etzioni can be mitigated 
as it is true that goals are not as objective as they seem and are influenced by political 
processes in organisation (Curnmings, 1977, p. 58) and by a definer's view of OE 
[Exhibit 3.16, Determinants of Choice ofOE Attributes; and Exhibit 3.12, The Use of 
the Goal Model in ~El. However, realising that goals cannot be objective and 
understanding how goals are set is helpful in realising the limitations of this model. 
This appreciation of how goal achievement is measured and how the measurements 
and criteria used affect the meaning of OE, is important to the use of the goal model 
to assessing OE. 
However, Etzioni's criticism of the influence of cultural factors from the external 
environment seems to come from an understanding of organisations as mechanistic 
entities unaffected by changes in the external environment. A different and more 
realistic understanding of organisations as organic, socially constructed open systems 
realises the importance of external influences on organisations and the choice of 
goals, processes of choice, and means of measuring them. 
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Another criticism finds that the identification of effectiveness with the goal approach 
is 'neither necessary nor productive', as OE has to do with 'an organization's ability 
to acquire resources and legitimacy, and to survival' (Pfeffer, 1977, p. 142). However, 
it could be argued that assessing organisations by their ability to acquire resources, 
legitimacy and survival in themselves are goals and important goals not precluding 
achievement of organisational goals that are as important to effective use of acquired 
resources. 
A relevant point raised by Weick (1977, p. 216) is that processes as criteria of 
effectiveness should be given more attention than is done by the OE literature. Goal 
attainment in the goal approach on a micro-level entails effective use of acquired 
resources which necessarily calls for consideration of effective processes for 
achieving goals. 
3.23.2 Criticism of How the Goal Model is Applied 
The approach is criticised for not providing a rationale for identifYing organisations' 
goals (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 897; Price, 1972, p. 7) as a necessary condition 
for measuring OE, or clarifYing whether goals represent ultimate criteria or goals 
consciously sought by organisations (Maboney, 1967, p. B-77) or means to ends. 
This criticism raised a number of alternatives for identifYing organisational goals: as 
the goals of the dominant coalition, or of an organisation's sub-units, or even goals 
defined by external referents [see more on which goals to measure in the goal model 
in Section 3.25). 
The distinction is not always clear as to whether goals being sought are means or ends 
when assessing OE [see discussion in Section 3.25, Characteristics of Goals Used in 
Assessing OE). Such distinction is of importance when considering OE through the 
goal approach as it hinges on correctly identifYing goals that represent desired end 
states and not only intennediate goals/means necessary for achieving goals as desired 
end states. 
Most definitions of OE include some nonnative standard against which to assess OE 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 107; Scott, 1977, p. 72). Criticising the nonnative 
nature of using the goal approach, although correct on one level, ignores the basic 
condition of any assessment process to have benchmarks against which to measure. A 
point of caution in using the goal approach is not to use it indiscriminately across all 
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organisations or in the same organisation regardless or time and place and the specific 
characteristics of organisations and organisations' units. 
Hannan & Freeman (1977, p. 107) argue 'that current conceptions of organizational 
goals do not pennit the establishment of organizational preference functions with 
properties strong enough to justity interorganizational comparisons of goal 
attainment'. This point raised against the goal model does not go with the nature of 
the approach, and relates to the previous point raised on the nonnative nature of the 
goal approach. The nature of goal-setting processes in organisations involves 
philosophical stands, preferences, and attitudes of managements in addition to the 
specifics of the internal and external environments of organisations which calls for 
approaching interorganisational comparisons with much caution as it might mean 
comparing different things. 
A further argument put forward by Hannan & Freeman (1977, p. 114) when 
measuring attainment of goals is that other difficulties arise from 'non-specifity of so 
many goals, it will often be unclear exactly what organizational action or what 
dimensions of outputs are relevant to goal attainment'. This unclear relation between 
outcomes/goals and action or processes involved was observed and commented on by 
interviewees in the PB case study and in the survey. It was explained by the nature of 
the interdependence of banks' departments and responsibilities of individual 
managers [see Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Infonnation on Perfonnance 
Evaluation at PB; Section 5.20.2, Perfonnance Evaluation in JCB; Section 3.25, 
Characteristics of Goals Used in the Goal Model for Assessing OE). 
In spite of the difficulties, whether theoretical or methodological, with the goal 
achievement approach the concept of organisational goals should not be rejected in 
toto (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 895). 
3.24 The Goal Model in Evaluating OE 
As this research adopts a goal attainment approach to asseSSIng OE, further 
elaboration of the goal approach is discussed below looking into types and nature of 
goals as used in literature, and lastly measures of OE. 
Campbell (1977, p. 48) notes, that in a goal model, it is assumed if an organisation 
does not know what it is trying to achieve, 'then it really does not know how to 
structure or staff itself or assess its perfonnance'. However, this is not an easy task 
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and a 'challenging problem for managers and researchers' (Cunningham, 1977, p. 
463). 
A second issue when discussing which goals to measure is 'whose perspective should 
dominate in the use of criteria' as this 'determines the type of criteria and the level of 
effectiveness desired' (Goodman & Pennings, 1977, p. 5). 
3:24.1 Goals of the Dominant Coalition 
OE research was heavily influenced by organisation theories, the most widely used 
level of OE assessment was the organisational level and, consequently, the choice of 
corporate goals, which are defined by the dominant coalition in management. 
Pennings & Goodman (1977, p. 161) advocate the use of organisational goals as they 
'represent desired end states specified by the dominant coalition'. The use of 
organisational goals to assess effectiveness is shared by Yuchtman & Seashore (1967, 
p. 892), Hall (1972, p. 79), Price (1972, p. 6), Cummings (1977, p. 58), Mahoney & 
Weitzel (1969, p. 357), Lowe & Soo (1980, pp. 63-64, 68), Khan (1977, p. 241), 
Otley (1995, p. 55), Vanderbosch & Huff (1997, p. 104) among others. Such goals 
could be as put forth in an organisation's charter, annual reports, manuals, public 
statement by key executives and other authoritative pronouncements (Cunningham, 
1977, p. 465; Lowe & Soo, 1980,p. 65). 
Some researchers disagree and find this 'singular focus upon the dominant coalition 
as the ultimate definer of priority values for the organization may prove to be unduly 
restrictive' (Seashore, 1981, p. 190). Researchers also disagree on who represents the 
dominant coalition, whether it is owners of the firm, or the managers as their 
representatives, or both parties pooled together to form an agreement upon 
penultimate goals (Seashore, 1965, p. 29). 
The problem with Seashore's suggestion is that 'managers of an organization do not 
wholly agree among themselves about the organizational goals: in addition it is not 
certain that these goals, even if agreed upon, would prevail' (Yuchtman & Seashore, 
1967, p. 894). A similar situation was observed in PB where managers could not 
agree on what were the corporate goals they were trying to achieve r see Section 
4.15.2, Corporate Goals of PB; and Exhibit 4.16, A Comparison of the Interviewees' 
Answers with Corporate Goals as Published in Annual Reports (1994- 1998)]. A 
further matter to consider is managers' personal preferences and values could 
influence goals implementation through power play and internal politics, and agency 
issues [see Section 4.10.3, Internal Politics at PB]. 
When using top management goals for measuring OE 'such statements of objectives 
may idealize, rationalize, distort, omit, or even conceal some essential aspects of the 
functioning of the organizations' (Katz & Khan, 1966, as quoted by Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967, p. 893) as was observed in the PB case study where the study did not 
show indications of one of the corporate goals relating to employees' training and 
development. This might be true in certain situations and undermines the use of the 
goal model in assessing OE, although a similar criticism can be directed at the use of 
goals inferred by researchers. 
3.24.2 A Conglomerate of Sub-Unit Goals 
This approach as to which goals to measure in assessing OE finds that goals used in a 
goal model are best represented by a conglomerate of departmental goals. This 
conglomerate of departmental goals reflect what the whole organisation is trying to 
achieve (Seashore, 1965, p. 29; Pennings & Goodman, 1977,p. 149): 
'organizations as a conglomerate of subunits have several advantages: It enlarges the 
scope of the concept of effectiveness by not focusing exclusively on output 
parameters such as sales ... organizational effectiveness is likely to be a function of the 
degree to which the subunits meet their task requirements as well as the extent to 
which their activities are coordinated' (Pennings & Goodman, I 977,p. 149). 
In the PB case study and the survey, interviewees from departments and sub-
departments did not always show a clear awareness of their unit goals [see discussion 
in Section 4.15.4, Characteristics of Departmental Goals at PB; and Section 5.16.2, 
Conflict between DepartmentallBranches' Goals and Corporate Goals in JCB]. Such a 
situation makes using a conglomerate of subunits' goals approach not feasible. Using 
this approach can be helpful when sub-units' goals are in harmony and faithfully 
reflect the whole of the organisation's future paths. 
3.24.3 Goals Defined by External Referents 
This approach looks outside organisations for goals as opposed to the previous two 
approaches where goals where decided from within an organisation. Using an external 
referent in the goal model of OE could have its advantages when comparing and 
evaluating an organisation's performance relative to competition andlor the industry. 
But such an approach lacks relevance as it does not take into consideration internal 
goals and processes. For this some researchers in OE do not find the idea that OE 
criteria defined by an outside investigator through induction or deduction as useful 
(Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 901; Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 152). 
Furthermore, assuming similarities in internal and external environments of different 
organisations and using a one-for-all measure may not provide useful and meaningful 
evaluations and comparisons. 
The concept of relativity in assessing OE has been endorsed in OE literature 
(Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 901; Pfeffer, 1977, p. 133; Hopwood, 1979 as 
quoted by Humphrey & Olson, 1995, p. 364). However, comparing organisations with 
one another (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p.901) has to be treated with caution. 
Evaluation of goal attainment and OE are not meaningful across organisations as 
goals differ in the ways in which organisations set them and measure their attainment, 
therefore comparing OE across organisations is untestable (Hannan & Freeman 1977, 
p. 111). Added to that the difficulties raised by 'the shifting nature of goals within 
units of organizations' (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 126). 
Furthermore, compared organisations might be at different stages in their life cycles, 
which raise the point of appropriateness of simply comparing different organisations 
at differing stages of development (Quinn & Cameron, 1983, p. 44). All the above 
explains the phrase there is 'no such thing as effectiveness per se' (Hopwood, 1979 as 
quoted by Humphrey & Olson, 1995, p. 364). 
3.24.4 Social Goals 
In addition to corporate goals whether decided by a dominant coalition or by 
managers of individual units, social goals are suggested by some researchers. 
According to Kirchhoff (1977, p. 349) goals are always derived from society as 
selected by the evaluator. Khan (1977, pp. 245-246) points out the relevance of 
considering the contribution of an organisation to the larger society of which it is a 
part as a criterion of importance. 
Social responsibility and social interests (Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967, p. 895; Lowe 
& Soo, 1980, p. 64; Pfeffer, 1977, p. 142; Johnson, 1983, p. 145; Lovell, 2002, p. 
158) is now of more importance than it was for earlier research from the 1950s to the 
1980s as we enter an area where production and social responsibility ought to 
complement one another. When defining goals for organisations from the different 
perspectives of definers, including social goals is a much more relevant issue to 
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consider and incorporate with other organisations' goals. This acknowledgement of 
social goals is needed to underline social responsibility for scarce resources and social 
justice in disposing of them. 
3.25 Characteristics of Goals Used in OE 
Goals are 'by definition many things to many people', shaped not only by wishes of 
organisational actors, but also by internal and external environments of the 
organisation (Hall, 1972, pp. 80,88). Organisations have a number of goals that can 
at times be contradictory and which call for designing systems 'which have the 
capability of handling explicit contradictions' (Mitroff & Mason, 1983, p.l96) if the 
MAS design is to be of any relevance for the user. 
There are different tiers of goals with strategic goals at the top of the pyramid guiding 
corporate goals and the more detailed operational goals found in annual budgets at the 
base of the pyramid. The PB case study deals with corporate or managerial goals 
which given the high abstraction of strategic goals, become ends in themselves (Hall, 
1972, p. 84; OtJey, 1995, p. 55). 
Different types of goals are used in organisations: motivational goals or ideological 
goals to supply incentives to participants, goals as guides to participants' efforts, goals 
as criteria for identifYing and appraising selected aspects of organisational functioning 
(Scot!, 1977, pp. 64-65). Some goals are closely related to the 'ends' or founal 
objectives of the organisation, others are adopted because they are thought to be 
'necessary means or conditions for achieving the main goals of the organization' 
(Seashore, 1965, p. 27; Campbell, 1977, p. 48). 
Goals cannot also be perceived as objective and are not outside the internal politics in 
organisations, and are often controversial (Scot!, 1981, p. 89). Added to that, goals 
seldom remain constant over time (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 378; Hall, 1972, 
p. 82; Cunningham, 1977, p. 469; Scot!, 1977, p. 74, Emmanuel et a\., 1990, p. 32) as 
they evolve with changes in internal and external environments, as well as the 
changing priorities which managements give them. 
Goals also have time reference (Seashore, 1965, p. 27), meaning criteria for past 
time period, others for current states, and stilI others for the future periods. Seashore 
(1965, p. 27-28) depicts these goals as: 
'a pyramid shaped hierarchy: at the top is the 'ultimate criterion' - some connection 
of the net performance of the organization over a long span of time in achieving its 
formal objectives ... the 'ultimate criterion' is never measured (except by 
historians) .. .In the middle are the penultimate criteria, these are the shorter run 
performance factors or dimensions comprised by the ultimate criterion. They are 
"output" or "results" criterion things sought for their own value and having trade-off 
value in relation to each other. .. at the bottom of the hierarchy ... concerning the 
conditions associated with high achievement on each of the penultimate criteria. The 
number of criteria in this class is very large ... and they are interrelated in a complex 
network that includes causal, interactional and modifier types of relationships'. 
The time scale is not always clear with published public corporate goals with 
implications on assessing OE. There are goals that organisations aim to achieve in the 
short-mn and others in the long-mn goals (Likert & Seashore, 1965, as quoted by 
Hofstede, 1968, pp. 50-51; Scot!, 1977, p. 74; Pennings & Goodman, 1977, p. 164; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 113). 
The Relative importance of goals is not the same across organisations even if similar 
goals are found in organisations. Goals may not be entirely unique to each 
organisation. But contingency theory suggests different circumstances (e.g., different 
industries) may require different goal priorities (Kirchhoff, 1977, p. 351; Kraft et aI., 
1996, pp. 104,111). [The relevance of a contingency approach to OE is discussed in 
the different approaches to the goal model. See more in Section 3.25, Characteristics 
of Goals Used in the Goal Model for Assessing OE). 
When choosing goals in the goal model many researchers advocate multiplicity of 
corporate goals and the different weightings given to each (Seashore & Yuchtman, 
1967, p. 378; Hall, 1972, p. 96; Steers, 1975, p. 555; Kirchhoff, 1977, p. 349; 
Pennings & Goodman 1977, p. 165; Hannan & Freedman, 1977, p. 112; Lewin & 
Minton, 1986, p. 528; Emmanue1 et aI., 1990, p. 32; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 318; 
Davis & Pet!, 2002, p. 88) as well as 'hard versus 'soft' goals. 
There is also evidence to show that organisations often simultaneously seek goals 
which could conflict with one another (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 378; Lowe 
& Soo, 1980, p. 65; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 32). This could mean effectiveness in 
one endeavour leads to ineffectiveness in another (Hall, 1972, p. 96) compounded 
when the more complex the organisation 'in tenus of operative goals the more 
difficult the effectiveness issue becomes' (Hall, 1972, p. 98). 
Furthenuore, organisations have operative and private goals (Cunningham, 1977, p. 
465; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, p. 112). Gross (1969 as quoted by Price, 1972, p. 6) 
takes the discussion of operative goals still further by arguing that not only public 
corporate goals need to be taken into consideration but also "intentions" and 
"activities", i.e. what participants are trying to achieve, what activities persons in the 
organisation are observed to be doing, and ip.volve verbal statements or inferences. 
Identification of which goals to measure is of great significance for using goal 
achievement as a measure of OE in that 'effectiveness is well defined only if both 
goals and outcomes are well defined and the comparison of the two is meaningful' 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1981, p. lll). 
The following section discusses defining outcomes i.e. how measurement of OE is 
discussed in the literature. 
3.26 Measurements ofOE 
With the mUltiplicity of corporate goals and the different weightings given to each 
(Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 528; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 318) and the availability of 
results, measuring OE becomes complex. OE has plagued academicians for 40 years 
in terms of its conceptualisation and measurement as it did for managers (Kraft et aI., 
1996, p. 102) [Exhibit 3.18, Suggested Measures of OE in the Literature]. However, 
measurements 'are necessary to 'a definition of organizational effectiveness' (Lowe & 
Soo, 1980, p. 68). 
Lewin & Minton (1986, p. 532) feel that any progress in developing a cumulative 
theory of OE 'will depend on progress in the development of effectiveness 
measurement tools as distinct from criteria or indicators of effectiveness'. Lewin & 
Minton's comment refers to the difficulty in operationlisation of OE i.e. to identifY 
and select tangible measures to evaluate an abstract intangible OE. The choice of 
measures must provide 'a rationale or empirical defence of why criteria chosen 
represent a true measure of effectiveness, and why the model should be applied to 
other organizations' (Steers, 1975, p. 550). 
Measuring OE in service industries 'is particularly difficult' due to customer 
participation involvement (Bowen & lones, 1986, as quoted by Kraft et aI., 1996, p. 
105), and where output is intangible in terms of count and quality. Kraft et al. (1996, 
p. 105) mention other difficulties in services industries discussed by other writers as: 
perishability, heterogeneity, production/consumption simultaneity, and labour 
intensity. When end goals are difficult to measure and that is more often the case than 
not, goals as means are used instead and their use serves 'as quintessential indicators 
of effectiveness' Scot! (1977, p. 75). 
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Partly because of the formidable difficulties in assessing outcomes, Scott (198 I, p. 
8 I) remarks that other types of indicators of OE, such as processes (Weick, 1977, 
p. 2 I 6, Scott, 1977, p. 82), standards and structures are used (Scott, I 977, pp. 82, 
84). 
Researchers differed on whether measures of OE should be externally or internally 
derived. Measures of OE 'must be based on organizational means and ends, rather 
than relying on externally derived criteria' (Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum, 1957), 
whereas Yachtman & Seashore (1967, p. 901) endorse taking the interests of various 
groups both within and outside of the organisation to develop and articulate 
preferences. 
Researchers also differed on whether to use single or multiple measures. The use of 
multiple measures was advocated by many (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 378; 
Hall, 1972, p. 91; Steers, 1975, p. 547; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 3 I 8). The measures 
need to be always a mUltiple relative measure independent of one another yet 
correlated to ensure comprehensiveness and explain more variations in OE. However, 
these multiple measures are combined by subjective means of combining multiple 
measures (Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 528), and have a trade-off value in relation to 
one another (Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 378; Davis & Pett, 2002, p. 88). 
To measure the effectiveness of organisations having similarities and dissimilarities 
no single indicator of effectiveness or even a group of common indicators can be used 
across organizations (Hall, 1972, p. 100; Steers, 1975, p. 547). Some of the measures 
would be universal and some unique to the specific organisation (Seashore & 
Yuchtman, 1967, p. 379). 
Scott also finds that different measures of OE for different uses should be used for 
particular features of organisations and systems in organisation. 
Seashore (1965, p. 27) suggests two types of values for OE measurements: the first, 
linear where more is better, and the second, curvilinear where an optimum is to be 
achieved rather than more or less of the measured value. 
Financial and non-financial measures are of equal importance to OE measurement. 
However, non-financial measures did not have a prominent place in organisations 
(Seashore, 1965, p. 5) until the 1980s although, non-financial measures reflect aspects 
ofOE that financial measures do not (Hall, 1972, p. 267; Kaplan, 1984, p. 413; Otley, 
1995, p. 56). Traditional accounting systems have focused on internal cost data, but 
internal non-cost performance data such as design, percentage of work force cross-
, " 
trained, new product introductions, first-class quality, product complexity, number of 
product changes need to be considered as well (Palmer, 1992, p. 194). 
Measurement of OE involves a number of issues: (I) the time horizon - short- versus 
long-term - (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 209; Hall, 1972, p. 80); (2) the use of 
multiple measures in determining OE as advocated by Hall (1972, p. 80) to escape 
achieving easily measured aspects. Composite financial ratios such as ROA, RO!, RI, 
sales growth, profit margin, market share, can reflect the efficiency and effectiveness 
of organisational performance (Mouritsen, 1995, p. 308; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 
208) 
Mahoney (1967, p. B-84) notes that 'managers in different industries, companies, and 
organizational environments share to a considerable extent a common framework for 
jUdging organizational effectiveness'. 
'business managers tend to use productivity and efficient performance as close 
substitutes for the ultimate criterion of effectiveness ... one might infer from the 
general business model that the concept of the ultimate criterion parallels closely the 
economic criteria of profit, productivity, and efficiency. Organizational and 
behavioral characteristics are perceived to be related to the economic criteria and 
somewhat predictive ofthem' (Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969, p. 362). 
However, Davis & Pett (2002, p. 88) agree that in spite of 'longstanding theoretical 
and empirical arguments to the contrary, strategy researchers continue to follow the 
well-established practice of focusing on narrowly-defined ratios of inputs and outputs 
(e.g. Return on Assets) as the primary empirical referent of organizational 
performance' . 
From the previous discussion one can elicit that, for measurements of OE to produce 
useful and meaningful results, measures of OE need to reflect a variety of 
organisational aspects: the life cycle of a firm in terms of size and growth (micro 
measures), the need for trade-offs among organisational goals, the environment in 
which an organisation operates and the particular industry (macro measures), the 
corporate culture, the particular perspective(s) of the evaluation, as well as the social 
perspectives in organisations. The use of different criteria of OE for different units 
within an organisation need to be addressed i.e. comprehensiveness and flexibility, to 
acknowledge the dynamic nature of OE, and the attempt to reach homeostasis both 
internally within an organisation and externally within a larger external environment. 
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Exhibit 3.18 
Suggeste dM fOE easures 0 in the LIterature 
Measure Reference 
I Profit Georgopoulos, 1965, p. 168; Seashore, 1965, p. 28; Mahoney 
& Weitzel, 1969, p. 364; Hall, 1972, p. 127; Simon, 1977, p. 
125; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531; Hofstede, 1968,p. 3; 
Campbell, 1977, p. 36; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, Emmanuel et 
aI., 1990, p. 33; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 316; Mouristen, 
1995, p. 308; Slagmulder, 1997, p. 109 
2 Sales Seashore, 1965, p. 28; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531, 
Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 33; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 32; Kraft 
etaL,1996. 
3 Rate of return Kichhoff, 1977, Campbell, 1977, p. 36; p. 351; Lewin & 
on investment Minton, 1986, p. 531; Emmanuel et aL, 1990, p. 33; 
Mouristen, 1995, p. 308. 
4 Return on assets Markus & Pfeffer, 1983 
5 Return on risk- Hefliar et aI., 2002, p. 39 
adjusted capital 
6 Residual Mouristen, 1995, p. 308 
Income 
7 Productivity Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969, p. 362; Steers, 1975, p. 549 
8 Average return Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 23 
on total capital 
9 Market share Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 391; Yuchtman & Seashore, 
1967, p. 897; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531; Emmanuel et aI., 
1990, p. 33; Slagmulder, 1997, p. 109; Kraft et aI., 1996. 
10 Growth Seashore, 1965, p. 28; Campbell, 1977, pp. 36-37; Markus & 
Pfeffer, 1983; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 33; Slagmulder, 
1997.p.109 
11 Sales growth Campbell, 1977, p. 36-37; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 33; 
Mouristen, 1995, p. 308. 
12 Employee Seashore, 1965, p. 28; Campbell, 1977, p. 36-37; Emmanuel 
satisfaction et aI., 1990, p. 33; Kaplan & Norton, 1993, p. 140; Anderson 
& Lanen, 1999, p. 400 
13 Customer Seashore, 1965, p. 28; Kaplan & Norton, 1993, p. 140; 
satisfaction Slagmulder, 1997, p. 109; Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 400 
14 Quality, Campbell, 1977, p. 36; MabberJey, 1992, p. 105; Palmer, 
cost/quality 1992, p. 194; Anderson & Lanen, 1999, p. 400 
15 Efficiency Campbell, 1977, p. 36-37; Mahoney & Weitzel, 1969, p. 362 
16 Frequency of Camp bell, 1977, p. 36-37 
accidents 
17 Absenteeism Campbell, 1977, p. 36-37 
18 Employee Campbell, 1977, p. 37; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531 
turnover 
19 Participation Campbell, 1977, p. 39; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531 
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20 Stability Campbell, 1981, p. 39; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 531 
21 Low production Seashore & Yuchtman, 1967, p. 391; Anderson & Lanen, 
costs 1999,p.400 
22 Customer Mabberley, 1992, p. 13; Helliar et al. 2002, p. 
profitability 
23 Innovation/ Steers, 1975, p. 549; Mabberley, 1992, p. 109; Palrner, 1992, 
adaptability and p. 194; Kaplan & Norton, 1993, p. 140; 
flexibility 
24 Adaptability to Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 33 
changing 
circumstances 
25 Compound Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 22 
asset and equity 
growth 
26 Social Ernmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 33 
responsibility 
27 Average return Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 23 
on equity and 
sales 
. 
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3.27 The Literature and the Research Project 
It was argued at the start that MAR has been creative and adaptive and borrowed from 
neighbouring disciplines such as economics, sociology, psychology, social 
psychology, and management. The same is true with regard to OE; OE has been an 
expanding concept, there are a number of ways of defining it using a microeconomic , 
goal achievement, social, psychological or financial perspective. The review of OE 
literature also showed the variety of measures that can be used such as profit, sales, 
ROI, ROA, return on risk-adjusted capital, and employee satisfaction to mention 
some. The review also showed that the goal achievement approach adopted in the 
empirical study is far from being one-dimensional or mechanistic. Both these broad 
understandings (of MAS and OE) derived from the literature review have informed 
the design and execution of our research. 
MAS is treated in the empirical research in a broad, flexible and inclusive way. The 
context of PB is constantly relevant to the analysed data. The analysis of the PB case 
study shows the impact the history of PB had on the design, implementation, and 
operation of MAS, and on the setting and choice of goals at PB which in turn affected 
OE measures. This also expands on the literature on the influence of economic and 
market realities and changes on the historical development of MA practice. 
The research continues the move towards the organisational and social roles of 
accounting compared to the earlier MAR which was influenced by psychological 
perspectives. It emphasises the difficulty in seeking universal findings that were 
sought that would suggest the one best way of MAS and the significance and 
relevance of context. 
In another aspect the research links to the literature in highlighting the distinctiveness 
of the organisation as an identifiable social structure or entity, and the 
interdependency of functions and processes that relate the organisation to its 
environment! Jordanian context. 
This research attempts to expand alld develop previous MAR in studying the effect of 
contingent variables of MAS design such as environment, technology, culture, 
organisational structure on broad features of organisational structure and control and 
their interaction with single characteristics of an organisation [see discussion in 
Section 3.7.3, Contingency Theory in MA]. The research continues MAR on the 
relationship between organizational structures and MAS variables. It highlights 
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elements in organisational structure that were identified by the managers interviewed 
as being of significance in the operation ofMAS. 
This research, in line with BAR recognises the impact of people on technology and 
structure and that humans do not react in a consistent and predictive way. The 
research continues MAR literature in that MA practices are not techniques that can be 
abstracted from the general milieu of social life but are part of the complex structure 
of the in internal and external environment and social life. By asking the interviewees 
questions not only about what info/data was used but also what managers thought of it 
and how they used it, the research and the pilot study attempted to look into social 
science and management understanding beyond formal accounting. In looking at the 
role of MAS in enhancing OE this research discusses behavioural issues implicated in 
the design, implementation, and operation of MAS such as participation in the design 
of MAS and MAS reports, the flow of information, internal politics, and the use of 
perfom1ance evaluation in motivation. 
The use of multi-methods in collecting data in the PB case study i.e., interviews, 
documentation, observation, external writings about PB, is an attempt at applying the 
concept of an inclusive development of MA practice as discussed in Section 3.1 
Historical Developments of MA Practises. This approach is also pursued in the use of 
a broad base of interviewees from different (hierarchical) levels, from branches and 
from head office, different functions (credit, deposits, finance, and branches) - putting 
it into the whole organisation context to show the influence of the organisational 
behaviour contribution in the literature. Thus we have taken a formal accounting 
issue, MAS, and contexted it managerially and organisationally. 
MA information when available in organisations can be used and be of use not only 
to managers within organisations. The research provides more insights to previous 
MAR in that generalisation on the ways in which people process information is 
problematic. The managers interviewed from different functions in JCB clearly 
showed differences not only in the type of MAS information they identified as of 
importance to their work but also in the ways they use it [see Section 3.11.2 Human 
Information Processing (HIP) theory in MAR]. By doing so this research develops 
the literature that calls for fostering a closer working and interactive relationship 
between MA researchers and MA practitioners. The research expands on social theory 
in MAR providing a framework by observing from analysed data the interaction 
between MAS users and initiators on the one hand, and of MAS and organisational 
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structure on the other. It also expands on previous MAR in supporting the effect of 
organisational life on shaping and changing accounting roles [see more on this in 
Section 3.5, Defining MA]. 
In investigating the role of MAS in enhancing OE in a Jordanian context, this research 
expands and develops the literature on how organisations can be seen as open systems 
comprising various sub-systems that individually and jointly determine OE. It 
highlights through an empirical study the relevance of the approach of other MAR in 
viewing OE as complex and multi-dimensional whether by measuring OE in the PB 
case study using composite financial measures independent of one another yet 
correlated to ensure comprehensiveness (ROA, deposits growth, profit growth, market 
share ... ) far from mechanistic solutions, or by highlighting the significance of using 
non-financial measures in measuring OE. 
In a related area the research expands on the literature on the goal model showing 
how the measurements and criteria used affect the meaning of OE. As the nature of 
goal-setting processes in organisations involve philosophical stands, preferences, and 
attitudes of management in addition to the specifics of the internal and external 
environments of organisations that affect OE measurements. We are thereby 
continuing the approach to interorganisational comparisons with much caution as it 
might mean comparing different things. 
In discussing the role of MAS in enhancing OE this research continues the literature 
in that processes as criteria of effectiveness should be given more attention than is 
done by the OE literature, as processing of plarming and control are analysed and 
assessed in the PB case study and the survey. 
The research highlights barriers to the achievements of OE whether relating to IT 
systems employed by PB, or the process of goal-setting, or diffusion of MAS 
information to PB managers. It expands and develops the unclear relation between 
outcomes/goals and action or processes involved as observed and commented on by 
interviewees in the PB case study and in the survey, which was explained by the 
nature of the interdependence of banks' departments and responsibilities of individual 
managers 
The impact of ideas derived from the literature on the scope and execution of the 
research, which is briefly and selectively indicated in this short section, will hopefully 
evolve more comprehensively in the discussion of the empirical research in the 
following chapters. 
3.2& SummaI)' of Chapter 3 
Prior to 1950 the term 'management accounting' was used rarely. The earliest 
published researched use of a cost calculation technique reported in the accounting 
literature, as published in the English language, was in the early l800s in the Soho 
Engineering Foundl)' of Bolton in Britain. Managers, engineers and accountants in 
those firms devised n~w means to replace labour conversion cost supplied until then 
by the market and the price system in the form of piece-rates. The emergence of new 
forms of non-market organisations called for new MA techniques for evaluation of 
performance and the effectiveness of administrative coordination and not only 
processes of production. 
Looking back at the historical development of MA practice one finds that it was 
influenced by economic and market realities and changes, by organisational 
changes/types of firms; by social realities affecting society in general and certain 
industries in particular; by political changes as well by cultural contexts; also by 
developments in related disciplines. 
MA was influenced by three main theories: economic theories, behavioural theories, 
and social theories. However, a number of researchers believe that there is no MA 
theol)'. 
Informed by economic theories, MAR until the late 1970s attempted to provide 
models and techniques to programme decision-making and control processes 
Methods used in MAR in the 1980s included the use of descriptive field research, and 
field studies that focus on developing evidence that either supports or contradicts an 
existing theol)'. There were also calls for opening up to different approaches in MAR 
and the use of more case studies. 
The 1990s was an era when MAR took a more open and pluralist perspective after 
going through self-assessment in the 1980s and expanded with the introduction of 
new theoretical approaches and a growing use of field-based research methods. 
MAS has numerous roles in organisations which an be broadly divided into roles in 
planning and decision-making such as in communicating corporate culture and being 
an agent of change, and roles in control such as maintaining organisational integrity 
and affecting employees' behaviour. All those roles can be linked to OE. 
MAS are defined/described by researchers in a number of ways. Some definitions 
stress a strictly functional orientation while others show the subtleties of roles of 
MAS in organisation as interpretive schemes used to communicate values and ideals 
and to coordinate and control. 
MAS design influenced by economic-based theories emphasise the technical 
orientation and evaluation of technical efficiency of processes. The introduction of 
infonnation economics in the 1970s to MA highlighted the costs and benefits of 
infonnation systems. The employment of agency theory in the 1970s into MAS, 
provided a better framework for multi-person infonnation system choice than other 
economic theories as well as acknowledging the problems of uncertainty and 
asymmetry of infonnation between principal and agent. Behavioural approaches 
incorporating into MAS design technical elements of a system with the social 
influences of the human element i.e. a socio-technical system. In applying 
contingency theories some researchers have sought to uncover direct relationships 
between contextual factors and organisations' accounting and infonnation systems 
and design effectiveness. 
The literature review of OE highlights some of the problems in defining OE, the 
different criteria used in assessing it as a construct that has not only different 
meanings and attributes but is measured in different ways. 
There are five main criteria suggested by researchers to assessing OE: allocation of 
resources, survival of organisations, adaptability and flexibility, resources acquisition, 
and goal achievement. The goal model for assessing OE has to answer the questions 
of which goals to measure? whose perspective should dominate? as this will 
detennine the type of criteria and the level of effectiveness desired. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDY OF PHOENIX BANK (PB) 
Phoenix: Mythical bird of the Arabian Desert, said to live for several hundred years 
before burning itself and rising again born from its ashes 
(Oxford Dictionary, encyclopedic edition, 1994, p. 671). 
PART I CASE STUDY RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Historical Background ofPB 
PB was first registered in May 1977 as a plc in Jordan with a capital of JD 5 millions 
[JD 0.60 = STO 1, CBJ Annual Report 1987 (first annual report published); JD 1.025 
= STO 1, CB] 2001 Annual Report (when the survey was carried out)]. It started 
operating with 14 employees working in a single branch. Ten years later, and by the 
end of 1988 total assets of PB were JD 135.5 million, total deposits lD 117.6 million, 
and total facilities JD 73.6 millions. The number of employees had risen to 533 and 
the number of branches to 21 [Exhibit 4.1, PB Total Assets from 1978-2001]. 
In 1983 Jordan was starting to be affected by a recession that hit the whole area. The 
recession affected PB as well as other Jordanian banks and a number of them faced 
financial difficulties. In 1989, although the profit & loss account of PB showed a 
profit, the balance sheet concealed a real loss of JD 30 million or three times the 
shareholders' equity (Malki, 1997, p. 23). The balance sheet showed an over-stated 
credit facilities figure most of which were bad and doubtful debts. That year marked 
the beginning of the dark days ofPB. 
In that same year more than one Jordanian bank had serious financial difficulties and 
some were subsequently liquidated. In this threatening economic atmosphere the 
governor of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) decided to relieve the board of directors 
and general manager of PB of their duties and in August 1989 merged PB with 
another faltering bank. The Economic Security Commission approved the governor's 
decision and a management committee for PB was appointed by CBl. 
After less than a year (on 10 July 1990), CBJ rescinded its decision and annulled the 
merger as it was found to be not feasible and not in PB's best interests. 
PB was to face still another historical event in its life. On 2 June 1992, CBJ decided to 
merge PB with yet another faltering bank. During this time CBJ was looking for local 
and foreign investors to buy the new entity made up of the merger of the two banks. 
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Exhibit 4.1 
PB Total Assets from 1978 - 2001 ( JD million) 
From 1989-1993 PS did not publish accounts 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
7.9 20.8 32.8 60.6 70.1 75.8 76 96.2 109.2 120.5 
1988 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
135.5 84.1 130.4 171.5 179.5 183.4 238 276 344.5 386.5 
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In February 1993 a group of investors from Jordan and abroad submitted an offer to 
buy PB (Malki, 1997, p. 33). The deal went through and PB was sold. 
In May 1993 the combined balance sheet of the newly-formed PB after the merger 
showed an accumulated loss of almost 65 million Jordanian dinars. A new board of 
directors was elected and a general manager was appointed for the first time since 
CB] took over PB in August 1989. 
During the period 1993-1997 three general managers were appointed: the third was 
the general manager who took part in this study. There were also changes in the board 
of directors, chairmen, and vice-chairmen. 
When the new general manager was appointed in July 1997 he made a number of 
organisational changes. He appointed a new management team, started a restructuring 
stage, and cut the number of employees to around 400 (on 31112/1997) to rise to more 
than 600 employees on 31112/1999. Out of 13 senior head office department 
managers eight were newly appointed and comprises 62 % of the management team 
during the time the study took place at PB [Exhibit 4.2, List ofPB Interviews]. 
Changes were also introduced to PB's organisational structure. New departments 
were formed such as the Credit Control Department, others were closed such as the 
Research and Development and Public Relations Department, and others were closed 
to be re-instituted a year later such as Branches Affairs [Exhibits 4.3 and 4.4, 
Organisational Charts for 1998 and 1999]. Authorities and responsibilities of 
managers were also changed as in the case of the first assistant general manager, and 
assistant manager for branches affairs. 
A number of reasons were responsible for the frequent changes. It seemed that the 
closing of certain departments had caused a gap in the communication channels as a 
result of a cut in the chain of command. On the other hand, suggested alternatives 
were not developed enough to fill in the gap caused by the absence of closed 
departments. Some negative effects of the changes might have been augmented 
further by what can be described by 'old habits die hard' as certain managers hung on 
to what they were used to and did not adapt to the new changes. 
The new general manager centralised some of the banking services in the head office 
departments like centralising letters of credit, transfers, and credit facilities. The 
rationale was that the centralised departments would render their services with an 
improved degree of control and co-ordination. However, he gave branch managers 
higher authorisation levels than they previously had in authorising credit. 
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Exhibit 4.2 
L' [PB I 1St 0 ntervIewees A d' D ccor mg to ate 0 fE mployment 
Employment 
Position 
I Branch manager 1978 
2 Treasury manager/Investment & external relations 1979 
manager 
3 Branch manager 1981 
4 Training & personnel manager 1985 
5 Assistant general manager for finance & personnel 1987 
6 Information technology manager 1994 
7 Branch manager 1994 
8 Internal audit manager· 1995 
9 General manager 1997 
10 Follow-up & collection manager 1997 
11 Credit control manager 1997 
12 Organisation & banking operations manager 1997 
13 Credit & marketing executive manager 1997 
14 Research & development manager 1998 
15 Corporate credit facilities manager 1998 
16 Legal department manager 1999 
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At the time of the study, PB's 1999 annual report showed total assets of JD 276 
millions, total deposits of JD 218 millions, and net total amount of credit facilities of 
JD 143.8 millions. The number of employees at the end of 1999 exceeded 600 and the 
capital was JD 33.3 million [Exhibit 4.1, PB Total Assts From 1978-200IJ. Since the 
appointment of the new management team one branch was opened making a total of 
31 branches and cash offices in Jordan and Palestine. 
4.2 Case Study ofPB 
The case study of PB investigates the role of MAS in enhancing OE in a Jordanian 
commercial banle With reference to the literature review on the role of MAS [see 
Section 3.15, Role ofMAS in Organisations), the case study investigation at PB sheds 
light on the role of MAS in enhancing OE in a different cultural setting (Hopwood & 
Bromwich, 1984, p. 10). The description provided by the study allows insight into the 
role of MAS at PB in general and during the restructuring stage although this was not 
the main focus of the study (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 247; Otley, 1984, pp. 12, 
147). 
The study of the MAS at PB looked into the characteristics and operation of MAS 
employed and factors behind its design, the organisational structure of PB, the 
channels and methods of communication used. It also included the content, 
characteristics, and use of MAS reports in the areas of planning, decision-making and 
control. 
The case study involves a single setting with the aim of further investigating similar 
issues in all JCB in a second phase of the research looking into the role of MAS in 
enhancing OE in JCB. 
OE was investigated at the organisational level rather than through a perspective of a 
particular system or systems within PB. The interpretation of OE used was that of 
goal achievement [see discussion in Section 3.18, Controversy over Defining OE; and 
Section 3.22.5, OE as Goal Achievement]. 
It is hoped that the case study would be of direct or potential relevance for both 
academic and non-academic audiences. 
A pilot study was done in the research area of interest prior to the case study 
investigation. The pilot study helped in familiarising me with the banking sector and 
the way Jordanian banks employ MA. 
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The pilot study covered four Jordanian banks - PB was not among them - through 
four structured interviews with the financial manager at each bank. The pilot study 
mainly looked into how MA information was used, and whether the managers were 
satisfied with the information provided to them by management accountants or 
whoever was acting in that capacity at each bank. 
4.3 Data Collection 
A number of methods were used in data collection: interviews, documentation from 
PB as well as external material written on PB. Observation was used to add a new 
dimension to data collected through interviews and documentation [Exhibit 2.6, Data 
Collection Methods]. More than one method for data collection was adopted for the 
sake of triangulation, and for trying to gain insights from different perspectives. 
4.3.1 Observation 
Observation provided me with information on PB on certain aspects that were not 
discussed in the interviews as welI as observing - though for shorter periods - how 
what was said to be by the interviewees was practised. 
Observation during the study was helpful in adding new dimensions for understanding 
the contexts and the phenomena being studied (Yin, 1994, p. 87). The remark by 
Giddens (1995, p. 237) 'the aggressive banter of the shop-floor is likely to give me 
more insight than a whole interview', brings to mind a sign near the elevators at the 
head office of PB saying 'it is forbidden to use the elevator going down' (stress 
added). 
Observation of things included the fact that the managers' offices I visited rarely had 
any personal items, and it attracted my attention that there were no natural plants at 
the head office building - a customary practice in other office buildings and banks -
and I was told that PB management did not provide any natural plants and forbid 
managers from having any in their offices as it was considered to be an unnecessary 
expense. In addition to the above, observation contributed to matters such as the way 
managers addressed and talked to their staff, or to clients who just dropped-in while I 
was carrying out my interviews and to observe the atmosphere at work and the issues 
the managers discussed in the interviews. 
Exhibit 4.5 
List of Reports Prepared by IT Department at PB (translated from Arabic) 
.. 
Report Title of report Department Frequency 
13 List of overdrawn & limit exceeding A/Cs Follow-up Daily 
8805 List of overdrawn & limit exceeding AICs Follow-up Monthly 
82 Position of foreign currencies in JD Financial Daily 
89 Main liquid assets Financial Daily 
75 Off-Balance Sheet accounts Financial Monthly 
79 Monthly expenses Financial Monthly 
190 Total direct credit facilities Financial Monthly 
862 List of deposits Financial Quarterly 
863 List of deposits (time, CDs, notification) Financial Monthly 
877 List of revenue & expenses (all currencies) Financial Monthly 
881 Detailed credit facilities Financial Weekl'i 
876 Balance Sheet Financial Monthly 
886 Credit facilities by_business sector Financial Daily 
887 Categorised deposits Financial Monthly 
8715 Categorised facilities & deposits Financial Monthly 
8716 D~osits exceedinq JD 50000 Financial On request 
8717 List of balances of a certain ledqer Financial Monthly 
352 Statistics of bills due Credit facilities Quarterly 
8806 Statistics of bills due Credit facilities Monthly 
8011 Deposits according to maturity General manage Daily 
8702 Balance Sheet General manage Monthly 
8703 Profit & loss AIC General manage Monthly 
8704 Branches profits General manage Monthly 
8705 Deposits General manage Monthly 
8706 Credit facilities General manage Monthly 
8707 Expenses excluding salaries General manage Monthly 
8722 Deposits receiving> 9% Main branch On request 
8724 Dishonoured cheques Organisation & 
Banking operatio Monthly 
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4.3.2 Documentation 
Documentation provided the case study with historical, current, and future 
information of PB. Documentation also covered organisational charts, future plans 
and budgets, MAS reports, what was the intended use of MAS reports, and how the 
reports related to what was said by the interviewees [Exhibit 4.5, List of MAS Reports 
Prepared by IT Department]. 
4.3.3 Interviews 
The main emphasis in collecting data was on 16 semi-structured interviews with 
senior managers. The interviews covered 12 head office department managers, three 
branch managers, and the general manager [Exhibit 4.3, PB Organisational Chart 
1998; and Exhibit 4.2, List of PB Interviews]. The interviews allowed for collecting 
more detailed information to gain a deeper understanding of the role and operation of 
MAS used at PB (Jones, 1993, p. 225). Two of the departments were formed only a 
few months before the interviews took place, and those were Research & 
Development (R&D), and Credit Control. The Organisation & Banking Operations 
department was reactivated, and an executive manager appointed to head it. 
Apart from one manager who did not wish to get involved in the study, the interviews 
covered all senior head office managers. The absence of participation of that 
particular manager, in my opinion, did not affect the study in any way as I 
interviewed three other managers in the same department. 
4.3.3.1 PB Interviewees 
Most of the meetings were arranged by the co-ordinator of the research at PB after 
discussing with her the managers I would like to interview. Three branch managers 
out of 28 branches in Jordan -at the time of the study- were chosen by the co-
ordinator. The total assets of each the three branches were approximately the same 
size and they totalled 12 % of the total assets ofPB Jordan branches. I do not believe 
- as will be explained later - that the choice of the three branch managers by the co-
ordinator biased the outcome of the study in any way. The co-ordinator's main 
concern was to choose those managers whom she believed will be more co-operative 
and would cause me no difficulty - all three happened to be from the old management 
team. 
It turned out to be true; I found them on the whole open, understanding and co-
operative. After going through all the interviews, the opinions of two branch 
managers -the third to a lesser degree- compared to the rest of the interviews showed 
a large degree of independence of opinion, and openness. They spoke out about 
things they believed were true each in herlhis own way. 
The interviews covered the three categories mentioned in the research structural 
framework [Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods]. The first category of interviewees 
comprised users of MAS reports such as the general manager and branch managers. 
The second category comprised compilers of information such as the assistant 
manager in charge of the finance department and the IT manager. The third category, 
those I referred to as movers/initiators, influence the design and operation of MAS 
such as the general manager and assistant general manager. It is opportune to mention 
at this point that PB did not have a department or a manager in charge of MAS as 
such but the tasks were undertaken by a number of departmental managers. The 
financial department and the R&D department shared the responsibilities of a 
management accounting department. 
Collection of data from multiple managers at PB is desirable because no single 
manager in the organisation has complete knowledge about how the MAS worked. It 
was also useful 'to guard against idiosyncratic views being treated as representative of 
the entire organisation' (Slagmulder, 1997, p. 108). Multiple interviews as well are 
helpful to check for internal contradictions in the interviews and with external 
contradictions from other sources (Pettigrew, 1972, p. 192). Multiple interviews also 
guard against what Young (1999, pp. 81, 82) observed in previous work he did 
(Young & Selto, 1993), that post-study interviews with managers revealed some 
managers' responses were based on social desirability in other words, they told us 
what they thought we wanted to hear. 
4.3.3.2 The Interviewing 
I would always begin each interview with stressing the confidentiality of any 
information the interviewee provided me with. I stressed that no one inside or outside 
PB will read my notes of what the interviewees said except for my 
supervisors/examiners. 
I felt that assuring the interviewees of this confidentiality was important for a number 
of reasons. The first, relates to the fact that securing the approval and co-operation of 
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the general manager was essential for securing the co-operation of the managers and 
to get the information I needed. This raised some suspicion in some of the managers 
that I was doing this study on· behalf of the management of PB. Secondly, I wanted to 
put the interviewees at ease and pave the way for an atmosphere of trust and openness 
in discussing my questions. Thirdly, the restructuring stage, which the general 
manager had initiated, resulted in terminating the employment of a number of PB 
employees and appointing new ones in their places. I felt the importance of reassuring 
the interviewees that any infomIation they provided would not be made available to 
anyone at PB and would not be used against them. 
All interviews were conducted in the offices of the managers where they normally 
carry on their business and during office hours. In spite of the interruptions, this gave 
me a valuable opportunity for observing and gaining first hand knowledge of the 
nature of each manager's work and the problems they faced at work with their staff, 
superiors, and visiting clients. 
The co-ordinator dissuaded me from taping the interviews. She believed that most 
managers would not be comfortable with the idea. So I depended on a note pad at all 
. times during interviews. I wrote down selected phrases and key words to help me 
recall what was said and what interesting things happened during the interview. 
Understandably, taping the interviews would have provided me with the possibility to 
listen again to the interviews and reassess the way the interviews phrased their 
sentences, made their stresses, and stops among other matters. However, I made sure 
that each interviewee received a copy of my notes of hislher interview - for some 
interviewees this occurred more than twice - as I believed that 'corrections made 
through this process enhance the accuracy of the case study' (Slagmulder, 1997, p. 
108). Interview transcripts were given to the managers to ensure that what was written 
corresponded to what was actually said. Any necessary amendments were made but 
those were very few and did not have a substantial effect on the integrity of the 
information in my notes. 
All interviews were carried out in Arabic. Although the interviewees understood 
English, I felt they would be more comfortable discussing the questions in Arabic or a 
combination of both. Note taking fulfilled two major functions: first, it provided a 
record of the data collected from the interviews, and the second, is that systematic 
note taking 'allows control over threats to validity and reliability, primarily that of 
observer bias' (McKinnon, 1988, p. 46). After the first three interviewees I started 
taking down notes and preparing transcripts in English rather than Arabic. I found 
that taking notes and writing transcripts in Arabic was not necessary and I could use 
different languages simultaneously - one in speaking and one in writing. 
The total amount of interview time was 58 hours spread over the period from 21 
October 1999 - 2 July 2000. Interviews with managers ranged from I hour to 8 hours, 
but most were 3 Y, hours long in two separate meetings. All interviews were followed 
by a follow-up meeting which was useful since, after writing notes of each interview, 
I would find that some information was missing or needed further elaboration so I 
would make a note and ask about it during the follow-up meeting. 
All interviews were carried by me although some researchers argue that 'the use of 
more investigators build confidence in the findings' (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 538). What 
might have been sacrificed in this respect was gained in consistency in approach and 
handling of positive and negative situations in the interviews and consistency in 
interpretation. 
4.3.3.3 The Case Study Interview Guide 
Semi-structured interviews with 16 interviewees were carried out using an interview 
guide as a common base for all the interviews with variations to suit the scope of 
responsibilities of each interviewee [see Appendix 2, Case Study Interview Guide]. 
Questions were open-ended to get as much as possible a detailed description of each 
manager's work and opinions. 
The questions in the interview guide acted as a reference to the areas I needed to 
cover in the interviews. They served also as prompts while respondents discussed the 
questions. 
Questions centred round the characteristics of MAS through which information was 
collected, processed and communicated and how that MAS worked for the 
interviewees in the areas of planning, decision-making, and control, and on the 
organisational structure and the channels of communication. The questions also 
covered the personal opinions of each manager, and whether the managers found the . 
MAS satisfactory and what they thought the gaps were. While the focus in the 
interviews was on the managers' subjective experience, the underlying theme was the 
way in which the MAS was used at PB and why. 
I thought it would be a helpful introduction to send to each interviewee prior to my 
meeting with him/her a faxed message confirming our meeting and mentioning the 
title of my research, the areas the questions would cover, and a suggested definition of 
MA and MAS [see Appendix 1, Letter ofIntroduction to PB Interviewees]. This was 
to provide the interviewees and me with a common definition to work with (Khan & 
Cannell, 1957, p.125). 
I serial coded each topic under the general headings used in the interview guide 
(external environment, management reports, planning and decision-making, 
organisational structure, etc ... ). While interviewing I would write down next to the 
answers the managers gave the nuruber of the topic being discussed, so finding any 
missing information was easy by simply detecting whether the numbers on the 
transcript were in serial. 
The questions were open-ended for the obvious reason that this will give interviewees 
more space to speak about their ideas and opinions, and an opportunity to add more 
on the topic if they wished to do so. I made a conscious effort to take a neutral stance 
in asking questions or commenting so as not to influence the opinions of the 
interviewees, and not to guide respondents into answering in a certain direction by 
unconscious or careless hints. I observed caution not to pass judgements on what each 
respondent described as being implemented in the organisation, and not to be 
evaluative of his/her personal ideas and beliefs. 
In addition to the formal discussions in the interviews there were also informal 
conversations (Gurd & Thorne, 2003, p. 25), which are used alongside other data in 
interpretation and analysis, as a valuable source offield data. 
4.4 Points on Validity and Reliability ofthe Case Study 
Construct validity is reinforced in the case study of PB through: 
the use of multiple sources of evidence; 
the establishing of a chain of evidence through the 16 interviews and the 
other two methods of data collection; 
the follow-up meetings with the managers and carrying out of corrections 
to the information collected through interviews (Yin, 1994, p. 33; 
Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 50). 
All this increases confidence in the construct validity of the findings of the case study 
on availability and diffusion of information, attention to planning needs, the emphasis 
on the control function and the cultural effect on MAS. 
The interviews helped in increasing the internal validity of the investigation through: 
explanation building; 
linking certain observations on the MAS at PB, as expressed by the 
interviewees, to the current practice and operation of MAS at PB after 
analysing collected data from interviewees; 
pattern-matching to other researchers models (Yin, 1994, p. 33). 
I was not able to identify a negative impact on the co-operation of the interviewees, 
whether men or women, with my investigation (out of the 16 interviewees 4 were 
women). Without going into the social behaviour of men and women, all managers 
seemed eager to help and were open and co-operative. In fact, I found a positive 
response from both male and female managers during interviews. Understandably this 
can be partly explained by the traditional kindness male managers felt they had to 
show to me even though I was taking up a lot of their time, and asking them to 
consider and think about things they might not have felt like talking about. 
In contrast, there were a couple of isolated cases from the old management team, 
where co-operation and openness were not at a level to hinder or negatively affect the 
collection of data but were less than I hoped for and got from other interviewees. I 
attribute the reason for this to a feeling of insecurity that came from the many changes 
that the old management team went through during their long years of work at PB. 
One point I view as contributing to enhancing the validity of the results is the 
separation of data collection and data analysis (McKinnon, 1988, p. 46) in this 
research since starting to analyse collected data while still doing subsequent 
interviews might have affected my questions in later and interpretations of earlier 
interviews. Whereas in this case I took note of what interviews said without trying to 
tailor the outcomes to fit what I saw or heard with a certain pattern that confirms or 
refutes what other interviews said, or even with some initial impressions I might have 
formed by then. 
To increase the reliability of the study 'a case study protocol' was prepared (Yin, 
1994, p. 85). The case study protocol included: 
a clear definition of the research area; 
the structure of the fieldwork to be undertaken such as the departments to 
be included in the study and the individual managers to be interviewed in 
each department; 
the key issues to be discussed in the interviews; 
an interview guide carefully prepared to act as a unifying base for all 
interviews, 
an analysis plan; 
a case study data base. 
The database was developed during the data collection phase to increase the 
replicability of the findings (Yin, 1994, p. 95; Slagmulder, 1997, p. 108). It included 
information such as past annual reports, published material on PB, successive 
organisation charts, copies ofMAS reports, and interviews transcriptions. 
Added to the many visits to PB's head office (which exceeded 35 visits), I also 
obtained first hand experience of some of the banking services offered by PB as I 
opened an account with a branch that was not involved in the study. I wanted to 
experience for myself some of what was talked about in the interviews, and at times 
used what I experienced in my questions. I shared with the managers their good days 
and bad days, their frustrations with the systems adopted at PB, MAS and others, with 
fellow managers and top management and shared their celebrations when promotions 
came along. I shared with them some of the changes that took place at PB, moving 
offices, rearrangement of departments and offices, the redecoration work where most 
of the furniture at the head office was been changed to the official colours of PB. At 
times, as a result of my repeated visits and meetings I found my self in unusual 
situations.' While immersing myself in the data collected for a period of 10 months, I 
did not lose a sense of detachment from the collected data as well as the purpose that 
my involvement with the managers. 
4.5 Restructuring Stage at PB 
The choice of PB was judgmental. I tried to avoid both the extremes of the largest or 
smallest commercial bank or the oldest or newest. The choice was also restricted, as 
well by a bank's management willing to co-operate with the needs of the study and 
provide what facilities and information was needed. 
I For example, the one when, while waiting for my interview I noticed that there was not a 
single piece of paper on the three desks in the room in which I was sitting. I tried to make 
friendly conversation with an employee Sitting at a desk next to me. I remarked by saying, "It 
looks like you'll be moving offices". She smiled but did not comment. After a few weeks I 
met her again on the staircase, and she tool< me by surprise when she immediately said, 
"You were right. We are going to be moved from our old offices. Do you know where we will 
be moving?" to which I replied "Believe me I have not got the slightest idea." But from the 
look on her face I was not sure she believed me. 
The choice of a bank undergoing a substantial restructuring stage was not planned 
from the beginning, but it was a valuable opportunity for me to observe the process of 
change in addition to my main purpose of collecting information on MAS. 
Eisenhardt (1989; p. 537) believes 'it makes sense to choose extreme situations and 
polar types in which the process of interest is "transparently observable". In a sense 
PB was an extreme case. The restructuring stage had a number of positive effects on 
the collection of data. The general manager was open to new ideas in his efforts to 
launch a new PB. He supported any catalyst he believed might contribute to the 
process of beneficial change at PB. The interviewees talked openly about problems 
they found in the design and operation of MAS. The climate was one of reassessment 
and change. Practices including MAS were reviewed. The negative effect of the 
restructuring stage was on the MAS at PB rather than on the study I carried out there. 
Being involved with a new management team, (62 % of the managers joined PB 
during 24 - 6 months before the study took place) turned out to be very helpful. The 
new managers felt liberated from supporting the existing system either by concealing 
information or finding excuses. They also were more confident in themselves and 
their abilities as they were specifically recruited because they had demonstrated their 
capabilities while working for other banks. 
4.6 Analysis of Collected Data from PB 
4.6.1 Analysing Processes 
When analysing data I examined and coded, categorised, tabulated collected 
information, and combined evidence to address the research question. Various 
analytical techniques were employed such as: using matrices for categories, tabulating 
frequency, and putting information in chronological order (Yin, 1994, p. 103). 
Analysis of pattern-matching (Yin, 1994, p.l06) was used in areas such as goal-
setting (Hughes, 1965), characteristics of information (Gordon et ai, 1978), and stages 
in the strategic management process (Wilson & GiIligan, 1997, p. 6). 
In addition to coding I used memos (1) to free associate, (2) to unblock the process of 
developing the theoretical concepts, and (3) to document the beginnings of a 
conceptualisation emerging from the data (Orona, 1997, p. 180). 
I used comparative analysis to compare the conditions and the significant 
dimensions and findings of the case study to other published case study descriptions. 
The aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the impacts which the different 
conditions and dimensions had on the collection and the free flow of information 
within PB. 
I also used diagrams to summarise and clarify the processes of the emergent findings 
such as Exhibit4.6, Availability and Diffusion ofInformation, and Exhibit 4.7, The 
Role ofMAS in Planning and Decision-Making. 
For tabulating and summarising data I used matrices. The matrices booklet has 16 
columns for the 16 interviews and rows corresponding to questions asked and topics 
discussed. This helped in summarising interview notes for each interviewee, and at 
the same time, show an overall view of opinions of all of interviewees [Appendix 1, A 
Specimen ofa Case Study Matrix). 
It remains to be said that, in this type of research, the findings stated in the case study 
analysis section are a combination of what Patton (1980, p. 270) described as being 
'not just personal', and they are also not just objective but there was always a mix. 
'Simply because the rules as to what constitutes a reasonably sound inference (from 
non-statistical research) are ambiguous relative to the rules as to what constitutes a 
sound statistical inference' (Kennedy, 1979, p. 664) does not invalidate the findings. 
The strength of the evidence remains a matter of judgement before attempting to 
reach conclusions (Young, 1999, p. 82). My aim was to construct a view of reality, as 
I was able to induce it from the collected data (Jones, 1992, p. 253). 
4.6.2 Analyses Framework 
Data collected from the case study on PB is analysed by referring back to OE which 
seeks to operationalise OE by suggesting some measures. The measures include what 
a bank's management would want to achieve for some of the stakeholders - especially 
customers, employees, and shareholders: 
1. Growth in net profit, measured as percentage increase in profits, 
ROI, and ROA. 
2. Growth in market share as measured in growth in credit, in 
deposits, and in assets. 
3. Customer satisfaction measured by composite measures of 
increase in number of services offered and employee 
satisfaction. 
As discussed in the literature review of OE [Section 3.19, Perspectives in Defining 
OE), a number of ways were suggested by researchers in measuring OE [see Section 
3.22, Criteria for Assessing OE). The means adopted in this case study is the 'goal 
achievement' as a measurement of OE in an organisation [see more discussion in 
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Section 3.22.5, Goal Achievement as a Criterion for Assessing DE; Section 3.24, The 
Goal Model in Evaluating DE; and Section 3.25, Characteristics of Goals Used in the 
Goal Model for Assessing DE]. 
Part II of this chapter includes a discussion of the goals of PB as published in the 
annual reports and mentioned by the general manager when I interviewed him, 
followed by a discussion of the process of goal-setting adopted at PB, and the system 
of communication of those goals. It can be noted that, whilst setting goals is not part 
of the functions of MAS, it can help in making appropriate decisions (Palmer, 1992, 
p. 182; Wilson, 1998, p. 1). As goal achievement is adopted for defining and 
assessing DE then it becomes pertinent to discuss the role MAS plays in providing 
necessary and sufficient information to help management in the goal-setting process 
and in communicating corporate goals. These two last issues are directly related to the 
discussion of business, and operational goals emanating from corporate goals. 
All through the analyses, the status quo of the topics discussed are included, as 
interviewees described them, as well as to possibility that the adopted MAS could 
enhance DE [Exhibit 4.8, Framework for Analysing the Role of MAS in Enhancing 
DE]. 
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In analysing collected data I did not discuss theoretical and empirical work by 
researchers separately. But I tried to incorporate it as much as possible within the 
analysis and discussion of the case study findings to further the process of theory 
building, and hoping this will be more engaging and would help to highlight even 
further similarities or otherwise between my findings and the extant literature. 
The analysis of PB case study data is discussed in the following four parts of this 
chapter: Part II analyses the role of MAS in providing necessary and sufficient 
information for individual managers to set their own goals within the hierarchy of 
goals in PB, and to help them monitor changes in the variables that affect their goals 
and plans of action for both the short and the long term. 
I started with the availability and diffusion of information rather than starting with the 
role of MAS in planning due to the importance the topic has to goal-setting, planning, 
decision-making and control. The concept and operation of MAS rests on providing 
financial and non-financial infonnation to users of MAS (in the case study the users 
are PB managers) to enable them to enhance the managerial functions of planning, 
decision-making, and control with the aim of enhancing OE [see discussion in Section 
3.15.1.1, Role ofMAS in Providing Strategic MA Information; Section 3.15.1.5, Role 
of MAS in Collecting And Diffusing Infonnation of MA Infonnation; and Section 
3.16, What are MAS?]. Part 11 also includes a discussion of the factors that affect the 
accessibility of infonnation at PB in general and within MAS implemented at PB in 
particular. 
Since the design of MAS plays a part in making information available to the different 
departments, Part 11 includes a discussion of the characteristics and design of MAS at 
PB, and the characteristics of the MAS reports used to communicate infonnation at 
PB. 
A discussion of the IT system is included in Part II also due to the important role the 
IT system plays in making information available through periodical and non-routine 
MAS reports, in addition to communicating information through an organisation's 
network. A description of the characteristics of the IT system used is included and 
how it was actually used to enhance the role of MAS in achieving OE. 
In Part 11 as in the other parts I discuss factors that affected both the design and the 
operation of MAS as expressed by the interviewee~. I try to highlight all through the 
analyses difficulties affecting the achievement of PB's corporate goals as observed 
and induced from the study. 
A matter to which I should draw attention at this point is the issue of partiality of 
MAS. The designers ofMAS do not come from neutral grounds. Nor do management 
accountants [Section 4.1 0.4, Centralisation of Infonnation at PB] who have 
substantial control over MAS reports, and in particular those dealing with the 
financial perfonnance of a bank. 'In designing MAS the accountant must decide 
which infonnation to collect regularly and which to collect on an ad hoc basis. In 
short he must have a way of assessing the ex ante value of infonnation. The 
management accountant is also concerned with the use of the infonnation collected' 
(Baiman, 1982, pp. 179- 180). 
This coincides with what was found in MAS at PB. The MAS reflected subjective 
attitudes of the designers of the system and of those who had substantial control over 
the operation of the system. An example is the predominance of financial infonnation 
which does not seem to be particular to the practice in ICB but has also been 
commented on in other countries (LovelI, 2002, p. 151). The biases of the financial 
department was reflected in the predominately financial data provided in MAS reports 
and in the historical nature of the data and compliance with CBl's regulations on how 
financial accounts were to be kept. Another factor that affected the partiality of MAS 
as explained in Part V of this chapter is the social culture, the corporate culture, and 
other sub-cultures within PB. 
Part III discusses sequentially the role of MAS in enhancing planning and decision-
making at PB. This part discusses the factors both internal and external affecting the 
design of MAS in ICB. Again there is a description of the state of MAS by using 
quotations from the interviews to portray the existing system. The questions in the 
interviews dealt not only with how things were but also why they were like that and to 
what effect. 
Part IV deals with control - another important function of management in which MAS 
plays an important role. When discussing control the analyses include the areas that 
are covered within MAS along with the internal and external factors affecting the 
design and role of MAS in JCB which also are investigated. This covers how the 
factors mentioned work for or against enhancing OE at PB. 
Part V deals exclusively with one of the factors of the external environment namely 
the cultural factors. It discusses cultural factors in so far as they concern MAS in 
tenns of design, implementation, and operation. 
A number of reasons prompted me to discuss this phenomenon under a separate 
heading. Firstly, what encouraged me and to which I referred in Part V was the 
recurrent mention of the tenn cultural factors in the interviews with PB managers. 
Secondly, the literature review used in this research mostly identified research written 
by western researchers and I wanted to investigate the existence of similarities and 
differences in the roles which MAS played within a different cultural setting. 
A third reason was that, in our time and age of globalisation, we need to know more 
about other cultures and, in particular, what concerns us here is the cultural effect on 
the business community bearing in mind that western international consulting firms 
operate in third world countries and in this case in the Arab world and in Jordan. 
Part II Availability and Diffusion of Information at PB 
4.7 Introduction 
This part discusses information needed for MAS to fulfil its role in meeting current 
and expected needs of management. It looks into the availability of information at 
PB on the one hand and its diffusion on the other. Availability of information deals 
with factors external to PB and internal within PB [Exhibit 4.9, Framework for 
Analysing the Availability and Diffusion of Information]. 
Diffusion of information is discussed in terms of the effects of internal factors such 
as centralisation of information, technology, and internal politics in providing 
necessary and sufficient MA information within PB. It also discusses the effect 
structural factors had on MAS in providing information and in its sufficient diffusion 
atPB. 
Availability and diffusion of information will be discussed under three mam 
headings: 
I. Accessibility of information within MAS at PB. 
2. Characteristics and design of MAS and MAS reports at PB. 
3. The use of computers in exchange of information within MAS at PB. 
All three headings are dealt with in the light of providing and communicating 
information within the MAS adopted in PB and its role in enhancing OE. 
The information used in the three headings involves all three methods of data 
collection and the three categories of interviewees - users, movers, and compilers -
mentioned in Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods. The information referred to in 
this discussion relates to planning and decision-making, control and implementation. 
4.7.1 Why information? 
Information is a term that 'includes any input to a person in the communications 
system', and that input can include relatively objective and subjective items (Ference, 
1970, p. B-84). Information in this context is both forward/outward looking and 
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historical information. Information that falls under forward and outward looking 
information is mostly on factors external to the organisation. 'Most strategic 
infonnation is collected from sources external to the organisation ... and is frequently 
ofa "soft" ... nature' (Peters & Waterman, 1995,p. 266). 
The importance of internal and external factors is in identifying internal and external 
threats and opportunities, which may lead accountants outside the boundaries of 
traditional management accounting (Palmer, 1992, p. 197; Peters & Waterman, 1995, 
p.266). 
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The external information referred to here is on the economic situation past, present 
and future, development in social culture that might render previous practices 
unacceptable or do exactly the opposite by changing practices that were thought to be 
unacceptable or superfluous to become very much the norm, in addition to 
information on competition and on developments of new technology [Exhibits 2.3, 
155 
Factors Affecting the Design and Role of MAS in ICB; and Exhibit 2.4, External 
Factors Affecting Design and Role ofMAS in ICB]. 
All these factors are discussed at length in this Part II with regard to their impact on 
the design and the operation of the MAS used at PB and its impact on OE. 
According to Simon (1977, p. 125) information can be used in 'four broad classes of 
uses: scorecard, to direct attention, to analyse a system's structure and dynamics, and 
to ascertain parameters of its current state'. 
Information, both formal and informal, is essential to all aspects of organisations' 
activities and is argued to be the most important attribute of successful organisations 
(Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 6; Stone et aI., 2000, p. 697). Information may be: 
routinely generated or ad hoc, it can be formally or informally transmitted and 
qualitative or quantitative (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 6). 
In the context of MAS, information on scorekeeping - as mentioned in Simon's 
quotation - the historical information is the starting point. As to directing attention it 
is an essential role of MAS 'both as an integrative mechanism used to coordinate 
diverse activities and as a measure of overall performance and viability' (Emmanuel 
et aI., 1990, p. 7) and is discussed in more detail in Part rrr on control. An important 
resource for achieving management control is MA information. However, it should 
not be assumed that MA is the 'only, or even the major means of management 
control' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, pp. 97, 98). This is emphasised further in 
organisations that offer services tailored to customer's needs, where there is a need to 
empower employees. 'This means providing employees ... with information they need 
to be able to take decisions themselves' (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 4). 
Going back to Simon's (1977) quotation, analysing a system's structure and 
dynamics or deciding on the parameters of its current state can be interpreted as part 
of directing attention to possible existing or potential problems in an organisation's 
structure and MAS design. 
The timing of management information should also be highlighted as inforn1ation 
should not only be available to management but also at the right time whether to be 
used for planning and decision-making or for control. 
For MAS to enhance management's functions and consequently OE, the design of 
organisational structure and channels of communication, though not within the 
design capacity of MAS, the latter's operation is greatly affected by them [see more 
in the discussion in Section 4.1 0, Factors Hindering Diffusion ofInformation at PB]. 
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4.7.2 Factors Affecting the Accessibility ofMAS Reports at PB 
This section discusses both information that was not available at PB and information 
that was available but was not adequately diffused or passed to managers. 
A number of factors are considered to investigate the adequacy of information for its 
various uses. Under availability of information, I will look into factors in the external 
and internal environment [Exhibit 4.9, Framework for Analysing the Availability and 
Diffusion of Information] specifically mentioned by the interviewed managers and 
comment on factors mentioned in the conceptual framework in Exhibit 2.4, External 
Factors Affecting Design & Role ofMAS in leB. 
4.7.2.1 Description of Availability ofInformation at PB 
The need for rnore relevant and detailed information was quite clear in the responses 
of the managers interviewed. They expressed their need for both external and internal 
information that corresponds to their needs each in his/her capacity. By internal 
information is meant information on variables within PB [i.e. internal variables], and 
by external information is meant information on variables outside PB [i.e. external 
environment]. 
'/ need MAS reports to help me in my work ... the Bank cannot afford the cost of 
training Bank employees to acquire the skills needed. We need to control and reduce 
our costs' (interview /3). 
In the above quotation the manager is expressing a felt need for more relevant 
information but expressing at the same time PB's policy to cut down costs which 
meant that PB cannot spend sufficiently to train staff on the skills of collecting, 
processing and communicating information. The need for internally-oriented 
information was also expressed in different forms by the managers. 
'If branches can provide me with their recommendations and ideas on how to 
improve their performance or give explanations of their actual performance] feel we 
can offer them better assistance' (interview /3). 
'] compensate part of what management reports lack in iriformation with wha; ] gain 
from discussions within ... committee meetings' (interview 7). 
The majority of interviewees (8 out of 12 who were affected by the availability of 
information) specifically said they would like to receive more periodical MAS 
reports than they are actually getting. One manager specifically mentioned resorting 
to means other than incoming MAS reports to get information. 
This should not be understood to mean that they would like to see current reports 
replaced by new ones. To further emphasise the need for more information 7 
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managers out of the 12 said that there are no routine periodic reports that can be 
eliminated. 
'At times I feel we need more information than the reports contain. Changing forms 
is not helpful as we have changed forms many times before, as well as it is time 
consuming' (interview 9). 
This situation can be depicted as a circle of deficient information [Exhibit 4.10, 
Deficient Information Circle 1 with the grave effects it could have on achieving OE. 
Out of 14 managers who received MAS reports, 8 managers (5. of them are from the 
old management team) said MAS reports were useful while 6 managers said not all 
of MAS reports they received were useful. This might be explained by management 
change being, 'rarely consensual, neutral activity' (Burns & Vaivio, 2001, p. 395). 
By non-useful reports the managers meant either that the reports were repetitious or 
lacked needed information. If we consider 'information is knowledge for the purpose 
of taking effective action' (Mason & Mitroff, 1973, p. 475) managers' decisions in 
these situations would be incongruent with a situation or needed action would not be 
taken. 
4.7.2.2 Information on the External Environment 
Information made available at PB in terms of depth, scope or detail of factors in the 
external environment of PB affected the degree to which MAS served management, 
consequently affecting the ability of management to achieve a higher degree of goal 
achievement. 
Traditionally 'management accounting has been criticized because it is heavily 
biased towards the internal comparisons of cost and revenues, and relatively little 
attention is given to the external environment in which the business operates' (Drury, 
1996, p. 837). It has been observed by numerous researchers that factors in the 
external environment affect the organisation in a number of ways (Pettigrew, 1972, 
p. 187; Hughes, 1965, p. 107; King & Cleland, 1975, p. 289; Simon, 1977, p. 40; 
Palmer, 1992, p. 197; Glennerster, 1994, p. 140; Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 109). 
'(M)anagers rely on the management accounting system to identify and communicate 
the important external and internal information that they need to recognize and adapt 
to environmental changes' (Atkinson et aI., 1997, p. 82). The majority of the 
interviewees at PB in different departments (11 out of 16) agreed that there were 
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some key factors in the external environment and any changes In these factors 
affected their work and their ability regarding goal achievement. 
Numerous examples were given by the managers for the need for external 
information as in the case of interviews 5 and 9. The two managers stressed the 
urgent need for a data bank on current and potential clients that would greatly assist 
them in their work. 
'I have mentioned to head office on more than one occasion that they need to provide 
us with a data bank on all current and potential clients in all the markets in which 
the Bank operates. The argument against my suggestion has always been that the 
Bank cannot afford to undertake such a project' (interview 9) .. 
In other words, the interviewees in the case study expressed the same felt need for 
MAS that provides broad and deep information support or as termed by March, a 
"garbage can" for users of MAS to access information and look for unusual signals 
(March as quoted by Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 107; Vandenbosch & Huff, 1997, 
p. 82; Pierce & O'Dea, 2003, p. 260). The interviewees also expressed their need for 
MAS with' analytic capability for a wide range of executive decisions' (Vandenbosch 
& Huff, 1997, p. 82). The data expressed in the quotation above can be described as 
'a rich informal environment, heavily laden with information, (Peters & Waterman, 
1995, p. Ill) where uncertain environments 'are both complex and dynamic' 
(Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983, p. 253). 
Vandenbosch & Huff (1997) conducted an empirical study in seven organisations on 
information used by high-level managers. They came up with the conclusions that 
information geared to the needs of executives helped in broadening the outlook of 
managers, challenged their preconceptions, and provided them with more insight into 
their businesses, thereby helping them to enhance OE. For most part, the study by 
Vandenbosch & Huff showed what enhancement in OE achieved was a result of the 
scanning of information geared to the needs of executives. 
What Vandenbosch & Huff referred to as 'broadening the outlook of managers', 
'challenging their preconceptions', and 'providing them with more insight into their 
business' are what the following discussion revolves around. 
'Broadening the outlook of managers' can be achieved by making available to them 
in-depth and wider scope of information on external factors as well as covering a 
larger number of factors. This was not available at PB as discussed earlier under 
'availability of information'. As for 'challenging the managers' preconceptions' this 
was again observed at PB where almost every manager had his/her own 
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understanding of what attracts or what were customers' needs. Each manager had 
his/her own interpretation of information made available to him/her through personal 
means coloured by hislher preconceptions [see more in Section 4.8 belowJ. This 
active role of MAS in collecting financial and non-financial infonnation to verify 
assumptions can be considered as the most useful (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 370). 
The third key phrase 'providing managers with more insight into their businesses' is 
discussed in as far as this affects the role and operations of MAS. 
There follows a discussion of factors in the external environment apart from culture, 
which is discussed in Part V of this chapter, and technology which is discussed in 
Section 4.11.1.3, Effects ofInformation Technology on MAS at PB. 
4.8 External Environment Factors Affecting Ability of Managers to Achieve Goals 
The factors, in order of how frequently mentioned by the interviewees, as well as any 
changes in those factors said to affect both the setting and achieving of goals, which 
highlights the significance of making information on external environment elements 
available to managers were: 
1st. Economic and political situation [Section 4.8.1J, 
2nd. Competition [Section 4.8.2], 
3rd. CBJ's regulations and directives [4.8.3J, 
These will be discussed in turn. 
4.8.1 Economic and Political Factors 
All those managers whose work was affected by the external environment (11 out of 
16 interviewees) said that the economic factors, whether local, national or 
international, affected them in setting their goals and in achieving them. Mabberley 
(1992, p. 104) agrees with PB interviewees on the importance of the availability of 
information on the external environment as organisations that 'successfully predict 
and hence benefit from changes in economic conditions are likely to provide the 
highest value to their shareholders (at least in the short term)'. 
However, PB interviewees found that information available at PB or from other 
sources on the economic aspects of the external environment was deficient in terms 
of detail and analysis. 
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'Information provided by government bodies or the Chamber of Commerce is very 
general and is not of much help to me. 1 understand the general manager's position 
that money spent on research is not a priority at the moment given the restructuring 
stage we are undergoing. But this does not solve the problem of lack of information' 
(interview 7). 
And: 
'I do not have a clear idea on how to set my targets as it all depends on the economic 
situation in the country. .. I do not receive any feedback information on the economic 
situation from Research and Development nor am 1 informed of the general 
manager's expectations and forecasts for the Bank as a whole. They can judge 
matters better by virtue of their'positions' (interview 6). 
The general manager agreed with the rest of the interviewees on the important effect 
of the economic factor. However, he believed that the political factor in Jordan and 
the region (Middle East) was the most hazardous of all factors in the external 
environment as it dictates the economic situation in the country and the 
government's economic policy. As explained in his words: 
The most hazardous factor 1 would say is the political factor. It comes sudden and 1 
do not have any control over it '. 
However, out of the other 15 managers interviewed only two said that the political 
situation and political developments locally and in the region affected them. The 
effect of political pressures and changes or 'uncertainty is compounded in developing 
countries by political volatility (Hopper et aI., 2003, p. 17) though, in the case in 
Jordan, not internally but rather from neighbouring Israel and regional instability in 
markets and economic uncertainty. This affects the services offered by JCB to 
corporate clients and causes a clear move to putting greater emphasis on retail 
banking and the targeting of small and medium-sized enterprise markets and the 
personal sector. Howcroft & Hamilton (1999, p. 69), though, make a similar 
observation as mentioned by some PB interviewees, but in the case of British banks 
it was due to economic changes. 
4.8.2 Competition 
Competition from other banks in the Jordanian market was another factor said to 
affect the corporate and departmental goals and managers' ability to achieve them 
(mentioned by all 11 managers whose work was affected by the external 
environment). 
'Information on services offered, on charges, in my opinion information like this is 
extremely important' (interview 5). 
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Bromwich (1990, p. 38) and Palmer (1992, p. 182) agree as they believe that, for a 
comparative advantage over competition to be maintained, organisations need not 
only cost information on their products, but also continuous information about the 
industry's demand curve and those faced by rivals. 
Very similar ideas are to be found in other researchers' works on the relevancy of 
competition in banking (Mabberley, 1992, p. 3; Pond, 2000, p. 3) as they operate in 
an intensely competitive market in terms of price nationally and internationally 
(Mabberley, 1992, p. 3). This led British and US banks towards individual account 
profitability and customer relationship management (Pond, 2000, p. 3). 
Competition as the most hazardous factor was specifically mentioned by three out of 
the nine managers who said that their work was affected by competition. 
Furthermore, information on competition is needed to satisfY managers' critical need 
for innovation. Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 200) find the 'most discouraging fact of 
corporate life is the loss of what got them big in the first place: innovation', which 
define the task of the truly excellent manager or management team (Peters & 
Waterman, 1995, p. 12). 
External information is critical to financial institutions to enable them to respond to 
competition when markets and clients' needs change leading to diversifying into 
ancillary business or to merging with other financial institutions as we currently see, 
or in providing comprehensive packages of services to clients (Howcroft & 
Hamilton, 1999, pp. 66, 67). 
4.8.3 Information on CBJ Directives and Regulations 
Changes in CBJ regulations and directives issued to all banks operating in Jordan 
were mentioned by eight out of the 16 managers as having a direct effect on their 
work. But information on this did not cause a problem as CBJ made it available to all 
Jordanian banks. 
PB management made sure that all affected departments knew and conformed to the 
new changes as CBJ regularly audited Jordanian banks and, in particular, PB given 
CBJ involvement since 1989. 
CBJ directives covered, among others, instructions on using internationally accepted 
standards in accounting and banking by Jordanian Banks (interview with assistant 
manager of the Department of Supervision on Banks, 25 August 1999). CB] believes 
that complying with these international standards regarding liquidity, branching, 
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doubtful debts provision, and capital adequacy (Basel committee) would enhance 
external reporting, shareholders' rights, and the performance of Jordanian banks. 
Referring back to Exhibit 2.4, External Factors Affecting Design and Role of MAS 
in JCB, 'MAS practices in other countries' was mentioned as one of the external 
factors affecting the design and role ofMAS. 
A direct influence on MAS adopted at PB from MAS practices in other countries 
brought through management consultants, or through designing of MAS by PB's 
managers following a model used in other countries, was not clearly found. The 
influence came indirectly through international accounting and banking standards 
with which PB and other banks in Jordan were asked by CB] to comply. 
4.9 Diffusion oflnformation 
In the previous sub-section the emphasis was on the need felt and expressed by the 
interviewed managers for more relevant and in-depth information on both the 
external and internal environments and the fact that it was not made sufficiently 
available to them. Added to the importance of availability of information, diffusion 
of information is of equal importance, an opinion shared by accounting academics 
(Stone, Hunton & Weir, 2000, p. 697) as one of the most important attribute of 
successful organisations. It carries in the context of JCB even more significance as 
the need for expert knowledge to be diffused within banks becomes critical. 
The same situation is faced when information is insufficiently diffused within an 
organisation, as it is when information is unavailable though for different causes. By 
insufficient diffusion of information we mean that information is available within the 
organisation but is not sufficiently shared with the relevant departments. Under 
diffusion of information I will look into the factors that impeded the free flow of 
information within the internal repOliing system as induced from the data collected 
and as mentioned by the interviewees. 
For managers of PB to plan they have, in many instances, to take into consideration 
what is actually happening in other departments as well as the future plans of those 
departments and of top management. Making such information unavailable affected 
the performance of related departments both in setting non-optimising goals and in 
achieving them, and ultimately achieving corporate goals. 
For example, the credit control department needed to be informed of the plans and 
actual results of the credit facilities department through an exchange of information 
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between both departments. The responsibilities of the collection and follow-up 
department - as the ultimate department responsible for collecting long-standing 
debts - was also tied to what volume of credit was granted and what the credit control 
department achieved in terms of collecting debts. Information resulting from both the 
credit and credit control departments acts as an input to the plans or change of plans 
ofthe collection and follow-up department. 
The work of the various departments in an organisation can be portrayed as a 'value 
chain' each linking and leading to the next. Therefore, any severing of the chain will 
have effects on the work and effectiveness of other related departments. Examples of 
this will be given below as observed and explicitly mentioned by some of the 
managers. 
4.9.1 A Description of the Extent of Diffusion oflnformation 
For an organisation to achieve the goals set by top management, co-ordination and 
exchange of information vertically and laterally has to be satisfied [see Exhibit 4.10, 
Deficient Information Circle]. 
Insufficient information diffusion III PB can be seen III what an interviewee 
described: 
'/ must say it is sometimes difficult to get the information / need' (interview /1), 
referring to information from other departments. 
'When J askfor information J am told by my boss that J will only be provided with the 
information that / need for my work' (interview 14). 
This was explained by another manager who 'believes that, in banking, there are 
types of information that should not be diffused' (interview /1). 
However, if we contrast the last two quotations with the views coming from different 
cultural backgrounds, we find that other researchers see the matter differently. As 
expressed by Hughes (1965, p. 27), based on his work with American organisations: 
'Just as top management needs certain kinds of economic financial, marketing, and 
product data to establish objectives for the company as a whole, individuals 
elsewhere in the organisation need to have similar information communicated to 
them in as much detail as makes sense in light of targets they must meet'. 
Hofstede (1968, p. 33), reflecting a similar view from his work with European 
organisations, believes that 'information which does not lead to immediate decisions 
being taken acts as useful background music'. 
This does not agree with what some high level managers at PB believed. Managers in 
the different levels of the hierarchy should only get the information directly related 
and needed in their work in a narrow sense. 
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However, Hofstede (1991, p. 281) writes that, in non-western countries, systems will 
work quite differently. An alternative or added explanation to the social values put 
forward by Hofstede (1991) might be the same factors in PB that hindered diffusion 
such as internal politics, feeling of insecurity, gaps in communication discussed in 
later sections. For example: 
In the PB case study the need for information was resolved by managers through 
resorting to 'personal means' to overcome inadequate diffusion of information. 
'1 get the information I need for my work not as part of the procedures in the Bank 
butthrouRh my personal relations with other managers' (interview 4, stress is mine). 
'At times 1 find difJiculty in getting information. 1 believe it is not a result of the 
organisational structure. In such situations 1 would tell the general manager about 
the difJiculty that I face and he will get me the information 1 need' (interview 8). 
4.9.1.1 How PB Interviewees Got Information Needed 
As to how the interviewed managers obtained information on the external 
environment, all ten managers and the general manager who said that the external 
environment affects their work got information through personal effort and means. 
'1 do not have staff whose job is to collect and pass such information (referring to the 
external environment) to me. As you see it all depends on my personal effort and the 
wide contacts 1 have in my community' (interview 14). 
'1 get information fi'om internal and external sources. Internal that is what is 
provided to me by the Bank on certain clients and external by asking my other clients 
or branch employees' (interview 5). 
According to Otley (1995, p. 46), such information should be the core of MAS and 
that much is obtained informally and sometimes accidentally, being speculative and 
qualitative in nature. 
Vandenbosch & Huff (1997, p. 83) identified four modes of acquisition of 
information by managers at work: undirected viewing when the viewer has no 
specific purpose in mind; conditioned viewing not involving active search; informal 
search which is an unstructured effort to obtain specific information; and focus sed 
search when the same reports are viewed regularly. Vandenbosch & Huff also linked 
certain modes of acquiring information to certain situations as 'in organisations in 
decline, executives tend to rely on highly formal, focused information systems and 
conduct relatively less broadly targeted informal scanning' (Vandenbosch & Huff, 
1997, p. 83). 
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Similar studies on how executives scan and use information within EIS or MAS have 
not been carried out on Jordanian executives. Consequently, one cannot judge the 
degree of applicability of the findings ofVandenbosch & Huff as we are dealing with 
two different cultural contexts. However, what PB interviewees mentioned in the 
interviews on their need to have access to more relevant, wide-scope, and in-depth 
information suggests that they needed more information to scan engage in what 
Vandenbosch & Huff termed 'informal scanning' or 'focussed search'. 
PB interviewees exercised a type of 'informal search' or an unstructured effort to 
obtain specific information on the external environment. Staff and managers scanned 
newspapers, magazines, other publications, economic reports from government 
departments and economic analysts. As mentioned in the quotation from interview 
14 [at the beginning of this section 1 that it all depended on their personal effort. 
However, wide-scope information needs to be provided or possibilities of obtaining 
it provided for informal scanning as well as focused viewing to ensure the 
availability of the information and the regularity of the flow on factors that could 
have a substantial impact on the ability of the organisation to achieve its goals. 
This phenomenon of an inadequate supply of information for managers to view 
regularly and periodically by means of MAS reports, or to scan wide-scope 
information, observed at PB does not seem to be an isolated case. Observations that 
the level of management information in the financial sector in the west historically 
have been surprisingly limited (Mabberley, 1992, p. 4). 
Information about competitors, the predicted economic situation, any expected 
changes in CBJ regulations, or any inside information on PB's clients from clients 
and friends were obtained by PB interviewees through personal means. One of the 
interviewees commented on the sources of external information by saying: 
'sources of external information do not help me much in taking decisions. At times / 
get information through personal means from outside the Bank. However this is not a 
source that would always be available to me' (interView 7). 
Personal effort or 'personal means' as referred to by many interviewees has its 
shortcomings. It might be insufficient and not aligned with top management's 
outlook or analysis of the economic, political, or competitive situation. 
'/ have to depend on my own interpretation of economic and competition factors' 
(interview 13). 
Personal means to get information on the external environment mentioned by the 
managers were the media, clients, friends, and publications of the Jordanian Banks' 
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Association or those of other Jordanian banks, CBJ statistical bulletins, specialised 
institutes' publications, and the Chamber of Commerce publications. 
'Information provided by government bodies or the Chamber of Commerce is very 
general, and is not of much help to me' (interview 7). 
An example of information, referred to by the managers as being summary in nature, 
was the market share of each bank in each geographical area, or a short summary of 
economic indicators provided by CBJ in its monthly statistical bulletins, or possibly 
unprofessional and/or general analysis from newspapers and magazines that did not 
meet the managers' needs for short- or long-term planning and decision-making. 
Relying on managers' personal efforts did not adequately provide satisfactory results 
_ as expressed by the interviewees in the quotations above. Added to that, not all 
department managers have what it takes and/or the time to prepare detailed analyses 
and realistic projections for future economic, political, and competitive factors. I 
refer here in particular to branch managers as an example when they were asked to 
submit their own projections for budgets [more on the role of MAS in planning in 
Part Ill]. 
The availability of a wider range of information on variables when making decisions 
and taking action allows managers to perform better. ,[Pleople who are exposed to 
more information have a better developed intuition and as a result respond more 
quickly and effectively to the information they encounter' (Vandenbosch & Huff, 
1997, p.S3). 
This was not found in the PB investigation. No broad range of information was 
systematically available to the managers. Resorting to 'personal means' for getting 
information means that each manager would have to rely on his/her personal 
interpretation of political, competition and economic developments, thereby acting 
upon different interpretations that might not be in unison with top management's 
interpretation. 
'My inu,pretation might very well be different from others in the Bank, that is quite 
right and that is why you find that we keep changing our plans as there is no unified 
vision of the future" (interview 14). 
4.10 Factors Hindering Diffusion ofInformation at PB 
Analysing collected data showed that a number of factors hindered diffusion of 
information at PB: 
J. Channels of communication 
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2. Feelings of insecurity 
3. Internal politics 
4. Centralisation of information 
5. Excessive bureaucracy 
6. Lack of documented procedures 
7. Organisational structure. 
T,hese will be dealt with in turn. 
4.10.1 Channels of Communication at PB 
Channels of communication and the organisational structure [discussed in Section 
4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB] are two factors that affect 
both the design and the operation of MAS. Although the design of MAS does not 
involve the design of organisational structure or channels of communication, MAS 
reflects both and MAS, in supporting managerial functions, is greatly affected by 
both. 
'Channels of communication are not clear to me at the moment. Responsibilities of 
departments and individuals are not very clear. In the absence of this I feel J have to 
improvise to do my work' (interview 4). 
This quotation does not express an isolated opinion of that manager in particular but 
the same view was explicitly referred to in interviews 7 and 6. Those interviewees 
expressed their frustration with not knowing exactly to whom they should go when 
they needed non-periodic information which was of direct relevance to their work. 
In other cases we find that it is either channels of communication which were not 
functioning properly or that information was blocked at some point within the 
organisation as there were managers, for example, who thought 'that there are 
departments in the Bank whose job is to do customer satisfaction surveys' (interview 
7) while there were none. 
A second example, and with triangulation from other interviewees, a manager 
(interview 5) had inaccurate information on where a MAS report prepared by his 
staff went to at the head office, and consequently for what purpose it was used. 
While the manager in interview 5 believed that that particular report went to the R & 
D manager, in fact it went to the Organisation and Banking Operations manager. 
The importance of communication within an organisation cannot be over-
emphasised. The need for lateral communication more than vertical (Hughes, 1965, 
p. 93), the need for communication within departments through regular meetings 
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(Hofstede, 1968, p. 297), as well as the need for intense communications (Peters & 
Waterman, 1995, p. 122) to enhance the formulation of goals and decision-making 
(Hall, 1972, p. 292) (planning and decision-making activities), and co-ordination and 
implementation (control activities) of organisational goals (Pettigrew, 1972, p. 187). 
'At times going through formal channels slows down communication and 
consequently action that needs to be taken' (interview 9). 
In the case study when the managers were asked whether they were satisfied with the 
distribution of MAS reports and whether the users received the MAS reports they 
needed, out of seven managers who did receive MAS reports and who answered the 
question, only two were satisfied. Five managers felt there were gaps, and one 
manager remarked that there was an excess of reports. 
4.10.1.1 Gaps in Communication at PB 
Channels of communication were not clear, 'there (we)re gaps in communication' 
(interview 8) which were observed during interviews, as when some managers talked 
about plans other managers were not aware of. 
'If I were to follow formal channels I would not accomplish what I need' (interview J 5). 
In interview 1 there was· a mention of a three-year plan and an annual budget 
prepared by consolidating the plans of the various departments. Only two other 
interviewees mentioned this plan or talked about the annual budget in terms of 
submitting or preparing any projected expenses for hislher department. 
Not mentioning that is rather significant. A couple of explanations might be given: 
(a) the annual budget was not of much significance to them; or (b) they were 
unaware of it since they were not involved, as the interviewees who did mention it 
were the ones who prepared future projections for other departments or branches. 
The last explanation seems to be the most plausible since, when managers were 
specifically asked whether they prepared projected expenses in their budgets, all 
gave negative answers. Another reason that adds to the plausibility of my deduction 
has to do with what I personally observed during one of my interviews. The manager 
I was interviewing asked an assistant to place an international call through the 
switchboard, turned to me and said that they could not dial the number directly 
because the financial department instructed the switchboard to block all international 
calls as (s)he has exceeded the budget. The interviewee said that it took him/her by 
surprise as part of her/his work had to do with branches in Palestine, and that (s)he 
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was not sent a copy of the budgeted telephone expenses and was never informed of it 
previously. 
Another example of a gap in communication was when talking about corporate goals 
set by top management a manager remarked: 
I do not have a clear idea on how to set budgets as it all depends on the economic 
situation in the country ... I do not receive any feedback information on the economic 
situation ... nor am I informed of the general manager's expectations and forecasts for 
the Bank' (interview 6). . 
4.10.2 Feeling of Insecurity at PB 
Some managers tried to withhold information from fellow managers or safeguard it. 
This might have been due to a feeling of insecurity or a lack of trust among 
department managers as can be sensed in the following quotation: 
'The idea behind this arrangement (at PE) is that being part of the department 
provides me with the information I need for my work. Otherwise I might not be able 
to get access to department information' (interview 12). 
This statement describes a situation where a manager belongs administratively to one 
department, but the actual work is of a different nature related to that of another 
department. The rationale behind such a situation was that some managers would not 
voluntarily pass information available to those who need it in other departments if 
not block it. 
'I feel some managers are apprehensive about sharing information they get to know 
through their positions in the organisation. They think this might harm them in some 
way or undermine their authority. They use information for their internal politics. ' 
(Interview 12). 
Such attitudes could be dysfunctional for the organisation as described by Argyris 
(1971, p. B-279): with lack of trust and win-lose dynamics 'the subordinate tends to 
build walls around his department to protect him from competing peers or arbitrary 
superiors'. An example of win-lose dynamics was mentioned by the manager in 
interview 4 where the interviewee said that, in order for himlher to get the 
information needed, (s)he told the manager of another depart11'~nt that was directly 
related to herlhis work that (s)he could take all the credit for the results in return for 
making all information available to him/her. 
What might have also contributed to the feeling of insecurity is the fact that, out of 
the 13 senior head office department managers interviewed, eight were new 
managers who joined PB as part of the new management team when the general 
manager came in September 1997. This could have given managers in head office 
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and branches -old ones in particular- a feeling that, during the ongoing restmcturing 
stage, changes could include them too. 
4.1 0.3 Internal Politics at PB 
Internal politics can affect the operation of MAS as it renders information that is 
available at PB inaccessible to some of the users. Internal politics as a factor 
hindering the diffusion of information within an organisation was mentioned by a 
number of the interviewees and agrees with what has been discussed by many 
.. " 
researchers (Gross, 1965, p. 211; Pettigrew, 1972, p. 188; Burchall et aI., 1980, p. 16; 
Markus and Pfeffer, 1983, p. 206; Mason & Mitroff, 1973, p. 483). 
j4t the Bank managers are very conscious of their status. This at times hinders the 
flow of information as they might withhold information for internal politics motives' 
(interview 11). 
Internal politics and the quest for power or, as referred to in the quotation by 
managers as being 'very conscious of their status', consumed time and effort of 
managers to get information they were not able to get through formal channels. 
Pettigrew (1972, p. 188) wrote about individuals in an organisation who possess and 
control information. He called them 'gatekeepers' [more in Section 4.10.4, 
Centralisation of Information at PB] and showed that they have a critical role to play 
in the transfer of technology between and among organisations. 
Managers who were skilled or in a position to manipulate the internal politics at PB 
were able to get the information they needed while others were denied it [Exhibit 4.6, 
Availability and Diffusion ofInformation in MAS]. 
'Personally I find no difficulty in getting the information I need. As for others, I 
expect at times it will take them some effort to get the information they need. The 
reason behind this could be the character of the provider of the information, or his 
feeling that information is power and withholding it from others gives him a feeling 
of importance , (interview 11). 
Power from possessing and controlling information referred to in the quotation above 
in interview 11 agrees with Pettigrew's (1972, pp. 188, 189) description as 'the 
ability of an actor to produce outcomes consonant with his perceived 
interests ... Power resources must not only be possessed by an actor, they must also be 
controlled by him'. Other interviewees, as in interview 8, reiterated this when saying: 
j4( times I find difficulty in getting information which I believe is not a result of the 
organisational structure. In such situations 1 would tell the general manager about 
the difficulty I face and he will get me the information I need' (interview 8). 
An explanation for the situation described in the quotation above stems from the 
interplay of power and internal politics that influence the flow of information. A 
contrary opinion was explicitly expressed by other managers (interviews 11, 13) who 
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explained that the information gatekeeper's concept was necessary in the 
organisational structure. 
Argyris (1971, B-279) agrees with the findings of this investigation in his discussion 
of the interplay of power and its effect on information and its availability by saying: 
'the difficulties with making valid information and technical competence the new 
currency for power are several. First, one greatly reduces the probability that 
managers can order others simply because they have power, this may be threatening 
to executives who have, up till now, been free to make the organisations "move" 
even if they had incomplete or invalid information. Second ... is the tendency for 
organisations to produce invalid information about important issues. Thirdly 
organizations with those properties described above, require those executives who 
enjoy ambiguity, the manipulation of others, and the making of self-fulfilling 
prophecies'. 
4.1 0.4 Centralisation ofInformation at PB 
'1 would not say that we have centralisation of information or that information is 
safely guarded by an individual or department ... what 1 can say is that we provide all 
departments with what information they need and they need not know what does not 
concern them' (interview 13). 
This converges with what a number of managers said about how they knew how to 
get information whilst others found it difficult. 
Some mangers did not rely on formal channels and procedures. They went round 
information gatekeepers who sit at a junction of a number of communication 
channels, and 'are in a position to regulate the flow of demands and potentially 
control decisions outcome' (Pettigrew, 1972, p. 190). 
A similar opinion is offered by Drury (1996, p. 662) in the way that, 'rather than 
being solely oriented towards the provision of information for decision-making, 
accounting systems can influence the criteria by which other information is sifted, 
marshalled and evaluated'. 
As a result, some PB managers were not able to get the information they needed- not 
because it was not available at PB and apart from flaws in the channels of 
communication, but due to formalised blocking of information by some managers to 
others. 
'All information that 1 relay to the general manager and the board is centralised in 
my department' (interview 13). 
'For the sake of protecting the secrecy of the information at the Bank, 1 cannot get 
these two reports ... directly from the IT department' (interview 8). 
Information gatekeepers who officially centralised information at PB decided who 
gets what information. From the list of programmed MAS reports [Exhibit 4.5, List 
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of MAS Reports Prepared by the IT Department] 25% of all reports went to the 
general manager, 61 % went to the finance department and 14% went to three other 
departments. If we calculate the concentration of programmed reports and put aside 
the reports sent to the general manager, then 81 % of all programmed reports go to a 
single department either to be used by that department or to be distributed by it to 
other head office departments. 
The calculation above concentrated on programmed MAS reports as the IT 
department had a complete list of reports whereas other departments that prepared 
some of their reports manually did not have such a list. 
The result of the situation can be observed in the redundant channel that the general 
manager had. All programmed reports that were sent to him were very similar in 
nature to those that the financial department got. It seems he felt that he needed to 
see for himself and reach his own conclusions from the reports he received in 
addition to those that he received from other managers. 
When interviewees were asked about the issue of centralisation of information in the 
organisation, opinions were divided. Out of the 13 managers who gave relevant 
answers, 7 believed that information was centralised at PB and 6 thought that it was 
not. It is interesting to note that 5 out of the 6 who thought that information was not 
centralised at PB belong to the old management team who were not replaced by new 
managers after the current general manager was appointed in September 1997 [see 
more on the attitude of the old management team in Section 4.24, Epilogue]. Pondy 
(1981, p. 233) agrees with the findings from this investigation that centralisation of 
functions and intentional blocking of information in particular 'interferes with the 
process of individual and organisational development' that ultimately affects the 
ability of managers to achieve their goals. 
4.10.5 Excessive Bureaucracy at PB 
A further reason suggested in the interviews that hampered the flow of information in 
terms of quantity and timing was excessive bureaucracy. By bureaucracy the 
interviewees meant the volume of paper work that needed to be done and had to go 
through long formal channels, and number of approvals. 
'To improve the flow if information I believe we should decrease bureaucracy in the 
Bank. '(Interview 12). 
And another manager remarked that: 
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'If 1 were to follow formal channels 1 would not accomplish what 1 need' (inlervi(!W J 5). 
Some interviewees' remarks that excessive bureaucracy was a characteristic of all 
Jordanian banks was investigated in the survey that covered all JCB [see Chapter 5, 
Section 5.27.1, Cultural Effects on Bureaucracy in JCB]. 
4.10.6 Lack of Documented Procedures at PB 
One·other reason contributing to the insufficient diffusion of information was the 
lack of documented procedures on what should be reported and to whom as 
expressed by the managers in the interviews in different ways. 
Documents such as policies and procedures manuals are an efficient way to transfer 
knowledge through organisations (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 117; Burns & Scapens, 
2000, p. 269). This was of particular importance for PB with a high employee 
turnover, and newly introduced procedures where procedures have not yet been 
passed to generations of mangers to also act 'as a form of organizational memory' 
(Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 117), and to act as a safeguard against 'knowledge being 
lost when key staff leave, to facilitate the training of new staff, or to exercise control 
over further modifications' (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 7). 
In the inteFviews managers described the situation in PB by saying that managers are 
the only ones with experience in the field or 'there are no second men in the 
departments' (interview 7). 
There is the manager who is experienced at his work but the rest of the staff are 
either new or do not have the necessary qualifications or skills to do the job. 1 really 
do not know the reason for this situation. Could it be a way to cut down operating 
expenses in the Bank?' (Interview I2). 
These were not isolated cases as the same idea was expressed in many ways by other 
interviewees. For example: 
'Most of my staff and those who report to me are not as well informed as 1 am about 
what goes on around them. So, 1 teach them how to use information and how to 
implement decisions taken' (interview 13). 
This situation was further complicated by the fact that employee turnover was high. 
High employee turnover was one of the difficulties faced by managers in running 
their departments. 
'The Bank suffers from high labour turnover and with the absence of a manual of 
procedures the problem is felt more as new employees do not have any documented 
material to rely on' (interview 11). 
If we look at the number ofPB employees at 3111211997 around the time when the 
new management took over in September 1997 and compare it to the number on 
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21110/1999 we find that it had increased by 40.5 %, and taking in consideration the 
information made available through the interviews on the annual labour turnover 
ratio, one can reach a conservative approximation of 65% new employees out of 
around 600 employees (not including lawyers in the legal department who have 
special contracts) at the end of 1999. 
Work procedures are also an efficient way to aid organisational coordination by 
increasing the predictability of actions and reducing the amount of inter-
organisational information flows needed (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 117). A further 
function of work procedures is 'to define and limit authority of individuals within the 
organization' (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 70). 
In interview 11 the manager expressed the need to document work procedures in 
general and, in as far as MAS is concerned, to document the types of reports that had 
to be prepared and distributed to the different department. But (s)he stressed a further 
point in addition to the need to document procedures in the following quotation about 
adhering to procedures regardless of who is in a certain position. 
'To document approved work procedures that have to be applied regardless of who is 
in a certain position or to what school he belongs' (interview JJ). . 
The reference most likely is to managers who resort to manipulation and internal 
politics to get what they want. 
Notwithstanding this view, documented work procedures have disadvantages such as 
focusing 'action controls on actions that are easy to define and monitor but that are of 
relatively little importance' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 117), and discourage 
creativity, innovation and responsiveness to change (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 117; 
Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 70). 
During the time of the PB case study, a big project on documenting the work 
procedures of banking operations in branches was completed. However, the absence 
of work procedures manuals for departments meant that managers of head office 
departments when appointed had to experiment independently to find out what 
worked best for their departments. 'A vital part of communication is written policies, 
written procedures, and organisation charts. True absence or neglect of these would 
produce institutional chaos or at least a low level of receptiveness ... avoiding however 
the rigid conformity which has a strait jacketing effect' (Hughes, 1965, p. 510). 
When managers improvise work procedures this could result in a lack of co-
ordination among departments. The effect would be augmented when channels of 
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communication are not clear, suffer from gaps, and internal politics interplay as 
found at PB. Crozier (1964 as quoted by Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 70), for 
example, noted that, to the extent that role performance is governed by rules and is 
therefore predictable, role incumbents find it difficult to build power bases'. 
This situation where work procedures were not adequately documented coupled with 
a high labour turnover worked against the smooth operations of departments which 
subsequently affected the ability to reach the required degree of goal achievement. 
4.10.7 Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB 
There was a general agreement among managers interviewed that delineation of 
authorities and responsibilities of departments should be improved. Out of 13 
managers who discussed this issue, 10 thought that it was not clear or that it needed 
improvement. 
'Responsibilities of departments are not clearly delineated at the moment. 1 deal 
directly with such cases to reach a compromise with managers of other departments. 
1 spend 40 per cent of my time doing things that 1 do not consider as part of my core 
activities. 1 cannot say 1 am satisfied with the current procedures" (interview 7). 
This has resulted in some managers not knowing who to contact to get information 
they need for non-routine activities. 
'Responsibilities of departments are not very clear this creates conjilsion as to who 
should be contactedfor each matter' (interview 9). 
Naturally this slows down business and could have a negative effect -particularly 
when clients' interests are involved in the delay. The unclear delineation of 
responsibilities and authorities of departments resulted in merging of responsibilities 
among departments. The managers did not explicitly talk about the dysfunctional 
effect of the merge but they talked about trying to reach individual compromises with 
each other to overcome the situation and to achieve what they believed to be their 
mutual benefit. 
Palmer (1992, p. 194) and Hughes (1965, p. 27) agree that 'lower-level employees 
should be educated in terms of the organisational strategy, and job descriptions and 
responsibilities should promote decisions that are in the long term best interests of 
the organization'. 
Such a situation where there is no clear delineation of responsibilities of departments 
could result in decreased accountability and controllability. 'An accounting system 
must attempt to match controllability and responsibility given work circumstances 
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with the accounting information collected and reported' (Bromwich & Bhimani, 
1994, p. 237). 
This can be tied to what I mentioned earlier on lack of written procedures to set a 
framework for communication through which MAS can function (Section 4.10.6, 
Lack of Documented Procedures at PB). Researchers argue for such a framework as 
'human beings perform best, most creatively, and with greatest comfort in 
environments that provide them with some intermediate amount of structure, 
including the structure that derives from involvement in authority relations' (Gross, 
1965, p. 102). 
A second factor that contributed to the unclear delineation of responsibilities and 
authorities of departments was frequent changes to the organisational structure of PB 
due to changes in the ownership and management [for more discussion see Section 
4.1, Historical Background ofPBJ. 
Centralisation of authority in addition to centralisation of information was a 
characteristic of the organisational structure of PB. Some managers explained this 
centralisation as being peculiar to the nature of the banking business (interviews 11, 
12, 13, 14), which agrees with Hofstede (1991, p. 143) that 'in whatever country all 
banks function niorelike pyramids'. However, other interviewees believed: 
'The current organisational structure is not amenable to efficient and speedy 
communication' (interview 6). 
Some researchers advocate simpler forms of organisational structure to enhance 
organisational flexibility with less layering to speed matters, avoid rigid bureaucracy 
(Peters & Waterman, 1995, pp. 270, 310), and simultaneous loose-tight properties 
both centralised and decentralised (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 15), as did 9 
interviewees out of 16 at PB. 
Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 314) propose a hybrid form of organisation structure 
one that will respond to the three prime needs: a need for efficiency around the 
basics; a need for regular innovation; and a need to avoid calcification by ensuring at 
least modest responsiveness to major threats. Not only does the organisational 
structure but also the sub-systems within an organisation reflect the way in which 
information is communicated and the ways in which controls such as budgeting are 
exercised (Preston, 1995, pp. 275, 276). This in turn is governed by decision-makers 
at PB in terms of what information is to be transmitted and to whom it is 
communicated. 
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The effect of organisational structure was discussed by a number of researchers as to 
its impact on MAS and its effect in general on the organisation (Gross, 1965; 
Hughes, 1965; Preston, 1965; Hall, 1972; Mason & Mitroff, 1973; Simon, 1977; 
Hopwood, 1978; Hannan & Freeman, 1981; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983; Spicer & 
Ballew, 1983). Simon (1977, p. 50) believes 'organisation structure, over and above 
standard operating procedures is itself a partial specification of decision-making 
programs'. MAS cannot provide a helpful tool to serve the needs of management in 
planning, decision-making and control in the absence of an adequate organisational 
structure [Exhibit 4.11, The Role ofMAS in Control]. 
The organisational structure of an organisation affects the flow of information and 
the availability of information to ensure that needed information gets to the users 
[Exhibit 4.6, Availability & Diffusion of Information]. This concept was another 
point of agreement between what was found and expressed by the interviewees and 
between theories and findings of other researchers. 
One manager said that the introduction of committees to PB by the new management 
has reduced the negative effect. Four of the five managers who felt that the 
organisational structure used at PB did not impede MAS reporting were from the old 
management team. 
The adoption of an 'open door policy' (interviews 1, 5, 6, 8 and 15) and the 
introduction of committees by the general manager alleviated the negative effect of 
factors that impeded the diffusion of information. 
'/ compensate part of what management reports lack in information with what / gain 
from discussions within ... committee meetings' (interview 7). 
Most of the managers, for the reasons given above, said that they had to chase after 
information. The opinions ranged from a clear affirmation by four managers out of 
I1 who answered the question to three managers -all from the old management team-
on the other side of the continuum saying they did not chase after information, four 
mangers whose opinions ranged in between from saying they chased after 
information at times or that they do not chase after information because they use 
their own personal means and know where and how to get the information they need 
[Exhibit 4.12, Structural Problems Affecting Goal Achievement at PBJ. 
One might argue that to measure the effects of organisational structure in isolation is 
one of the most difficult problems (Hannan & Freeman, 1981, p. 116). It is not 
possible to measure the OE of PB with and without the availability of those types of 
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information to assess the exact impact of the unavailability of information on the 
external and some of the internal factors. 
Nevertheless, what PB interviewees expressed agrees with Spicer & Ballew's (1983, 
p. 90) view that: 
'organizational effectiveness is in large measure a function of how well 
organisational structure provides a basic framework for planning, monitoring, and 
controlling the performance of subunits and the flows among them'. 
Nevertheless, one of the factors that might have helped to overcome this is 'the open 
door policy PB adopts' (interviews 1,5,6,8 and 15). 'Getting management out of the 
office is another contributor to informal exchanges' (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 
122). 
One can say that, since the interviewees felt the need for that information, and since 
that information was directly related to the goals set or related to factors that affected 
the achievement of corporate goals, one can conclude that the unavailability of that 
information affected OE viewed as the degree of goal achievement. 
A number of managers expressed their need to receive reports that were already 
prepared and used by other departments (interviews 7, 8, 12, and 14) but were not 
sent to them although they believed that those reports would have helped them in 
their work. 
This situation augmented the effect of unavailability of information on the external 
environment and certain aspects of the internal environment. Managers fell into a 
circle of deficient information which impaired the effectiveness of their decision-
making, and hindered their efforts towards a higher degree of goal achievement 
[Exhibit 4.1 0, Deficient Information Circle]. 
The diffusion of information that was available at PB was hampered by a number of 
reasons relating to organisational structure identified by PB interviewees in Exhibit 
4.13 : 
Exhibit 4.13 
Elements in the Organisational Structure that Hinder the Flow of Information 
I. Unclear work procedures and lack of job descriptions. 
[See discussion in Section 4.1 0.6, Lack of Documented Procedures at PB). 
2. Unclear channels of communication. 
[See discussion in Section 4.10.1, Channels of Communication at PB; Section 
4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB] 
3. Frequent changes to organisational structure. 
[See discussion in Section 4.1, Historical Background of PB). 
4. Lack of a structure for co-ordination among the various departments. 
179 
[See discussion in Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at 
PB; Section 4.15.4.2, Departmental Goals were not Discussed by Top 
Management at PB; 4.12.8, Participation on MAS Reports Design at PB] 
5. Centralisation of organisational structure. 
[See discussion in Section 4.10.5, Excessive Bureaucracy at PB; Section 
4.10.7, Organisational Structure Elements at PB; Section 4.12.8, 
Participation on MAS Reports Design at PB]. 
6. Centralisation of information by gatekeepers, internal politics, feeling of 
insecurity. 
[See discussion in Section 4.1 0.2, Feelings of Insecurity at PB; Section 
4.IOJ, Internal politics at PB; Section 4.1 0.4, Centralisation of 
Information at PB]. 
4.1 I Characteristics and Design ofMAS at PB 
The characteristics and design of MAS are discussed below in Part II under 
'Availability and Diffusion of Information' as the design of MAS chosen at PB 
affected the value and amount of information provided. This is followed by 
characteristics and design of MAS reports as a main mechanism for communicating 
information within MAS. The discussion of the characteristics of information in 
MAS reports is of significance for the impact it has on OE, as the design of MAS and 
organisation structure are all part of an overall package for OE (Gordon & Naraynan, 
1984, p. 42). MAS reports reflect the approach PB's management had to using 
information, as well as the degree of information diffusion management believed 
needed to be provided. 
4.1 1.1 The Design ofMAS at PB 
The question of how to design MAS in order to provide an effective framework for 
the generation and communication of MA information has been researched by many. 
A number of factors which affect MAS design were suggested in MAR developed 
from a contingency perspective to relate MAS design to several contextual factors 
such as the decision-making style (Driver & Mock, 1975; Hofstede, 1968; Gordon 
& Miller, 1976; March, 1987), culture (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983), established power 
distributions, technology (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983), characteristics of the 
environment/social milieu (Gordon & Miller, 1976; Hopper, 1980; Gordon & 
Naraynan , 1984; Ashton, Hopper & Scapens, 1995), the performance appraisal 
system (Ashton, Hopper & Scapens, 1995), the chosen strategies of an organisation 
(Spicer & Ballew, 1983; Palmer 1992, p.l79), the organisational structure (Gordon 
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& Miller, 1976; Hopper, 1980; Gordon & Naraynan , 1984), occupational culture 
and professionlisation and demands of clients (Hopper, I 980, p. 401), the 
interrelation of man and machine (Simon, 1977; Driver & Mock,1975), the 
psychology and the problems of the users not that of the designers ofMAS (Mason 
& Mitroff, 1973, p. 485; King & Cleland, 1975, p. 287) see Exhibit 4.14, Factors 
Affecting the Design ofMAS. 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 125) believe that, in practice, MA is used in much a wider 
, 
variety of circumstances where accounting systems serve as a 'dialogue machine' 
rather than providing answers, as an 'idea machine', enabling creative solutions to be 
found to messy, ill-defined problems' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 17). 
Exhibit 4.14 
Factors Affecting the Design of MAS 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Il. 
Corporate culture 
Psychology and problems of users ofMAS 
Decision-making style 
Interrelation of man and machine 
Organisational structure 
Culture 
Established power distribution 
Information technology 
Strategies of an organisation 
Characteristics & environment of the firm/social 
milieu 
Motivational factors & Performance appraisal 
system 
12. Principles of feedback & feedforward control 
Hofstede, 1969 
Mason & Mitroff, 1973 
Driver & Mock, 1975 
Driver & Mock, 1975 
Hopper, 1980 
Markus & Pfeffer, 1983 
Markus & Pfeffer, 1983 
Markus & Pfeffer, 1983 
Spicer & Ballew, 1983 
Ashton et aI., 1995; 
Hopper, 1980 
Ashton et aI., 1995 
Wilson, 1998 
Unstructured problems are an important issue discussed by a number of researchers 
to be taken into consideration in MAS design (Driver & Mock, 1975, p. 492; Mason 
& Mitroff, 1973, p. 480; Simon 1977; Palmer, 1992, p. 194). Unstructured problems 
and situations or what are termed as 'wicked problems' need a framework that is 
more adaptable and flexible. 
Well-structured situations at PB that had a framework were budgets used mainly for 
branches, and budgetary control. For other unstructured situations the framework 
provided comprised five permanent committees to deal with different matters. 
There was a main committee (Assets & Liabilities committee) that met regularly 
every month, and other sub-committees that were responsible for specific matters 
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such as a deposits committee, a credit facilities committee, and an investment 
committee among others [see more in Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB]. 
Added to a framework to deal with both structured and unstructured situations there 
is the matter of whether to deal with ex ante or ex post decisions. Ex ante decisions 
address issues concerned with planning [discussed in Part HI of this chapter] which 
call for: 
The availability of information needed for ex ante decisions and 
planning 
Clearly identified corporate and business goals 
Communication channels through which MAS can operate. 
The distinction between these two types of decision situations affects the type of 
accounting information that is appropriate (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 7). Otley 
(1980, p. 421) and (Palmer, 1992, p. 199) add to the argument the consideration of 
the fit among MAS and other information systems as part of an organisational 
control pa<;kage. The design of the required MAS to produce desired results in goal 
achievement should avoid implicit assumption 'that there is one and only one 
concept of information that qualifies as information for all people, problem and 
situations. One can only hope that we will learn to develop information systems that 
are more adult in the humane sense' (Mitroff & Mason, 1983, p. 198). 
One should also consider the interrelationships between the contingent variables 
mentioned above -particularly as this research deals with MAS for decision-makers 
whose tasks are relatively non-routine and who require expert knowledge, and that 
this research looks into all of the factors in Exhibit 4.14, Factors affecting the Design 
of MAS, together and not in isolation as was done by the different researchers who 
proposed the factors. 
Below is a discussion of the contingent factors that affect MAS design. To avoid 
repetition of some of the variables discussed elsewher~, cross references to the 
relevant sections is stated under each sub-section. 
4.11.1.1 Effects of Strategy on Design ofMAS at PB 
Strategy is somewhat different from other contingent variables. In a sense it is not an 
element of context, rather it is the means whereby managers can influence the nature 
of the internal and external environments, the technologies of the organisation, the 
182 
structural arrangements, and the corporate culture [see more in the discussion in 
Section 3.15.1.2, Role ofMAS in Communicating Organisational Climate]. 
MAS on their part assist managers in formulating strategy of 'markets and products, 
required technologies and appropriate structures' and in focus sing on implementation 
of strategies. (Chenhall, 2003, p. 151). For control purposes MAS reinforce long-
term strategies and continuous cost reduction (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 126; 
Hiromoto, 1991, p. 2). MAS can also be linked to companies' strategies for 
innovation (Hiromoto, 1991, p. 2) . 
. ' 
Wilson (1995, p. 160) identified three levels of strategy: (l) corporate strategy where 
resources are allocated amongst various businesses or divisions of an enterprise, (2) 
business strategy at a level of a particular business or division dealing mainly with 
competitive position, and (3) functional strategy, where corporate and business 
strategies are cut down to less abstract and more specific tasks. The PB case study 
looks into the corporate and business strategies. 
4.11.1.2 Effects of Corporate Culture on Design of MAS at PB 
The design of MAS at PB reflected variables from different corporate cultures as a 
result of changes of top management and the existence of sub-cultures (Hofstede, 
1968) [see more in Part V, Section 4.23, The Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at 
PB]. Top management shape the fundamental process by which organisational 
cultures are formed and changed (Johns et aI., 2002, p. 89; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 
1978, p. 65). 
The influence of the decision-making style (Driver & Mock 1975) on the design 
partly reflected the new group decision-making style through committees that was 
introduced by the current general manager. Nevertheless, the partiality of the 
designer of the system could be found as well through centralisation of information 
and insufficient financial and non-financial information [see Section 4.10.7, Other 
Organisational Structure Elements at PB; Section 4.18.2, Non-Financial Performance 
Evaluation Measures Used at PBj. 'At the individual level facts are identified and 
selected on the basis of the subjective perspectives and values of accountants which 
are influenced by particular personal experiences in education, training and 
employment (and more generally by their status, age, gender, race and other extra-
organizational factors), (Jones, 1992, p. 133). 
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Decision-making styles of individual managers and their perception of the relevance 
of the information to their decisions need to be studied so as to appreciate their 
influence on the organisation and MAS. The influence of the individual manager on 
the design and .role of MAS cannot be brushed aside (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 
215) any more than can the influence of the corporate culture. Organisations assume 
an existence of their own and become social actors in their own right while still being 
influenced by individuals. 
4.11.1.3 Effects ofInformation Technology on MAS Design at PB 
As used in this research, IT refers to hardware (such as machines and tools), 
materials, people, software and knowledge (Chenhall, 2003, p. 139). The way in 
which information technology and its developments affect JCB, as described by the 
interviewees, is similar to the effect of IT on British banks as Howcroft & Hamilton 
(1999, p. 69) describe it has 'enabled banks to access their databases in cost-effective 
ways and thereby convert essentially bland data into knowledge and information 
about specific segments of their customer base'. It has also enabled managers to be 
informed to a far greater extent than ever before about all aspects of their company's 
operations (Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 3). 
In addition to the overall benefits an organisation gets from new advanced 
teclmology, in banking operations in particular 'as a bank moves through the phases 
from profit center to customer profitability the utility of information becomes greater 
as the data becomes more specific and therefore more relevant to decision making 
style' (Rezaee, 1991, p. 35). The storing, analysis and reporting of such critical 
information was made possible by technological advancement. 
4.11.1.4 Effects of Organisational Structure on MAS Design at PB 
It is of importance for MAS to be tailored to an organisation's organisational 
structure (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984, p. 33). An empirical study by Gordon & 
Narayanan (1984, p. 42) suggested that, as decision-makers perceive greater 
environmental uncertainty, they tend to seek external, non-financial and ex ante 
information in addition to other types of information and increasingly move toward 
an organic form of organization. Gordon & Narayanan (1984, p. 37) discuss whether 
organisational structure decisions precede decisions on characteristics of information 
if so, then organisational structure would reflect the type of organisation as being 
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either organic or mechanistic as defined by Burns & Stalker (1994, p. 97), and is 
consequently reflected in the characteristics of information: non-financial, ex ante, 
and external. Different forms of organisational structure will require different types 
of accounting information to be provided (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 52). The effects 
of organisational structure on the types of information provided at PB is discussed in 
detail in Section 4.10.1, Channels of Communication at PB; Section 4.10.4, 
Centralisation of Information at PB; and Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational 
Structure Elements at PB, in that certain types of information were available to the 
interviewees and not others. 
Organisational structure also plays an important role in transmitting corporate culture 
and giving continuity to the past (Bate, 1984, p. 46). In the context of MA change it 
is discussed that management might initiate change and therefore, organisational 
structure change could precede change in information characteristics, or it can be 
influenced by MAS users and/or management accountants and consequently might 
not be preceded by a change in organisation structure. Nevertheless, Gordon & 
Naraynan (1984, p. 43) suggest that MAS can be used in a proactive way in 
initiating change in organisational structure if organisational structure is considered 
as an intervening factor between environmental conditions and OE. 
It would be worth repeating here that PB managers believed the organisational 
structure was not amenable to good communication and did not enhance the role of 
MAS (Hopper 1980). MAS at PB also reflected the problems of clarity and of gaps 
in the communication channels [Section 4.10, Factors Hindering Diffusion of 
Information at PB]. 
4.11.1.5 Effects of Size on MAS Design at PB 
Size of an organisation has been discussed by many researchers and often with 
contradicting findings. Some suggest that size is 'the major factor' in determining the 
'shape' of the organisation (Pugh et aI., 1969; Child & Mansfield, 1972 as quoted by 
Ford & Slocum, 1977, p. 564), others find that size is not 'the critical factor' in 
determining the form of the organisation (Hall, 1972, p. 112; Aldrich, 1972 and 
Mayhew et aI., 1972 as quoted by Ford & Slocum, 1977, p. 566). 
As an organization becomes larger, the need for managers to handle greater 
quantities of information increases and consequently the role of MAS in larger 
organisations to a point where they have to institute controls such as rules, 
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documentation, specialization of roles and functions, extended hierarchies and 
greater decentralization down hierarchical structures (Child & Mansfield, 1972, as 
quoted by Chenhall, 2003, p. 148). However, Chenhall (2003, p. 148) observes that 
few studies have considered size as a contextual variable in studying information 
systems as studies have examined relatively large organisations. Findings by 
McNally & Eng (1980, p. 150) from data collected on New Zealand companies, lend 
support to the growing evidence that companies which use more sophisticated MA 
and decision-making techniques are frequently larger and outperform those that have 
failed to adopt those techniques'. 
Number of employees seems to be a measure favoured to estimate the size of an 
organisation (Ford & Slocum, 1977, p. 569; Loan-Clarke et aI., 2000, p. 180; 
Chenhall, 2003, p. 149) although there is disagreement as to which members should 
be included (Ford & Slocum, 1977, p. 569). Loan-Clarke et al. (2000, p. 180) 
mention a tentative measure in Europe of medium-sized firms to be 200-250 
employees and the latest EU definition of medium-size businesses with up to 250 
employees [see Section 4.1, Historical Background of PB]. The number of PB 
employees on 31/12/1999 was 600 which makes it a relatively large bank. 
4.11.1.6 Effects of Psychology of Users on MAS Design at PB 
The influence of individual preferences and inclinations means that a system of 
accounts and reports that is useful for one decision-maker is not guaranteed to be 
useful for another. An information system must be attentive to properties of 
individuals and organisations even when those properties are disconcerting (March, 
1987, p.161; Shields, 1997, p. 27). 
This fact can have an implication for the quality of information provided in MAS 
reports as, when a good understanding of the users' needs and psychology is 
established, the quality of reporting is expected to be improved. In such a situation 
characteristics of the information provided would be geared to the use to which it 
would be put. 
The influence of designers, compilers, and initiators on the design of MAS and MAS 
reports resulted in the fact that they did not correspond well to the psychology and 
problems of the users of MAS as designers and users of information systems 'have 
fundamentally different motivation and attitudes that may lead to very different 
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perceptions' (Pierce & O'Dea, 2003, p. 258) [see Section 4.12, Characteristics and 
Design ofMAS reports at PBj. 
Differences in the assumptions over the psychology of users embodied in MAS 
design is an explanation of what is discussed in Section 4.7.2.1, Description of 
Availability of Information at PB, in that eight interviewees out of the 14 who 
received MAS reports said they did not find them useful [see also discussion in 
Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Information on Performance Evaluation at 
PBj. 
4.11.1. 7 The interrelation of Man and Machine 
The interrelation of man and machine is discussed in detail in Section 4.13, The Use 
of Computers in MAS. 
4.11.1.8 External Culture 
The Effects of External Culture on MAS is discussed in detail in Part V. 
4.11.1.9 Characteristics of Environment of the Firm/Social Milieu 
Characteristics of environment of the firmlsocial milieu are discussed in Part V, The 
Effects of External and Internal Cultures on MAS. 
4.11.J.lO The Established Power Distribution 
The established power distribution is discussed in detail in Section 4.10.1.3, Internal 
Politics at PB. 
4.11.1.11 Motivational Factors and Performance Appraisal System 
Motivational factors and performance appraisal system is discussed III detail m 
Section 4.18, Role ofMAS in performance Evaluation at PB. 
4.11.1.12 Principles of Feedback and Feedforward 
Principles of feedback and feedforward are discussed in detail in Section Part IV, 
Emphasis on Control Function as Compared to PI arming. 
4.12 Characteristics and Design of MAS Reports at PB 
The characteristics and design of MAS reports are discussed in relation to 
characteristics of information identified by Gordon et al. (1978, p. 207): 
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• Time horizon of MAS reports 
• Orientation of information 
• Format ofMAS information 
• Frequency ofMAS reports. 
In addition to characteristics that were found of relevance in MAS reports in PB: 
• Financial information at PB 
• Age of reports at PB 
• Over-information in MAS at PB. 
4.12.1 Financial Information at PB 
MAS reports in PB were characterised by predominantly financial information. Four 
out of the 14 managers who received MAS reports said that the reports contain non-
financial information compared to all 14 saying that the reports that they used 
contained financial information. Only one manager used reports that had analysis 
[for more see Section 4.l5.7,~ The Role of MAS in Providing Non-Financial 
Information for Planners; and Section 4.18.2.1, Reliance on Financial Measures in 
MAS Information at PB). 
Example of the type of non-financial information mentioned by managers is 
information found in the 'current/potential clients visit report' where branch 
managers would keep the executive manager for marketing informed of the field 
visits and of the points discussed in the visit, the outcome of the visit, and 
suggestions and propositions offered by the employee who visited the 
potential/current client. 
Another example of the non-financial information in MAS reports was in the annual 
report of employees' performance evaluation which the personnel manager received 
- this being one of the four above-mentioned managers. 
The report asks each employee's senior manager to fill in a form to evaluate different 
attributes of the employee such as employee's awareness and knowledge of the 
requisites of his/her job, policies and procedures related to the job, or information 
about an employee's communication skills, his/her ability to express, explain, and 
justify herfhis ideas. 
4.12.2 Time Horizon ofMAS Reports at PB 
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The time horizon (Gordon et aI., 1978, p. 207) of MAS reports was ex post. All 14 
managers received reports that were backward-looking and contained historical 
information [more on backward-looking MAS reports in Part III, Backward 
Emphasis in MAS at PB]. 
The answers of the interviewees on the focus (Gordon et aI., 1978, p. 207) of 
historical information in the reports was specific and narrow and used mainly for 
control purposes as incoming MAS reports showed this characteristic. Thirteen 
managers (not including the general manager) said that incoming reports provided 
them with feedback. While 10 of the 13 said that, in addition to feedback, they used 
the reports for control and performance evaluation purposes, only 3 stated that the 
purpose was planning and decision-making. 
This is again emphasised by the fact that 11 managers used MAS reports as the most 
important feedback control mechanism. Consequently, the majority of reports 
contained information that was specific and narrow in nature to enable managers to 
exercise control over branches but not other head office departments as control over 
those was not exercised [more on this in Part IV of this chapter under Emphasis on 
Control Function as Compared to Planning). 
4.12.3 Orientation of Information at PB 
The orientation (Gordon et aI., 1978, p. 207) of MAS reports used was all internal 
dealing with matters that have to do with feedback control. However, the role of 
MAS in providing management with information to achieve a higher level of OE is 
not served only through internal control information on PB's departments [this was 
discussed previously in Section 4.7.2.1, Description of Availability ofInformation at 
PB, and Section 4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at PB]. 
4.12.4 Format ofMAS Information at PB 
The format (Gordon et aI., 1978, p. 207) ofMAS reports was predominantly figures 
and/or tables as all managers who received MAS reports said that the reports 
contained only figures. Only 4 managers said that they received, in addition to 
reports containing figures, other reports that are mainly descriptive in nature such as 
the marketing form used by branch managers that describe their visits to current or 
potential clients. One manager - Human Resources manager - said that some of the 
MAS reports sent to the general manger would contain charts to explain data. 
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MAS reports used predominantly figures or tables were not a problem to the 
managers as all interviewees who did receive reports had accounting degrees. This 
agrees with what Lau & Tan (1998, p. 164) found in their fieldwork on financial 
managers in Singapore and Australia. 
4.12.5 Frequency ofMAS Reports at PB 
The frequency of MAS reports is an important dimension of MA information 
(Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 74; 10hnson & Kaplan 1987, p. 160; Gordon et aI., 
1978, p. 207; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 6). Most MAS reports, other than those for 
the general manager, were provided daily. This reflects on the one hand the nature of 
banking work and the need for close supervision over the movement of funds. On the 
other hand, the near absence of reports of longer time periods reflects the emphasis 
on operational control. 
4.12.6 Age of MAS Reports at PB 
This characteristic of the age of MAS reports might also be linked to what is 
mentione.d in Section 4.12.8, Participation in MAS Reports Design at PB that some 
managers did not find them as useful as they would like them to be. Some of them 
were not changed for years whereas the goals, policies and corporate culture had 
changed a number of times over the past five years [see Section 4.1, Historical 
Background ofPBj. 
When asked how long have they been using the reports, out of the 10 relevant 
answers five specifically said that they have been used 'for a long time'. The 
remaining two managers said their departments were newly formed so the reports 
they used are only few months old. 
4.12.7 Over-Information in MAS Reports at PB 
Another characteristic of MAS reports used at PB was over-information and not 
using reporting by exception. 'Over-information reduces the effectiveness of a report' 
(Hofstsede, 1968, p. 210) as can be seen from the general manager's statement: 
'/ cannot afford to spend time reading it all. What / need is a one-page summary 
containing all the vital information that is directly related to my decision' (general 
manager interview). 
Reports were not geared to the needs of the users. One of the prominent drawbacks 
was the length of the reports instead of giving due emphasis on exceptional matters. 
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To give one example from many, the monthly reports of one department were all sent 
again to the general manager at the end of the year in a single report. A balance 
should be kept between needed detail and excessive detail (Palmer, 1992, p. 200). 
4.1 2.8 Participation in MAS Reports Design at PB 
The design of MAS reports suggests an influence of financial accountants m 
emphasising historical internal data, figures, and in focusing on control which, 
although greatly needed, does not fulfil the needs of senior managers involved in 
planning and decision-making. 'However, participation appears to be a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for accounting information to be seen as relevant' 
(Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 99) [see more on participation in Section 5.13.7, 
Managers' Participation in MAS Reports Design in JCBj. 
It is worth mentioning here a summary of the answers of the managers relating to 
involvement in the design of MAS reports that they used. Ten out of the 13 managers 
(excluding the general manager) who received MAS reports used reports that were 
designed by the compiler(s) of the reports. Only 2 managers used reports designed by 
them and just one manager said that the reports he used were designed in 
collaboration with the compiler(s). 
On the other hand, a number of managers said that they had the 'freedom to make any 
changes in the design of reports'. This might suggest a lack of co-ordinating effort 
between users and prepares of reports, and that the work procedures at PB were not 
very clear on the process of generating and communicating MAS information and 
what that entails. 
The design and characteristics of MAS reports used at PB to transfer information 
among departments on factors internal and external to PB must convey the need for 
external non-financial information, the need for revising and updating reports to suit 
the continuously evolving demands of managers dee to changes in the external 
environment, in goals, policies, and in corporate culture. 
4.13 The Use of Computers in MAS at PB 
4.13.1 A Description of the IT System Used at PB 
The IT system at PB uses a banking system application which enables branches to 
perform accounting transactions such as deposits, credit facilities, setting limits for 
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control purposes, and other transactions on clients' accounts. Branches are also able 
to execute transactions such as loans, transfers, LlCs, and other banking services 
using a business model. The application also covered the work of the dealing room. 
The system is a distributed system; each branch can operate independently and can 
have inter-branch transactions. It is all linked to the head office, with a primary copy 
in branches and a secondary copy in head office. The computer system was first 
installed in 1995 and it was not until 1997 that all branches and head office 
department were networked. 
Upon the general manager's request, at the time of the study, not all head office 
departments were on-line. Most PCs at PB were stand-alone and were not connected 
to PB's network. This situation affected speed and availability of information as well 
as increasing the incidence of errors in re-keying. 
4.13.2 Factors that Hindered the Use ofIT in MAS at PB 
Most managers interviewed were partially satisfied with the IT system not in terms 
of its capabilities but in the way in which it was used and the support it offered them. 
PB interviewees (8 out of 12 managers) thought the way the system was employed 
needed improvement. Out of the 4 managers who said they were satisfied 3 were 
from the old management team. 
'The current reporting system can be improved by programming all reports that are 
currently prepared manually from data already stored in the computer system' 
(interview 6). 
Three main factors hindered better utilisation of the IT system within MAS: 
Psychological gap between managers and computers. 
2 Ineffective use ofIT system capabilities. 
3 The restructuring Stage at PB. 
4.13.2.1 Psychological Gap between Managers and Computers at PB 
'There still exists a gap between managers and computers' (interview 3). 
It is 27 years since Simon (1977, p. 20) wrote that 'the interrelation of man and 
machine will become -is becoming- quite as important a design problem for such 
systems as the interrelation of man to man', and it is 36 years since Hofstede (1968, 
p. 208) wrote that modern managers are becoming much more information-
dependent and learn to use information. After more than two decades this same 
interrelation between man and machine was still an evident impediment for PB 
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interviewees. It has led to lost opportunities III taking more advantage of what 
modern technology can offer for MAS and after more than 30 years the dependency 
on information grows even bigger. 
Most interviewees, apart from branch managers, did not use computers for their work 
themselves. Two reasons can be given: 
(l) Their feeling that their staff provided them with their needs (interviews 8 & 2). 
For the most part assistants would provide them with written reports based on 
information retrieved from the IT system. 
(2) To cut down costs (interviews 7,10,11, and 12). 
The IT department manager obviously needs to have a PC in his office, as do the 
three branch managers who need them to approve certain transactions that exceeded 
the branch tellers' and supervisors' authorisation limits. Out of the 12 interviewees 
left 7 did not have PCs in their offices, either because they did not want to, or they 
did not 'have a PC in (their) office(s) as part of the Bank's policy to control costs' 
(interview 7). 
'The computer culture is not properly diffused in the bank still' 
(interview 14). 
'At the moment not all head office departments are on line and that is at their 
request' (interview 3). 
The idea of culture affecting the adoption of technology is shared by many. lohns et 
al., (2002, p. 85), describe culture as a key factor in the decision to implement 
technology. Jones et a1. (2002, p. 86) quote Eining and Owen (1994) on the effect 
cultural and socio-economic differences have on the way in which technologies are 
accepted by people in a society, and in the effect social 'values shape people's 
behavior and their utilization patterns of technology within the organization'. Schein 
(1985 as quoted by lohns et aI., 2002, p. 90) shares the same opinions on using 
technologies: 
'The introduction of any new technology into an occupation, organization, or society 
can be seen as a culture change problem, and if the new technology is to succeed, 
management must recognize that any resistance is not to the technology but to the 
cultural change implications of its introduction'. 
The gap was reflected not only in the way in which managers at PB used computers 
but also in not fully appreciating the capabilities of computers to exchange 
information. 
'People from other departments do not seem to appreciate the complexity and 
amount of work designing and programming a report needs' (interview 3). 
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When managers felt that certain reports needed to be computerised 'they want it the 
next day' (interview 3). 
Another aspect of the computer gap could be seen in that: 
'There is no .e-mail service as management fears that employees will use it for 
private communications and that will be a waste of time and money' (interview 3), 
This reflects two further aspects of the gap - one relating to top management and the 
second to other managers at PB. Management it seems was not fully convinced of the 
great potential value which computers can provide an organisation, and the feeling 
exists that employees have to be controlled all the time to prevent their misusing 
computers and computer services. 
This phenomenon can be explained as a reflection of the general state in Jordan 
concerning advanced communications. A report published by the International 
Economic Forum on international competitiveness (1999) showed that Jordan comes 
at the lower end on an indicator to measure IT development. Only four out of 1000 
persons (logarithmic average) in Jordan use the Internet (Economic Outlook, p. 7). 
Despite what is said about globalisation and the world as a global village, cultural 
differences affect the ways in which technology is adopted and used in different 
cultures as can be observed in the case ofPB. 
4.13.2.2 Ineffective Use oflT System Capabilities at PB 
'The IT system is currently used mainly as data processing (and to). store raw data' 
as an information silo although, 'the abilities to do more analysis are available in the 
system' (interview 3). 
There was certainly a felt need by the managers that 'these reports are time 
consuming as they contain a lot of figures. (They) get the figures from the system but 
the report itself is not programmed' (interview 9). 
Technically speaking 'it (IT system) is one of the best systems in the country as we 
have avoided most of the mistakes those banks that introduced computerisation 
before us suffered" (interview 6). 
Simon (1977, pp. 108, 117) commented on similar situations by saying 'the scarce 
resource today is not information, but capacity to process it. .. The main issue is how 
to take advantage of the greater analytic capacity, the larger ability to handle the 
interrelations of things, that the new developments in decision-making provide' 
(stress added) and at a greater speed. 
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The IT system used at PB, as described by the IT manager, has the capabilities to 
handle a large variety of applications and undertake high levels of analysis in 
reporting but its full potential was not fully used. 
Among the factors said to affect the degree of usefulness and the impact an IT 
system can have on the performance of an organisation and, consequently, on the 
value placed on it by the shareholders are: how responsive an IT system is to the 
organisation's needs, the degree to which technology is used to support the effective 
and efficient operation of any financial institution, and the extent to which 
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technological solutions assist the organisation to respond to changes in the market 
(Mabberley, 1992, p.109; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, p.75). Mason & Mitroff(l973, p. 
484) stressed the use of IT in addition to other tools for effectiveness display and 
channelling of information such as stories, art, graphics, one-to-one contact and 
group discussions. 
The capabilities of the system were highly praised by the interviewees, but that on 
its own was not sufficient in generating and communicating information. Out of 12 
relevant answers only four managers said they were satisfied with the support the IT 
system gave them. The rest all agreed that needed improvements had to be 
introduced so that the system can respond to their needs. The main reason given by 
the managers to the unresponsiveness of the IT system to the needs of managers was 
lack of qualified employees. 
Similarities to these same ideas are reiterated by Vandenbosch and Huff (1997, p. 
97), that it is not adding more information but it is the type and processing of 
information and how it can be used that are more important, and that IT systems 
provide cross functional information and the ability to 
combine information from diverse sources in a flexible manner rather than act as 
information silo [see discussion in Section 4.15.1, How Managers Used Historical 
MAS Reports; and Section 4.15.5.1, Short- and Long-Range Planning at PB]. 
These opinions of researchers mentioned above were not always found at PB. The IT 
system was mainly used as a data-processing system. Cross-functional analysis and 
combining of information was only done to the degree of showing results of 
successive periods and a comparison between the two. The on-line network did not 
provide managers with the possibility of scanning different levels of information 
[Exhibit 4.12, Structural and IT Problems Affecting Design and Operation of MAS 
and Goal Achievement at PBJ. The unavailability of qualified staff to make better 
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use of the collected information in producing more useful reports in terms of 
analyses, presentation, and cross-functional information added to the ineffective use 
of the IT system [Exhibit 4.15, Structural and IT Problems Affecting Design and 
Operation ofMAS and Goals Achievement at PB]. 
4.13.2.3 The Restructuring Stage at PB 
In addition to the cultural factor that was discussed in terms of a gap between 
managers and computers as a factor that played a part in the limited utilisation of the 
capabilities of the IT system [see more on the cultural effects on MAS at PB in Part 
V of this chapter], a second factor that might have contributed to the limited use and 
benefit obtained from the IT system was the restructuring stage. 
The restructuring stage might have caused what was observed by Vandenbosch & 
Huff (1997, p. 81) namely that, although the higher the 'perceived environmental 
uncertainty, ... the greater the felt need for information ... When uncertainty is 
overwhelming individuals often resist "wasting time" in scanning, preferring to focus 
on those aspects of a situation with which they are comfortable'. 
Although the new management team was trying to produce a more stable internal 
environment by setting work procedures in branches and departments, this was 
accompanied by cutting down of costs including expenses on expansion in the use of 
computers, hiring qualified employees, training staff, and providing more research 
facilities to sustain development of information systems at PB including MAS. 
Cutting costs can be a critical factor in destabilising 'an environment and a set of 
attitudes that encourage experimentation' (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 136) in 
addition to the effects on training of managers as a success factor of organisations 
(Loan-Clarke et aI., 2000, p. 177). 
The restructuring stage might also be responsible for the concentration of access to 
printed MAS reports within the IT Department. The printing out of plOgrammed 
reports was centralised in the IT Department and then reports were distributed to 
head office departments, while branches printed their own reports. 
A reason given for centralising printing programmed reports in the IT department at 
the head office was because the IT department felt that staff at head office 
departments were not adequately trained to use this function at the moment, and 
entering wrong instructions would result in loads of unwanted reports being printed 
out. 
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Exhibit 4.15 
Structural and IT Problems Affecting Design 
and Operation ofMAS and Goals Achievement at PB 
Goals to be 
achieved 
(P 1) Continuously changing 
_______ organisational structure, 
~ and departments' responsibilities 
L------.J~ 
" (P2)Unclear and inadequate channels 
~ of communication 
(P3) Centralisation of information 
(P4) Ineffective use ofIT 
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PARTIIl THE ROLE OF MAS IN PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING AT 
PB BACKWARD EMPHASIS IN MAS AS OPPOSED TO A 
FORWARD OUTLOOK 
4.14 Introduction 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 8) argue that planning and control in the wider sense are 
'two sides of the same coin and must be considered together', and that planning is a 
form of control and control must involve the setting of objectives and plans 
(Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 126). However, for clarity and emphasis on planning 
activities the different aspects of the. two functions are discussed separately in Parts 
III and IV. 
To implement the vision and set long-term corporate goals and operational goals of 
an organisation a forward-looking reporting system or a 'pre-decision information 
system' as defined by Baiman (1982, p.191) is needed. To draw future plans an 
organisation has to know more than 'where does it stand now?', the answer to which 
is provided by an historical backward-looking accounting information system. 
The management of an organisation needs internal management reports to provide 
~ 
the different levels of management with information to aid and enhance planning, 
referred to in the Wilson & Gilligan Model (1997, p. 6), as stage 2 'where do we 
want the organisation to be?' 
From this second step onwards and the entire following sequence of stages, 'how 
might an organisation get there?' 'Which is the best way?', 'How can arrival be 
ensured!' (Wilson & Gilligan, 1997, p. 6), all these stages require a forward outlook 
needing the support of an outward and forward-looking MAS. 
Information is provided through MAS for both short-range and long-range planning, 
and for the co-ordination and harmonisation of both time phases for planning and 
control activities in an organisation. 
A forward-looking information system sho;}ld concern itself with providing 'an 
understanding of the system behavior, losing sight of objectives, and of the decisions 
that are to be made, sometimes leads strategic planning efforts into an excessive 
occupation with prediction' (Simon, 1977, p. 130). 
Our findings on the role of MAS in planning and decision-making from the analysis 
of collected data are stated in Exhibit 4.13. This section discusses the first two 
findings. The last three are discussed in Part II 'Availability and Diffusion of 
Information'; in Section 4.7, Introduction; Section 4.7.1, Why Information?; Section 
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4.9 Diffusion ofInformation at PS; and Section 4.1 0, Factors Hindering Diffusion of 
Information at ps. 
4.15 The Role of MAS in Supporting Planning and Decision-Making at PS 
The following quotations from the interviews shed light on how well what was 
practised at PS in relation to long-term planning: 
'Once 1 am done with this plan 1 will think about what's next' (inlerview 11). 
Or as expressed by another manager: 
'As new matters come-up all the time the general manager asks me 10 see to certain 
things. In such cases 1 will give his request priority over what 1 have planned for 
myself (interview 8). 
'Planning takes little of my time although it should be a primary core activity' 
(interview 7). 
These managers' views were not isolated cases. Other managers, due to inadequacy 
of relevant information needed for planning and decision-making and looking at their 
daily tempo at work, talked explicitly about the difficulties they face (interviews 5, 6, 
8,11,13, and 16). Few managers were involved in planning or received MAS reports 
that helped them in planning. 
'1 assume they (top management) do have a plan and that they discuss targets' 
(interview 7). 
Eight managers out of the 15 (excluding the general manager) said they were not 
involved in planning for their departmentslbranches. The general manager was 
dissatisfied with MAS reports for planning purposes. 
4.15.1 How PS Managers Used Historical MAS Reports 
The backward orientation of information in MAS reports used at PS can be seen in 
that most reports received by managers reflected the current state of matters instead 
of having a forward-looking orientation. Twelve out of 13 managers in addition to 
the general manager said that incoming MAS reports helped them in knowing where 
they were and in identifYing problem areas, which implies historical information. 
'The reports I receive help me in knowing where 1 am with the historical information 
they include. However, they do not help me to plan for the future' (interview 13). 
'What 1 want to see is that, when 1 need to take a decision, 1 should rely 80 % on 
information provided to me by my staff and 20 % on my own experience. What is 
actually happening is that 1 have to rely 70 % on my work experience and just 30 % 
on the information provided to me' (interview 16). 
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A similar situation is described by Argyris (1971, p. B-280): 'in the past, when data 
was very incomplete much of the intuition used by managers was to fill in many 
blanks with possible valid data. This meant that managers focused on immersing 
themselves "in the facts" especially as revealed by past practice'. 
When the managers were asked how they used incoming MAS reports only three out 
of 15 (excluding the general manager) said they used them for planning, while 13 
r 
managers used them for feedback control. On this theme Mason & Mitroff (1973, p. 
477) call for a balance between a purely scientific approach to planning for the future 
and 'the gutsy risk-taking and intuition', neither of which would produce the desired 
results. 
This characteristic of backward-looking reports is reflected also in the qualities that 
managers like to find in the reports: 4 managers out of the 15 wanted the timing of 
incoming MAS reports they received to be improved. They felt that they needed to 
get information earlier than they were currently getting it. 
For example, the manager in interview I said that (s)he received MAS reports from 
branches and head office departments through the internal mail, which meant (s )he 
did not receive them on the same day, so (s)he had to act immediately on information 
given to himlher by telephone, then wait for the reports to come in to finish 
documentation and the necessary paper work. 
A third manager explained the source of the delay was that MAS reports were not 
sent directly from the computer department but rather had to go first to the finance 
department. 
Clearly for feedback control timing for corrective action to assess deviations carries a 
great weight. The same applies to MAS reports where their main purpose was control 
as stated by 10 managers out of 15. 
What was expressed by the interviewees agrees with King & Cleland (1975, p. 289) 
that desiglling an information system 'which has the objective of supporting 
corporate long-range planning will have a user set which is quite different than the 
set for a production control system'. 
4.15.2 Corporate Goals ofPB 
Setting corporate goals vis-a-vis the different external and internal stakeholders is not 
part of the role which MAS is expected to fulfil. However, MAS can provide support 
for setting goals which is a factor that can have a critical effect on the effectiveness 
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of MAS in supporting an organisation's management in achieving those goals and 
consequently enhancing OE. 
Management accountants are in a position to provide the necessary support for goal-
setting (Palmer,1992, p. 181; Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 15) thanks to the 'access to a 
broad base of organizational information .that enables the accountant to derive an 
integrated understanding of the history of the organization and its productive process, 
a view often unavailable to peers in marketing, engineering, or management. This 
knowledge may help the managerial accountant to provide critical input into the 
strategic planning process' (Palmer, 1992, p. 181). 
Palmer (1992, p. 195) argues that management accountants have a role in setting 
corporate goals to protect management against unreasonable expectations by 
'verifying that the mission and objectives established are consistent with the financial 
resources of the organization'. This corresponds to the stages of 'how might an 
organisation get there? 'and 'which is the best way?' through MAS in planning and 
control that are congruent with the underlying values, goals, and strategies of the 
firm (Kaplan, 1984, p. 414; Palmer, 1992, p. 182). 
The design of MAS should facilitate the provision of information used for setting 
targets and future plans. MAS uses the channels of communication designed through 
the organisational structure to adequately diffuse information. Nevertheless, we 
should keep in mind that the designers of MAS are influenced by a variety of factors 
such as their own backgrounds, sub-cultures, psychological dispositions, 
philosophical outlook, and professional training. 
For five years from 1994-1998 PB's management has continuously stated the 
following goals in its successive annual reports: 
I. Increase PB's market share in deposits. 
2. Increase low cost financial resources. 
3. Collect debts incurred before 1993. 
4. Develop employees' technical skills (stated in 4 out of 5 annual reports). 
5. Develop PB's services and provide new services and products to meet the needs 
and preferences of clients. 
The corporate goals in the case study were decided by top management comprising 
the general manager, the chairman, and the board of directors. Setting corporate 
goals has always been regarded as the prerogative of top management. 
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Understandably, top management has to take the interests of the different 
stakeholders into account when setting corporate goals. 
One problem noted within the goal concept is the 'multiplicity of goals' (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1981, p. 122) and sub goals of organisations (Seashore, 1965, p. 26), in 
addition to the variety of dimensions of the goals and the possibility that these 
dimensions are uncorrelated (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 137). As a result, management cannot 
maximize all of the organisation's goals simultaneously. Consequently, management 
'must consider their trade-off value, their contingencies, and presence of negative 
correlation among them' (Seashore, 1965, pp. 26, 27). [See more in Section 3.25, 
Characteristics of Goals Used in the Goal Model for Assessing OE.] 
In addition to the above, when deciding on corporate goals top management cannot 
escape the past history of the organisation nor the need to incorporate the individual 
goals of the managers (Hughes, 1965, p. 14). 
On the other hand, if MAS is to serve management to achieve better planning, 
decision-making and control, MAS needs to have a clear sense of direction. A set of 
unclear goals will undermine the role of MAS in enhancing managers' abilities to 
achieve some of their goals. The excellent companies focus on only a few key values 
and let 'everyone know what's important, so there is simply less need for daily 
instructions (i.e., daily short-term memory overload), (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 
65). 
In the interviews each manager was asked what (s)he thought PB's corporate goals 
were. The managers gave 21 different corporate goals for PB according to their 
understanding of what PB was trying to achieve. One manager remarked: 
'1 do not find the Bank's goals clear to me. It might be because they are continuously 
changing' (interview 7). 
Other managers (interviews 10, 13, 14) said that all businesses have the sole goal of 
achieving maximum profit and, consequently strive to pursue any avenue that leads 
to maximising profit. 
'All banks have the same goals. 1 believe what the board and shareholders care 
about is how much profit the Bank is making' (interview 10). 
Managers at PB had different impressions and interpretation of what attracts a 
customer or what type of clients PB targeted. Seventeen different factors were 
mentioned by 10 managers whose responsibilities were related to customers. The 
most frequent factor maintained by six managers out of 10 was personal relations 
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with clients [see more on cultural effects in Part V of this chapter], followed by five 
managers naming speed of service and four naming cost of products or services. 
The chairman of PB in an article published in the Jordan Times newspaper (8 June 
1999) wrote that: 
'Companies' boards and managements, accordingly must be committed to the 
following: 
Providing customers with high quality and value, fair prices and honest 
transactions. 
Providing a superior return to our shareholders and protecting and improving 
the value of their investment through prudent utilisation of corporate resources. 
A company's business transactions must be properly authorised and completely 
recorded in the company's book. 
Being responsible corporate citizens. 
Treating our employees' self-development through assistance In improving 
broadening work -related skills. 
By looking at each of the above goals and comparing them to the responses of PB 
managers: seven out of the 15 interviewees (excluding the general manager) believed 
that top management's goals were to increase profits, which could be related to but is 
not the same as 'a superior return to shareholders' but maximising or increasing profit 
was not mentioned as a goal per se in any of PB's annual reports although it was 
identified by 3 interviewees (interview 10, 13, 14). Some researchers are not in 
favour of specifying profit as one of the goals of an organisation (Hughes, 1965, p. 
21; Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 284). 'Company profit is not a purpose or a goal -
either for the company or for any individual in it, including the president. Profit is, 
however, an incentive and a means to reach goals and serve mutual needs' (Hughes, 
1965, p. 21). The idea that profit is 'a natural by-product of doiug things well, not an 
end in itself, is also almost universal' (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 284). 
To increase market share, came second, as six managers believed that was one of top 
management's goals [Exhibit 4.16, A Comparison ofPB Interviewees' Answers with 
Corporate Goals as in the Annual Reports (1994-1998)]. Mabberley believes that 'the 
fundamental objective of any organisation is to maximise its value to shareholders. 
Yet, according to a survey in the USA, the great majority of banks lack the tools to 
achieve this objective' (Mabberley, 1992, p.IOI). Still further, according to the 
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Rational Goal Model, the goals of an organisation 'may be derived from 
conceptualisations of social missions or functions' (Cunningham, 1977, p. 465). 
Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 284) add that, among the few common attributes that 
excellent companies share, are values that are almost always stated in qualitative, 
rather than in quantitative terms and when financial objectives are mentioned, they 
are almost always ambitious but never precise. 
Exhibit 4.16 
A Comparison of PB lilterviewees' Answers about Corporate Goals as in Annual Reports 
( 1994-1998) 
Corporate Goals Frequency 
I Increase capital 2115 
2 Increase market share in deposits 6115 
3 Increase low cost sources of funds 0 
4 Disinvest low yield investments 0 
5 Collect old debts 4115 
6 Develop employee's skills through training courses and IT technology 
to achieve distinguished performance to serve clients 311 5 
7 Develop banking products and provide new services and products to 
meet the needs and preferences of clients 3/15 
As for IntrodUCIng new serv1ces and developIng current ones, wh1lst th1S was 
prominent in top management's public declarations, only 3 managers out of 15 said 
that it was one of PB's goals. 
One other prominent goal had to do with employees, as mentioned in the annual 
reports, though not as far reaching as in the chairman's article when he talked about 
'self-development of employees through improving and broadening work- related 
skills'. PB's goals fell short of that and talked about technical skills to improve 
customer service. 
The interviewees' opinions on this issue were as follows: five managers said that the 
goals of PB included goals related to employees. However, two of the five 
interviewees talked about improving working conditions such as providing job 
security and the other three talked about developing employees. 
The answers of the interviewees showed a lack of agreement on what goals were to 
be achieved by PB. This can have a negative effects on OE as 'a company where 
individual managers act according to their own preferences rather than a widely-
accepted corporate pattern may suffer both from missing important opportunities and 
from failing to develop selected opportunities in an orchestrated powerful manner' 
(Gordon & Di Tomaso, 1992 p.795). 
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4.15.3 Departmental Goals at PB 
When discussing departmental goals coordination, the alignment of respective 
departmental goals to serve corporate goals both in the short and long-term has to be 
reflected in goals which individual managers set for their departments. Nevertheless, 
'mere awareness of corporate goals, however, is not enough to change many people's 
behavior. Somehow the organization's high-level strategic objectives and measures 
must be translated into objectives and measures for operating united individuals' 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996, p. 80). 
Department managers had their own interpretation and 'vision' of the future of PB as 
was found in the interviews and expressed by one of the managers: 
'/ have set (departmental) goals myself with my vision of the future of the Bank' 
(interview 7). 
A conflict in interpretations and insufficient interaction between corporate and 
individual goals can leave each manager drowned in pursuing daily tasks without a 
clear vision as to whether it was towards the desired end of achieving corporate 
goals. 
Departmental goals were not always clear in the minds of the interviewees. 
Corporate goals need to· be divided into sub-goals and sub-sub-goals for each 
department and branch to achieve in its own capacity and contribute to the ultimate 
achievement of corporate goals. 
Goal incongmence as a source of strategic misalignment coupled with asymmetry of 
information were reflected in the insufficient dissemination of information on 
corporate goals within the organisation and the strategies adopted to achieve them 
[see more in Section 4.9.1, A Description of the Extent of Diffusion ofInformation, 
and Part IV of this chapter, Emphasis on Control Function as Compared to Planning]. 
It was also reflected in a lack of adequate co-ordination among the different head 
office departments. 'Dissemination of information ... can occur either vertically 
between hierarchical levels of the organization or horizontally among different sites 
in the firm' (Slagmulder, 1997, p. 116). 
The majority of the interviewees' opinions on what departmental goals were can be 
expressed by the quotation: 
'/ have been working with (the general manager) for many years, I understand what 
he wants' (interview 7). 
Similarly, managers expressed the view that, since the department's work was so 
clear, they did not need any goals to explain what was it they had to do. Two of the 
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head office managers felt that, so long as they had a job description, they did not 
need to set goals for their departments. 
For branch managers, their goals were the same ones included in the branch budget. 
These goals, which were financial in nature, were better co-ordinated with corporate 
goals compared to goals of other departments at PB. 
Staff departments need to have goals just like 'mainstream groups', and their goals 
must be something more than simply "supporting the line organization" (Hughes, 
1965, p. 63). Staff or 'profit-enhancing' departments need to set their goals within 
their own vision of their role in enhancing the performance of other departments and 
branches, and in co-ordination with profit-generating departments. Specialist staff in 
departments have the duty to push the business goals of the organisation outward and 
forward and not only confine their roles within what have been set by 'mainstream 
departments' . 
4.1 5.4 Characteristics of Departmental and Branches' Goals at PB 
4.15.4.1 Unclear and Non-Quantified Departmental Goals at PB 
Managers at PB did not have to sit and articulate their goals and 'have them down in 
writing'. Some of the departmental goals that were given by the interviewed 
managers were fuzzy in nature such as, 'develop my staff or 'increase my market 
share', or 'implement some of PB's strategies', or 'improve the performance of my 
department'. Whatever the nature of the departmental goals expressed in the 
interviews, they were not tied to concrete plans and subsequently monitored and 
controlled. Such goals stayed as 'wishful thinking' as they were neither operationlised 
nor measured. 
To plan for their departments, managers would find it helpful to spell out their goals 
in clear terms, agree on them with top management and staff, and then place a value 
on them. Departmental managers then should communicate the agreed goals to their 
staff and ensure that all staff in each department understand them and understand 
their importance to them personally, to the department, and to PB as a whole. To 
ensure proper implementation, this should be followed by measuring the contribution 
that members of staff have made to their achievement (Hughes, 1965, p. 81). As 
expressed in interview 2 the departmental goal was: 
'/ have been working with the general manager for a number of years before joining 
Phoenix Bank. / understand what he wants and what is expected of me' (interview 7). 
205 
'to achieve the administrative and organisational goal of the Bank' (interview 11). 
The need 'to achieve a goal of PB' came up in the answers of the managers as in 
interviews 2 and 7 above. This necessarily requires that departments should align 
their goals with those of top management of PB. Departmental goals also need to be 
operationlised and measured, to ensure that they can be evaluated and controlled. 
Such positions need to be balanced with the fact that the general manager might set 
different goals for different periods and might change his strategies accordingly. This 
same idea was recognised on a different occasion by the same manager in interview 
7 above who said that 'the policy had to be changed many times during the past 
year'. Long years of working together might make co-ordination within goal-setting 
process quicker and easier but does not replace the need for a satisfactory goal-
setting process. 
4.15.4.2 Departmental Goals were not Discussed by Top Management at PB 
'The assets & liabilities Committee does not discuss targets or goals of departments. 
The board does not interfere either, and nor does the general manager' (interview /3). 
The absence of a unified understanding of the corporate goals and of the 
interpretation and effect of information on each manager's work and on PB as a 
whole was what the manager in the following quotation from interview 12 and others 
referred to as 'conflict of goals'. It resulted from the absence of alignment of 
corporate and departmental goals given the varied perspectives mentioned by 
Pennings & Goodman (1981, p. 152) where vertical constituencies (such as 
employees, management, owners ... ) have different and possibly competing 
expectations: 
'DijJerence(s) in perspective can and do cause conflict as each of us sees the matter 
from his own perspective' (interview 12). 
A unified understanding of the goals can be reached when 'managers communicate 
their strategy up and down the organization and link it to departmental and individual 
objectives' (Kaplan & Norton, 1996, p.76). 
4.15.4.3 Unclear Focal Roles of Departmental Managers at PB 
The clarity of departmental goals and their alignment with corporate goals is also 
reflected in the focal roles of the departments and branches of PB, or for that matter, 
in all organisations. Focal roles of the various departments and branches are dictated 
by the pursuit of departmental goals subservient to corporate goals. A manager, 
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however, would have the freedom to pursue the achievement of goals and choose his 
focal roles at his own discretion through a goal-oriented management style. 
In the interviews, three managers said that their focal roles continuously changed by 
either new priorities dictated by the general manager or under the influence of the 
needs of other departments. 
'1 find myself providing other departments with ad hoc service more than planning 
new services that I.feel should be one of my priorities and core activities' (interview 8). 
This situation left the managers with the feeling that they have neglected the core 
activities of their departments. 
'1 cannot say that 1 am satisfied with the current situation. 1 spend almost 40 % of my 
time doing things that 1 do not consider as part of my core activities" (interview 7). 
'Many times my role is decided by others. As 1 see it 1 was appointed to this position 
to organise matters at the Bank and I do it to the best of my ability' (interview 11). 
The difficulties of not having clear operationlised business and functional goals 
aligned with corporate goals in order to measure the OE of PB can be seen in the 
following: 
(l) Departments responsible for the collection and transfer of information 
through MAS (such as the financial department at PB) would not be 
collecting information relevant to corporate goals, as managers were not 
directly engaged in trying to achieve specific, measurable, goals within a set-
time frame. This fact by itself does not enhance the achievement of corporate 
goals. 
(2) A control and performance evaluation difficulty arises, such as how can a 
department's performance be evaluated if the goals themselves were not clear 
and quantified? 
Part of MAS's role, with their domain, is one of helping managers at all levels to 
ensure that plans are implemented and targets and goals are achieved, otherwise it 
would not be possible to serve managers in relation to the end of enhancing OE. 
Information collected and transferred by MAS and analysed would either not 
correspond to the set goals or, alternatively, MAS would provide and collect 
information on achieving a goal that was not sufficiently specified and which meant 
different things to different managers. 
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MAS in this situation reflected the state at PB of lack of specific measurements and 
timed goals [Exhibit 4.17, Problems Relating to Corporate and Departmental Goals 
Affecting OE]. 
4.15.5 The Goal-Setting Process at PB 
Different opinions were given by head office managers on the goal-setting process 
and on who should set goals and how branch budgets should be decided up on. 
The goal-setting process will be discussed in as far as it has an impact on the ability 
of MAS to provide managers with their information needs for purposes of planning, 
decision-making and control. Some managers believed that goals should be set from 
'bottom - up'. 
'Branch managers are the best qualified to decide on the fillure growth rate of their 
branches because they are there in the field and have continuous contact with clients' 
(interview 15). 
Others, who believed in 'top-down goals', thought that branch managers could only 
come up with 'wishful thinking' goals or, at the other extreme, easily achievable 
goals, and head office should therefore decide for them. Most of the head office 
departmental managers did not have set goals for their departments. 
The goal-setting process used for setting goals in branch budgets was expressed by a 
senior manager as: 
'We listen to their needs but take the final decision on the goals of the branch 
budgets' (interview 13). 
Another manager at the head office remarked '1 must make it clear that we do not 
impose goals or targets (referring to branch managers when preparing their annual 
budgets)' (interview 8). 
For the role of MAS to promote behavioural congruence in beliefs and behaviour of 
top managers, departmental managers, and branch managers it needs to be 
recognised (Hughes, 1965, p. 80; Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 213; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 
4) 'that planning is an iterative process involving both top-down and bottom-up 
communication to bring together the top management's knowledge on broad issues 
with divisional managers' knowledge on the specific environmental and product 
market uncertainties' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 213) [see discussion in Section 
3.15.2.2, Role ofMAS in Affecting Employees' Behaviour]. 
However, all three branch managers interviewed talked about a strong influence from 
the general manager on the setting of their goals. 
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Exhibit 4.17 
Problems Relating to Corporate and Departmental Goals Affecting OE 
GOALS 
____ ..:;W,o.:as it possible to enhance achievement )0 
through MAS? 
~at did PB actually achieve in 1998 
- 2001? 
Problem (1) Not all goals were 
operationlised 
roblem (2) Not all departments had goals 
Problem (3) Managers did not internalise or were 
not aware of corporate goals 
Problem (4) Inadequate goal-setting process 
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'When the general manager's projected goals do not coincide with what branch 
managers set in their budgets then they will have to convince him of their reasons or 
else they will have to follow his projected goals' (interview 15). 
The goal-setting process adopted at PB was described by some managers as having a 
negative influence since the setting of difficult goals by top management made them 
feel under pressure. 
1 feel that targets set by the general manager are difficult to achieve on my own. 1 
expect head office to help me in achieving these targets' 
(interview 9). 
The process of setting departmental goals in the annual budgets and plans was also 
viewed by managers as being unsatisfactory. When those managers were asked what 
they thought the weak and strong points of their budget were, out of 7 managers 
(who prepare annual budgets) 5 managers said the weak point of budgets was the 
way goals they were expected to achieve were set [more in Part IV of this chapter, 
Emphasis on Control Function as Compared to Planning; and Section 4.17, Conflict 
ofInterest in Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control]. 
The importance of goal-setting was expressed by many researchers (Hughes, 1965, p. 
133; Palmer, 1992, p. 195; Jaggi & Mensah, 1995, p. 15) as 'not even overwhelming 
ability will produce effective performance without adequate goal setting and 
motivation' (Hughes, 1965, p. 133). Gross (1965, p. 214) emphasised that the 
selection of strategic objectives is the essence of planning and no 'comprehensive 
projections of budgets, income statements, or balance sheets can define an 
organization's major goals'. 
4.1 5.5.1 Short- and Long-Range Planning at PB 
Long-range plans at PB mentioned by the interviewees were a 3-year plan for 
deposits, credit and profits. As mentioned earlier [Section 4.14, Introduction], not all 
departmental managers were involved in long-range planning. This was also noted 
by Pond (2000, p. 10) in discussing British banks when he noted that it is 'a common 
dilemma as short-term profits are often prioritised ahead oflong-term gains'. 
Short-range planning was done through annual budgets prepared by each branch, 
and a general budget prepared by the financial department that covered all PB's 
revenues and expenses. 
For those managers who had a budget, the aspects that were budgeted for were all 
financial apart from an annual plan for training needs of employees. Branch budgets 
dealt with three areas: deposits, credit and profit. The isolated case of the two 
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departments' budgets, the Treasury and the IT Department, either covered forecasted 
revenues only or forecasted costs only. If branches achieved their targets in the 
budget during the year top management would adjust the budgets to increase the 
target that were initially set at the begilUling of the year. As for the annual general 
budget for PB, no adjustments during the year would be introduced. 
Management of PB used branch budgets for three purposes: 
First, for short-term planning and this has been discussed above and in Part II of this 
chapter in respect of information needs. 
Second, for control as discussed in Part IV, Emphasis on Control Function as 
Compared to Planning at PB- a Short-Range Orientation. 
Third, performance evaluation of branch managers as discussed in Section 4.18, Role 
ofMAS in Performance Evaluation at PB. 
4.15.5.2 Problems Relating to Lack oflnformation for Planning and Setting Goals 
atPB 
One difficulty that was mentioned by three managers was that the budgets or plans 
were not updated and became irrelevant once changes in the external environment 
occurred, or when their plans .. were tied to the achievement of targets in other 
department which, once unrealised, meant that their own plans became irrelevant. 
A further weak point mentioned about the goal-setting process was the way in which 
future projections were decided up on. 
'The budget starts with previous year actual figures plus a minimum level of growth, 
which would be decided by the general manager. Based on this 1 will prepare my 
budget' (interview 9). 
Regardless of the philosophy adopted by PB, whether top management should set 
corporate goals then other levels of managers should set their own goals within what 
achieves both top management and individual managers goals i.e. an integrated type 
of 'top-down planning', or whether managers should set their goals independent of 
top management then, corporate goals would be the summation of individual goals 
i.e. 'bottom-up plalUling', PB managers felt that they did not have the information 
they needed information on the economy and competition on which to base their 
'outward and forward' plans. 
'1 do not have a clear idea on how to set targets as it depends on the economic 
situation in the country ... ! do not receive any feedback information on the economic 
situation ... nor am ! informed of the general manager's expectations and projections 
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for the Bank as whole. They [referring to top management] can judge matters better 
by virtue of their positions' (interview 6). 
In the absence of this, the outcome was that: 'the goals stated in the letter ffrom the 
general manager to branch managers informing them of their budgets for a coming 
year] could be close to the ones I suggested or totally different ones' (interview 9). 
As for the consequences ofIack of information those are discussed at length in Part 11 
of this chapter Availability and Diffusion oflnformation at PB. 
4.15.6 The Role of MAS in Planning Product Innovation and Customer 
Satisfaction 
Another issue related to short- and long-range planning is product innovation and 
meeting clients' needs. It was expressed in the corporate goals and in the chairman's 
and the general manager's statement as: 
'We want our clients to be proud to work with us'. 
The corporate goals stated in the annual report relating to product innovation and 
customer satisfaction were not operationlised and measures were not made available. 
Nor were corporate goals on this issue clear in the minds of the managers. 
When managers were asked how did they know that PB's clients were satisfied with 
the types of services and the way the services were offered, the responses ranged 
from an extreme 'you can never please clients' (interview 13), to another extreme of 
not having any information on the matter. The quotation from interview 13 above 
agrees with what Peters & Waterman 1991, p. 156) wrote: ' despite all lip service 
given to market orientation these days ... the customer is either ignored or considered 
a bloody nuisance'. Along the continuum five managers out of 10 (excluding the 
general manager) - who all had direct contact with PB's clients, said they would 
know about customer dissatisfaction through the clients' complaints in terms of 
num ber and source of complaints. Three managers said that they knew that their 
clients are satisfied with dealing with PB because they still keep their accounts. 
'A good measure of customer satisfaction is that 1 am able to keep my clients given 
the tough competition' (interview 6). 
This statement in fact describes the 'where are we nowT stage but does not provide 
plans for future growth in the number of clients and in a more preferred type of 
clients as often mentioned in the interviews. 
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Customer retention is a good indicator but what PB's future short- and long-range 
plans indicated was growth, which means attracting new customers as well as 
retaining the existing ones. 
'The Bank does not have a strategy for measuring customer satisfaction. Previously 
there were suggestion boxes in branches but not any more. There used to be debates 
lvhether the branch managers should keep the keys or not' (interview 15). 
One difficulty that faced managers of PB was the fact that it was not clear to them 
which clients they should target and monitor to start with, then comes the challenge 
of launching new products, and creating more value for their clients. 
'Once I am able to identifY my clients it becomes easier to understand their needs 
and to provide them with the type of services they need' (interview 9). 
The two factors of customer retention and customer complaints in measuring 
customer satisfaction have to be complemented by others. Apart from the general 
manager, out of 10 managers who have direct responsibilities for dealing with 
clients, the managers gave six different types of clients they thought PB was 
targeting, Six out of 10 managers gave similar opinions on the type of clients 
whereas the other 4 managers mentioned other types of clients. 
The managers interviewed discussed the issue in general but only two managers 
(interview 6 & 7) specified that they were referring to a credit client. However, what 
attracts a corporate client is different from a small depositor or a client looking to 
finance the purchase of a car. 
There are important reasons which make identifying types of clients an important 
issue. The first is that 'some form of customer profitability analysis is important to all 
financial institutions, although the level of detail applied will vary depending on its 
type' (Mabberley, 1992, p. 13). The second, identifying types of clients, is helpful in 
any future plans for attracting new customers and looking into the needs of each 
category by identifying the customer potential for the purchase of the service 
(Hughes, 1965, p. 66). Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 186) observe that 'the excellent 
companies tend to be more driven by c1ose-to-the-customer attributes than by either 
technology or cost'. A further aspect to be considered in identifying types of clients 
is in providing 'a detailed analysis of the firm's products and the offerings of its 
competitors' (Bromwich, 1990, p. 30). So, in this respect 'all financial institutions 
must be innovative to some extent' (Mabberley, 1992, p. \09). This type of 
information was not available at PB. 
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In the American market Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 191) and Leander (1996, p. 40) 
note that the banking industry started to align organisation structure around market 
segments in a shift to an industry-style orientation, and American commercial banks 
'see the process as inevitable, driven in part by client demand and in part by the 
desire to differentiate themselves from competitors' (Leander, 1992, p. 40). The 
organisation policy which leading world banks adopted before this recent change 
took place (as described by Leander 1992, p. 40) since the beginning of the 1900's 
was similar to the one used by PB in planning its marketing efforts along 
geographical lines. 
PB did not follow an industry style orientation. In fact, a number of managers said 
that they targeted all types and categories of clients. One reason given was the small 
size of the market, which they said was not sufficient to sustain industry 
specialisation. 
Differentiation of types of clients requires laying down plans and goals to meet 
customer's needs and preferences in terms of types of services, pricing, and standard 
of offering the services. On this issue of setting goals to meet the needs and 
preferences of clients, PB interviewees did not show clear goals. Their opinions 
seemed to be based on personal impressions and interpretations. One manager said 
that (s)he did not seek this kind of information. To describe this better, in interview 
11 the manager said: 
'/ wish / had more information on customers' satisfaction' although, on the other 
hand,(s)he saw studying new services as 'the most important part of .. (his/her) job'. 
Lack of information on customer satisfaction found in all interviews took the 
managers by surprise. When asked, managers stopped for a moment to think and a 
number of them said that someone at PB must have been doing this. Nor did PB not 
also have a set strategy for marketing: 
'as a Bank we do not have a set strategy of means and methods for marketing our 
services' (interview 15). 
Naturally as a result of that, MAS adopted by PB did not play a role in enhancing OE 
by giving managers the support they needed to achieve the corporate goal of 
'developing banking products and provide new services and products to meet the 
needs and preferences of clients' mentioned in the annual reports from 1994-1999. 
4.l5.7The Role ofMAS in Providing Non-Financial Information for Planners at PB 
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'There is a strong emphasis on financial goals in the annual budget. The budget 
usually does not contain non-accounting measurements' (interview 1). 
Non-financial information on changes in the economy or in the political scene is 
needed for planning as much as financial information (Seashore, 1965, p. 50; Patton, 
1984, p. 279; Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 281; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 4; Kaplan & 
N orton, 1996, p. 75). The need for non-financial information was appreciated by PB 
managers: 
'1 have found that knowing problem areas coupled with visits to branches and face-
to-face meetings with their employees provide me with more information for 
planning and decision making than 1 thought of to begin with' (interview 8). 
Rangone (1997, p. 216) offers an explanation for this situation of appreciating the 
importance of non-financial factors but not seeking to identify and measure them, as 
qualitative terms 'are characterized by inherent ambiguity and imprecision. For this 
reason, intangible factors are often disregarded by accountants, even though they are 
implicitly evaluated by managers in their strategic thinking'. 
Thirteen out of 15 managers (excluding the general manager) said that incoming 
reports contained financial information and only 4 managers said that the MAS 
reports they received contained non-financial information as well. 
'1 find non-financial information difficult to get. 1 cannot say that 1 am satisfied with 
non-financial information reporting and 1 believe this situation applies to all banks. 
The reason might be that non-financial reporting is done manually. 1 think data that 
is handled by employees become bulky and difficult to get and to process' (interview II). 
Non-financial types of information mentioned by the managers as being helpful if 
available included: credit worthiness of a client, how a client manages his/her 
business, information on customers' needs and customer satisfaction, and 
information on the external environment 
It is relevant here to go back at this point and highlight what was discussed on the 
partiality of MAS (Section 4.11.1.2, Corporate Culture at PB; and Section 4.11.1.6, 
Psychology of Users at PB). The MAS adopted at PS was designed by financial 
accountants which agrees with the quotation mentioned earlier by Rangone (1997, p. 
216) that 'intangible factors are often disregarded by accountants' but evaluated by 
managers when it comes to strategic pi arming. Some PS managers explicitly 
mentioned their need for non-financial information for planning purposes, but the 
design of MAS did not meet their needs. 
March (1987, p. 160) comments on the value and quality of information collected in 
organisations by saying 'most information in organizations is collected and recorded 
not primarily to aid decision making directly but as a basis for interpretation that 
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allows coherent histories to be told'. He also comments on the obscurity of a link 
between information and its uses and doubts the possibility of proving such a link, as 
'future decision options in most probability are sufficiently obscure as to make the 
possible benefits from different information strategies almost indistinguishable' 
(March, 1987, p. 157). 
It is. difficult to state to what degree these two reasons contributed to the 
insufficiency of information for problem-solving and decision-making at PB. But 
what can be said is that there were specific types of information that were not 
available and managers did not actively seek them. 
Part IV EMPHASIS ON CONTROL FUNCTION AS COMPARED TO 
PLANNING AT PB: A SHORT-RANGE ORIENTATION 
After discussing the role of MAS in enhancing planning and decision-making, Part 
IV discusses the role of MAS in enhancing control and implementation of plans. 
Control as a term has wide connotations, what is more pertinent in the context of MA 
among the wide meanings of the word are: control as domination i.e. a person who 
has power over others. Secondly, control systems are used to change the performance 
of individuals and the outcome of organisational processes (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983. 
p. 206). Thirdly, feed-forward control as planning and alignment of managerial 
activities (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 14). 
Emmanuel, et aI., (1990, p. 14) refer to planning and control as conventional terms to 
feedback and feedforward control, were planning is seen as the process of setting 
goals and the means of their attainment, and control as the process of ensuring that 
plans are achieved'. MAS at PB was more geared to feedback control than to the 
other functions, as will be explained following. 
Organisational control relies considerably upon MAS (EmmanueJ et aI., 1990, p. 7; 
Otley, 1995, p.46). However, it is difficult to isolate the effects of MAS at PB from 
other controls as 'they act as a package and must be assessed jointly' (Otley, 1980, p. 
422). 
The discussion of the role ofMAS in control at PB is divided into: 
(I) Forms and areas of control. 
(2) The game of the budget and conflict of interest. 
(3) Performance measurements and evaluation of individuals and units. 
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4.16 Forms and Areas of Control at PB 
Control was exercised mainly through budgets and MAS reports. Deviations from 
budgets were monitored through budgetary control to ensure the achievement of 
annual goals set for branches and some head office departments. 
MAS reports were seen as being the most important organisational control used 
(mentioned by 11 out of 15 managers, excluding the general manager). Other 
controls mentioned in descending order were: formalisation of procedures 
. (mentioned by 4 managers), field visits (mentioned by 3 managers), and 
standardisation of procedures (mentioned by 2 managers). 
Although MAS reports were mainly used for control purposes [as explained below], 
apart from branches not all head office departments had budgets or plans, nor did all 
head office departments receive MAS reports informing them on their performance 
for control purposes. 
'We do not receive control reports on the department's performance from any of the 
Bank's departments' (interview 4). 
Feedback control was the main purpose of MAS reports as expressed by II 
interviewees out of the 15 (excluding the general manager). However, 13 
interviewees said that MAS reports served a double purpose and provided them with 
feedback information that was not for operational purposes. 
This emphasis on the control function links with the characteristics of MAS reports 
the interviewees said that they would have liked to see in the reports they received. 
Ten managers out of 15 said it was speed that they needed, and that time was of the 
essence for reports to reach them in the shortest time possible. 
Seven of them ranked speed as the number one characteristic they would like to find 
in MAS reports. Ten managers also chose accuracy, 4 of them ranked it as number 
one and six as characteristic number two. Both speed and accuracy are requisites of 
feedback control. The two characteristics are useful to get accurate information on 
what has been achieved and in a short period of time so that corrective action could 
be taken. 
This applies particularly III a banking context where managers have to be kept 
informed of the indebtedness position of clients exceeding a certain limit and how 
accounts are progressing. Or where clients make deposits in currencies other than the 
Jordan dinar where the exchange rates and currencies positions have to be monitored 
continuously. 
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One objection to the use of such negative feedback control is that errors are allowed 
to occur with lags between the occurrence of an error and the implementation of 
corrective action. Such time lags are an important factor in the control of human 
organizations and, in such cases there is a need for anticipatory or feed-forward 
control (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 13). This in turn makes feed-forward control 
equally, if not more, important than feedback control (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 14). 
The frequency of reports once again stresses the feedforward control nature of MAS 
reports. Those reports that were mainly targeted on branches were monthly reports 
while, within branches or departments, daily feedforward control was provided in the 
case of 10 of the 15 interviewees (excluding the general manager). 
Control was exercised over branches mainly through budgetary control and through 
visits by managers of head office departments. 
'Internal reports that I receive indicate problem areas in addition to a number of 
issues which help me in evaluating branches' performance' (interview 8). 
However, this did not apply to head office departments which did not have budgets 
as branches did: 
'I do not receive reports informing me to what extent my department achieved its 
targets' (interview 7). 
In this respect it is relevant to note that managers need feedback to enhance 
performance rather than information on the overall performance of an organisation 
(Hughes, 1965, p. 49). 
Waterhouse & Tiessen (1978, p. 71) note that, in some types of organisations where 
meaningful output measures may be impossible to develop, effective control over 
sub-unit activities and the utilisation of resources will rely heavily upon the selection 
and socialisation of organisation members. This applies to banks that provide clients 
with services that are not easy to control or measure, and where departmental 
managers and branches have authority to act. In situations where knowledge of the 
transformation process of inputs into outputs is imperfect and the ability to measure 
output is low, Ouchi 'advocates that control through clans or corporate cultures is the 
most appropriate mode' (Ouchi as quoted by Drury, 1996, p. 653). On this Peters & 
Waterman (1995, p. 81) remark that the excellent company seems to understand 
important yet paradoxical needs that more discretion leads to greater commitment. 
One of the two departmental managers who prepared budgets (or, as one of the 
interviewees termed it 'plan') said, when I asked whether (s)he received any control 
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reports concerning the annual plan he sent to the general manager, that the need did 
not arise yet: 
'1 never found myself in a situation where ... actual (revenue) was less than ... targets 
in the annual plan' (interview 14). 
[See more discussion in Section 4.17, Conflict of Interest in Setting Goals and the 
Game of the Budget Control at PB]. 
On the other hand, the plan mentioned in interview 14, did not include any mention 
of projected expenses nor did branches' budgets for that matter. The manager in 
interview 14 explained that there was no need to budget expenses, since the policy of 
PB was that an expense would not be paid unless it was properly authorised. 
This raises the question of the overall evaluation of the department's plan. It 
contradicts with what researchers believe i.e. that control should cover all activities 
of an organisation. The absence of a match between revenue earned and costs 
incurred to achieve that revenue, splitting the process and looking at each phase 
separately, weakens the link between the activity and the cost, and renders control 
less effective. 
Such a match between the revenue and cost of an activity, as in cases similar to the 
one mentioned in interview 14, will again help in evaluating the productivity and 
expended effort of a department to realise a certain income. In the banking industry 
'which has experienced pressures to manage costs more effectively ... Costs should be 
planned for and managed before they are incurred, rather than simply monitored and 
controlled after the event' (MabberIey, 1992, p. I). 
The findings can be summarised as: 
Exhibit 4.18 
Summary of the Findings on the Role ofMAS in Control at PB 
Managers interviewed criticised: 
I. The unclear financial and non-financial goals for departments and branches. 
2. Measurements and/or standards for measuring goals achievement. 
3. Organisational structure's role in the flow of information. 
4. The provision of information for feedforward and feedback control. 
4.16.1 Budgetary Control in Branches at PB 
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Budgetary control was exercised over branches only and covered three areas: 
deposits, credit, and profit. 
~ branch budget will include forecasts for growth of deposits and credit facilities 
but not the branch's needs in the form of furniture, new employees or maintenance 
work ... Some of the branches would not take the initiative and ask for maintenance 
work or renovations' (interview 11). 
Head office managers who were involved in budgetary control believed that it was 
instmmental in improving results and achieving corporate goals. 
'1 believe that budgetary control is particularly helpful in revealing problem areas in 
branches and problems in the budget preparation process itseif. .. budgets and 
budgetary control helped improve branches' performance a great deal' (interview 8). 
However, Abernethy & Brownell (1999) urge caution when using budgetary control 
as a diagnostic device -particularly in organisations under change, but emphasise 
their interactive use 'with its focus on dialogue, communication and learning, 
between top management and subordinates as well as managers at the same level' to 
encourage information flows (Abernethy & Brownell, 1999, p. 192). 
The areas that management showed a keen interest in exercising control over were all 
of a financial nature relating to the financial performance control of 
branches/departments. Branches, the main revenue generating units or 'mainstream 
department', received monthly performance evaluation and a variance report showing 
positive and negative deviations from the budget. It is worth mentioning here that the 
monthly variance reports along with any comments were sent to branches carrying 
the general manager's signature although they were prepared by the R&D department 
in collaboration with an assistant general manager. One explanation could be that 
R&D was not in the direct chain of command with branch managers, hence needed 
the stronger authority of the general manager, and/or it was a manifestation of 
internal politics. 
In addition to the monthly reports, control was exercised via quarterly reports and a 
meeting of branch managers with the general manager and some of the head office 
managers. The aim of the quarterly meetings was to discuss achieved results as 
compared to the respective branches' budgets. 
Branches and head office managers interviewed however, did not agree on the 
significance of the variance reports that were prepared for branches. This is of 
particular importance in organisations undergoing change where organisational 
members need to know why budget variances occur, and how the system and 
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behaviour can be adopted (Abernethy & Brownell, 1999, p. 191). The interviewees' 
opinions ranged from: 
'1 do not believe that all deviations are bad' (interview 8) 
to 
'1 would not be happy if a branch was achieving higher profits but going against 
instructions (regarding deposits or credit regulations). 1 believe that the moment 
branches act in contravention to instructions it would be the beginning of the 
collapse of an organisation' (interview 13). 
Researchers find tolerance for failure and support for' deviant behaviour as long as it 
is compatible with company goals' (Hughes, 1965, p. 57). Tolerance for certain 
deviations protects organisations from worse long-run performance and various 
harmful side effects (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 164). Peters & Waterman (1993, p. 
223) believe that successful organisations are those which 'make lots of tries and 
consequently suffer failures or the organization won't learn'. 
The apparent emphasis on control that was found affected the type of MAS reports 
used and the type of information collected - mostly internally. This was coupled with 
control using financial performance measures to the exclusion of others as was 
apparent from the areas covered in the budgets (namely deposits, credit facilities, and 
profits). 
Management was not unaware of the importance and relevance of other non-financial 
measures as was clear from the corporate goals and vision of the general manager 
and chairman of the board of PB. However, non-financial measures were noticeably 
unsatisfactory in the MAS used at PB. 
4.17 Conflict ofInterest in Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control 
The branch budgets were used first and foremost by the branch managers for 
feedback control and evaluation of their performance rather than to provide 
information for reassessment. This put branch managers under pressure to achieve 
their targets, and a conflict of interest arose between branch managers and head 
office (March, 1987, p. 154; Drury et aI., 1993, p. iii). Branch managers, for 
example, would not ask for maintenance or renovations, as this will affect the profits 
of the branch, profits being one of the measures used in evaluating them. 
Managers' performance for that period and any subsequent promotions or demotions 
was decided by the ability of the branch manager to achieve the budget goals in all of 
the three areas of deposits, credit facilities, and profit. This constitutes a classic case 
of sacrificing the long-term interests of the organisation for the sake of the short-term 
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interests of a manager, or a common dilemma 'as short-term profits are often 
prioritised ahead oflong-term gains' (Pond, 2000, p. 10). 
'Branch managers are under pressure to achieve their targets which might lead to 
making credit facilities available to clients prior to finaliSing the necessary 
contracts" (interview 12). 
This could very well lead to 'a tendency to make the information consistent with the 
transmitter's perception of what the recipient wants to hear' if the recipient is a 
superior (Ference, 1970, p. B-85), and the creation of budgetary slack (Waterhouse 
& Tiessen, 1978, p. 72). This reflection of the phenomenon of conflict of interest 
arises when using budgets for performance evaluation rather than feedback or 
forecasting (Hofstede, 1969, p.lS). 
The budgets produced by branch managers meeting short-term targets consist almost 
entirely of financial measures that did not bear strong relation to some of the 
corporate goals of PB. Kaplan & Norton (1996, p. 83) when discussing the balanced 
score card, believe that 'in an integrated plarrning and budgeting process, executives 
continue to budget for short-term financial performance, but they also introduce 
short-term targets for measures in the customer, internal business process, and 
learning and growth perspectives', thereby linking strategy that has been decided to 
actions in specific tangible short-term targets. 
The short-term/long-term dilemma can also be found in the case of branch managers 
who are routinely transferred from one branch to another, and who might not stay in 
one branch for more than one year. In such cases the emphasis of both the branch 
manager and head office will be on short-term performance. 
This conflict of interest between the two parties was also seen in the substantial 
effort management was expending to ensure that branches follow the regulations of 
credit facilities to protect the interests of PB. 
The general manager formed a Credit Control Department a few months before the 
study took place. The aim of the Credit Control Department was to protect the 
interests of PB. Top management felt that PB' s interest were threatened by the non-
compliance of branch managers with PB directives under pressures of achieving 
targets either by the vested interest which branch managers have in improving short-
term profits or targets by extending personal services under pressure of social 
cultural values [more in Part V of this chapter, The Effects of External and Internal 
Cultures on MAS at PB]. 
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Managers' personal goals were incompatible with those of corporate goals so long as 
branch managers were evaluated by the achievement of their budgets. They would 
always resort to means to further their short-term interest of achieving the annul 
budget on account of the long-term interest of the branch and PB as a whole. 
The parties to the game of budget control as described by Hofstede (1968) were, on 
one side, the branch managers who had an annual budget to achieve, and a few head 
office departmentallllanagers and the general manager on the other side who 
evaluated the achievement of the budgets. 
Some head office departments' managers believed that branch managers, due to their 
direct and continuous contact with clients, were in a better position to decide rates of 
growth and profit in their particular geographical areas. 
'f believe that branch managers are the best qualified to decide on the future growth 
rate of their branches because they are in the field and have continuous contact with 
clients' (interview 15). 
However, head office departments, the other party to the game of budget control, 
believed that: 
'Branch managers tend to set easily-attainable targets for themselves or build in 
slack They have information by virtue of their work that f do not know about or are 
not informed of (interview 8). 
In interview 14, the departmental manager described the process of preparing 'the 
annual plan' for PB by saying that each member of the staff in the department would 
set hislher targets for the coming year which would be revised by the head of the 
department as members of staff 'usually state a minimum estimate of the amount to 
be collected as f will use their estimates to evaluate their work' (interview 14). 
This situation might have been very weB responsible for what was described as: 
'60 % of branches achieved their targets by the end of September (referring to 1999)' 
(interview 8). 
On the other hand, branch managers seemed to present budgets below the 
expectation of those of the general manager. 
'When the general manager's projected goals do not coincide with what branch 
managers set in their budgets then they will have to convince him of their reasons or 
else they will have to follow his projected goals' (interview 15). 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 171) explain that: 
'The psychological evidence therefore suggests that the best results will be obtained 
by setting the most difficult goals that will be accepted by managers and thus 
'internalised' and accepted as their own personal objectives. However, it is 
important that managers successfully attain their targets sufficiently often to give 
positive reinforcement and to prevent them from falling into a cycle of failure'. 
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Furthermore, in addition to the need to take into consideration the ability of 
budgetees to attain targets in the budgets, the process should not be a critical function 
in performance evaluation. 
Head office managers mentioned that 'beside using budgets for control purposes' they 
were used to evaluate branches and branch managers' performance. The conflict of 
interest here will work against providing head office with full feedback information 
as it might work against the evaluation of branch managers through the budget. 
Managers will be tempted to set the easiest achievable goals that are acceptable to 
top management. 
In an empirical study by Hofstede (1968) it was found that a big percentage of large 
successful companies use budgets for feedback rather than control. The benefits that 
top management receives from accurate feedback on items budgeted were found to 
be of more value to management than a partial improvement in results by a stricter 
control as feedback plays a key role in facilitating learning. Brownell & Hirst (1986 
as quoted by Lau & Tan, 1998, p. 166) argued that 'subordinates might find 
budgetary participation useful even when budget emphasis was low'. This supports 
the opinion that budgets can be beneficial to subordinates even when they are not 
used for exercising control. 
What was found at PB was that budgets were first and foremost used to exercise 
control over branch managers to achieve targets set in their respective budgets. By 
this branch managers were pushed further into a negative form of the 'game of the 
budget'. 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 103), although conceding that budgets are an imperfect 
tool in uncertain and changing environments, unclear organisational hierarchies, not 
well specified responsibility centres, and large interdependence with other parts of 
the organisation, similar to what was observed at PB, note that, 'nevertheless it is 
still, despite its imperfections, an important tool of control as evidenced by its 
widespread use'. This coincided with the interviewees' explanation that budgets and 
budgetary control improved goal achievement. 
The imposition of certain targets on branch managers III combination with the 
information the branch managers had on their geographical areas, which was not 
made fully available to head office, added to the conflict of interests. A branch 
manager commented in an interview that: 
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'I like to have two sets of goals: one for me and the other set for head office' 
(interview 9). 
Two of the 3 branch managers interviewed grumbled about the process through 
which future goals for deposits and facilities as well as profits were set. As 
commented by Hofstede (1968, p. 296), 'that mistrust and undue pressure will 
destroy the game spirit'. 
4.18 The Role of MAS in Providing Information on Performance Evaluation at 
PB 
When one talks about control, control not only involves monitoring and regulation, 
but also measurement of performance and motivation of employees and units 
(Lynne, 1995, pp. 237, 238). Branch budgets in addition to control were used to 
evaluate performance of branch managers as expressed in interviews 6,8,9,13, 15. 
Otley (1995, p. 56), while stressing the importance of performance evaluation in 
control, cautions against the use of strictly quantitative performance measures. For 
'performance is multi faceted and cannot be reduced to simple quantitative 
measures ... (or) on the ... subjective methods dependant upon the jUdgement of a 
manager's superior' (stress added). The same idea was also expressed by Hofstede 
Cl 968, p. 296) who warns against using budgets solely for evaluation purposes. As 
branch managers mentioned, their evaluation was based on the achievement of 
financial results in their respective budgets covering credit facilities, deposits, and 
profits targets. 
'Performance of the branches is evaluated according to achieving targets stated in 
the budget' (interview 6). 
PB management also used a form for employees' annual performance evaluation to 
be filled-in by a superior for his staff. The form was criticised by the managers 
interviewed (interviews 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15) as being too subjective and dealing with 
vague attributes for which no measurements were offered by PB management. Other 
comments were: 
'It is difficult to rank employees as excellent, very good or good' (interview 9). 
'I find it extremely difficult to fill the employees' annual performance evaluation 
report. I do not believe the report can evaluate an employee justly' (interview 15). 
[See also Part V of this chapter, The Effects of External and Internal Cultures on 
MAS at PB]. 
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Nevertheless, branch managers clearly did not know how they were evaluated, by 
whom, and by what criteria. The criteria used to evaluate branch managers were not 
quite clear to them. 
'/ am not sure how the general manager uses the internal audit report but J think he 
uses it in evaluating us' (interview 9). 
'As far as J know such reports (visits to branches) go to the R&D department to be 
used in the evaluation of branches , (interview 6). 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p; 271) note that superiors leave contract terms purposely 
implicit for a number of reasons: they may not be able to describe the bases of 
performance evaluation to avoid motivating managers in directions that turn out to be 
no longer appropriate, they may want to encourage managers to do their best and not 
to give up when they perceive a performance target as being impossible, or 'they 
want to reduce manager's propensities to engage in short-term manipulations of the 
performance measures'. 
In the interviews head office managers were asked whether they were involved in 
evaluating branches (as units) or branch managers (as individuals). It was found that 
senior departmental managers who ought to be involved in the performance 
evaluation process were not. 
Branches' budgets were mainly used by PB's management in evaluating branch 
managers' performance. PB management, through the MAS used at PB, did not 
encourage managers to budget realistically and unintentionally pushed them to dress-
up their results. This impact on the feedback recipient's future work performance is 
also observed by Luckett & Eggleton (1991, p. 376) as they note that, the 'nature of 
the message and individual characteristics, appear important when investigating the 
behavioural consequences of feedback'. 
Top management relied almost entirely on financial measures in budgets for the 
performance evaluation of branch managers, and neglected collecting and reporting 
additional relevant information for performance evaluation through MAS to head 
office managers [see discussion in Section 4.18.2, Non-Financial Employees' 
Performance Measurements Used at PB; and Section 4.18.2.1, Reliance on Financial 
Measures in MAS Information J. 
From the interviews it was noticed that two head office managers and the general 
manager were the only ones involved in performance evaluation, although there were 
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in addition to those other managers directly involved with branches in areas such as 
marketing, internal organisation, or collection of outstanding debts. 
'1 do not believe that the current method of evaluation reflects justly the performance 
of the branch' (interview 5). 
Palmer (1992, p. 193) believes that, although performance measures are 'links 
between actions of members of the organization and the strategy of the organization', 
and are 'powerful tools to motivate, evaluate, and control employee behavior. Yet 
many organizations 'encourage behavior that is not consistent with organizational 
strategy by using performance measures that lack timelines, accuracy, or relevance to 
the fundamental goals and objectives of the organizational strategy'. Hiromoto 
(1991, p. 6) proposes performance to be 'judged over time without emphasis on 
individual time periods' as MA should help organisations to learn by stressing the 
progress of performance over time. 
Measurements used for measuring goal achievement were viewed by both head 
office departments and branch managers as being unclear, unfair and incapable of 
reflecting actual performance for each department in view of long- and short-term 
goals ofPB. 
From the analysis and discussion above, any suggested measurement for 
performance evaluation needs to take into consideration three dimensions: (1) the 
nature of measurement as a number of questions were raised as to the nature of the 
measurement of goal achievement for support or profit enhancing departments such 
as the legal department, the human resources department or R & D, (2) the point of 
measurement as work of the various departments and branches of PB are a flow of 
activities - a chain of activities that tie to one another with one leading to another, 
consequently, there is a need when deciding on measurements for goal achievement 
for individual managers, to decide at what point a manager achieved a goal (3) the 
time phase of measurement whether to be used for the short-term or the long-term. 
The difficulty surfaced more prominently for branches as the majority of head office 
departments (11 managers out of 15) did not receive any control report. [See more 
discussion on goal-setting for branches and head office departments in Section 
4.15.3, Departmental Goals at PB; Section 4.15.4, Characteristics of Departmental 
Goals at PB; and Section 4.16, Forms and Areas of Control at PBj. 
Questions arise concerning the point of measurement dimension, previously 
mentioned, for the collection of a debt which is one of the corporate goals listed in 
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the annual reports [Exhibit 4.16, A Comparison of PB Interviewees' Answers with 
Corporate Goals as in Annual Reports (1994-1998)]: is it for, example, when a 
favourable verdict is pronounced or is it at the point were the verdict is implemented 
by obtaining an order for foreclosure? Alternatively is it the point where the client 
actually pays his obligation to PB in full or would it still be considered a goal 
achievement if a settlement is reached with PB forfeiting part of the debt? 
Unclear and inadequate measurements that were insufficiently communicated in 
addition to the intrinsic difficulty of evaluating the performance of managers worked 
against enhancing the short- and long-term OE of PB [Exhibit 4.19, Structural 
Problems Affecting MAS Design and Operation and Goal Achievement at PBJ. It led 
in some situations to an atmosphere of intense rivalry with managers trying to 
conceal information from one another so they can take credit for achieving goals. 
Cross-functional measures reflect the interdependent nature of the different 
departments and the strategic perfonnance of PB as top management 'needs 
information that provides an overview of the organisational situation and address the 
unstructured problems and .decisions that will shape tomorrow's performance 
reports' (Palmer, 1992, p. 194). 
To overcome a similar situation and secure the co-operation of certain other 
departments, one of the managers informed his fellow managers -whose work was 
related to his- that they 'can take aJJ the credit' (interview 3) in return for keeping him. 
informed of all information that was of critical importance to him in doing his work. 
A similar observation was made by Kaplan & Norton (1992, p. 71) who noted that 
senior executives need to understand how a measurement system affects the 
behaviour of managers and employees. 
When the managers participating in the study were asked whether they thought that 
employee satisfaction was sufficiently monitored and measured at PB, out of 14 
answers 10 managers believed it was not measured properly. 
4.18.1 The Role ofMAS in Evaluating DepartmentslBranches as Units at PB 
On the question of whether departments/branches were evaluated as units apart from 
evaluating managers (individuals), 5 managers out of the 12 who answered the 
question reiterated what they said about their own evaluation as managers while 7 
managers dealt with the question directly and said that their departments were not 
evaluated as units. 
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Exhibit 4.19 
Structural Problems Affecting 
Design and Operation ofMAS and Goals Achievement 
Goals to be 
achieved 
"'"-" . 
(P 1) Continuously changing organisational 
~ structure and departmental 
responsibilities 
~ 
\ 
(P2) Unclear a~d i~adequate channels of 
commUnIcatIOn 
(P3) Centralisation of information 
(P4) Ineffective use ofIT 
(PS) Inadequate measurements for performance 
evaluation and goal achievement 
(P6) Neglect offeedforward control 
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'Branches as operating units are not evaluated as far as 1 know' (interview 11), 
And 
'1 do not think it (measuring branches 'performance) is being applied' (interview 15). 
Managers who expressed the idea that the evaluation of the departmentlbranch and 
manager was one and the same thing were also unsatisfied with the measurements 
used. They thought measurements were unfair in being totally dependent on financial 
measurement and concentrating more on the short-term, which can work against 
long-term performance. 
'The work of my department is evaluated through financial achievements ", 1 look at 
it differently through technical improvements, enhancing my staff efficiency, and the 
calibre of clients 1 am able to attract. 1 care about long-term improvement, which 
might be reflected in the department's performance in the short-term' (interview 1). 
4.18.2 Non-Financial Employee Performance Evaluation Measures Used at PB 
I mentioned earlier [Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Information on 
Performance Evaluation at PB} that the performance evaluation form used by 
superiors to evaluate staff was unclear and inadequate. The issues raised by the 
interviewees concentrated on: 
(1) the frequency of the evaluation; 
(2) the attributes the form tried to measure; 
(3) unclear measurements for evaluating attributes; 
(4) the evaluation process given the above did not reflect meaningful and true 
evaluations. 
Employee evaluation according to two of the interviewees (interviews 7, and 15) 
should be more frequent (e.g. quarterly rather than annually). 
'To wait until the end of the year to tell an employee how well (s)he has performed 
would be too late' (interview 7). 
This can be related to learning theory as feedback and knowledge of results leads to 
more effective learning when it is provided quickly, so that which was good can be 
reinforced and that which was bad can be corrected. 
MAS adopted at PB was viewed by most managers as being unsatisfactory in terms 
of information provided for evaluation purposes due to the characteristics of MAS 
reports and the incomprehensive information on operations and in particular non-
financial information and measurements. 
'1 want our employees to be proud to work for Phoenix Bank' (general manager 
interview). 
And, as previously quoted by one ofthe interviewees: 
'A satisfied employee is a productive employee' (interview 8). 
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On the attributes issue in the evaluation form, one of the managers said: 
'Th{e) form contain{ed) some difficult measurements such as loyalty. I ask myself 
how can I measure an employee's loyalty? It is extremely difficult to measure a 
matter like loyalty. ' (Inten'iew 9). 
4.18.2.1 Reliance on Financial Measures in MAS Information at PB 
On the issue of non-financial measures and financial measures complementing each 
other, head office managers expressed their need for non-financial information in 
addition to financial information. Some interviewees were not happy with the 
situation that predominantly financial types of report were provided to them, as in the 
following quotation: 
'I find non-financial information difficult to get. I cannot say I am satisfied with non-
financial information reporting ... the reason might be that non-financial reporting is 
done manually. I think data that is handled by employees become bulky and difficult 
to process and to get' (interview 11). 
. In the interviews, when managers were asked how were financial and non-financial 
results used in control, six managers out of 15 (excluding the general manager) said 
that financial information only was used and 8 managers said that both financial and 
non-financial data were used - though not in the same reports. One interviewee said 
his evaluation was based on technical issues. In performance evaluation, five 
interviewees out of 13 believed they were evaluated using financial measures only or 
mainly financial measures, while eight managers said that they did not receive any 
evaluation of the work of their departments, and two interviewees said it did not 
relate to them. 
'Evaluation of the department's work is done through the financial achievements' 
(interview 1). 
In an article published by the. Arab Banks Union magazine (December 1999, p. 34) 
there was a clear call to Arab Banks to emphasise customer satisfaction instead of 
seeking to attain a certain market share. However, the magazine (in the same issue 
and in a featured report on Jordanian banks) discussed a number of financial 
measures in the evaluation of Jordanian banks without mentioning any non-financial 
measures. 
Drury (1996, p. 512) finds that, in recent years: 'there has been a shift from treating 
financial figures as the foundation for performance measurement and control to 
treating them as one among a broader set of measures'. MAS in turn can help 
organizations achieve their quality goals by providing a variety of reports and 
measures that motivate and evaluate managerial efforts to improve quality' (Drury, 
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1996, p. 840; Hiromoto, 1991, p. 2). However, 'there is a danger that if non-financial 
measures that are necessary to compete successfully in today's worldwide 
competition environment are not emphasized, managers and employees will be 
motivated to focus exclusively on cost and ignore other marketing, managerial, 
strategic and other considerations' (Drury, 1996, p. 835). This agrees with the 
quotation from interview I: 
The work of my department is evaluated through financial achievements ... I look at it 
diffirently through technical improvements, enhancing my staff efficiency, and the 
calibre of clients I am able to attract. I ;:are about long-term improvement, which 
might be reflected in the department's performance in the short-term' (interview 1). 
And the quotation from interview 8: 
'f need and seek non:financial as well as financial information in my workfor setting 
budgets andfor branches' evaluation' (interview 8). 
Qualitative factors that were mentioned by the branch managers as enhancing long-
term future performance were: motivation, better-qualified employees, and better co-
ordination among departments and branches. 
In the area of measuring performance, non-financial measures are also advocated in 
relation to short- and long-term targets (Bromwich & Bhimani 1989, p. 16, 
Hiromoto, 1991, p. 2). Traditional financial measures report on what happened last 
period without indicating how managers can improve their performance in the next. 
'Non-financial measures provide a balance between external measures like operating 
income and internal measures like new product development' (Kaplan & Norton, 
1993, p. 134, 135). Nevertheless, the tendency to stress financial goals should be 
weighed against the degree of difficulty of measuring non-financial objectives. 
Part V THE EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL CVL TVRES ON 
MASAT PB 
4.19 Introduction 
The issue of cultural effects on MAS has been discussed by a number of researchers. 
Strauss & Corbin (1998) and Smith, Dugan & Trompenaars (1996) remarked on the 
blind application of theories without giving due care to the contextual element. 
Trying to impose or judge is 'a mistake frequently made ... theories developed in 
industrialised nations are superimposed on non-industrialised ones or on other 
industrialised nations that have different populations and cultures. The imposed 
theories just do not fit, either in whole or in part and thus can be very misguiding' 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1988, p. 287). 
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To take an example mentioned by Hughes (1965, p. 146) when considering 
motivational needs gave as an example, he has 'plenty of parking space' as a means 
of satisfying a physical maintenance need. This might be applicable to employees in 
the USA but does not apply to Jordan where the percentage of the population owning 
cars is much less. The concern of the majority of employees would be a work place 
that is easily accessible by public transport. 
Social culture is part of the contextual environment to which an organisation has to 
adupt in the same way it adapts to economic, technological, political, and legal 
elements in the external environment [Exhibit 2.4, External Factors Affecting Design 
and Role ofMAS]. 
The issue of the cultural effect attracted my attention when I asked interviewees for 
explanations regarding certain practices. The answer in a number of instances was 
that this was how things work: 'it is our culture'. 
Although the research framework and the interview guide were not planned to 
emphasise cultural issues, their effect on the business community was explicitly 
referred to by 11 managers ofthe 16 interviewees. 
Tribal, family and religious affiliations, which are part of the cultural and social 
factors, were quoted by the interviewees as affecting their work as well as various 
aspects of business activities in Jordan. 
At times managers had a positive stance towards cultural influences, at others they 
attributed negative practices and the fact that there was little they could do about it. 
Quoting Peters & Waterman (1995) in describing how US managers adopted 
Japanese management practices: 
'It was never so clear as in 1980, when U.S. managers, beset by obvious 
problems of stagnation, leaped to adopt Japanese management practices, 
ignoring the cultural differences, so much wider than even the vast expanse 
of Pacific would suggest' (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 5). 
It is difficult to isolate cultural effects on certain areas of management to measure the 
impact of culture on managerial functions and systems. Organisations exist in their 
environments as open systems continuously interacting, affecting MAS design and 
being affected by them. 
Gross (1965, p. 211) notes that 'individuals and systems in any organisation are 
always guided by some pattern of values' and that values can be 'internal and 
external' and can have many dimensions such as 'conformity and individualism', 
'passivity and activism', 'freedom and control' and 'authoritarianism and democracy'. 
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Later Hofstede (1991) listed four dimensions: large power !small power distance, 
collectivism/individualism, masculine! feminine, and uncertainty avoidance along 
which different cultures can be measured and compared. 
In Large power distance cultures according to Hofstede (1991, p. 35), subordinates 
are expected to be told what to do, while collectivism pertains to societies in which 
people from birth onwards are integrated onto strong, cohesive ingroups, which 
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty (Hofstede 1991, p. 51). In a masculine culture a humanized job should give 
more opportunities for recognition, advancement, and challenge, while feminine 
cultures give more opportunities for mutual help and social contracts (Hofstede 1991, 
p. 94). Uncertainty avoidance as defined by Hofstede (1991, p. 113), is the extent to 
which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertainty or unknown situations. 
The dimensions chosen by Hofstede echo some of the dimensions mentioned by 
Gross, although it needs to be said that measurements used by Hofstede were 
criticised as being unrepresentative of cultures, and too reductionist (Harrison & 
McKinnon, 1999; Chenhall, 2003, p. 154; Hopper, 2003, p. 19). 
Those values that guide individuals and systems affect MAS from the design stage 
to the role it has in the planning stage to its role in control, implementation, post-
audit, as well as defining OE and its attainment. 
This section will discuss the cultural effects on MAS on: 
(I) planning - the goal-setting process, participation in decision-making, and 
communication of strategies and goals; 
(2) control - budgetary control and performance evaluation; 
(3) organisational structure; 
(4) effects of corporate culture 011 MAS. 
The cultural effects were not confined to the nature of goals and processes but also 
covered some of the organisational structure characteristics of PB which were also 
identified to be the way they were due to cultural effects of Jordanian society (social 
culture) and within the banking sector in particular (occupational culture); 
'1 believe a cultural factor peculiar to our society is behind the current situation 
(centralisation and safeguarding of information) it is a widespread practice that staff 
talk freely about information made available to them through their work' (interview 4). 
4.20 Cultural Effects on MAS in Planning and Decision-Making at PB 
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Managers talked about a family atmosphere at PB and about 'act(ing) as a father 
figure to ... staff' (interview 6). In a society like that of Jordan, which can be described 
as being a male dominated society, the father who is traditionally the dominant figure 
at home is copied in organisations and plays the same role in the same 'dominant' 
way with his subordinates at work as he does at home. 
This reflects itself in organisations in several ways: in the way decisions are taken, in 
communication, and in setting goals and plans. 
'Our juniors are afraid to criticis~ or state an opinion contrary to their seniors as 
they know that such behaviour will not be acceptable. Managers will always say that 
their assistants or their staff know nothing about the work or that they still need 20 
more years to be able to do their job properly' (interview 8). 
What has been expressed by the interviewees agrees in some respects with Hofstede's 
(1991, p. 35) study on 'Cultures and Organizations', later work by Smith et a!. (1996, 
p. 26), Javidan & House (2001, p. 294) in addition to the work of many others. 
Hofstede's (1991, pp. 26, 53, 84, 113) empirical study positioned Arab countries on 
the four cultural dimensions as large power distance, collectivist, masculine, and 
strong uncertainty avoidance culture. 
Chenhall (2003, p. 154) acknowledges that Hofstede's values provide a convenient 
tool for research. However, his dimensions of culture when exclusively used prohibit 
understanding 'how behavior is influenced by the fundamental traits that influence 
how individuals think, feel and respond'. 
Another criticism of Hofstede's dimensions is their reductionst characteristics of 
very complex aspects of cultures and lack of adequate theoretical foundations: 
'Aspects of MAS behaviour, such as participation and performance evaluation, are 
correlated with four (sometimes five) dimensions of culture that purport to vary 
across countries. Such research is too distant from actual problems to be of practical 
value, and it is buili on unsatisfactory theoretical foundations. It fails to see culture 
as a dynamic product of interactions between subcultures and sub-units in 
organisations, families, ethnic groups and stratification systems as traditional non-
capitalist cultures change into modern, capitalist forms' (Hopper et aI., 2003, p. 19). 
In a small power distance situation subordinates expect to be consulted before a 
decision that affects their work is made, but they accept that the boss takes the final 
decision ( Hofstede, 1991, p. 46). This aspect of the Jordanian culture affected the 
centralisation of the goal-setting process and corporate plarming [see more in Section 
4.15.5, Goal-Setting at PBj. Planning was confined to senior and top management 
and other levels .of managers did not participate and at times did not feel the need to 
set goals relating to their own work. 
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'Branch managers are mostly at the receiving end, they almost never voice their 
opinions. This also has to do with our culture. Neither at home nor at work are 
juniors at liberty to say what is on their minds' (interview 6). 
This agrees with Hofstede's view (1991, p. 35) that a 'high power distance' culture 
leads to an unsatisfactory interaction and iteration as communication is initiated by 
superiors and such a situation might give rise to conflict of interest between superiors 
and subordinates. 
This applies as well to participation in different stages of goal-setting processes 
whereby organisational goals are decided by top management and the different 
managerial levels set their own goals in alignment with organisational goals through 
a process of interaction and iteration to reach a set of final levels of corporate, 
business and functional goals (Wi1son, 1995, p. 160). 
The phenomenon of participation in setting targets has been discussed earlier 
(Section 4.15.5, Goal-Setting Process at PB) as having a negative effect on the level 
of co-operation one would expect from managers who were not consulted or, 
according to cultural reasons, did not set goals that would serve them as individuals 
and at the same time are in alignment with the corporate goals [Section 4.12.2, 
Participation in MAS Reports Design at PB; and Section 4.17, Conflict ofInterest in 
Setting Goals and the Game of Budget Control at PB]. 
A satisfactory process of interaction and iteration did not take place for setting goals 
and plans at PB. As described in the quotation (interview 6, on the previous page), 
managers were hesitant to speak their minds in front of their superiors. 
A satisfactory exchange and communication cannot take place at work as juniors are 
expected to listen to their seniors and implement what has been decided by their 
superiors. This is a matter that was of concem to the general manager: 
'/ really do not know why it is that managers do not submit suggestions on their own 
initiative. / do not know whether it has to do with interpersonal relations?' 
He continued to say that, when no suggestions were forthcom.ing, he would take the 
initiative and eaU up branch managers and suggest new ideas on how to plan and 
market their services. 
Simon (1977, p. 97) agrees and adds that 'acceptance of authority denies 
participation in the decision-making process'. The acceptance of the patriarchal 
authority in Arab Society, as described by Sharabi (1992, p. 97), lets managers 
surrender duties of decision-making to their superiors and on the other hand 
superiors expect subordinates to show acceptance. However, Simon argues that 
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'increasing participation at the expense of authority will increase organizational 
effectiveness'. 
One needs to consider in the case of PB the potential repercussion on employees if 
top management went against traditions when adopting a participative approach in 
management (that is, in contradiction to a long tradition of a well-regulated superior-
subordinate relationship in a 'strong power-distance' culture). 
One cannot but agree with the view that 'organizations will be most human, humane, 
and conductive to self-actualization when they strike a balance between freedom and 
constraint' (Simon, 1977, p. 98) but this balance is of necessity different from one 
country to another and dependent on time and place. 
Given such a situation where managers do not effectively participate in goal setting, 
an implicit conflict of interest could arise between top management and the different 
levels of managers. Due to the existence of such situations, top management at PB 
had to make sure that PB's interests are protected and that social customs are used to 
advance PB's interest as noted to in the following quotation: 
'(Personal relations) interfere with the proper implementation of procedures' 
(interview 1J). 
4.20.1 Cultural Effect on MAS in Planning for Marketing and Customers' Needs 
The cultural effect on MAS was seen in planning for the marketing of services and 
products and customers' needs. According to most interviewees, meeting customer's 
needs in Jordan was by what the managers repeatedly described as 'personal 
relations'. 
A client wants to feel that (s)he can 'trust the people in the Bank' (interview 5) 
personally and not as an institution: 
'f believe clients in many cases move with the credit officer as (s)he changes 
employment (interview 7). 
This agrees with Hofstede's (1991, p. 67) findings that 'to the colJectivist mind only 
natural persons are worthy of trust. Personal relationship prevails over the task and 
should be established first'. However, collected data did not show a 'collectivist' 
dimension as described by Hofstede in other aspects. Interviewees did not express 
positive attitudes or preferences to . working in committees or belonging to work 
groups. Nor did they show preferences for collective compensation schemes [see 
more in Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB]. 
Personal relations are explained further as going, III many instances, beyond a 
business relation to a relation of friendship. 
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'We can not ignore the cultural factor which at times makes dealing with clients a 
tricky matter ... my clients step into my office freely ... they sometimes will come in just 
to say hello ... Clients expect to be treated as friends and not only as business 
partners' (Interview 6). 
This was observed personally and frequently during my many visits to the three 
branches and to head office managers. In many instances, Clients whether after 
finishing their business with a PS officer or at the customers' service counter, would 
just come in to discuss a matter with the branch manager· or other head office 
managers, or just drop by to exchange greetings and, at times, more than a few 
words. 
'When a client visits me, in most cases without a prior appointment, according to 
customs I have to receive him well and spend sufficient time chatting with him about 
this and that. This means wasting time with him at the expense of my other work. At 
the same time I have to go along or he will consider it as a personal insult' (interview 5). 
Managers talked of the strong 'effect of family and tribal influence in the business 
community' (interview 6) and, in particular, on attracting clients in a small economy 
such as Jordan. It is a generally recognised belief for them that, only by appointing a 
branch manager from a short list of families, can business in certain areas be 
reasonably generated. 
In his book 'Neopatriarchy' Sharabi (1992, p. 64) describes tribalism as still at the 
roots of Arab social life and a major obstacle facing the development of Arab 
societies. He believes that the development of tribal social structure into a 
'neopatriarchy' social form reflected itself in a number of ways in Arab societies. The 
loyalty of the individual in the neopatriarchal society is to the extended family, tribe, 
religion or sect. 
Javidan & House (2001, p. 299) rank Arab countries as being medium 
individualistic, and among the most in-group countries (J avidan & House, 2001, p. 
300). The in-group is to be understood here to pertain to a close circle of family and 
friends and not in the sense of teamwork spirit. 
Strong uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1991, p. 113, Arab countries ranked 271 53) 
. was not clearly observed or entirely applicable. This can be explained in the 
deterministic dimension (Miroshink, 2002, p. 259; Kirkman, Gibson & Shapiro, 
200 I, p. 23) whereby the will of God takes more prominence than individual effort in 
the planning and achievement of results [see more in Section 5.26, Cultural Effects 
on Planning and Goal-Setting in JCSj. 
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The cultural effect on attracting clients had a number of dimensions. It depends on 
the factors that affect the society in its daily interactions. By this I mean: 
(1) Family and tribal ties, which were described by a number of managers as 
being a continuously present influence in the business community. 
(2) Religion - conspicuously avoided by all interviewees but a thorny topic 
better avoided particularly after the bittemess of prolonged years of war in 
neighbouring Lebanon. Nevertheless, it could not be brushed aside. Religion 
was directly mentioned by just one manager as an affecting variable, although 
families and tribes in Jordan are identified and affiliated along religious lines. 
Religion is part and parcel ofthe family and tribal factor in Jordan. 
(3) Other social affiliations such as political affiliations or social groups. 
One of the managers went on to say that the way (s)he executes hislher duties is also 
. affected by the three factors of family, religion, and other social affiliations 
mentioned above, 
'These elements affect decisions I take in the course of my work as they do in my 
ability to attract clients' (interview 15). 
'Personal relations' were mentioned by6 out of 10 managers as being what attracts a 
customer in Jordan. 'Personal relations' might not necessarily be motivated purely by 
personal gain but also by family ties or other social affiliations. It could have a 
positive effect of generating business or attracting needed skills but also 'in bending 
procedures and regulations when someone has the right connections' (interview 12). 
4.21 Cultural Effects on the Role ofMAS in Control at PB 
The influence of national culture on control systems [see discussion in Part IV of this 
chapter, Emphasis on Control Function as Compared to Planning for a description of 
the role of MAS in control at PB] was investigated by Lau & Tan (1998, pp. 164, 
167) to examine the relationship between performance evaluative styles, 
performance, and the relationship between budget emphasis, budgetary participation, 
task difficulty and managerial performance. In a survey of 320 middle-level 
managers from Australia (a 'small power-distance') society and 160 managers in 
Singapore (a 'large power-distance' society) all working in financial institutions, Lau 
& Tan (1998) did not find significant differences as might have been expected 
regarding the research questions among managers in the two culturally different 
countries. 
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What Lau and Tan found might, on the face of it, seem to contradict what was 
observed at PB. Lau and Tan found no significant difference between managers in 
the two culturally different countries on questions regarding budgetary participation 
and whether high budget emphasis enhanced performance. 
The explanation given by Lau & Tan (1998, pp. 173, 174) was 'that 
internationalisation and globalization of financial markets means that financial 
services sector managers have wider international exposure and focus than managers 
in sc-me other industries'. Another reason given was that managers in financial 
institutions were exposed to other nations and cultural influences while receiving 
their education overseas. 
The influence of western management practices is not the same for managers 
interviewed at PB as it was in the investigation of Lau & Tan. Managers of PB were 
not as exposed to international banking dominated by western practices. 
PB does not have any branches overseas. Jordanian banks that have branches outside 
Jordan and the Arab world are very few. Out of the 16 investment and commercial 
Jordanian banks (CBJ, 1999 Annual Report) only one had branches in Europe, 
America and south east Asia, and two other banks each had an offshore branch in 
Cyprus. In 2001, apart form the Arab bank, only three other JCB have 10 branches 
outside Jordan and Palestine (CBJ, 2001 Annual Report). 
Jordanian banks and PB for that matter are not significantly involved in international 
banking markets as they are small in size, the total assets of all Jordanian banks was 
$16,269 million in 1999 (CBJ Monthly Statistical Bulletin, June 2000, p.20). To 
place this in perspective, the total assets of the whole Arab banking sector combined 
is approximately equal to the total assets of the HSBC group ($ 485 milliards), which 
ranked as number 7 among the largest banks in the world (Economic Outlook, no. 13, 
January 1999). 
The second reason Lau & Tan described for the absence of significant differences 
between financial managers in Australia and Singapore, was that managers working 
in financial institutions in Singapore received their education overseas. In the case of 
PB all managers interviewed received education in Jordan or in neighbouring Arab 
countries apart from one who received a college education in the former Soviet 
Union. The training courses offered to managers were mostly in Jordan and provided 
by Jordanian institutions. 
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However, a variable that was not encountered by Lau and Tan in their investigation 
was the restructuring stage. PB was undergoing a restructuring stage, which could 
have attributed to the effect on the degree of participation in setting budgets and 
budgetary emphasis in addition to the social culture factor. 
The control function through budgetary control at PB stressed mainly financial 
targets such as profits, market share in deposits, and credit facilities [for more see 
Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB]. This was in accordance with 
what Hofstede (1991) concluded: in more masculine societies (Arab culture ranked 
by Hofstede as 23/53, p. 84) 'accounting systems stress the achievement of purely 
financial targets more than in more feminine societies' (Hofstede, 199/, p. 155). By 
masculine he meant 'assertive, tough, and focused on material success' as opposed to 
a feminine society which is 'more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of 
life' (Hofstede, 1991, p. 82). 
The cultural effect can also be seen in performance evaluation (a process which 
affects the productivity of employees and OE). The social beliefs and attitudes of a 
society affect the criteria used, the design, and implementation of the performance 
evaluation process [see Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Information on 
Performance Evaluation at PB]. 
The design needs to take advantage of social culture and try to avoid what blatantly 
goes against it. Most managers found the performance evaluation process 
unsatisfactory and not capable of producing meaningful evaluations. The 
dissatisfaction mentioned related to the process of performance evaluation itself. It 
also dealt with the fact that management has to evaluate employee performance, as 
this is what principle§ of management dictate, but applying it effectively has to take 
into consideration the social and cultural context of Jordan. The manner in which it 
was applied ran against the local culture in Jordan. 
'Employee evaluation is extremely difficult for me, to fill-in an employee evaluation 
report saying his work is unsatisfactory and recommend that he be sacked, this sort 
of thing cannot be done in Jordan' (interview 4). 
. The manager in interview 4 is referring here to a small, close society in Jordan where 
family and tribal ties are strong and, at times, come before other affiliations (Sharabi, 
1992, p. 64). What was clear in the interviews was that the performance evaluation 
process was unsatisfactory because its design did not take into consideration certain 
sensitivities in the culture such as directly confronting employees with negative 
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comments, in addition to the other shortcomings discussed in Section 4.18, Role of 
MAS on Providing Information in Performance Evaluation at PBj. 
'In our society a manager would not tell an employee to his/her face that (s)he is 
dissatisfied with his work. So how do you expect him/her to fill an evaluation report 
to that meaning and still look him in the eye?' (Interview 9). 
The manager in the above quotation was referring to the employee evaluation form 
used at PB. 
The above agrees with Hofstede (1991) and Sharabi (1992, p. 64) on both 
recruitment and dismissal in a 'coliective' society (Arab countries ranked on the 
individualism dimension 26/53, Hofstsede, 1991, p. 53). By 'collectivism' it is meant 
'that people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive 'in-groups', which 
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty' (Hofstede, 1991, p.51). This consequently puts more weight on the 
recruitment of new employees than it does for other countries. 
Cultural effect plays an added part at this point as mentioned earlier by one of the 
managers that regulations can be bent to suit personal, family and tribal relations, 
'Proper qualifications are not what decide who is employed' (interview 4). 
A recruitment process needs to be a major safeguard in a services industry such as 
banking. The work of employees at a bank cannot be counted or even physically 
observed, as it the case in manufacturing industries. A great deal will depend on a 
satisfactory and reliable recruitment policy and process. 
Spicer & Ballew (1983, p. 86) agree on the importance that the recruitment of 
employees has by saying that the firm may have little choice but to rely almost 
exclusively for control purposes on an 'ex ante selection mechanism and rigorous 
training and socialization processes'. 
An inefficient employee appointed through a flaw in the recruitment and selection 
system, or through the bending of the rules under pressure of the social culture will 
end up as a financial burden and a demotivating factor to other employees as 
expressed by a PB interviewee. Nevertheless, as expressed earlier (interview 4 on the 
previous page) by one of the managers, dismissing an inefficient employee is not an 
option and managers will have to live with the situation. 
4.22 Effects of External Culture on the Organisational Structure at PB 
Cultural effects observed on organisational structure, discussed below, are not 
confined to PB and Jordan but have been explained by other researchers from 
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different cultures. Cultural differences do have an influence on organizational 
structure and management decision-making that can aid or hinder organizational 
effectiveness (Johns et aI., 2002, p. 89). 
Gordon & Narayanan (1984, p. 33) agree on the significance of external culture on 
organisational structure and argue that, • after controlling for the effects of the 
environment, the relationship between an organization's information system and 
structure is no longer significant'. However, their conclusion ignores the effect of 
factors such as management style/corporate culture, psychology of systems' users, 
and internal politics. 
What has been discussed in Part II of this chapter on the inadequacy of the diffusion 
of information was explained to be as a result of the social custom of freely talking 
with friends about what takes place at work and comparing experiences, said to be 
common in the Jordanian society. This can also be linked to what the general 
manager said, namely that: 
'Rumours circulated by people affect (my work) .,. in a small community like ours 
rumours spread quickly'. 
Hofstede (1991, p. 35) describes large power distance cultures such as Jordan (Arab 
countries ranked 7/53 countries and regions, p. 26) as having organisations with 
power centralised in a few hands and subordinates who are expected to be told what 
to do. These phenomena were observed and discussed in Section 4.10.4, 
Centralisation of Information at PB; and centralisation of authority is discussed in 
Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB]. 
Hofstede (1991, p. 141) continues to describes organisations in large power distance 
cultnres as a 'pyramid of people'. 'The general manager on 1Qll of the pyramid and 
each successive level has its proper place below (stress added). This was reflected in 
a number of issues such as bureaucratic procedures where subordinates address their 
superiors in formal terms and use proper titles. It can also be noted from what 
interviewee 13 said: 
'Most of my staff and those who report to me are not as well informed as I am of 
what goes on around them. So, r teach them how to use information and how to 
implement decisions taken' (interview 13). 
In addition to the goals-setting processes [see discussion in Section 4.15.5, The 
Goal-Setting Process at PB], the effect of culture on organisational structure is also 
reflected in the limited use of committees and groups [see discussion in Section 
4.23.2, Committees at PB]. 
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4.23 Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB 
'There was a king who liked slender waists, and people starved themselves to become thin. 
Another king admired bravery. and people endangered themselves and fought duels to the 
death ... The handle of authority and power easily influences fashion and changes morals' 
(The Book of Leadership & Strategy - Lesson of Chinese Masters. translated by T. Cleary. 
1990. p. 65) 
'External values' affect all activities of business life but they are reflected in different 
ways when cultural values interact with personal attributes and beliefs of top 
managers to create a corporate culture. 
Corporate culture was described in different terms by many researchers as 'internal 
pattern of values' (Gross, 1965, p. 211); as 'shared perceptions of daily practice' 
(Hofstede, 1991, p. 183); or as 'the pattern of shared and stable beliefs and values 
that are developed within a company across time' (Gordon & Di Tomaso, 1992, p. 
784); and still as 'meaning and values constructed and shared between members' 
(Preston 1995, p. 289). 
Corporate culture is what better fits the implicit model ofthe leader (Hofstede, 1991, 
p. 151). It is greatly influenced by 'those in position ofleadership' (Hughes, 1965, p. 
14) and 'can sometimes be observed only in power centers' as exercised by founders, 
leaders, and powerful persons (Schein, 1990, p.ll, as quoted by Gordon & Di 
Tomaso, 1992, p. 789). 
A number of researchers' beliefs converge in the view that top management sets the 
general atmosphere in an organisation in terms of goals and strategies, and style of 
management (Hughes, 1965, p. 46; Hofstede, 1991, p. 183; Gordon &Di Tomaso, 
1992, p. 789; Alexander, 1994, p. 4). Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 6) quote Chester 
Barnard of General Motors in describing good managers as value shapers concerned 
with the informal social properties of organization. 
Corporate culture may then be described as the input of the national culture 
processed through the inherited and cognate characteristics. and attributes of top 
management in an organisation interacting with the environment. It is reflected in the 
choice of corporate goals, systems, and processes instituted to achieve them. 
Corporate culture values are transmitted through formal written procedures and 
through 'softer means: specifically the stories, myths, legends, and metaphors' 
(Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 282). [See Section 3.15.2.1, The Role of MAS in 
Maintaining Organisational Integrity]. 
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Corporate culture embraces important dimensions such as 'time horizon over which 
goal accomplishment is measured' Markus & Pfeffer (1983, p. 209), processes such 
as budgeting (Preston, 1995, p. 284), and measurements 'of customer satisfaction, 
internal business performance, and innovation and improvement are derived from the 
company's particular view of the world and its perspective on key success factors' 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1992, p. 77). 
Some researchers though have belittled the effect of the corporate culture to 
'superficial manifestation like common symbols, heroes, and rituals, and stressed the 
effect of national culture on organisations' (Hofstede, 1991, p. 236). Others believe 
that corporate culture 'can in large determine the 'success/failure' of an accounting 
information system implementation irrespective of technical merits' (Bromwich & 
Bhimani, 1994, p. 237) or that, with a strong corporate culture, the ever present 
possibility of abuse is present (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 79). However, corporate 
culture's effect on the organisation is not only because employees in the different 
levels have internalised and adopted top management's' ways, but because they 
would follow the chief executive if only to forward their own interests. 
Gordon and Di Tomaso (1992, p. 786) in a study of 11 US insurance companies 
observed how certain cultural values fit certain types of industries, such as 
'companies in highly dynamic industries' being 'characterised by cultural values that 
enhanced adaptability'. The study also (Gordon and Di Tomaso, 1992, p. 794) 
supported previous research in that a 'strong culture is predictive of short-term future 
company performance'. 
Strong culture can be explained as 'the consistency of perceptions of company values' 
(GOl'don and Di Tomaso, 1992, p. 794), or as 'those shared values [which] can be 
seen to survive for decades after the passing of the original guru' (Peters & 
Waterman, 1995, p. 26). Strong leaders' values, in addition to consistency and 
survival need to be diffused formally and informally within an organisation. 
What was found on the impact of corporate culture on various areas in PB (including 
MAS, organisational strucutre, goal-setting, and committees) agrees with the 
findings of other researchers as discussed above. However, the 'consistency' 
mentioned by Gordon & Di Tomaso was not found in the PB case study as large 
changes took place at PB from February 1993 to October 1997 -the date when the 
new management was appointed- to June 2000 -the date the case study was 
concluded. 
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Nevertheless, the new management showed adaptability to internal and external 
conditions of PB and that contributed to the enhancing of organisational 
effectiveness after the new management team took over [see discussion on results 
achieved in 1998 - 2001 in Section 4.24, Epilogue]. 
The case study covered the higher levels of management at PB [Exhibit 4.3, PB 
Organisation Chart 1998; and Exhibit 4.2, List of Interviewees]. During the time of 
the case study, PB was going through a restructuring stage. The oldest of the new 
management team had only been in office for two years. 
PB had a 'diversity of educational backgrounds at the Bank, social backgrounds, and 
different schools of management as a result of change in ownership and in 
management' (interview 8). 
This was also expressed by the general manager when he said: 
'At the moment we have different cultures at the Bank There are the old employees 
and employees ... who joined. .. as a result of the merger ... and there are employees 
who joined Phoenix Bank after the merger ... and there is the new management team; 
it will take some time to melt all these into one corporate culture'. 
The corporate culture the general manager advocated as being induced from the 
goals set for PB and from what he said was: 
1. all for the restructuring stage, 
2. open communication, 
3. management by objectives, 
4. teamwork and collective decision-making through committees, 
5. emphasising qualifying and training employees. 
4.23.1 Sub-Cultures at PB 
In addition to the influence of the general manager and chairman there were sub-
cultures or 'informal cultures' at PB. These sub-cultures were either inherited from 
previous managements or were peculiar to certain managers. They manifested 
themselves in a number of ways as stated by the manager in interview 2 in describing 
control activities: 
'/ see myself as a traffic warden', 
Or the sign posted next to the elevator saying, 
" It is forbidden to use the elevator going down" (stress added). 
Cunningham (1977, p. 470) discussed the effect which sub-cultures have in an 
organisation and the need for the issue to be addressed in organisational change 
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efforts. The need for a common language if not a common culture was emphasised 
by a number of managers as well as by the general manager as a factor contributing 
to enhancing OE [Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems Affecting Goal 
Achievement at PB]. 
'UnifYing language among branches and head office managers ... is greatly needed' 
(interview 8). 
A strong unifying factor that was expressed by managers interviewed was 'the needs 
of the restructuring stage'. This was the common language of all managers, it was 
their 'mission'. One manager even referred to it as a 'national duty'. 
4.23.2 Committees at PB 
The cultural effect on MAS was also felt in what the new management was trying to 
introduce and that is working through committees and the spirit of teamwork. This 
agrees with what Simon (1977, p. 133) describes, albeit in a different culture, that an 
individual 'works much better when he is teamed with his fellow man in coping with 
an objective, understandable, extemal environment'. 
Interviewees remarked on this: 
'The culture of teamwork is still weak at the Bank' (interview 8). 
This explains why 5 managers out of 15 (excluding the general manager) said that 
they either do not sit on any committee or that that they worked on ad hoc 
committees only. 
'1 personally think that committees might work in other countries but not in Jordan. 1 
do not believe in committees as aprinciple nor as a practice" (interview 12). 
Committees were introduced to serve a number of purposes at PB: . 
(l) to exchange information among members of administration on matters 
internal and external to PB;' 
(2) for planning and co-ordination of new projects; 
(3) to build a team spirit; 
(4) to reach collective decisions such as credit decisions. 
The opinions of interviewees on the work of committees ranged from: 
'1 like to stress teamwork within a committee framework even if not much is 
achieved" (interview 8), 
and, '1 feel that committees (inter-departmental) are a good tool to achieve 
management goals' (interview 2), 
to '1 personally think that committees might work in other countries but not in 
Jordan' (interview 12). 
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Exhibit 4.20 
Structural and MAS Design Problems Affecting Goal Achievement at PB 
(PI) Continuously changing organisational 
~tructure, and departmental 
~--------. / responsibilities 
Goals to be achieved 
(P2) Unclear and inadequate channels of 
"( communications 
00( (P3) Centralisation of information 
\ (P4) Inefficient use oflT 
(PS) Inadequate measurements for performance 
evaluation and goal achievement 
(P6) Neglect offeedforward control 
(P7) Unclear corporate culture affecting availability 
and diffusion of information 
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However, the role of committees at PB was not yet as clear or as well-established as 
they were introduced by the new management only a couple of years before the date 
of the case study to create a 'teamwork' culture (interview 8). 
Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 132) note how 'the excellent companies use this 
mundane tool quite differently from the rest. The task force is an exciting, fluid, ad 
hoc device in the excellent companies. It is virtually the way to solving and 
managing thorny problems, and an unparalleled spur to practical action'. 
The restructuring stage helped the role of MAS in providing information by 
spreading an atmosphere of co-operation among managers. But, as the influence of a 
strong corporate culture as described earlier (see Section 4.23, Effects of Corporate 
Culture on MAS at PB) could not be found at PB this did not work towards 
achieving a higher degree of OE [Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems 
Affecting Goals Achievement at PB). Two factors worked against a strong corporate 
culture: those of strong sub-cultures still found at PB from previous managements, 
and the factor of the consistency of corporate culture that suffered as a result of 
several changes before and after the new management took over in September 1997. 
The 'open door policy' mentioned by managers in the interviews and open 
communication helped to reduce the drawbacks that worked against the desired 
effect of the new corporate culture. However, the open door policy and open 
communications were marred by information gatekeepers and the centralisation of 
information. The effect of committees, as explained on the previous page, was still in 
its nascent stage and had little impact on enhancing the role of MAS and OE in 
respect of collective decision-making and the flow of information. 
The effect of management by objectives (MBO), another dimension of PB corporate 
culture [see Section 4.23, Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB), was not to 
have a substantial impact on the role MAS in providing a better means of control as 
it was explained earlier [Section 4.15.4, Characteristics of Departmental Goals at PB] 
in this chapter as departments did not have clear, quantified, measured objectives nor 
did some of them receive feedback reports on their performance. Consequently, at 
this stage MBO could not have played a practical role. 
Nor could the fifth dimension of corporate culture mentioned in Section 4.23, Effects 
of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB, of emphasising qualifying and training PB 
employees that ·was not specifically mentioned and therefore which could not have 
played a role of any significance in enhancing OE. 
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The restructuring stage atmosphere could be felt among the new management team 
and provided them with a personal motive to achieve and succeed in introducing 
change. The effects of other dimensions of PB corporate culture [see last paragraph 
in Section 4.23, Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB], team work and 
collective decision-making through committees, and emphasising qualifying and 
training employees on enhancing OE were not substantial. 
Change at PB came centrally from top management recognising the need for change 
to initiate better performance, so plans for change and its organisation and 
implementation were all overseen by top management. From this followed new 
departments, new positions, change in responsibilities of department managers, and 
organisational structure changes in several organisation charts for the period from the 
appointment of the new management to the time the study was done. Although the 
change was clearly a top-down effort, the new management team brought in by the 
general manager also had a role to play. They knew that they were recruited in the 
first place to introduce change in the aim of improving PB's performance, so there 
was also an element of local change that was seen by the new management team as 
necessary to mobilise PB's change process. 
4.24 Epilogue 
The extensive and in-depth study of MAS at PB showed a number of positive and 
negative elements in MAS design and operation. Although PB achieved a degree of 
OE by partially achieving some of its corporate goals, the weaker points worked 
against a higher and sustained enhancement of OE. 
Cunningham (1977, p. 465) agrees with what was pointed out at several points in this 
analysis, that 'the organisational system functions effectively to the degree that its 
subsystems are in harmony and are co-ordinated to work together'. This is true of the 
relation of MAS as a system to the other organisational systems and to the overall 
OEofPB. 
MAS reports used at PB were viewed by all managers interviewed as helpful in 
knowing 'where do they stand?' (12 managers out of 15 excluding the general 
manager) as the first stage in the Wilson & Gilligan model and 'the base line for 
planning' (Wilson & Gilligan, 1997, p.6). 
The second stage of 'where do we want to be?', although decided by top 
management, has to be sufficiently communicated to all levels of management. 
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However, the interviewees did not show clear understanding and internalisation of 
corporate goals. The way plans were discussed earlier in Part II of this chapter 
underlines that [Exhibit 4.17, Problems Relating to Corporate and Departmental 
Goals Affecting OE]. 
MAS reports used at PB did not provide managers with their needs for information in 
the 'how to get there?' stage in planning as information was unavailable or deficient 
and/or insufficiently diffused through PB as can be seen in Exhibit 4.19, Structural 
Problems Affecting MAS Design and Operation and Goal Achievement at PB; and 
Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems Affecting Goal Achievement at 
PB]. 
In choosing between alternatives or 'which way is best?' stage to get where they 
wanted to be, 11 managers out of 13 who received them found MAS reports 
unhelpful in finding solutions and just gave them an indication of a problem area 
[Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems that Affected Goals. 
Achievement]. The general manager remarked on this by saying: 
'Management reports draw my attention in an indirect way as I try to read between 
the lines '. 
In the case study managers found MAS reports helpful in attracting attention but 
stopped short of providing enough search information to scan in trying to find 
possible solutions. 
'Management reports do not fully assist me with finding solutions to problems. They 
mostly provide the day-to-day solutions' (general manager interview). 
On 'how to ensure arrival?' in reaching the chosen goals, the fifth and final stage, 
feedforward and feedback control information will be used again in a new cycle of 
planning (Wilson, 1998, p. 10). The managers were divided on the issue of whether 
MAS reports were helpful in measuring the degree of achievement of operational or 
corporate goals. Seven managers out of 13 who received MAS reports said that they 
were helpful in measuring the degree of goal achievement while 6 managers said 
they' were not helpful [more under Part IV of this chapter, Emphasis on Control 
Function as Compared to Planning - Short-Range Orientation]. 
The emphasis on the control function enhanced OE in terms of market share and 
concrete results were produced. By the end of 1998, after the new management team 
took over PB in 1997, it was able to achieve a growth of 29.7 % in total assets (The 
Arab Banks Union magazine, January 1999, pp. 77, 81) compared to an average 
growth in total assets for all Jordanian banks of 8.1 %. 
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In deposits a growth rate of 30.5 % was achieved (The Arab Banks Union magazine, 
January 1999, p. 81) as compared to the overall average growth in deposits for all 
Jordanian banks for the same period of 8 % (The Arab Banks Union magazine, 
January 1999, p. 74). The growth rate of credit facilities for 1999 was also a high of 
36.7 % (The Arab Banks Union magazine, January 1999, p. 78). [Exhibit 4.21, PB 
Deposits and Credit Facilities from 1994-2000]. 
According to PB's 1999 Annual Report, PB was able to achieve in 1999 a growth 
rate of 14.29 % in total assets compared to 1998. In deposits the growth rate was 
16.12%, and growth of 9.98 % in total credit facilities was achieved in view of a 
growth rate of 1.7 % in real terms in GDP in 1998 and 1.5% real growth in GDP in 
1999 (CBJ 1999 Annual Report, p. 5). 
All of the three measurements of growth in deposits, credit facilities, and total assets 
decreased in 1999. The growth rate in total assets of PB for 1999 has decreased by 
51.89 % compared to the growth rate achieved in 1998 over. 1997 figures (from 
29.7% in 1998 to 14.29% in 1999). Growth in total deposits decreased by 47.15 % 
(from 30.5% in 1998 to 16.12% in 1999). There was also a fall in the growth rate in 
total facilities by 72.81 % over the growth rate achieved in 1998 (from 36.7% in 
1998 to 9.98% in 1999) [Exhibit 4.21, PB Deposits and Credit Facilities from 1994· 
2001]. 
It should be acknowledged that the 1999 results showed growth rates and a number 
of administrative improvements were introduced as part of the restructuring stage, 
although the growth rate in all the three measurements fell compared to 1998. One 
explanation can be given as 'organizational objectives are multiple, partially 
conflicting and subject to change over time, appropriate measures of performance 
will have similar characteristics' (Emmanuel, et aI., 1990, p. 32). PB management 
gave different weightings to its goals each year. 
To use a second measure ofOE. PB achieved an improvemenfof21.7% in 1998 over 
1997 in its market share in deposits from 2.3% in 1998 to 2.8% in 1999 to 2.87% in 
2000, to 2.9% in 2001 (CBJ 1998· Annual Report, p. 9; CBJ Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin June 2003; PB Annual Report 1998, 1999 and 2001) showing a very slight 
increase of 2.5% in 2000 over 1999 and 1.05% increase in 2001 over 2000, given 
that the increase of total deposits for the banking sector increased in 2001 over 2000 
by 6%. 
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Deposits 
(lD milliont 
Credit 
facilities 
(lD million) 
Exhibit 4.21 
PB Deposits (excluding deposits of other banks) 
and Credit Facilities from 1994- 2001 (JD million) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
100.3 133.6 143.4 143.4 187.2 217.4 
70.4 105 102.4 95.6 130.7 143.8 
GJ Deposits 
l!Icredit 
o 
2000 2001 
236.4 255 
203 232.8 
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The same trend in enhancement of PB's market share in credit facilities showed an 
increase of 12.5% in 1998 over 1997 - from 2.4% in 1998 to 2.7% in 1999 -. In 2000 
PB's market share in credit facilities increased to 4.46% showing a substantial leap 
of 59.29% in 2000 over 1999 but stabilising at 4.7% in 2001, whereas total credit 
facilities in 200 lover 2000 increased by 8.75% [Exhibit 4.21, PB Deposits & Credit 
Facilities from 1994-2001]. 
Nevertheless, as can be seen from Exhibit 4.22, PB Profits (Before Tax) from 1994-
2001, PB suffered losses in 1997, 1998, and 1999. In 1999, an improvement in 
results was achieved as losses fell from JD 2.4 million to JD 1.5 million. This 
substantial decrease of 37.5%, which can be explained better, and the trend observed 
further in 2000, as a slight profit of JD 0.267 million was achieved in 2000 only to 
fall back in 2001 to show a loss of JD 0.893 million. 
The improvement in results came along with the improvements introduced in MAS 
and improved managerial skills as well as an improvement in other systems and 
procedures with the appointment of the new management team. 
To explain the reason for the fall in growth rates, it would not be accurate to rely on 
the financial measures stated above to judge any change in OE. Lewin & Minton 
(1986, p. 528) agree with this as 'whatever the criterion or the unit of analysis, 
effectiveness is determined in relative terms and often require some subjective means 
of combining multiple measures or a judgement to use a single aggregate measure' 
[see discussion in Section 3.25, Characteristics of Goals Used in the Goal Model for 
Assessing OE]. 
In the analysis of the data collected at PB, I have showed that it was not possible to 
measure goal achievement for customers' satisfaction in terms of new products and 
services since the new management team took over, although some new banking 
services in the period were being considered and one new type of service was 
introduced at PB. 
It was not possible to measure goal achievement vis-a-vis employees' satisfaction, as 
although top management identified customers' satisfaction and employee 
development and qualification enhancement as corporate goals, no information or 
measurements were available on those two issues. Employee tumoverwas part of the 
non-financial measures of customers' satisfaction. As was found in the case study 
the employee turnover due to the restructuring stage exceeded 50 % p.a. 
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Exhibit 4.22 
PS Profits (before tax) from 1994- 2001 (JD million) 
4~-----------------------------------. 
-3~----------------------------------~ 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Profits 1.7 3.4 1.5 -0.12 -2.4 -1.5 0.267 
(JD 
million) 
o 
El 
o profits 
2001 
-0.893 
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Having more than half of the employees of PB as new employees each year reflected 
itself in the need for more efforts to train staff. But that was something which PB's 
management could not do in its attempt to cut down costs at that stage. There seemed 
to be a strong emphasis on developing the technical abilities of PB employees. 
Developing employees' skills was stated as a goal in the annual reports from 1995-
1999 as well as being mentioned in the chairman's article referred to in Section 
4.15.2, Corporate Goals at PB, as 'employees self-development through assistance in 
improving and broadening work related skills'. It was also expressed by the general 
manager when he said: 
'We want our employees to foel proud to work at Phoenix Bank'. 
Although PB' s management prepared a career-path plan that was first introduced in 
1999, such a plan can be considered as part of the maintenance media for satisfying 
employees' maintenance needs more than being concerned with the self development 
of employees. Looking at annual reports figures between the years 1994-1998 (1999 
figures were not available in the annual report) management spent on average over 
the 5-year period JD 17,430 annually (I STG = JD1.012, average exchange rate on 
2711 012000, CBJ Monthly Statistical Bulletin), or between 0.028 % to 0.6 % of total 
general and administrative expenses on training with an average of 0.3% per annum 
or 0.18 % of net interest and charges received (PB Annual Report 1998). These 
amounts do not seem to reflect the emphasis placed on developing employees so 
frequently mentioned by top management. 
On the other hand managers still. complained about the lack of qualified staff as can 
be seen in the quotations from interview 13 in Section 4.22, Effects· of External 
culture on Organisational Structure at PB. So it cannot be said that there was a 
greater degree of 'developing employee skills through training courses and IT 
technology to achieve distinguished performance to serve clients' [see PB 
Chairman's published article in Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals at PB; and Exhibit 
4.16, A Comparison of PB Interviewees' Answers with Corporate Goals as in 
Annual Reports (1994-1998) J although employee development and enhancing 
performance was one of the top management's goals. MAS reports were not used 
with a view of providing such information for management. The result was 
individual impressions by managers from their personal perspectives. The MAS has 
failed to serve management in this respect due to failure in the design of the system, 
given that reaching higher degrees of achievement of the other goals requires an 
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enhancement of employee qualifications and employee development all in turn 
affecting any enhancement in OE [Exhibit 4.6, Availability and Diffusion of 
Information; Exhibit 4.16, A Comparison of PB Interviewees' Answers with 
Corporate Goals as in Annual Reports (1994-1998); and Exhibit 4.20, Structural and 
MAS Design Problems Affecting Goal Achievement at PB]. The MAS adopted at PB 
was not designed to provide such information. 
Feelings of job insecurity were expressed by a number of managers as felt by their 
staff; 
'Some employees do not feel job security and I believe this is afficting their 
performance. I think that it is possible to do something about it' (interview J). 
When managers at PB were asked whether they felt that employee satisfaction was 
being properly measured, 10 managers out of the 14 (excluding the general manager) 
who answered said it was not properly measured. Three managers said they measure 
it by the number of complaints they received from employees, but did not mention 
how they learned about the silent majority. Two managers answered by saying 'you 
can never please employees' (interview J J & J 3). 
One plausible explanation of such an attitude described as 'insatiable employees' was 
given by Hughes (1965): 'What is really happening is that they seek maintenance 
needs owing to the denial of opportunity to contribute meaningfully to the setting of 
company goals' (Hughes, 1965, p. 148). 
A safeguard measure was applied by giving employees the right to read their 
performance evaluation report before having it sent to the Personnel Department. 
However, 
'A small number of employees protest at the evaluation in the evaluation reports' 
(interview 13). 
This can either mean that managers would have given a positive evaluation to all 
their employees as expressed by one manager: 
'How can 1 look him (employee) in the eye after saying negative things about him in 
thereport?' (interview 9); 
or that employees knew the futility of protesting over their managers' evaluation and 
preferred to leave matters as they were waiting for the appropriate moment to voice 
their discontent. 
One indicator of employee satisfaction is the rate of employee turnover. Employee 
turnover showed a high rate in 1999 but a 50 % employee turnover rate [measured as 
number of neW employeesl total number of employees] was considered by the 
personnel manager as ' within the normal range'. 
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Given that there was not enough information on employee satisfaction or a 
satisfactory measure for evaluating it, it is not possible to evaluate the role of MAS 
in enhancing 0 E in this respect. 
MAS as an information system designed to serve management in strategic and short-
term planning and decision-making and in control was not designed to provide such 
information in the first place [Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems 
Affecting Goal Achievement at PB]. The causes behind that were lack of intent on 
the part of top management, cost rationalisation reasons, and cultural re?sons. 
A phenomenon discussed by many researchers is that variables that are easier to 
measure get to be measured and what is measured gets to be controlled (Rangone, 
1997, p. 216). To take an example, we find the change in value of deposits or credit 
facilities of profit realised by PB branches were measured and monitored 
periodically. However, MAS at PB did not try to measure the effect of qualitative 
factors. 
Thirdly, traditionally research and customer surveys and survey attitudes do not 
receive serious and widespread consideration by the business community in Jordan, 
or, if considered, are gracefully put aside for -a never ending- for the time being. An 
explanation could be the small size of Jordanian banks. The resources available to 
Jordanian banks are relatively limited compared to those oflarge international banks. 
Carrying out customer surveys and employee attitude surveys is a costly and lengthy 
process that needs managements' commitment. 
On the other hand, the Jordanian market is characterised by over-banking and strong 
competition among Jordanian banks that compete mainly in the Jordanian market -
apart from the Arab Bank- only three other JCB have a total of ID branches outside 
Jordan and Palestine. 
Otley (1995, p. 55) gave the performance of an organisation as a further reason that 
influence the type of control system adopted besides the organisational state of an 
organisation and the cultural values. This relates in a way to 'the restructuring stage' 
mentioned earlier in this section. 'Controls used by an organisation are highly likely 
to be influenced by how successful it is. Highly successful organisations are likely to 
have surplus resources and not to require strict formal controls' (Otley, 1995, p. 55). 
Otley's statement agrees with what was observed at PB where a comprehensive and 
well-balanced control system was not implemented, and control was strictly applied 
through budgetary control and hierarchical authority. 
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A further factor believed by Hofstede (1968) to contribute to enhancing OE besides 
control is the need for achievement. The 'need for achievement is a powerful 
motivator. . .It depends strongly upon the leadership skills of the budgetee's superior, 
but also upon the way the system is organized' (Hofstede, 1968, p. 6). 
Hofstede is referring here to two factors, the managerial skills and the control 
system, which incorporates the design of the system, the type of information 
collected and provided to users for employees' appraisal and self-development. 
The use of budgets and budgetary control was reflected in the enhancement seen in 
PB's 1998 figures although the economic situation in Jordan stayed the same, as the 
real growth rate of the Jordanian economy in 1998 and 1999 was similar (at around 
2% in real terms). The improvement in all the measures of deposits and credit can be 
related to reasons such as the one explained in the quotation by the manager in 
interview 8: 
'Budgets and budgetary control helped improve branches' performance a great deal' 
Hofstede (1968, p. 13) agrees with what has been observed, namely that the 'total 
amount of control in the organization tends to be positively associated with 
organizational effectiveness'. 
The improvement in results achieved by PB in 1998 and 1999 were a result of a 
better MAS in terms of better control information, budgets, budgetary control, MAS 
reports, and better managerial skills introduced by the new management team. But 
the trend was substantially reversed in 1999 as shown by lower growth rates [see 
Exhibit 4.1 0, Deficient Information Circle]. 
Although more emphasis on control than on planning was found in the study of the 
role of MAS in terms of design, purpose, and characteristics, control was not 
comprehensive [see discussion in Part IV of this chapter, Emphasis on Control 
Function as Compared to Planning: Short-Range Orientation]. There was over-
reliance on a small number of control tools, methods, and measures that were mainly 
financial in nature [Exhibit 4.20, Structural and MAS Design Problems Affecting 
Goal Achievement at PB; and Section 4.16, Forms and Areas of Control at PB]. 
The enhancement in OE was realised and measured mainly in financial rneasures but 
not in other management measures which are customer satisfaction and employee 
satisfaction. Consequently, it was not possible to establish a comprehensive overall 
picture of OE at PB as customer satisfaction was not measured other than through 
complaints and customer retention, while no procedures where followed to measure 
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employee satisfaction. The use of a 'multiple measure' to provide such a 
comprehensive picture was not possible. 
It was also found that PB's performance reached a state where it started to stabilise. 
This can be depicted as shown in Exhibit 4.22, PB Profits (Before Tax) from 1994-
2000 and Exhibit 4.23, The Role of MAS in Enhancing OE which show a projected 
performance of a Jordanian commercial bank (A) that takes full advantage of all the 
components of MAS all other matters being equal, which can be signified in the 
relation of: 
OE = f(Management systems including MAS + Structural factors). 
MAS in the equation should be able to provide the effective collection of information 
internal and external (availability of information) and free flow of information using 
vertical and lateral channels (diffusion of information) [Exhibit 4.6, Availability and 
Diffusion of Information]. Proper care for the planning process and the goal setting 
processes (a forward looking system) [Exhibit 4.7, The Role ofMAS in Planning and 
Decision-making] and ensuring the proper implementation (control) [Exhibit 4.11, 
The Role of MAS in Control] with an understanding of the social and cultural 
context (cultural effects on MAS) while other structural factors that affect the design 
and operation ofMAS should be conducive to the operation ofMAS [Exhibit 4.13, 
Elements in Organisational Structure that Hinder Flow of Information]. This agrees 
with findings by McNally & Eng (1980, p. 150) from data collected from New 
Zealand companies, showing that companies which use more sophisticated MA and 
decision-making techniques outperform those which failed to adopt them. 
Exhibit 4.23, The Role of MAS in Enhancing OE, shows the performance of a 
Jordanian commercial bank (B) implementing an MAS providing some the 
information needed by the users of MAS, and pushing managers by use of budgets 
and controlling performance closely to provide the organisation with a steady rate of 
growth. But a point will be reached where the benefits of the' implemented elements 
of MAS will stop providing the big push experienced when the system was first 
introduced. The performance of organisation (B) would then reach a plateau. 
This does not imply that performance on the financial indicators would not grow, 
but that the rate of growth that will be achieved will be substantially slower. The 
partial implementation of MAS could not provide support to PB to achieve its 
potential and continue to show the high rates of growth seen in 1998 [Exhibit 4.10, 
Deficient Information Circle]. 
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Exhibit 4.23 
Role of MAS in Enhancing OE in JCB 
Jordanian commercial bank (A) contribution of MAS to enhancing OE 
Jordanian commercial bank (B) limited achievement in OE 
through inadequate use of MAS, other matters being equal 
A 
Time 
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The improvement which PB management introduced to the MAS produced tangible 
results most prominently in control areas. The improvement in MAS was reflected 
along with other factors in the organisation as the restructuring stage involved not 
only MAS, but also a number of factors such as other information systems in PB as 
well as recruiting new managers. 
Case studies cannot be used as laboratory experiments where all variables can be 
controlled and the effects of certain variables isolated when results are measured [see 
Section 2.2.1, The Phoenix Bank Case Study - Research Method IJ. However, in 
1999 as the same managers continued to work at PB and the other changes 
introduced in the form of rationalising expenses by merging some branches and 
reorganising others, as well as increasing the capital of PB by JD 10 million, the 
same upsurge seen in 1998 did not continue in 1999 in terms of growth in deposits, 
assets, credit facilities, and market share. 
One explanation offered here is the lack of attention given by PB's top management 
to using MAS in planning and decision-making [see Parts III & V of this chapter), 
and to further improvement in the use of MAS in control of implementation [see Part 
IV of this chapter]. 
Improved planning and control along with giving more care and attention to the other 
enhancers of goals achievement relating to employees, innovation, and to clients 
would continue to provide higher growth rates. Attention to other factors that were 
mentioned by the interviewees as impeding the free flow of information at PB (such 
as the organisational structure and unclear channels of communication, or enhancing 
the performance of employees by better selection processes, better training and 
development and better qualifications) would also result in a higher degree of goal 
achievement [see discussion in Section 4.10, Diffusion of Information; Section 
4.13.2, Factors that Hindered the Use of IT in MAS; Section 4.15.4, Characteristics 
of Departmental Goals; and Section 4.17, Conflict of Interest· in Setting Goals and 
the Game of Budget Control]. 
4.24.1 Effects of Change at PB 
A matter to which I would like to refer, although it is not part of the research 
question, but one that surfaced during the data analysis. It concerns the attitude of the 
interviewees towards the MAS currently applied at PB which was clearly towards 
change. Only 5 interviewees had a clear positive attitude towards the system and all 
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were part of the old management team (out of 16 interviewees 8 were already 
working for PB for many years ranging from 26 years to 6 years before the new 
management team came). The remaining 11 managers all said that the system needed 
improvement. 
Interviewees from the old management team had a positive attitude towards all topics 
discussed in the interviews namely: satisfaction with the IT system used (out of four 
interviewees who were satisfied three were from the old management team); out of 
eight interviewees who believed that MAS repotis they received were useful five 
were from the old management team; the five interviewees out of six who believed 
that information was not centralised were from the old management team; four out of 
the five managers who believed that the organisational structure did not impede the 
flow of information vertically or laterally were from the old management team. All 
. three managers who said they did not have to chase after information were from the 
old management team. 
This explains and does not contradict what Gordon and Di Tomaso (1992, p. 788) 
found that previous research has shown that management is considerably more 
positive about their companies than people at lower levels (Hay Group, 1986), 
although Gordon & Di Tomaso were referring to upper level management operating 
in a stable environment and not a not a restructuring stage such as the one at PB. 
To explain the positive attitude by managers towards the above-mentioned issues 
from the old team that was not shared by managers from the new team the following 
reasons are suggested: 
1- Resistance to change. This is a phenomenon that has been observed by many 
researchers. The managers from the old team liked things the way they were 
and saw no need for the new management team to introduce any changes 
(Burns & Stalker, 1994, p. 209; Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 11; Norris, 2000, 
p. 233; Granlund, 2001, p. 160) [see discussion in Section 3.4, Who Needs to 
be Involved in MA Change?].Burns & Vaivio (2001, p. 394) provide a 
convincing explanation of the attitude of the new management team towards 
the managed and formal change introduced at PB: 
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'In this view, change in management accounting becomes something that 
has been predetermined by organizational authors. It is designed and carried 
out in a preordained way. It is actively steered towards an objective, away 
from potential obstacles. This logic of change grants a key role to the 
motivated actors who initiate and take responsibility for transformation in 
the management accounting craft'. 
Bums & Stalker (1994, p. 127) describe change at the Scottish firms in their study 
which were facing environmental change in competition and technology and market: 
'No such change of systems was visible in any of the Scottish firms. Instead, 
strenuous efforts were made to maintain the mechanistic system or to impose it more 
stringently than had previously been the case'. 
One of the reasons Bums & Stalker (1994, p. 100) give for resistance to change was 
'the attachment of a person to the position he holds ... enduring after the need has 
arisen for some change in the character of the position or its location in the 
structure' . 
Abernethy & Brownell (1999, p. 189) explored the role of budgets in organisations 
facing strategic change and concluded from an empirical study on hospitals in 
Australia that organisations undergoing strategic change need to use budgets 
interactively and not solely for setting goals and measuring variances i.e. 
diagnostically. They also theorised that 'the relation between strategic change and 
performance will be moderated by the extent to which budgets are used interactively' 
(Abernethy & Brownell, 1999, p. 193). Abernethy & Brownell's observations are 
confirmed in the observation at PB in the way budgets and budgetary control are 
used and how PB interviewees criticised them [see more discussion in Section 
4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB; Section 4.17, Conflict of Interest in 
Setting Goals and the Game of the Budget Control at PB; and section 4.18, Role of 
MAS in Providing in formation on Performance Evaluation at PB] 
2- Internal politics reasons. The old management team was well-entrenched in its 
position and wanted to protect its achievements. 
3- Feeling of insecurity. The old management team did not want to criticise 
. and speak against any new changes introduced by the new management and where 
not certain how introduced changes would affect it, whereas the new management 
team has joined in the first place to introduce change in an effort to improve existing 
situation so they did not feel they should be satisfied with the current MAS. 
Bums & Scapens (2000, pp. 11, 12, 13, 19, 23) agree that introducing change to 
institutionalised. or culturally dictated practices could be faced with resistance 
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particularly if the change challenges existing ones. Bums & Scapens continue to say 
that change 'involves much more than a knowledge of the formal systems; it requires 
an understanding of the habits of organizational members', the role of power, the 
ways of thinking i.e. informal change, and the underpinning assumptions which are 
taken-for-granted in day-to-day activity'. On this Bums & Stalker (1994, p. 192) 
explain that a threat from change is felt by managers not only by the intrusion of 
new kinds of tasks and new kinds of resources, or even by the recruitment of 'new 
kinds of people, but by clothing them in new institutionalised forms, they take on the 
appearance of a threat to other parts of the existing order, instead of a source of new 
life'. All this was clearly observed at PB. 
4.25 Summary of Chapter 4 
Part I of this chapter provided a short historical background of PB, a Jordanian 
commercial bank that prospered quickly in the first ten years of its foundation in 
1978. It then faced serious financial difficulties and was sold in 1993 to new 
investors. The PB case study was carried out in 1999-2000 after a new management 
team took over in late 1997. Part I also discusses data collection methods and how 
data collected from 16 semi-structured interviews was analysed. 
Part II discusses availability of information and tries to explain the requisite of 
information needs that PB' s senior management needed to have in order to enhance 
the achievement of corporate goals and subsequently OE. It discusses the needs of 
information for setting goals that are influenced - as explained by the interviewees -
by economic, political, and competition factors. The availability of information on 
two other factors related to the goals of PB and the measures used in the research 
design (i.e. customers' and employees' satisfaction) was not evaluated systematically 
and found to be lacking. This resulted in each manager having herlhis own 
interpretation of customer satisfaction and needs. 
In the discussion it was explained that a number of problems were faced in achieving 
a higher degree of corporate goals. These problems were: unavailability and/or 
insufficient diffusion of information on the external environment and on some factors 
in the internal environment. 
Part II also discusses the characteristics of the design of MAS adopted at PB. It was 
found that a number of factors affected the design and hampered the operation of 
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MAS such as the organisational structure, the unclear channels of communication, 
the unclear responsibilities and authorities of departments, and the design and 
characteristics of the MAS reports, in addition to the fact that MAS was affected by 
the partiality of its designers. 
The use of IT was discussed also as an important factor that shapes the design and 
operation of MAS, as well as being shaped by it. It was found that the capabilities of 
the IT system were not effectively utilised, but mainly used as a data processor: 
As a result, planning by top management and the subsequent marshalling of 
resources for PB was not able to enhance the OE of PB to reach its desired levels if 
not full potential (Part HI of the chapter]. A number of reasons were responsible for 
that: 
1- unstable internal and external environments and the unavailability of 
sufficient information on the external environment; 
2- conflicting goals and roles of first level managers; 
3- over-emphasis on financial measures and targets and the neglect of non-financial 
ones; 
4- planning did not involve all levels of management. 
The case study indicated a lack of clear goals and an absence of plans that cannot be 
compensated for in seeking effective control. 'Unless plans and goals are effectively 
determined, controls will be meaningless' (Hughes, 1965, p.95). 
Part IV discusses how the enhancement of financial results as an outcome of an 
emphasis on the control aspect of MAS in PS was realised, although with some gaps 
- such as not incorporating projected expenses in budgets, and conflict of interest 
between branch managers and head office, which was not resolved through MAS. 
Another prominent characteristic of the control system at PB was that it did not cover 
all departments nor did it cover all areas of activities. 
Unclear and inadequate performance evaluation procedures. used within the MAS 
adopted at PB, as well as unsatisfactory non-financial measures and the lack of cross-
functional measurements was what characterised measurements used in control. 
Most of the interviewees felt that the adopted performance measurements were not 
comprehensive and did not reflect justly their performance. The system as a result of 
not covering all departments and all areas of activity could not achieve a better co-
ordination of the work of managers. 
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The internal uncertainty coupled with external uncertainty did not constitute a 
demotivating factor for higher levels of management. This was because of the culture 
of 'a mission' that prevailed at PB and which motivated the new management team 
to try and overcome conditions that were not conducive to a smoother working 
atmosphere. 
However, other factors relating to setting-goals, control, performance evaluation and 
employee satisfaction, and customer satisfaction discussed in Parts II, HI and IV did 
not provide a clear enough direction for managers. This they attempted to resolve 
through an 'open communication' culture where managers, including the general 
manager, substituted the role of structural conditions with improvised solutions. This 
came at the price of consistency. 
Nevertheless, OE was enhanced as was observed in the measured financial results. A 
higher degree of OE, however, could not have been achieved as the other dimensions 
of the corporate culture (teamwork and collective decision-making and qualifying 
and training employees) were still not well-rooted at PB. 
Part V discusses positive and negative effects of external or social culture in Jordan 
on planning, performance evaluation and organisational structure. It also discusses 
the effects of a changing and inconsistent corporate culture on the design and 
operation ofMAS. 
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· CHAPTER 5 
SURVEY OF JORDANIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS 
ON THE ROLE OF MAS IN ENHANCING OE 
The chapter follows the same classifications as Chapter 4, Case Study of PB. 
Part I discusses methodological issues, Part II Availability and Diffusion of 
Information in JCB, Part III the Role of MAS in Planning and Decision-Making 
in JCB, Part IV The Role of MAS in Control in JCB, Part V The Internal and 
External Cultural Effects on MAS in JCB. 
Part I THE SURVEY RESEARCH METHOD 
5.1 Aim of the Survey 
The survey attempts to refine, amend, or change the initial findings drawn from 
the PB case study. 
5.2 The Survey Population 
I chose to investigate JCB in the first place and not foreign banks operating in 
Jordan as my interest lay in understanding the MAS practices specifically in 
Jordanian banks. 
Secondly, the commercial banks category was chosen because it includes the 
oldest banks in Jordan such as the Arab Bank founded in 1930, and ranked 
number five among Arab banks in terms of capital and assets (Jordan Times, 29 
December 2002, p. 12), the largest banks in terms of profits, market share, and 
total assets among other measures. On the other hand, commercial banks include 
the newest and smallest bank, the Export and Finance Bank founded in 1996. 
The JCB are all privately owned with the exception of the Export and Finance 
Bank which has part of its share capital owned by the Jordanian government. 
Some of the banks have investors from other Arab countries. However, in all 
cases the majority of shares are held by Jordanians. The management (general 
managers, and senior managers} of those banks is exclusively Jordanian. 
5.3 The Research Question and Method 
I used semi-structured interviews to investigate the similarities and differences in 
the role MAS play in PB and other JCB to enhance OE; how MAS was used in 
each bank by middle and senior managers; and to what extent MAS served them 
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in planning, decision-making, and control in order to achieve corporate goals, 
thereby enhancing OE. 
My choice of interviews to look into the case study findings was based on the 
view that surveys could be used for explanatory as well as descriptive purposes 
[see discussion in Section 2.2.2, The Survey -Research Method 2J, in addition to 
being 'an excellent vehicle for measuring attitudes and orientations' (Babbie, 
1983, p. 204). The survey is to be informed both by a review of extant literature 
on MAS and DE and the findings of the case study. The use of a survey as a form 
of field study was 'non-experimental': data was collected through extensive 
visits that totalled 70 hours of interviewing. 
5.4 Limitations of the Survey 
This section on the limitations of the survey includes a discussion of the effects 
of bias on the field data, ethical issues in carrying out the survey, and points on 
the veracity and reliability ofthe survey. 
5.4.1 Bias 
Biases could come from a number of sources. The topics discussed in the 
questionnaire comprise one of the most likely areas. The issues discussed touch 
on rather sensitive areas such as management's responsiveness to information 
needs, management's commitment to providing information, performance 
appraisal, internal politics, and information gatekeepers. Some· interviewees 
might not have felt comfortable discussing these matters with me as a researcher. 
Another possible source of bias could be the extent to which the. interviewees had 
experiential knowledge about the topics the research investigated, and whether 
the answers provided by the interviewees were based on their direct knowledge 
. and experience. 
My presence during the 30 interviews naturally affected to various degrees 
(which cannot be measured) the managers interviewed, and this is a matter that 
cannot be avoided when doing personal interviews (Sudman & Bradbum, 1982, 
p. 6). I tried to mitigate the effect of bias on the interviewees' behaviour and 
answers when trying to explain a question to an interviewee. As Clandinin & 
ConneJly (1998, p. 165) argue '(t)he way an interviewer acts, questions, and 
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responds in an interview shapes the relationship and, therefore the ways 
participants respond and give accounts of their experiences'. 
When explaining questions I tried not to lead the respondent, but it should be 
remembered that interaction in interviews is inevitable (Holstein & Gubrium, 
1997, p. 113; Potter, 1997, p. 149; Baker, 1997, p. 13J). What I tried and hoped 
for was to keep it to a minimum. I did not allow -to the best I consciously was 
aware of - the findings of the case study to affect my attitude or intonations on 
any topic [see more discussion on bias in Section 4.4, Points on Validity and 
Reliability of the Case Study]. I let the interviewees instruct me and explain the 
meanings of things and their significance. I only came out of this approach when 
I felt that an interviewee wanted to know to what extent I appreciated and 
understood what was being discussed. 'Interviews are conversations where 
meanings are not only conveyed, but cooperatively built up, received, interpreted 
and recorded by the interviewer' (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p. 119). My 
presence during the interview could have affected the interviewees in giving 
favourable answers to reflect a positive picture, or the opposite when an 
interviewee might want to portray a negative picture if (s)he was on unfavourable 
terms with hislher seniors (Clandinin & Connelly, 1998, p. 165). 
Atkinson & Shaffir (1998, p. 54) identified three facets affecting the relationship 
between the field researcher and the subject that could help predict the potential 
effect of the researcher on the subject: 
'l. Is the researcher known to all, some or none ofthe participants? 
2. What is known about the researcher's activities? 
3. What activities does the researcher undertake and how does that locate him [sic) 
within the group under study?' 
I looked for biases to isolate them by comparing the answers of the four different 
interviewees in each bank by examining the coherence and plausibility of their 
answers [Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods]. 
Another source might have been my being a female researcher. As it was in the 
PB case study, being a female researcher did not adversely affect my work in any 
obvious way. In fact on the whole both female and male managers were, if not 
cooperative, very cooperative, in terms of giving me time and providing 
information: I was able to get the information I set out to get and in many 
instances interviewees volunteered more. 
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The male managers extended a gentleman's help and courtesy, which is the 
expected attitude in Jordan with its paternalistic culture. Furthermore, their 
cooperation and interest could have come from my work since accounting is an 
area mostly dominated by men and might have been unusual for me as a female 
researcher to be seen to be professionally involved. Nevertheless, if there had 
been a bias in the reactions and responses of the male managers it was not 
noticeable. I did not feel that what they said or did relating to the questions asked 
affected negatively the information collected. On the contrary, I believe it had a 
positive effect. 
When I interviewed female managers [6 out of 30 interviewees], r found that 
female managers were open with me and a feeling of mutual interest was 
noticeably present - they for my work and me for their work. 
One point raised by Miller & Glassner (1998, p. 101), which I personally found 
relevant in my interviews was: 
'The issue of how interviewees respond to us based on who we are -in their 
lives, as well as the social categories to which we belong, such as age, gender, 
class, and race- is a practical concern as well as an epistemological or theoretical 
one', 
I believe that the way I was perceived by the interviewees in terms of age group, 
class and race helped me in carrying out the interviews. 
5.4.2 Ethical Issues 
A second limitation I had to face while doing the survey was that relating to 
ethical issues (Choudhury, 1986, p. 28). This I tried to overcome by 
uncompromisingly protecting the anonymity of the interviewees and any 
information or personal views I came to know about during the interviews, such 
as when, on a number of occasions, I was asked by managers interviewed how 
their bank compares with other banks or whether other banks have this or that. 
Another situation I faced was when I gave the transcripts of the interviews for 
the ten managers I chose for interviews notes verification. One interviewee said, 
'] agree with almost all of what is in the interview transcript, but tell me who will 
read this transcript?' when I emphatically said that no one other my supervisor 
can have access to the interviews transcript, he said, '] sure do hope so as] have 
been burned previously by researchers who would make what I said available fo 
my superiors '. 
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I was also very careful in passing any infonnation from one bank to the other, as 
some were direct competitors. When I found myself in a situation where I was 
asked by a certain bank manager about my interviews with hislher competitors, I 
gently but clearly said that I cannot as a matter of principle and in the interest of 
all banks involved share any infonnation I obtained through my interviews since 
else how can I protect the anonymity of everyone, including the enquirer? 
Whenever an interviewee would say 'this is off the record', what (s)he told me 
was not mentioned in the transcript. Nevertheless, what was said naturally added 
to my understanding of the topic discussed and influenced my interpretation. 
On the other hand, I tried to follow the highest degree of honesty and included in 
the transcripts what was actually said by interviewees. One other matter that is 
likely to occur while collecting data is the bits of professional gossip that I would 
hear during my interviewees. It can be helpful if used wisely in understanding 
what was going on and why, but not to be shared with others. 
5.4.3 Points on the Veracity and Reliability of the Survey 
I gave due care to enhance the veracity of the data through using follow-up 
meetings and carrying out corrections and verifications of interviews notes. 
Personal experiences in qualitative research should not be dismissed as ' from 
field text to research text: the task is to discover and construct meaning in those 
texts ... the search for these patterns, narrative threads, tensions, and themes that 
constitutes the inquiry that shapes field texts into research texts is created by the 
writer's experience' (Clandinin & Connelly, 1998, pp. 170-171). Silvennan 
(1998, p. 240) quotes Polyani (1964) in that, in qualitative research 
'comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a 
responsible act claiming universal validity'. Throughout I worked on achieving 
veracity through a careful step-by-step linking of interpretations, conclusions, 
and findings to collected data. _ 
The validity of research as seen by PeriikyHi (1997, p. 207) 'concerns the 
interpretation of observation'. He suggests that this can be reached through 
transparency of analytic claims (apparent validity) and through examining 
deviant case-analysis after having established a pattern (Perllkylii, 1997, pp. 209, 
210). 
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The interview guide [Appendix 3] used provided content validity when the 
collected data provided satisfactory answers to the role of MAS in planning, 
decision-making and control. Through the data collected from the experiences of 
30 different interviewees I tried to establish a chain of evidence referred to by 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 261) as "enumerative induction", where a number 
and variety of pieces of information and conveyed experiences all go in the same 
direction. 
To increase the replicability of the findings, I prepared a plan before embarking 
on the survey that included who and how to contact and establish relations with 
the managements of the commercial banks. 
I prepared an interview guide and planned how it would be tested, names of who 
will be interviewed in each bank, and a framework for data analysis which 
include preparing the matrix sheets and the layout of the different sheets for data 
analysis. 
I developed a database prior to and during the survey that included the 
population, the interview guide, the. functions targeted, interview transcripts, and 
a data analysis plan (Yin, 1994, p. 95; Slagmulder, 1997, p. 108). 
To increase the reliability of the survey the findings from the case study were 
the centre of the survey investigation. They were also the basis for the survey 
interview guide. 
As Perakyla (1997, p. 206) mentions, 'the key aspects of reliability involve 
selection of what is recorded, the technical quality of recordings and the 
adequacy of the transcripts'. I started by checking ten transcripts with the 
interviewees and asked them to review them and see whether what was written 
truly reflected their opinions. The answers were very encouraging as only two 
questions out of 460 questions needed to be amended in a way that changed the 
meaning. With such encouraging results I felt that I could endorse the transcripts 
without a need for further checking. 
As much as was possible I tried to maintain the comparability and consistency 
across the 30 interviews, which was a big help at the data analysis stage. I 
interviewed four managers from each bank, and targeted the same four functions 
in all banks. Two of the interviewees were in charge of both the financial 
department and developing deposits, which resulted in 30 and not 32 
interviewees. To achieve the same objective with all interviewees I used the same 
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technique for interviewing and offering explanations or prompts during 
interviews. 
r did a triangulation of the answers of the interviewees in each bank and prepared 
a summary of their answers to reflect agreements or disagreements [Exhibit 5.1, 
Entering and Summarising Survey Data]. Those summaries provided me with 
confidence as the answers of the managers interviewed would agree much more 
than they disagreed in questions that asked them to describe actual processes or 
practices, as well as reflecting on the different personal attitudes and per~eptions 
of managers coming from different perspectives. 
One limitation of the survey was that the collection of data did not involve any 
prolonged direct observations of the banks' MAS - as was done in the case 
study. The analysed data was to a large degree compiled from the 30 managers 
interviewed whether as collectors of information, influencers, or users. 
A further limitation was that the notes I took down could not capture the whole 
content of the interview in spite of the care given to taking notes (McKinnon, 
1988, p. 46). r tried to add some of the missing bits back when transcribing the 
interviews. I was able to remember some parts of the conversation or answers 
stimulating my memory when transcribing and reviewing my field notes (Miles 
& Huberman, p. 51). However, I could not add the silences, facial expressions, 
intonations, or body language which I encountered. 
5.5 Survey Data Collection 
Similar methods of data collection were used as in the PB case study [Exhibit 
2.6, Data Collection Methods] and these are discussed below. 
5.5.1 Letters ofIntroduction 
I initiated contact with the first bank through personal acquaintances who put me 
in contact with the head of the Research and Training Department who arranged 
interviews 5, 6, 7, and 8. I approached other banks also through acquaintances or 
through the Research and Training or Human Resources managers at the banks 
who would arrange my meetings. Alternatively, I was provided with the names 
and telephone numbers to make my own contacts and appointments. After the 
first couple of banks it became much easier as my subsequent interviewees felt 
more at ease knowing r had already interviewed at such and such a bank such and 
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such managers, particularly when the names were those of familiar senior 
managers. 
Before visiting an interviewee I used the same means of introduction I had 
previously used in the case study interviews. I sent a fax to the manager I 
planned to interview introducing myself and the objective of the research. The 
introduction letter included also more information such as what sort of questions 
will be asked, and what topics will be discussed, and confirming the time and 
date of the interview [see Appendix 1]. 
5.5.2 The Survey Interviews 
All data was collected through personal semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews gave me not only the opportunity to get the answers directly and 
without leaving any questions unanswered, but also the opportunity to explain 
issues that otherwise might have been unclear to the interviewees. They also 
provided an opportunity to observe the work place. 
Personal interviews helped, via the open-ended questions to ask further and 
probe for more relevant information (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 281) and look 
for possible links between MAS on OE. 
In the survey interviews I noticed what I had previously noticed in the case study 
interviews namely, that not all managers seemed familiar with the term MAS. To 
give an example, on one of my visits to interview a credit manager (who asked 
his assistant to be present in the interview to assist him in answering my 
questions- as I was told), a senior deputy general manager and a well-known and 
respected figure in the banking community, walked in. When he asked what the 
research was about. I explained the title of my research to which he answered 
very confidently, "you should be visiting factories instead of banks, my advice to 
you is to choose two factories in Jordan for your research". 
'This being the case I had to be more careful, and sensitive to the interviewees. I 
tried to put the interviewee at ease first and start gradually with explaining en 
passanf what I meant by the external environment in question I and not -for 
example- ask 'what the external environment meant to himlherT I also moved 
from the more obvious questions (such as question I that asks about whether 
(s)he needs information on the external environment), to questions that needed 
more personal input and analysis such as question 17 which asks about elements 
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in the organisation which the interviewee finds necessary for the smooth flow of 
information [see Survey Interview Guide, Appendix 3]. 
I believe that if I had not paid attention to the sequence of the questions I would 
not have got the information which I did. I feel that they would have found the 
topics discussed in the questionnaire intimidating and need a good deal of input 
of knowledge, experience and openness. 
All interviews were held in the managers' offices during workirg hours apart 
from interviews 5 and 1. In interview 5 both the interviewee and I realised that 
there was no way we could finish the interview with the continuous interruptions 
of clients and employees so we moved to another room away from the reach of 
clients since, according to the custom in Jordan, clients can walk into the offices 
of branch managers without a prior appointment. 
I preferre~ to do the interviews in the interviewees' offices during working hours, 
as artfully described by Baker (1997, p. 131) 'interviewing in which the 
interviewer, and later the analyst investigate 'interiors' (states of the mind) or 
'exteriors' (descriptions of social settings) through a representational view of the 
language'. It gave me a feeling of the place and a sense of the atmosphere. I 
observed each interviewed manager's behaviour, and how (s)he did hislher work, 
how much pressure (s)he had to deal with, and the sort of matters brought to 
hislher attention by employees and clients. It gave me the opportunity to observe 
how hislher staff interacted, not forgetting the short or at times longer chats with 
the staff while I waited for my appointments. I always made it a point to chat 
with secretaries or assistants of the interviewees about their work experiences. 
The personal interviews gave the opportunity to gain a better understanding of 
the meaning 'through nonverbal, usually non-linear, an~ 'invisible' features of 
. context, often commonsensically referred to as tone, emotion, history, or 
experience' (Altheide & Johnson, 1998, p. 307). 
All this provided me with an excellent opportunity to later interpret what was 
being discussed in terms of control, bureaucracy, and the kind of responsibilities 
the interviewed managers carried. 
'interviewing or intense field observation [ ... are ... ] the only methods of data 
colleCtion sensitive enough to capture the nuances of human living' (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998, p. 28). 
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It could be argued that all this.is sUbjective and personal. However, when one 
walks into an office there are things absorbed by an interviewer that verbal 
answers might not show. 
In one of my interviews, for example, when I visited a credit manager for the 
second time to ask him to clarify some unclear answers and get answers for a 
question or two that I missed in our first meeting, I found that he had moved his 
desk from its former place, which overlooked a wonderful view of Amman. I 
could not help commenting about the change; he said that now he had his desk 
facing the glass partition that divided his office from the credit officers in the hall 
so he could know what was going on out there. This attracted my attention and a 
number of questions came to my mind as to why he felt that continuous visual 
control of his staffwas necessary. 
I did the interviews between July 2001 - August 2002. Interviews ranged from 1 
hour and 15 minutes to 3 hours and 45 minutes, which is actual interviewing time 
including first interview and follow-up. The average interview time was 2 hours 
and 18 minutes spent with each interviewee. But these times do not indicate the 
actual time I spent with the interviewee, which would be much longer as, for 
. example, in one case the actual interview time was 3 hours and 40 minutes 
whereas the time I spent was more than 6 hours looking at all sorts of reports, 
interruptions from staff, and then I was taken to the video room to see video 
tapes showing the marketing efforts ofthe bank. 
There was no marked difference between the lengths of the average interview 
time for each of the credit managers and the branch managers (131 and 130 
minutes). The longest interviews were with the deposit managers (average of 166 
minutes). The shortest average interview time was with the financial managers 
(121 minutes). These average interview times might shed some light on the 
.. differences among the four functions that was clear in their answers as discussed 
in the data analysis. 
I met all of the interviewees for a second visit, except for four interviewees 
where the unclear answers were very few in number and were answered over the 
telephone. Apart from those, I visited all of the other 26 managers for a second 
round of meetings to get clarifications on unclear answers, or answers that 
showed that the interviewee did not understand the question sufficiently or 
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digressed, or answers that did not seem to be in agreement with other answers in 
the interview. 
. 
Out of the 30 interviews I had verifications of the interview transcripts [written in 
English] by ten of the interviewed managers [Exhibit 5.2 Table of Survey 
Interviews]. I chose those ten interviews in particular as they had a better 
command of English than the others to start with and, depending on the outcome, 
I would have done more verifications. 
The result of checking the answers was very reas~uring in that, out of the 10 
transcripts each containing 46 questions, only 4 questions needed changing in a 
way that affected the meaning of the answer altogether. Those were questions in 
interview 6 and 20. 
5.5.3 The Survey Interview Guide 
The questions were set to address the case study findings such as those in Exhibit 
4.13, Elements in Organisational Structure that Hinder the Flow of Information; 
Exhibit 4.14, Factors Affecting Design of MAS; and Exhibit 4.11, The Role of 
MAS in Control among other issues. 
The questions used in the interviews were carefully prepared to achieve a good 
focus on the topics decided on prior to undertaking the survey. The interview 
guide was prepared in a way to avoid leading questions, and to ensure the clarity 
of the questions to the interviewees. I asked mangers about their personal 
opinions, as I did in the case study. However, once again my underlying interest 
was to know how MAS worked within each bank and not to emphasise 
subjective experience. 
To assure as much as possible the appropriateness of the interview guide I piloted 
it on two branch managers of PB - other than the branch managers interviewed 
in the case study. The results of the testing were encouraging and a few 
amendments -mainly changing the spacing left to write down the interviewees' 
answers- were introduced to the interview guide. 
The interview guide not only contained questions on 'who, what, where, how 
many, and how much' to explain contemporary events (Yin, 1994, p. 6) but I 
tried to complement it by adding a number of 'why' questions. 
The 'why' questions were set not only to investigate the operation of the system 
but also to 'study the conditions and consequences of actual practices' (Roberts 
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Exhibit 5.2 
Table of Survey Interviews 
No. Title of the Interviewee Checke Duration 
d 
1 Financial Department Manager 75 mins 
2 Executive Branch Manager 105 
3 Manager - Liabilities Development and 220 
Management 
4 Manager - Credit DeRartment Y 135 
5 Deputy Branch Manager 180 
6 Small Business Unit Manager (credit) Y . 170 
7 Assistant General Manager I Retail 225 
8 Assistant General Manager I Finance 160 
9 Senior Manager Local Operations and Financial 80 
Control Department 
10 Marketing Department Manager Y 180 
11 Manager - Credit Follow Up and Remedial Loans Y 145 
Unit 
12 Branch Manager 95 
13 Assistant General Manager I Credit 90 
14 Branch Manager 130 
15 Financial Controller Y 125 
16 Manager and assistant manager I Treasury 110 
Department 
17 Executive Manager I Finance Y 170 
18 Branch Manager Y 
19 Assistant Credit Manager 120 
20 Assistant Manager of Research and Financial Y 120 
Planning Department 
21 Manager - Credit Facilities & Control 65 
22 Manager - Jordan Branches (deposits) 160 
23 Assistant Branch Manaqer 170 
24 Financial Controller Y 155 
25 AGM Corporate and Trade Finance 140 
26 Branch Manager 95 
27 Assistant Manager - Savings Accounts 90 
28 Branch Manager 130 
29 Manager - Corporate Credit Y 185 
30 Financial Department Manager 80 
Average interview duration . 138 
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& Scapens, 1985, p. 447), and to leam something about the interviewee's level of 
infonnation (Khan & Cannell, 1957, p. 135). 
In line with the choice of a case study method for the research, and to go beyond 
the classifications that closed questions provide (Kahn & Cannell, 1957, p. 135), 
the interview guide used in the survey had, out of 46 questions, 30 open-ended 
questions (such as questions 3,6,7,8 ... ). It also contained questions that were 
answered with a yes or no, (such as questions 12,25,36 ... ), and questions that 
asked the interviewee to choose from a number of choices (as in questions 19,23, 
41...). 
Close-ended questions were used to measure attitudes towards certain issues. 
Funnel sequence from the most general to restricted questions was also used (in 
questions 15 and 16, 17 and 18 ... ). 'The funnel sequence is specially useful when 
one wants to ascertain from the first open questions something about the 
respondent's frame of reference' (Khan & Cannell, 1957,p. 159). 
The last two questions in the interview guide were set to address some aspects of 
the cultural influence on work procedures in the eight banks because the case 
study findings pointed to that direction. Social culture's influence was mentioned 
in relation of a number of issues in the case study interviews and the survey 
interviews. Notwithstanding, I decided to exclude those two questions from the 
data analysis. The reasons as I see them are: 
(I) the cultural impact on business life and practice is so subtle and complex 
that in no way can I get deep insights in a couple of questions .. 
(2) I also did not want to digress from the research question, and get deeper 
into how culture influences and shapes the business community although 
I believe it is a very important topic and worth researching. 
The answers to the open-ended questions were transcribed verbatim. I did not use 
tape recorders as this would have made some of those interviewed feel uneasy. 
From my previous experience in the case study investigation and later in the 
survey, some managers felt uneasy about recording the interview, as they were 
not sure how I was going to use the tapes. On a number of occasions I had the 
feelings that they thought I was doing it for some purpose other than my thesis. 
Some respondents were uneasy with the checking of the transcripts, as most of 
them did not have previous experience with interviews for research of such a 
scope and consequently the need for verification. For the questions that gave the 
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interviewees a choice, I typed the choices on separate sheets so that the managers 
could read them carefully and make their choices. 
The interviews were mainly conducted in Arabic with some terms and 
expressions in English. After taking down notes in Arabic during the first 
interview I found out that it was much easier for me to ask the questions in 
Arabic and write down the answers directly in English rather than transcribe the 
whole interview in Arabic and then translate it to English. 
5.6 Sources of Data 
In each bank I did four interviews which served two purposes: firstly, to collect 
data from different sources (Slagmulder, 1997, p. 107) for triangulation purposes; 
secondly, each interviewee represented a different perspective, which gave 
richness and density to the topic discussed. 
As planned in the research framework (Exhibit 2.6, Data Collection Methods] the 
sources of data are: the users of MAS reports (the branch managers and the credit 
managers); the collectors of information (the financial managers or financial 
controllers); and the movers (the assistant general managers or financial 
planners). The latter two are also users of MAS reports. 
Not all interviewees were of the same hierarchical position. The interviewees 
included four deputy/assistant general managers, three executive managers, 
seventeen managers who were heads of their departmentslbranches, three 
assistant departmental managers, and three sub-department managers such as a 
manager in charge of corporate credit within the credit department (Exhibit 5.3, 
Distribution of Survey Interviews According to Position]. 
Interviewing managers of different hierarchical positions provided me with the 
opportunity to observe how their situations in terms of planning and decision-
making differed. For example, when I asked one of the deputy general managers 
whether he faced any problems with communications channels, he said 'as a 
deputy general manager I do not face any but I am sure my staff face such 
problems'. So, meeting other levels of managers in the same bank gave me a 
better understanding of the design and operation ofthe MAS. 
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Exhibit 5.3 
Distribution of Survey Interviwees According to Position 
assistant general 
--__ 'n.a~rs 13% 
sub-department 
managers 17% 
assistant department 
managers 17% 
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o Managers 
o assistant department managers 
o sub-department managers 
o assistant ~~n_~ral manag<..e,,-r,-s _.-' 
5.6.1 Branch Managers 
Branch managers as users of MAS hold a sensitive function in a commercial 
bank. Branch managers are the bank's representatives with whom clients meet 
and do business. A branch manager represents an advanced feedforward and 
feedback channel, as well as being in a sense an agent of management, a situation 
that brings forth an agency theory situation. 
The interviews with branch managers totalled 17 hours and 20 minutes (an 
average of 130 minutes). One of the eight branch managers was the main branch 
manager. This interview alerted me to the fact that main branch managers are not 
representative of other branch managers. A main branch manager is usually a 
senior manager who enjoys both close geographical and personal relations with 
head office managers and top management. After that one interview, I preferred 
to meet branch managers other than the main branch manager. In two cases I 
interviewed the main branch deputy managers, which was more in line with the 
other interviews as the deputy branch manager expressed his personal beliefs and 
experience and not that of the branch manager. Not all branches were of the same 
size: the number of employees in the branches ranged between 7 - 30 employees, 
larger branches being the main branches. 
5.6.2 Credit Managers 
The credit managers are very prominent users of information given the role they 
play in a commercial bank. Credit is a core function of the bank, as well as the 
profit centre that earns the biggest percentage of a Jordanian commercial bank's 
profits. 
A further point is that the credit facilities function in all the nine banks was 
centralised in a central credit department at the head office. Some of the banks 
gave authority to the branch managers to grant credit to customers within certain 
limits while some gave none. 
5.6.3 Deposit Managers 
The third function that was targeted by the survey was deposit managers. This 
choice reflects two things: the importance of deposits to banks, and the important 
relationship and coordination between deposits and credit. A total of 22 hours 
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and 8 minutes of interviewing were spent with deposit managers with an average 
of 166 minutes per interview. 
I interviewed among the eight deposit managers a deputy deposits manager in 
charge of saving accounts [Exhibit 5.2, Table of Survey Interviews]. In that 
particular case I chose savings account, as it was the type of deposits the bank 
was targeting. In two other cases I interviewed managers whose work 
responsibilities affected deposits in the banks either because they decided the 
rates of interest or they decided which types of deposits the bank emphasised. 
Interview 16 was with a treasury manager and assistant manager -who had a role 
in deciding on deposits' interest rates- after all my efforts and persistence failed 
to allow me to meet with the manager of the Branches Management department 
who was in charge of deposits. I was later told by a colleague that he belonged 
to the old generation of managers in the bank and, as a result of the changes the 
bank was undergoing, talking to me would make him feel uncomfortable. 
In another case, after meeting with another bank's manager of the branches 
department, (s)he felt I should meet with the marketing manager (interview 10) 
as (s)he could provide me with better information on the bank's efforts in 
planning deposits and the type of deposits the bank's management was seeking. 
5.6.4 Financial Managers 
The fourth function targeted was financial managers who were compilers and 
users of information. In some of the banks, financial managers were also 
financial controllers and budgets and budgetary control were part of their 
responsibilities. There was one case where the departmerit responsible for 
financial planning and budgetary control for the entire bank's national and 
international planning was separate from the financial department. The 
interviews took 16 hours and 8 minutes with an average of 121 minutes per 
interview. 
5.7 The Survey Sample 
The sample chosen for the survey was a judgmental sample in the sense that the 
functions were decided on as the most appropriate in which to interview before 
interviewing ,began. However, in the cases where I did not get to interview the 
head of the department, I interviewed one of the available deputies. I did not 
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have any prior decision as to the choice of which branch manager to interview 
but whoever's schedule permitted himlher to meet me. 
The sample included 24 men and six women; which reflected the very small 
number of woman in managerial positions in JCB. This was also the case in the 
case study: the percentage of women in managerial positions was 25% and, as it 
was with the case study, the women managers in the survey sample were all 
outspoken and raised what they thought were difficulties they faced at work, 
which they related as a direct result of top management cul~' s and attitudes. 
5.8 Survey Data Analysis 
In analysing the data I used a number oftechniques. I started with examining the 
data collected from all 30 interviews, and rereading the interview transcripts to 
help gain an understanding and some deeper insight. Then I entered the collected 
data in matrices to get it in a manageable form, as dealing with so complex and 
large volume of data can be overwhelming. 
5.8.1 Matrices 
I used the matrices for examining, categorizing, tabulating, and recombining the 
evidence to address the case study findings (Yin, 1994, p. 102). Matrices helped 
in displaying data, ordering and rating (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 15), and 
compressing it, thereby permitting the drawing of conclusions (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p.l41). 
The summarising and coding of data in matrices was a step-by-step process so as 
not to lose or incorrectly code data. A good place to start from was to enter the 
responses of each interviewee in each bank a matrix, then a summary of the four 
interviews for each bank, then for each function and lastly for all banks, and then 
collated them in four booklets for ease of reference [Exhibit 5.1, Entering & 
Summarising Data]. 
The first booklet had eight matrices - one for each bank in the survey population. 
Each matrix was made up of four columns for the four interviews in each bank, 
and 46 rows for each question in the questionnaire [see a specimen of a matrix 
used in the survey in Appendix 5]. This provided me with a quick summary of all 
transcripts in examining the field data. It gave an excellent opportunity to look 
for answers that seemed unusual, unaccounted for, and out of line with the data 
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from the other interviews at the same banle In such situations I checked with the 
respondents and/or tried to understand the reasons behind them. 
A second booklet of matrices contained the eight matrices for each bank. Each 
matrix had one column and 46 rows summarising the data of the four interviews 
in each bank into one. This provided me with some indicators on the corporate 
culture, type of administration, top management and staff attitudes. 
In the third booklet, I entered the data once again in another matrix where the 
columns showed the four functions, i.e. deposit, credit, branch, and financial 
function while the rows stayed the same. The data showed the four functional 
perspectives in its detailed form. The matrices prepared according to each of the 
four functions, helped in identifying any differences between the needs and/or 
the perceptions of managers in each function. 
The fourth and last booklet had two matrices: one for a summary of all of the 30 
interviews with one column and 46 rows to match the number of questions; and 
the other matrix containing a summary of each of the four functions summarised 
from the first booklet of the eight banks' matrices. 
As a result I could use data from the four booklets both in its summarised and 
detailed form as I was going back and forth among the matrices during the 
analysis stage. ' 
It is true that the survey investigation is of a qualitative nature, but still I felt this 
last matrix would be helpful in giving some quantification of qualitative data, and 
in providing a description of the general attitudes expressed in the 30 interviews. 
The summarisation of all interviews was also helpful in highlighting trends and 
in showing which categories and functions differed from the general trend as 
well as comparing it to PB where the managers interviewed included all 
departmental managers. 
As it was with the case study, I would start from the field findings i.e. from the 
data to the concepts. Doing this helped in (a) establishing the discrete findings, 
(b) relating findings to each ·other, (c) and identifying patterns (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 262; Babbie, 1983, p. 408). 
5.8.2 Memos and Diagrams 
While examining the interview notes in order to enter the data in the matrices, I 
prepared memos [see a specimen of a memo in Appendix 6], each dealing with a 
certain topic, such as external information, communication, computers, 
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budgets ... and wrote down quotations from the transcripts to be used later as an 
example of what I would discuss, and to convey to the reader a feeling of what 
the interviews and the interviewees were like [Exhibit 5.4 Data Analysis 
Framework]. 
I used diagrams and tables to explain concepts and processes in a summarised 
and concise way. Some of the diagrams I created while examining the transcripts 
[for example, Exhibit 5.1, Entering & Summarising Survey Data; Exhibit 5.4, 
Survey Data Analysis Framework], others later on while writing the report [for 
example Exhibit 5.5, Elements in Organisational Structure for Enhancing the 
Role of MAS in Enhancing OE; and Exhibit 5.6 Effects of Social Culture on 
Planning and Decision-Making in JeB]. 
Writing memos and drawing diagrams helped me in distancing myself from the 
data collected and its individuality. Writing memos was also a tool in developing 
the findings (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 218, 223). The matrices, memos, 
documentation, and diagrams helped in building understanding either by adding, 
developing, or refuting the case study findings (Yin, 1994 p. 110). 
In the analysis of collected data that follows, I documented the findings and 
carried out a quick comparison with PB findings and with other researchers' 
work hoping this would help to highlight even further similarities or otherwise, 
keeping in mind that the work of other researchers was undertaken in a different 
cultural context. I tried to add meaning and significance to the data when 
analysing it by commenting on answers and_ using quotations to explain my 
comments. I looked for relationships and patterns and linkages among the survey 
descriptive field data (Patton, 1980, p. 268), not forgetting to mention the never-
ending cycle of writing, editing and rewriting which, in addition to improving the 
quality of the text, also helped as a way of 'knowing, discovery and analysis' 
-(Richardson, 1998, p. 345). In the analysis stage the researcher's bias cannot be 
ignored as in data collection. After doing the case study, those conclusions and 
concepts with which I came out must have been present in my subconscious. I 
tried to escape that by keeping a clear documented trail of data, and while 
analysing the data I kept an open mind with regard to different interpretations, 
conclusions - which came out from the analysis. What I constantly wanted to 
achieve was interpreting and conveying what I saw and heard. 
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Exhibit 5.4 
Survey Data Analysis Framework 
Matrices Matrices Matrix 
per bank per of all 
function intervie 
,It 
Select quotations 
11 11 \ ~ 
Memos to integrate revised propositions 
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Exhibit 5.5 
Elements in Organisational Structure in Enhancing the Role of MAS in Enhancing OE in Jordanian JCB 
Elements decisive to enhancing theflow 
ofinfonnation within an organisational 
structure: 
1. Stable and well-defined responsibilities 
and authorities 
2. Clear communication channels 
3. Structure for coordination among managers 
4. Departments with specialised functions 
5. Clear work procedures 
6. Decentralisation of authority and infonnation 
1- Enhance flow of infonnation 
2- Enhance communication 
3- Enhance coordination 
Improve planning, decision-
making, and control 
Enhance effective and efficient 
performance 
Enhance OE 
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Exhibit 5.6 Effects of Social Culture on Planning and Decision-Making in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
High power distance 
culture 
[I] Lower level of interaction 
and iteration in planning 
and decision-making 
[2] Conflict of departmentlbranch 
with corporate goals 
[3] Conflict of individual goals 
with departmentlbranch 
goals D [4] More 'restricted information' Less effective 
planning 
[I] Lesser attention to planning 
[2] Lesser attention to forward-looking 
MAS reports 
O Diminishing role ofMAS in enhancing 
OE 
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Part II INFORMATION NEEDS IN JORDANIAN COMMERCIAL BANKS 
5.9 Availability and Diffusion of Information in JCB 
5.9.1 Goal-Setting in JCB 
As discussed in the case study, MAS on the one hand plays a role in providing 
management with information that can be of help in the goal-setting process, and in goal 
achievement [see discussion in Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals of PB]. On th,e other 
hand, I have used goal achievement as one way of measuring OE [see more in Section 
3.22, Criteria for Assessing OE; Section 3.24, The Goal Model in Evaluating OE; and 
Section 4.6, Analysis of Collected Data from PB]. 
When the respondents were asked how corporate goals were communicated to them (Q 
28) answers such as the following: 
'In quarterly meetings with top head office managers but not in a planned way ... goals 
would be mentioned in passing' (interview 12). 
As to setting their own goals some of the answers given were: 
'I was not consulted in setting the goals of the department ... but I try to work and follow 
the team' (interview 19). 
'We get our targets from head office' (interview 28). 
'The financial analysis and control department sets future plans for the bank' (interview 
30). 
Looking at the summary matrix of each bank in the population we find that 15 
interviewees out of the 30 came to know about corporate goals either through a circular 
sent by top management, or during an annual, or quarterly meeting organised to discuss 
with either head office departmental managers, or branch managers their budgets or at 
. ' 
times not at all: 
'I do not know what the corporate goals may be my boss knows about them ... I am only 
informed of my departmental goals' (interview 29). 
And 
'Top management is not really clear about what they want' (interview 15). 
We should keep in mind that, among the other 15 interviewees or the 50% there were four 
assistant /deputy general managers who would be directly involved in the setting of 
corporate goals [Exhibit 5.3, Distribution of interviewees]. Knowing that, their bias on the 
population should be kept on mind. This on its own would not affect the confidence in the 
data as discovering outlying cases, referred to as 'negative cases', enhances explanation 
building (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 160), and helps in getting some insight into top 
management's beliefs and attitudes as to who needs to be told and who does not. 
280 
When the interviewees were asked whether a conflict existed between achieving their 
departmentallbranch goals and corporate goals (Q 29), 18 out of 30 respondents said that 
there was no conflict between achieving both. However, out of those 18 respondents four 
said that their departments did not have any goals [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in 
lCB]. When asked whether their departmentallbranch goals corresponded to their 
individual goals 37% (11 respondents out of 30) said they did not [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-
Setting Process in JCB]. 
The biggest reason (6 out of the 11) for non-correspondence was that they felt they could 
shoulder, and were looking, for more responsibility. What was said in interview 6 reflects 
on the goal-setting process: 
'I try to let them correspond ... but I like a good challenge I look for more responsibility ... 
I seek more responsibility '. 
To follow on from this, question 31 asks about how the lack of congruence between 
departmentallbranch goals, individual and corporate goals affected the respondents, and 
27% gave effects like: (l) the disagreement demoralised and demotivated them, (2) 
setting lower targets for themselves. Those effects mentioned by senior managers might 
have serious effects on performance andOE as commented: 
'Top management understanding is very different from mine ... this cannot help in 
achieving corporate goals' (interview 10). 
Exhibit 5.7 
G IS P . lCB oa - ettmg. rocess m 
Item DM CM FM BM 
(N=30) (n= 8)" (n=8) (n=8)" (n=8) 
Informed of corporate goals 
before preparing their budgets 75% 75% 63% 37% 
Overall percentage 50% 
Conflict exists between department !branch goals 
and corporate goals 13% 50% 0% 75% 
Overall percentage 40% 
Disagreement between corporate and 
departmentallbranch goals and personal·goals 13% 63% 50% 63% 
Overall percentage 37% 
DM=deposlt managers, CM-credIt managers, FM-finanCIal mangers, BM- branch managers 
• Throughout the exhibits the answers of the two interviewees who were in charge of both 
deposits and finance were included under DM and FM for comparability between the 
functions. . 
And: 
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'1 know the needs of my customers more than top management ... they do not give us 
sufficient authority to act ... no explanations' (interview 28). 
The large percentage of 50% of respondents who were not involved in influencing goal 
setting also shows that the banks' top management exercised a top-down policy in goal-
setting [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCBj. 
If we look at the individual functions, deposit managers/assistant managers as a single 
group representing a functional perspective showed more involvement with only 25% of 
the respondents saying they were not pre-consulted and that their role was restricted to the 
receiving end. 
On the matter of did they think that a conflict existed between departmental and corporate 
goals, encouraging responses were given to the question as 88% (7 out of a population of 
8) negated the existence of such conflict compared to overall percentage of 60% [Exhibit 
5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCBj. One manager said that cooperation within committees 
ironed out differences in opinions. A second said, 'our department is under the spotlight' 
(interview 27) meaning they were continuously followed up by the general manager so 
there was no scope for a conflict. Other managers said profit sharing plans at their banks 
made sure the two went together. 
The same pattern follows: when they were asked whether their departmental goals 
corresponded with their individual goals, 7 out of the 8 (88%) respondents answered 
affirmatively, which is higher than the overall average percentage (63%). 
Within the credit managers/assistant managers' category, the same pattern as in the 
deposit managers' group was found (two respondents out of 8 -25%- were informed about 
the corporate goals through circulars or were not informed) . 
. 
One of those who was not consulted said: 
'J was not consulted in setting the goals of the department ... but J try to work and follow 
the team' (interview 19). 
However, on the issue of a conflict arising between achieving corporate and department 
goals, 50% (4 respondents) thought that there was a conflict or that a conflict arose 
sometimes. The reason given by these four respondents was that the credit department's 
goals clash with those of other departments at the bank and its goals might not take 
priority. 
The other noticeable matter about credit managers is that 63% thought that their 
departmental goals did not correspond with their personal goals compared to an overall 
percentage of 37%. When asked how this affected their performance, the effects 
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mentioned could be grouped under:. (I) feelings of disappointment and frustration, (2) 
quality and quantity of work dropped as in for example: 
'Top management's understanding is very different from mine ... this cannot help in 
achieving corporate goals' (interview 10). 
The comparison between the deposit managers and the credit managers is of interest as to 
why they held different perceptions. Credit facilities departments in a Jordanian 
commercial bank hold a critical position being the source of largest profits and highest 
risk. On the other hand, Jordan has been suffering from an economic recession for a 
number of years (see Section 1.2.6, The Stagnation Years; and Section 1.3, Development 
. of the Banking Sector in Jordan] and granting credit during this recession period has 
contracted noticeably due to the state of the market, the high lending rates, and the 
political situation in Palestine. 
This might be one explanation for the dissatisfaction among credit managers in general 
who played a larger role in banking operations in the past. 
As for the financial managers/financial controllers, the top-bottom pattern was also 
obvious as 5 out of 8 (63%) financial managers were informed of the goals either by a 
management letter, or by committee: 
'The financial analysis and control department sets future plans for the bank' (interview 
30). 
Nevertheless, when asked whether a conflict existed between achieving their 
departmental goals and corporate goals (Q 29), all eight managers said 'No'. However, 
37% (3 out of 8 managers) said that their departments did not have goals in the first place, 
as noted by two financial managers: 
'As a cost centre mostly 1 set goals for my own use. ' (interview 1). 
And: 'A financial department has no goals on its own.' (interview 8). 
Fifty per cent of the financial managers felt that their departmental goals did not 
correspond to their individual goals (Q 30), but 7 out of 8 managers said that the lack of 
correspondence did not affect their performance negatively. 
The branch managers seemed to show the top-bottom pattern much more clearly 
compared to the other three functions who were all senior managers. Those who were 
infonned directly by the general nianager or assistant manager made up 37 % of the 
branch managers interviewed. The other branch managers (63%) said they knew about 
the corporate goals either through a memo or when branch managers received their 
annual budgets from their managements. Some of the branch managers said they knew 
about the folloWing year's corporate goals as late as December or even January of the 
same year. 
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The branch managers were split in the middle: 50% believed that a conflict exists 
between achieving corporate and branch goals whilst 25% said that the conflict arises at a 
client level, which brings the total to 75% of the branch managers (assistant managers 
who believed that they were not able to achieve their branches' potential because head 
office saw that as conflicting with the bank's interests: 
' ... Head office puts obstacles in the Wiry of the growth of my branch ... but again I do not 
have the overall picture' (interview 18). 
Once again the pattern seen with credit managers is repeated with branch managers, 
though for different reasons. This can also be seen in question 30 as 50% also felt that the 
lack of congruence between their branch goals and their individual goals. A further 12% 
said that it applied 'to some extent', bringing the total to 62%. As for how the conflict 
affected them, very similar answers to those given by credit mangers were given by 
branch managers/deputy managers such as causing demoralisation and demotivation, 
frustration, setting lower targets for the branch and lower productivity and targets' 
achievement. 
Kaplan & Norton (1996, p. 80) stress congruence between individual efforts and 
organizational efforts by saying that an awareness of corporate goals is not enough, and 
that they should be translated into objectives and measures for operating units and 
individuals. 
The above discussion of the different levels of goals reflects on the role of MAS in 
enhancing OE [see discussion in Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals of PBJ. When 
departmentallbranch goals are not set in 50% of the cases by managers, consequently 
managers might not be motivated to achieve them for being either too difficult to achieve 
or inappropriate under the circumstances keeping in mind that the managers interviewed 
are more in contact with clients than top management. 
Chan & Lynn (1993, p. 88) also stress the importance of goal congruence between 
individual and organisational efforts: 
'It is critical that an organization's members reach agreement on the goal performance 
measure link in a participative fashion to ensure congruence between individual efforts 
and organizational efforts'. 
Some of the managers interviewed, as was the case in PB, did not set goals or targets for 
their departments, especially when their departments were service/supporting 
departments. In such cases using goals achievement to measure' OE would not be 
applicable, and would not lead to achieving accountability, performance appraisal, and 
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development of those departments as far as top management is concerned (Wilson & 
Chua, 1993, p. 65). 
Although 50% of those interviewed feel that their departmental goals did not correspond 
with their individual goals, most of them said that it did not affect their work. 
Nevertheless, they said it left them demotivated and demoralised. Theories of motivation 
such as the Human Relations theory stipulate that non-financial incentives, such as 
participation in goal-setting, play a part in motivating employees to higher achievement 
levels. The need of employees to achieve self actualisation through achieving their 
individual goals in addition to departmental goals affects work quantitatively and 
qualitatively and needs to be incorporated into departmental goals. 
5.9.2 Information on the Internal and External Environments in ICB 
This sub-section will discuss the quantity, quality and the timing of information made 
available through MAS reports in order to look at the ability of the current systems to 
respond to the various needs of decision-makers in ICB. 
The questions that addressed availability of information related to factors external and 
internal to each bank in the population. The questions also examined the current state of 
availability of information in each bank and what those interviewed felt was missing and 
why it was needed (i.e. to what use would the unavailable information have been put?) 
The aim behind the above is to examine whether the MAS operating in ICB did play a 
role in planning, decision-making, and control and, if that was the case, then to what 
extent? It also aims to find out what seemed to be the obstacles from the point of view of 
the interviewees and from my point of view from the analysis of collected data [Exhibit 
4.9, Framework for Analysing the Availability and Diffusion ofInformation]. 
5.9.2.1 Information on the External Environment 
There was a unanimous agreement among all interviewees that elements of the. external 
environment affect their work and goal achievement regardless of the position they held 
at their banks, regardless of their function, and regardless of the size or the market share 
of the bank, and the type of administration a bank had. 
This coincides with the case study findings (67% of the 16 managers interviewed in the 
different departments of PB) and, in particular, the answers from all the managers in 
charge of similar ·functions at PB. All 30 interviewees said that they needed reports to 
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inform them about the external environment of their banks as there was an 'organic link' 
(interview 1) between the two: 
'We do not exist in a vacuum ... the economic report leads to a management letter which 
leads to a strategy which leads to a budget ... .. (interview 8). 
Or, as said in interview 15: 'we cannot isolate ourselves from the environment'. 
The interest in the external environment and its changes was of a broad-scope nature: 
76% of the interviewees were interested in wide-scope information on the external 
environment [see Exhibit 2.4, External Factors Affecting Design and Role ofMAS]. The 
other managers (24%) felt that there were few variables in the external environment that 
interested them. 
Taking a closer look at deposit managers, 25% chose to be informed of only a few 
variables. The variables mentioned were economic, political, new government 
regulations, changes in government policies, public expenditure, and market and banks' 
financial indicators [Exhibit 5.8, Need for Information on the External Environment in 
JCB]. 
Exhibit 5.8 
Need for Information on the External Environment in JCB 
Item DM CM FM BM 
(N~30) (n~8) (n~8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Need reports on the external 
environment 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Wide-scope information more helpful 
in achieving goals 75% 88% 75% 75% 
Overall percentage 76% 
One credit manager out of 8 chose to be informed about only a few variables in the 
external environment namely competitors, political changes, and clients' portfolios. 
This fact reflects the sensitive nature of granting credit, where matters such as credit 
decisions and a client's ability to pay back can be affected by a wide array of variables, 
particularly those that have to do with clients' portfolios. 
In the case of financial managers, 25% choose to be informed of only a few variables in 
the external environment. The variables they needed for planning, decision-making and 
control were: market share and the financial position of each bank in Jordan, changes in 
government regulations, and the economic changes in the external environment. 
The same pattern was found with the branch managers who were no different from the 
other functions as 25% branch managers chose to be informed of only a few variables in 
the external environment \"lIther than wide-scope broad information. The variables that 
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were mentioned by the branch managers were competition, political changes, and the 
economy. 
We notice from the answers of the respondents [Exhibit 5.8, Need for Information on the 
External Environment in lCB] that the choice of 76% of interviewees for wide-scope 
information on the external environment was not linked to a certain function of the JCB. 
This was also found in the case study on the need for broadening the outlook of managers 
(Vadenbosch & Huff, 1997, p.83; Pierce & O'Dea, 2003, p. 260) [see discussion in 
Section 4.7.2.1, Description on the Availability of Information at PB; Section 4.7.2.2, 
Information on the External Environment; and 4.8, External Environment Factors 
Affecting Ability to Achieve Goals at PB]. 
Gordon & Miller (1976, p. 61) quote Mintzberg that one of the existing impediments to 
managerial use of data gathering in formal information systems is that information is too 
limited in scope. 
To find out why wide-scope information on the external environment was important to 
the interviewees, I asked them in what ways would they have used the information [Q 3]. 
The most frequently mentioned uses of external information were: 
(l) To help in analysing what went on in the external environment, and an important 
matter they would have in mind was looking for new markets (mentioned 20 times) 
[see Exhibit 5.9, Uses ofInformation on the External Environment]. 
(2) For setting goals and planning (14 times). 
(3) Improving and rationalising decisions (8 times). 
Exhibit 5.9 
Uses ofInformation on the External Environment in JCB 
Frequency Uses 
1 20 times Analysing the external environment / look for new markets 
2 14 Setting goals and planning 
3 8 Improving decision-making 
4 2 Improving customer service 
Deposits managers as a group needed information on the external environment for: [1] 
planning, setting goals, and the need to understand the external environment came at the 
top of their uses (mentioned 6 times) [2] long-range decision-making (3 times). 
For Credit managers the most important uses were: [l] improving their credit decisions 
(4 times), [2] setting and amending plans (3 times), 
[3] identifying profitable sectors and trends in the market (3 times), 
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[4] setting credit policies and evaluating credit decisions taken (1 time). 
Financial managers gave 6 different ways that they would put the information into use. 
The most frequently mentioned were: [IJ looking for new markets, new opportunities, 
and new products (7 times); [2] budgeting and planning (5 times); [3] pricing, [4] 
measuring the relative strength of the bank; [5] reducing costs. 
Branch managers believed that the information would help them in: [I] better servicing 
and supporting and retaining their clients (4 times); [2] planning and setting goals (3 
times); [3] attracting new business and growth (2 times); 
[4] taking decisions to fit market conditions (2 times); [5] at the bottom of the list, was to 
avoid risks and to evaluate the bank's position in the market. 
All the interviewees (100%) said they needed information on the external environment 
and the majority of the interviewees (67%) needed wide-scope information. The uses they 
would put that information to all flow into the pool of enhancing DE. The uses mentioned 
could be grouped under improving their decision-making abilities, and setting goals 
better suited to the dynamics of the environment, thereby grasping opportunities they 
would know about through wide-scope information, and to grow in a way suitable to the 
circumstances. 
Broadly relevant information is supported by many researchers (Vandenbosch & Huff, 
1997; Miller, 1993; Brouwens & Abernethy, 2000) [see more in discussion in Section 
4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at PB; and Section 2.5.2, External 
Factors]. Miller (1993, p.120) writes 'Even in successful organizations there are 
occasional small failures that should induce managers to re-examine their premises and to 
gather more broadly relevant information'. Brouwens & Abernethy (2000, p. 223) find 
that 'broad scope information .. .is also externally focused, non-financial, and future 
oriented'. 
The factors in the external environment mentioned by the managers interviewed in PB 
were again mentioned by the survey interviewees apart from circulating rumours, namely: 
economic and political changes, competition, government regulations. 
The views expressed by the interviewees in the survey and the case study about changes 
in the external environment affecting the performance and DE as they affect other 
organisations is shared by many researchers. The need for information on the changes in a 
dynamic external environment applies to banks in Jordan as it does to the banking sector 
in the West (Mabberly, 1992, p.104; Helliar et aI., 2002, pAO). Other researchers 
highlighted the effect of the external environment on organisations in general (Hughes, 
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1965, p. 107; Hall, 1972, p.312; King & Cleland, 1975,p. 289; Simon, 1977, p. 40,121; 
Bromwich, 1990, p. 27; Palmer 1992, p.197; Burns & Stalker, 1994, p.l; Miller, 1993, 
pp. 120,134; Preston, 1995,p. 279; Vfunosi, 2000, p. 50) to name but some. 
Researchers describe the external environment in many ways: as problematic in its 
existence (Weick, 1977, p. 218); can be multi-dimensional (Kirchhoff, 1977, p. 347); and 
no ranking of the importance of factors in the external environments is meaningful or that 
factors can have an isolated effect (Hall, 1972, p. 312). Pennings & Goodman (1977) see 
changes in the external environment as being of a random nature (p. 167), and 
organisations enact part of their own environments (pondy, 1977, p. 230), which in turn 
affect them. 
Hirsch (1975, p. 327) talks of the institutional environment as part of the wider external 
environment that also needs to be considered: 
' ... yet, the relative performance of the industries from which samples are drawn is not 
examined in most studies of DE, largely because their environments are often defined as 
beyond the scope of measures used to assess the major components of each organisation's 
task environment' (Hirsch, 1975, p. 328). 
The effect of the institutional environment came out clearly in the survey. Even in the 
case where respondents said that they were· interested in only a few variables in the 
external environment, information on other banks was mentioned as a focus of interest. 
Burns & Scapens (2000, p.5) recognise that 'many accounting practices can both shape 
and be shaped by the institutions, which govern organizational activity'. 
The international institutional influence on the Iordanian banking sector comes mainly 
through international banking standards with which CBI requires Jordanian banks to 
comply. Those regulations affected the design and role of MAS as well in Jordanian 
banks as discussed further in the case study [see Section 4.8.3, Information on CBJ 
Directives and Regulations; and Section 2.5.1.3, MAS Practice in Other Countries]. 
5.9.2.2 How Survey Interviewees Got Information Needed 
After clearly indicating the need for information on the external environment [Exhibit 5.8, 
Need for Information on the External Environment in JCB; and Exhibit 5.9, Uses of 
Information on the External EnviroruTIent in JCB], the respondents were given choices in 
question 4 regarding whether they actually received such information for planning and 
decision-making through current MAS reports. Four respondents said !yes' and 8 said 'to 
a satisfactory extent' adding up to 40% of those interviewed who got the information 
[Exhibit 5.10, MAS Reports on the External Environment and Their Frequency]. The 
289 
respondents who answered with an emphatic 'yes' were the ones who also said that they 
preferred information on few variables in the external environment, a matter that reflects 
on the nature of information included in MAS reports as dealing with a limited number of 
variables. On the other hand, 60% of the respondents said 'No' and 'to some extent': 
'We need more information ... more accurate and more specialised as it helps me in 
achieving goals' (interview 23). 
And: 'MAS reports do not serve my purpose' (interview 12). 
Different reasons were mentioned such as: 
Exhibit 5.1 0 
lE' MASR h E d tit . F eports on t e xtema nVlronment an elr 
Item DM CM 
(N=30) (n=8) (n=8) 
External environment infonnation actually 
received 63% 12% 
Overall percentage 47% 
Needed periodic MAS reports 50% 50% 
Overall percentage 53% 
Needed periodic and ad hoc reports 
Overall percentage 40% 50% 50% 
. JC requencvm B 
FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) 
50% 25% 
63% 37% 
37% 63% 
'We get information through the Statistics Department but it is contradictory information' 
(interview 27). 
And: 'Reporting is not comprehensive enough ... this requires of me a lot of manual work 
to consolidate data from different reports to produce meaningfol information on the basis 
of which one could make educated decisions' (interview 10). 
And: '1 inherited the reports 1 receive from the previous manager ... we need to update the 
reports ... the quality and components should be more detailed and more .comprehensive ' 
(interview 15). 
And, on a similar note: 
'A lot of the MAS reports do not provide detailed information ... so 1 do not seriously look 
into them' (interview 29). 
These comments suggest that what they got was less than they needed whether in terms 
of breadth, detail, or quality totalling up to 60% of the respondents. 
On the issue of timing of information, 53% of all those interviewed [Exhibit 5.10, MAS 
Reports on the External Environmept and Their Frequency] said they would prefer to 
receive information on the external environment periodically to stay updated on the 
changes in elements of the external environment specified earlier as economic, political, 
social factors, competition, government regulations, and technological changes. 
'The timing of the information is important ... some information 1 get late ... so 1 have to set 
different scenarios ... this affects my work adversely' (interview 24). 
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The rest of those interviewed (i.e. 47% of the respondents) felt that they needed ad hoc 
reports in addition to periodic reports in order to be updated and infonned on particular 
issues that periodic reports might not deal with regularly. It also reflects on the dynamism 
of the external environment that they have to react and pro-act to. 
For a closer look at individual functions, deposit managers' replies to question 4 did not 
confonn to the overall pattern. Those deposit managers who said 'yes' and 'to a 
satisfactory extent' to actually receiving infonnation for planning and decision-making 
through current MAS rerorts comprised 63 % of all the deposit managers interviewed 
compared to the overall percentage of 40%. The answers indicate that the majority got 
their infonnation on the external environment through MAS reports. 
The deposit managers were split in half with 50% preferring to receive periodic reports 
and 50% preferring to receive periodic as well as ad hoc reports, which is in line with the 
overall percentage of 47% 
Credit managers/deputy managers were not happy with the infonnation they received on 
the external environment through MAS reports. Only one respondent out of the entire 
credit managers' category said that he was quite satisfied with the MAS reports provided. 
Out of those who were not happy with the information they got, two respondents (25%) 
clearly said that they did not actually receive infonnation on the external environment at 
all. Five respondents (63%) answered that they had 'to some extent' information on 
changes in the variables in the external environment totalling 88%. This is much higher 
than deposit managers at 37%. It is worth mentioning here that two respondents of the 
five mentioned in the 'to some extent' group said that they complemented the minimum 
information they needed to do their work by information obtained through personal 
efforts. 
Using personal efforts to get information was mentioned by a number of managers 
interviewed in the case study as a means of obtaining information. The sources mentioned 
by ili.ose interviewed in the survey were the same as in the case study, namely the media, 
colleagues, acquaintances, Central Bank of Jordan publications, and other banks' 
publications [see Section 4.9.1.1, How PB Interviewees Got Information Needed]. 
As to the timing element, 50% of the credit managers/assistant managers interviewed said 
they needed MAS reports to inform and update them periodically. The other 50% said 
that, in addition to the periodic reports, they also needed ad hoc reports on emerging 
issues when they need them. 
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Financial managers in the JCB were happier with infonnation on the external 
environment than their credit manager counterparts. Half of the respondents in this 
category said that they got what they needed to a satisfactory extent, and just one 
respondent said (s)he did not actually get infonnation. Three interviewees (37%) said 'to 
some extent' . 
As to the timing of the reports, the financial managers were more in favour of periodical 
reports (63 %) compared to 37% preferring to receive, in addition to periodical reports ad 
hoc reports. 
A number of explanations can be given regarding the clear preferences of the financial 
managers. In all banks apart from one, the financial managers were among the originators 
of MAS reports if not the only ones. Those reports addressed their needs more than they 
did in the case of others. The task of providing information was once again assigned to a 
department while a different unit used them (Swanson, 1983, p. 220). As will be made 
clear later on, financial managers lfinancial controllers needed more information for 
feedback control purposes than for planning and decision-making, bearing in mind that 
the control they exercised was ex post control [Exhibit 5.11 Functions in Which MAS 
Reports were More Helpful in JCB]. 
F unctIOns In W IC eports were more 
Exhibit 5.11 
h' hMASR elpl In HI ful' JCB 
(N=30) OM CM FM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
More in planning 
Overall percentage 9% 12% 12% 12% 
More in decision-making 
Over percentage 6% 0% 25% 0% 
More in control 
Overall percentage 72% 12% 63% 63% 
Equally 
Overall percentage 25% 75% 0% 25% 
BM 
(n=8) 
0% 
0% 
100% 
0% 
Branch managers showed the same pattern as credit managers, with 75% of the branch 
managers saying that they did not actually receive infonnation on the external 
environment about which all of the interviewees and not only branch managers said they 
needed to know. Out of the eight branch managers, 25% said that they did receive 
infonnation or that they did so 'to a satisfactory extent'. 
The pattern found with the financial managers/financial controllers, deposit, and credit 
managers was reversed in the case of branch managers. It seems that branch managers are 
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more interested in getting ad hoc reports and periodic reports (63%) to deal with non-
recurring cases in the market that they came across in their work more than getting 
periodic reports (37%) that could be too late or not covering issues that are of current 
interests to branch managers as timely information in terms of speed and frequency has 
the potential to reduce uncertainty (Brouwens & Abernethy, 2000, p. 223). 
5.9.2.3 Sources ofInformation on the External Environment in JCB 
Sources of information on the external environment available to the managers 
interviewed for the purposes of decision-making and planning were: 
(a) statistics published by government; 
(b) internal reports and data bases; 
(c) personal efforts. 
(a) Statistics published by government bodies: Those statistics were criticised by almost 
all interviewees in the survey as they were in the case study [see Section 4.9.1.1, How PB 
Interviewees Got Information Needed). The criticisms centred round the issues of 
inaccuracy, unreliability, and lateness as can be found in the following quotations: 
'Government statistics are not reliable' (interview 3 & 4). 
And: 'Government statistics on the economy are always late in relation to economic 
changes' (interview 8). 
And: 'We like to get more information .. , more accurate and more specialised as it is 
this type of information that helps me in achieving goals' (interview 23). 
And: 'We have information through the Department of Statistics but it is contradictory 
information' (interview 27). 
(b) Internal reports and data bases: These will be discussed under characteristics and 
design ofMAS reports in JCB [Section 5.13). 
(c) Personal efforts: Some survey interviewees (17%) relied on their personal efforts to 
get information. Although the questions did not include questions about whether the 
managers interviewed used personal effort or personal means to get information on the 
external environment as the focus is the role of MAS, they explained it by: 
'I rely on my personal effort to get information' (interviews 14 & 13). 
And ' ... Each on of us does hislher own research ... 1 am happy with it this way or else 
they would send me information that 1 do not really need in targeting my market' 
(interview 27). 
The managers interviewed in the case study had the same opinion. At PB managers who 
said that their work was affected by the external environment got information to varying 
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degrees through personal efforts. The sources for information to which the managers 
interviewed resorted were such as media, clients, friends, publications of the Jordanian 
Banks' Association [see discussion in Section 4.9.1.1, How PB Interviewees Got 
Information Needed]. 
5.9.2.4 Information on the Internal Environment in JCB 
When asked about MAS reports they received on the internal environment, 73% of the 
survey respondents said they needed more information than was provided by MAS 
reports (Q 16) [Exhibit 5.12, Need for More Information on the Internal Environment in 
JCB], 
'Until now I am not able to take decisions I am a happy with due to the absence of an 
information system' (interview 12). 
And: 'Reporting is not comprehensive enough ... this requires me to do a lot of manual 
work, to consolidate data from different reports to produce meaningful information on the 
basis of which one could make educated decisions' (interview 10). 
And: 'What I would like to get is my branch budget' (interview 18) 
Exhibit 5.12 
Need for More information on the Internal Environment in JCB 
Item DM CM FM BM 
(N=30) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Need more information 50% 88% 50% 75% 
Overall average 73% 
Two respondents of the 37% who did not need more information than they were getting 
said that they got all that they needed on the internal environment through committee 
meetings thus compensating for what MAS reports lacked. 
When I asked what other information they might be looking for, respondents gave 10 
different types of internal information they felt were needed for their work. The main 
types are shown in Exhibit 5.13, Types of Internal Information Needed by the Survey 
Interviewees. 
I asked the interviewees for what purposes they needed the information identified. Of the 
21 respondents who said they needed more information on the internal environment, 73% 
needed it for planning and decision-making, 14% needed it for control, and 14% for 
coordination. 
Looking at what information was available to managers on what was going on in other 
departments in their banks obviously explains what came in response to question 16 when 
76% said they needed more information on the internal environment to enhance their 
abilities in planning and decision-making. 
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I 
2 
3 
4 
Types 0 Internal In onnatlOn e e byt e f 
Exhibit 5.13 
Neddb h S I urv~ ntervlewees 
Times 
mentioned TYl'e of internal infonnation 
9 times The work of other departments such as structure of deposits, credit 
facilities, other departments' goals 
5 times Information on the bank's new and existing services 
2 times Customers' profiles 
2 times Corporate goals and plans 
Question 14 asked what it was that they were informed about on the internal environment 
of their banks, and how helpful it was in planning and decision-making. More than 37 
different items were specified. The information can be categorised as shown in Exhibit 
5.14, Types ofInternal Information Provided to the Survey Interviewees. 
Exhibit 5.14 
T lypes 0 fIt IIfi n erna n onnatlOn P ·d d t th S rOVl e 0 e I urvey. ntervlewees 
Times Types of internal information provided 
mentioned 
I 17 times Infonnation connected to HR regulations, and administrative 
notices and news 
2 11 times Infonnation on the bank's new products 
3 4 times Information on the bank's profits and revenues 
4 3 times Customer satisfaction 
5 2 times Information on the bank's budget 
Half of the Deposit managers (50 %, 4 out of 8 respondents) said they got what they 
needed on the internal environment. As to what type of information the other 50% 
needed, the answers differed from information on credit facilities and deposits to the need 
to be informed before any changes are introduced to computer programmes to 
information on customers' and products' profiles. 
As to why they needed this information, the answers of those four who said they needed 
more information could be grouped under: (1] planning and -decision-making needs (3 
times); [2] control and evaluation needs (2 times). 
Looking at the credit managers, only one respondent when asked said he got what he 
needs. The rest (7 respondents) believed that what they got was not enough. The eight 
types of other information they felt they needed for purposes of planning and decision-
making were varied. The answers given can be grouped under: 
[1] information on structure of deposits in the bank; 
[2] information on new services; 
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[3] information on credit products other than retail and corporate credit; 
[4] information on plans of opening new branches. 
Financial managers showed a very close pattern to deposit managers with 50 % saying 
they did not need internal information other than which was provided to them. The 
remaining half was not satisfied with the internal information. Those who needed more 
information on the internal environment indicated that they needed more analysed 
information, better timing of reports for planning purposes (2 respondents), and more 
accurate i!lformation (1 respondent). 
Branch managers, 75% said they needed more internal information than they received. 
The information needed by unsatisfied managers were, apart from one, information for 
planning and decision-making purposes, such as on the liquidity position of the bank, the 
bank's investment portfolio, and information on new services. 
A longitudinal case study by Helliar et al. (2002, p. 44) on a British bank extending over a 
period of six years showed the evolution of MAS reporting over the years. It showed that 
the 'Bank's profitability reporting system had been affected by the development of new 
products and a change in the management accounting culture within the Bank'. This 
brings to mind the clear emphasis which both credit and branch managers put on their 
need to know about new services and customer and product profitability, which seems to 
apply to banks in both countries. 
Helliar et al. also noted that: 
'the financial engineering did not develop in the banking industry until the 1980's ... the 
pace of change in both external and internal factors increased dramatically during the 
1980's and 1990's, and this had both a direct and indirect impact on the Bank's need for 
better information about its business processes in order to maintain its financial viability' 
(pp.48, 50). 
Mabberly (1992) makes a similar to Helliar et al. in financial institutions 'any internal 
information has been limited to conventional budgetary control' (p. 4), and that the ability 
of MAS to identify unprofitable processes and products as one of the major difficulties 
facing financial institutions (p. 171). 
5.1 0 Diffusion ofInformation in JeB 
This section looks into whether the available information was sufficiently diffused 
through the surveyed banks' structures, and the reasons which the interviewees believed 
hindered the diffusion of information. This will be compared to the findings from the case 
study and other researchers' work. The interview guide used in the interviews dealt with 
the effects of centralisation of information, technology used in communicating 
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infonnation and the use of computers, internal politics, bureaucracy, and information 
gatekeepers in providing the necessary and sufficient infonnation for each manager 
within each bank. 
5.10.1 Factors Hindering the Diffusion ofInfonnation in JCB 
There were some factors within the PB that were found to have affected the role which 
MAS played in enhancing OE. The effect came from factors that were part of the 
organisational structure, such as the structured flow of infonnation. Other factors were 
infonnal organisational factors such as internal politics. The case study showed that there 
were gaps in communication, feelings of insecurity, internal politics, centralisation of 
infonnation, excessive bureaucracy, lack of documented procedures, and problems 
relating to the organisational structure [Section 4.1 0, Factors Hindering the Diffusion of 
Infonnation at PB]. 
5.10.1.1 Centralisation ofInfonnation in JCB 
One of the findings relating to the organisational structure of PB was that the 
centralisation of infonnation affected the availability and diffusion of infonnation 
[Exhibit 4.15, Structural and IT Problems Affecting MAS Design and Operation and Goal 
Achievement at PB]. Centralisation, whether it came as a result of the fonnal 
organisational structure, self-appointed infonnation gatekeepers, or internal politics, 
affected the availability of infonnation thereby negatively affecting goals achievement 
andOE. 
To look at this in the survey population, questions 19 and 20 asked about infonnation 
gatekeepers and internal politics as aspects of the unstructured centralisation of 
infonnation, and the structured centralisation of infonnation in the organisational 
structure of the eight banks. The questions also asked how the existence of those 
phenomena affected respondents' work with regard to planning, decision-making, and 
control to assess the effect on goals achievement and subsequently OB. 
5.1 0.1.2 Internal Politics in JCB 
When respondents were asked [QI9] whether they believed that internal politics existed 
at the bank, 56% said 'yes'. The percentage was brought down by the 37% of financial 
managers who said the phenomenon was not found at their banks [Exhibit 5.15, Effects of 
the Centralisation ofInfonnation, Infonnation Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCB]. 
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Exhibit 5.15 
Efti t fC tr r ti fI fi f ·1fi f Gtk ec so en a lsa ono norma IOD, n onna IOn a e eepers, &1 t IP r' . JCB nerna o lues In 
DM CM FM BM 
(N=30) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Existence of centralisation of infonnation 
Overall percentage 67% 50% 63% 75% 63% 
Existence of infonnation gatekeepers 
Overall percentage 47% 63% 50% 37% 25% 
Existence of internal politics 
Overall percentage 56% 63% 63% 37% 63% 
Negative effect on planning 
Overall percentage 63% 37% 88% 25% 63% 
Negative effect on decision-making 
Overall percentage 54% 50% 37% 25% 63% 
Negative effect on control 
Overall percentage 59% 37% 50% 37% 75% 
Some of the respondents' answers explained the reasons internal politics existed: 
'Internal politics ... more due to lack of professional attitUde and negative relations 
hetween head office and branches ' (interview 12). 
And: 'It is a cultural issue .. .Jordanians like to keep information to themselves, it makes 
them feel powerful' (interview 10). . 
And: 'They (some managers) need to express their importance so they interfere in the 
providing of information , (interview 15). 
Those who believed that internal politics were not found - although being a much smaller 
percentage (37 %) than those who believed in its existence- could have a number of 
. explanations for their belief. One explanation could simply mean they were not aware of 
its existence, or never came across it in their dealings with other employees of the bank. 
Another explanation might be they did not feel comfortable to acknowledge the fact, as 
they might have regarded it as a sign of weakness in the organisation rather than as a 
phenomenon that exists in any 'social system' in varying degrees and not peculiar to JCB. 
On the play of internal politics within a social entity, Giddens (1995, p.IOS) writes that 
'there are thus political and economic aspects of all social systems which have some 
enduring existence'. Giddens as well as many other researchers (e.g. Gross, 1965, p. 211; 
Pettigrew, 1972, p. IS8; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 206; Argyris, 1971, p. B-279; Mason 
& Mitroff, 1973, p. 483; Bariff & Galbrith, 1978, p. 15; Puxty, 1993, p. 91; Miller, 
1993,p. 126; Burns & Stalker, 1994, pp. 101, 146, 152; Granlund, 2001, p. 162) agree on 
the role which internal politics play within an organisation. 
If we look at the. interviewees from the perspective of their functions, 63% deposit, 
branch, and credit managers believed that internal politics was found at their banks: 
298 
' ... On my level the existence of internal politics bothers me more than having information 
gatekeepers' (interview 4). 
It is worth mentioning here that among the 3 deposit managers (37%) who said that the 
phenomenon of internal politics did not exist in their respective banks there was an 
assistant general manager who had a positive outlook on almost all issues. 
As for financial managers, 37 % believed that internal politics found at their respective 
banks, which is a much lower percentage than in the case of deposit, branch, and credit 
managers. 
Financial managers on the whole felt that they were in a good position to get information 
and keep it centralised in their departments. This could be a possible explanation for the 
difference between the beliefs of the financial managers and the managers in other 
functions. 
Bariff & Galbrith (1987, p. 15) agree and explain that accountants and MIS staff share 
the ability 'to acquire power for themselves' and affect the redistribution of power of 
users of accounting and other information as they are the providers of 'information, 
materials and other services to support users'. Bums & Stalker (1994, pp. 146, 152) also 
report on the use of information as a means of playing internal politics and that it resulted 
in reducing OE. They continue to say that 'information may become an instrument for 
advancing, attacking, and defending status'. Similar beliefs were expressed by 
Whittington (1992, p. 685), Wetherbe (1991, p. 55), Markus & Pfeffer (1983, p. 206), 
Mason & Mitroff(1973, p. 483), Argyrls (1971, p. B-279), Pettigrew (1972, p. 188), and 
Gross (1965, p. 211). 
Given the influence of family and tribal affiliations in Jordanian society, one particular 
matter that can be added to the above is that internal politics can also be influenced by 
personal contacts and family ties (Whittington, 1992, p. 695) [see discussion in Section 
4.22, Effects of External Culture on Organisational Structure at PB; and Section 5.28, 
Cultural Effects on Diffusion ofInformation in JCB]. 
Wetherbe (1991, p. 55), after acknowledging the existence and effect of internal politics, 
. suggests that top management can deal with it by cross-functional design. Chia (2000, p. 
260) reported his findings that 'the implementation of MAS may not be effective in 
reducing the information asymmetry problem of moral hazard unless other monitoring 
devices are in place and functioning effectively'. 
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As to the effect which internal politics had on the interviewees' ability in planning, 
decision-making and control, this will be discussed along with the effect of centralisation 
of information and of information gatekeepers in Section 5.1 0.1.3 below. 
5.10.1.3 Structured Centralisation ofInformation and Information Gatekeepers 
The survey interviewees' responses showed that 67 % believed that information was 
centralised at their banks. As for information gatekeepers, 47% of the interviewees 
believed that there were also gatekeepers. Again, the percentaee of information 
gatekeepers was brought down by the financial managers of whom 63% said there were 
no information gatekeepers at their banks [Exhibit 5.16, Consequences of Centralisation 
of Information in JCB; and Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, 
Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics and their Effect]. 
Exhibit 5.16 
Consequences 0 Centralisatton 0 In ormation In J B f f fi C 
Times mentioned Effect 
I 9 times Delays work 
2 4 Reports do not contain enough details 
3 2 Incorrect information 
Similar opinions were expressed in the case study where 54 % of the managers 
interviewed believed that there was centralisation of information at PB [see discussion in 
Section 4.10.4, Centralisation of Information at PB]. 
One respondent had an opinion on this when I met him/her for a second follow up 
meeting after six months after our first meeting. 
The change of senior and middle managers did not change anything .. .1 believe it is the 
mentality of Jordanians ... a cultural matter' (interview 13). 
This was a comment on the big changes introduced by the general manager of the bank 
(after assuming his position a year earlier) to create a more dynamic and effective work 
climate by replacing the older generation of managers with younger managers. The 
comment of the interviewee above reflects the feeling of frustration as it was revealed that 
the problems management of the bank faced were not mainly due to the organisational 
structure or attitudes of certain managers but were mainly a reflection of the social culture 
and that they posed a major obstacle that might not be easily surmountable. 
Whether this affected the work of the respondents and, if so, how it affected their work 
was looked at in question 20 in terms of planning, decision-making, and control. Only 3 
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respondents (10%) said that the three phenomena had a positive effect on their planning, 
decision-making and control. The remaining 90% mentioned a number of negative 
effects. Some just said it was a negative effect without specifying what it was. 
The most frequently mentioned effect was: [1] the phenomena delayed their work; [2] 
MAS reports did not contain the details needed by the interviewees; [3J users received 
incorrect information. What follows from this is the extent of suitability and plausibility 
of goals set, plans and decisions made under such circumstances and how that would 
affect OE [Exhibit 5.16, Consequences of Centralisation of Information in JCB]. 
Deposit managers as a group showed a lower percentage, 50% believed there was 
centralisation of information (67 % overall percentage). However, 63 % believed there 
were information gatekeepers compared to the overall responses of 47% [Exhibit 5.15, 
Effects of Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in 
JeB. 
As to how the three phenomena affected their planning activities, 37 % of the deposit 
managers said it caused delays, and 25 % said it hindered them from doing their work, 
which naturally would be reflected in their ability to achieve their departmental goals and 
subsequently corporate goals resulting in a lower OE. 
What applied to planning also applied to decision-making. Once again delays in taking 
decisions were mentioned by 50 % of respondents. This in one deposit manager's opinion 
took its toll on customers' relations and quality of work. 
Control exercised by deposit managers/assistant managers was also affected by 
centralisation of information, internal politics, and information gatekeepers in the same 
way as planning and decision-making as mentioned by 37% of the deposit managers. 
In the case of those interviewed in the credit departments, whether assistant general 
managers or corporate credit department managers or assistant credit managers, 63 % of 
these interviewed (5 interviewees) said that there was centralisation of information in 
theirrespective banks, which is slightly lower than the overall percentage of 67%. Half of 
the credit interviewees (50%) said that there were information gatekeepers, compared to 
the overall percentage of 63% [Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, 
Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCB]. 
There was a single interviewee (interview 21) - an isolated case - who said that none of 
the three phenomena was to be found in his bank. Looking at the answers of the three 
others interviewed in the same bank as the respondent in interview 21, we find that one 
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respondent said there was centralisation of information, two said there were information 
gatekeepers and one said there was internal politics at the bank. 
It is true that all respondents answered the questions from their own personal perspective 
but there is the question as to why the opinions of the other three interviewees at the same 
bank were so different from his. It is worth mentioning here that the credit manager 
whom I interviewed in this particular bank has been working for that same bank for 
almost 20 years and his assistant was present during the interview upon his request to 
help him in answering the questions (or so I was told). 
The way in which credit managers found that the three phenomena affected their work in 
planning [Q 20] was commented on in interview 11: 'Substantially ... ] cannot plan or 
decide based on incorrect information '. 
The phenomenon reduced their effectiveness in setting of plans (4 interviewees) by 
creating red tape routine, delaying work, and providing inaccurate information. One 
corporate credit manager [interview 19] explained it as • managers at the bank belong to 
different schools '. 
One respondent [interview 6] believed that centralisation of information made his work 
easier. The explanation he gave was that, with information centralised in one department, 
this meant he would know where to get it from, and would not have to chase around 
looking for the information he needed in the different departments of the bank. 
In decision-making, 63 % of the credit respondents said that centralisation of information 
in all its forms did not affect their decision-making processes. The explanation was that, 
keeping in mind that commercial banks get more than._ 90% of the profits from credit 
facilities, when it came to granting credit to an applicant all the necessary information had 
to be obtained or else no decision would be taken. This information they got from credit 
applications, which were not part of MAS information. It needs to be pointed out here 
that the credit interviewees all seemed to concentrate on short-term decisions when 
answering question 20 relating to deciding whether to approve a credit application or not. 
The phenomena seemed to affect credit managers more in controlling the work of their 
departments and monitoring implementation. Of the eight respondents 50% said that they 
were negatively affected, whereas one respondent believed that the phenomena had a 
positive effect. 
If we look at the credit managers who said that the phenomena did not affect them in 
planning it was because they depended on personal means to get the information which 
they needed. As for decision-making, the reasons that were mentioned by the respondents 
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were that they relied on detailed and comprehensive credit applications to get information 
and not from MAS reports. In control no clear answers were given as to why their ability 
to control their departments and implementation was not affected. 
When the financial managers were asked questions 19 and 20,75 % of them said that 
there was centralisation of information at their respective banks. And 37 % of the 
respondents (3 interviewees out of 8) believed that information gatekeepers were found in 
their banks. Perrow (1970 as quoted by Hopper, 1980, p. 402) ascribed managers' 
resentment of the rower of accountants to the centralised structures of finance and 
consequent neglect of managers' information needs. 
A single financial manager said that none of the phenomena was to be found at his/her 
bank but, at the same time, all the other three interviewees in the same bank believed that 
the phenomena were found at the bank. 
As to how the phenomena affected financial managers in planning, 75% said that they 
were not affected. Some of the answers given were that they were not involved in 
planning for their department to start with. 
'A financial department does not have goals' (interview 8). 
Two respondents said that the effect on their work was translated into delays in work and 
blocking their ability to take action. 
At the other end of the spectrum, one respondent said that the centralisation of 
information helped herlhim to get accurate and up-dated information much quicker from 
one source, while another financial controller experienced that: 
'centralisation is causing bottlenecks' (interview 15). 
The same situation was expressed by the respondents when they were asked about 
decision-making. A majority of 75 % said they were not affected, as they were not 
involved in the first place. A single respondent in this category said that it affected the 
quality of hislher work [Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, 
Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCBj. 
On control, 63% said the phenomena affected their ability to control with the implications 
for the quality of their work as opposed to planning and decision-making where 25% of 
the deposit managers were negatively affected by centralisation of information: 
' ... 1 have to go back and evaluate the iiiformation given to me instead of having clear 
correct information' (interview 11). 
As pointed out above in the quotation from interview 8, financial managers/financial 
controllers were not involved in planning, but control -with emphasis on the short-term-
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was an important part of their jobs since the majority of the respondents in this category 
(75%) were in charge of budgetary control. 
Branch managers believed there was centralisation of information (63%), which is more 
than the other three categories of respondents. However, 25% believed that there were 
information gatekeepers. 
As to how did the phenomena that existed in the branch managers' opinions affect 
planning and decision-making, 63% of the branch managers believed they had a 
substantial negative effect on availability of information. 
One explanation given by the three who said that the phenomena had no effect on them 
said: 'it depends on how good hislher relations are with other head office managers' 
(interview 14). Another manager said that the phenomena had a small negative effect on 
herlhis work. The third branch manager believed that the phenomenon of centralisation of 
information had a positive effect on the flow of information as it provided a regular flow. 
On control 75, % of the branch managers felt that the existence of the three phenomena 
had a large negative effect on their ability to control. 
The branch managers come out as the least content of the four groups. Throughout the 
answers they expressed the need to have more say over the managing of their branches. 
Centralisation of information prevented them from setting their own plans, and 
insufficient authority prevented them from taking the decisions they felt were most 
suitable. Branch managers were also not provided with proper channels to provide 
feedback information to head office. 
On the unstructured centralisation of information due to internal politics and information 
gatekeepers, Miller (1993) writes that information can be an instrument of power (p. 126) 
with which many other researchers agree, then he continues to say that 'power begets 
power' and those who have it might be unmotivated to give it up (p. 125). Roberts & 
Scapens (1985) believe that 'accounting researchers have not explicitly recognised the 
use of accounting as an instrument of domination i.e. power' (p. 449), but information is 
not neutral and can be used politically. 
5.11 Organisational Structure in JCB 
In the PB case study, the organisational structure ofPB was found to be one of the factors 
that hampered the role of MAS by decreasing the quality, quantity, and the effectiveness 
of the flow of information within MAS [Section 4.10.1, Channels of Communication; and 
Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PBj. 
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Elements relating to organisational structure for enhancing the flow of information were 
identified in the case study [Exhibit 4.13, Elements in Organisational Structure that 
Hinder the Flow of Information J. I included them in the interview guide used in the 
survey to find out whether they also worked for the other JCB [Exhibit 5.5, Elements in 
Organisational Structure in Enhancing the Role ofMAS in Enhancing OE]. 
On the above I asked the survey interviewees questions 17-20. I started by asking a 
general question on what in the respondents' opinion were the elements of organisational 
structure that allowed the smooth flow of inforIPation for effective goals setting, and why 
those elements were important to herlhim. Then I asked specifically whether the 
respondents faced any problems with the delineation of responsibilities among 
departments and managers and channels of communication. Questions 19 and 20 
concerned the centralisation of information - whether it was part of the formal structure of 
the organisation or as a result of self-appointed information gatekeepers (managers) who 
managed to wield power and used it to promote their own interests, and how was all that 
reflected in planning, decision -making, and control [discussed earlier in Section 5.10.1, 
Factors Hindering the Diffusion ofInformation in JCBj. 
Following what was done in the case study, the analysis will discuss the effects which 
structural factors had on MAS in terms of providing information and in the sufficient 
diffusion of information in each of the eight banks. 
5.11.1 Elements Decisive in the Organisational Structure of JCB for the Flow of 
Information 
All those I interviewed in the course of the survey had been working· in the banking 
industry most of their working lives and, in many cases, all of their working lives. In one 
isolated case one interviewee was recruited a year before from outside the banking 
industry. 
The periods they have been in banking ranged from 7- 25 year~ (2 of those I interviewed 
retired shortly after I interviewed them). Also, most of the managers interviewed have 
been working for the same bank for most of their working lives. Consequently the 
respondents have gained reasonable experience in banks and at times valuable experience. 
Furthermore, most of the respondents held senior positions in their banks which gave 
them the opportunity and a perspective to compare and weigh the value of those practices 
which worked and why as well as those practices which did not. I was interested to know 
about the work experience of each interviewee and asked informally about it. I felt that 
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this would help me - though not in all cases - to evaluate the answers (s)he was giving 
me, particularly that I was asking questions that needed knowledge and experience and 
soundness of judgement (Chan & Lynn, 1993, p. 93). 
In question 17 each interviewee was asked what were in hislher opinion the elements 
decisive for a smooth flow of information within the bank for effective goals setting. The 
answers given can be listed under nine categories [Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organisation 
Structure Decisive for the Flow of information]. The elements that were mentioned far 
more than the others were well-defmed and stable responsibilities and authorities, 
communication channels, and coordination among managers and departments, followed 
by the need for specialised departments for the different functions at the bank. It would be 
safe to say that the elements identified either worked for the respondents or were found to 
be lacking in the banks they worked for [Exhibit 5.18, Elements in Organisation Structure 
Decisive for the Flow ofInfonnation per Function]. 
Exhibit 5.1 7 
El . 0 StuD .. t< h FI ements ID rgamsatIOn truc re eCISlve or t e owo fIt< . leB n ormation In 
Frequency 
N=30 Element Case study 
I 47% Stable well-defined responsibilities and * 
authority 
2 40% Communication channels • 
3 37% Coordination * 
4 27% Dtlpartments with specialised functions 
5 23% Work procedures • 
6 20% Decentralisation • 
7 20% Human factor • 
8 J% Job descriptions • 
.. 
* Elements mentroned In ExhibIt 4.13, Elements In OrgamsatIOnal Structure that Hmder the Flow of InfonnatlOn 
The identification of coordination and communication brings to mind what Lewin & 
Minton (1986, p. 528) say on the topic that 'organisational systems that support decision 
making ... (are) designed so as to facilitate interactions and' communications for the 
coordination and control of organisational activities'. 
The next question I asked was why they thought that the elements they have identified 
were of importance. The answers clustered round 'because that's what made their 
performance more effective and efficient' (mentioned 16 times). Another reason was 
because it enhanced communication among managers and departments. Then came 
'because it helps' planning' and it 'made feedback and follow up easier'. [See Exhibit 
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5.19, Functions that Organisational Structure of a Jordanian Commercial Bank should 
Serve]. 
Exhibit 5.18 
Elements in Or9'anisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of InfonnatlOn per Function in JCB 
Element DM CM FM BM 
(N=30) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
1 Coordination 50% 50% 12% 37% 
Overall percentage 37% 
2 Departments with 
specialised functions 
-
25% 37% 50% 
Overall oercenta9'e 27% 
3 Communication channels 25% 50% 63% 25% 
Overall percentage 40% 
4 Stable well-defined responsibilities 
and authority 37% 50% 37% 50% 
Overall percentage 47% 
5 Decentralisation 37% 
-- 12% 37% 
Overall oercentage 20% 
6 Human factor 12% 25% 12% 25% 
Overall oercentage 20% 
7 Job descriptions 12% 
-- 12% 12% 
Overall percenta9'e 1 % 
8 Work procedures 12% 37% 
-- 37% 
Overall percentage 23 % 
Looking at deposit managers -for a close look at each of the four functions- their 
answers for Q 17 on decisive elements of organisational structure can be grouped under 
[see Exhibit 5.18, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for Flow of Information 
per Function 1: 
(1) coordination among department (mentioned 4 times); 
(2) communication channels (2 times); 
(3) well-delineated departments (3 times); 
(4) shorter hierarchy (3 times). 
Ihe elements the deposit managers named follow the pattern of the overall interviews 
outlined earlier. 
The reasons deposit managers gave for their choices were also in harmony with all the 
other respondents .. They said that those elements of the organisational structure improve 
communication so ideas and information can be exchanged and with greater ease. The 
second reason was delays would be avoided i.e. perfonning tasks would be more effective 
and efficient as shown in Exhibit 5.19 above. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
F h 0 unctions t at 
Function 
Exhibit 5.19 
I rgantsatlOna Structure of JCB should Serve 
Make perfonnance of staff more effective and efficient 
Enhance communication among departments and managers 
Help in planning 
Make feedback and follow-up easier 
The eight credit managers iaentified 10 elements in the organisational structure. The 
most frequently mentioned elements were [see Exhibit 5.18, Elements in Organisation 
Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information per Function in JCB]: 
(1) coordination with other departments with a stress on IT department [4 times]; 
(2) documented work procedure [3 times]; 
. (3) clear communication channels [4 times]; 
(4) well-defined responsibilities of departments and individuals [4 times]; 
(5) specialised departments [2 times]. 
As to the reasons why the above elements were specifically identified, the credit 
managers followed the general pattern (Jutlined in Exhibit 5.19, Functions that 
Organisational Structure of a Jordanian Commercial Bank Should Serve. They said those 
elements were needed: (1) to speed matters; (2) to improve coordination; (3) to improve 
control through better accountability, follow up and feedback; and (4) to improve 
planning in general and planning for reducing credit risk in particular. 
As for the financial managers; their identification of elements in the organisational 
structure was quite dispersed. They named 12 elements but three were identified more 
frequently [Exhibit 5.18, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of 
Information per Function in JCB]: 
(I) communication channels (5 times); 
(2) specialised departments (3 times); 
(3) adequate levels of authority (3 times). 
The reasons given by the financial managers/controllers for the choice of elements were: 
(l) to increase efficiency and effectiveness, speed up matters and avoid bottlenecks; (2) to 
enhance communication and exchange of information; (3) to avoid resistance, negative 
reactions from other managers and avoid internal politics. 
Branch managers mentioned nine different elements but the most frequently mentioned 
were: 
308 
(1) assigning adequate authority for each position ( 4 times); 
(2) specialised departments (4 times); 
(3) decentralisation (3 times); 
(4) communication channels (2 times); 
(5) coordination (2 times); 
(6) work procedures (3 times). 
Three of the four elements were shared by the other respondents in deposit, credit, and 
finance. The other two ['decentralisation' and 'assigning proper authority'] were peculiar 
to branch managers and are closely linked together. 
Branch managers did not actively participate in setting their goals as was discussed in 
Section 5.9.1 on goal-setting: 
'/ know the needs of my customers better than top management ... they do not give us 
sufficient authority ... no explanations' (interview 28). 
Or as another branch manager explained: 
' ... A client is a manager's client and not the bank's client' (interview 14). 
Most of them complained that head office did not give them enough authority and, at 
times, none to grant credit or preferential interest rates to existing customers or to try and 
attract new customers. 
'There is no delegation of responsibility or authority commensurate with the position an 
employee holds' (interview 18). 
Everything had to go through Branches Management Department at head office; a matter 
branch managers believed affected their ability to achieve their branch and personal goals 
(Pondy, 1977, p. 233). 
The reasons branch managers gave for the choice of the elements of organisational 
structure above were: [I] to eliminate confusion, delays, and inconsistencies (3 times); [2J 
for coordination with head office (3 times); [3] to achieve better results and improve 
morale (2 times). 
The effect of organisational structure on MAS has been discussed by a great number of 
researchers including Gross (1965), Hughes (1965), Hofstede (1969), Hall (1972), Mason 
& Mitroff (1973), Simon (1977), Hopper (1980), Hopwood (1978), Hannan & Freeman 
(1977), Markus & Pfeffer (1983), Spicer & Ballew (1983), Lewin & Minton (1986), 
Miller (1993), Scapens (1994), Bums & Stalker (1994), Mouristen (1995), Preston 
(1995), Helliar et al. (2002) to mention but some. 
Hopper (1989, p: 408) agrees with the need for the decentralisation of organisations as 
this will make MAS more responsive to managerial demands regarding formats, content, 
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timing, and distribution of data. Wilson & Chua (1993, p.292) express a similar opinion 
on the topic of delegating more authority in this case to branch managers: 
• delegation ensures that localized decisions are made by local managers who have gained 
a specialised stock of knowledge about local conditions ... delegating decision-making 
authority to local managers is intended to lead to higher levels of motivation'. 
Reid (2000, p. 430) sees the link between environment and organisational structure when 
the environment is stable, decision-making is conservative, involving little analysis, and 
the organisational structure would be strongly centralised. However, the market facing 
JCB was highly competitive, surrounded by rapid political, e.:onomic, and technological 
changes which banks' managements cannot choose to ignore for long. 
5.11.2 Delineation of Responsibilities and Authority of Departments in JCB 
Question 18 in its second part asked about a specific feature of organisational structure. 
The case study findings indicated that problems with the delineation of the 
responsibilities of departments and individuals were not clear and needed improvement as 
77% ofPB managers said [see Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at 
PB]. 
In the survey a very similar percentage was found: 75% of the respondents said they 
faced problems with the delineation of responsibilities of departments. In answer to what 
were the problems they faced, 14 respondents [47% of the respondents identified it as the 
most critical element to affect the flow of information] said that the responsibilities of 
sub-departments within larger main departments were not clear. 
The interviewees blamed the organisational structure for the problems with delineation. A 
small number of respondents blamed it on human nature and internal politics [Exhibit 
5.20 Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities in JCB; and Exhibit 5.21, Causes of 
Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities in JCB]. 
For a closer look at deposit managers' opinions, 75% faced problems in the delineation 
of responsibilities of departments one way or another. The problems mentioned were: (1) 
confusion as responsibilities were not clear (50% of the respondents); (2) managers were 
unable to take decisions (25%). 
As to why responsibilities of managers and departments were unclear and undefined, six 
different answers were given. The more frequently mentioned were: (I) job descriptions 
were to blame; (2) some managers were reluctant or too weak to take decisions. Others 
less frequently mentioned were insufficient care for long-term plarming, and systems and 
procedures. 
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Credit managers, as they have been on most of the topics compared to deposit managers, 
were more demanding and uncompromising. In this case 100% faced problems with the 
delineation of responsibilities of departments. Unclear responsibilities were the problem 
mentioned by 63% of the respondents. 
Exhibit 5.20 
ro emsmt e e meatlon 0 P bl . h D r esponsl I Ibes 0 e artments m fR ·H· fD . JCB 
(N:30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Those who faced problems 
Overall percentage 75% 75% 100% 50% 75% 
The reasons behind the problem were many, nine in number. The most frequently 
mentioned can be grouped under: organisational structure (3 times), unclear policies, 
nature of banking, and managers belonging to different schools and sub-cultures. 
Exhibit 5.21 
C auses 0 . th D r f fR ·bT . fD art t· JCB fP bl ro ems m e e mea Ion 0 esponsl I Itles 0 epl mensm 
Frequency Cause ofthe problem 
1 14 times Flaws in the organisational structure 
2 6 Management style 
3 5 Influence ofthe human factor 
4 5 Internal politics 
5 2 Nature of banking 
Financial managers were happier with the delineation of responsibilities of departments 
than were the managers in the other functions. The problem faced by the 50% of financial 
managers/controllers was. the lack of clarity and confusion in responsibilities. The 
problems were caused in their opinion by management style, and the human factor. 
75 % of branch managers/deputy managers faced problems with the delineation of 
responsibilities. In their opinions the causes were: flaws in the organisational structure (5 
times), introduction of new systems or changes in existing ones (2 times), and internal 
politics (1 time). 
As the data in Exhibit 5.20 [Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities of 
Departments in JCB] clearly show, the delineation of responsibilities was a problem the 
majority of managers in JCB faced. The problem with unclear responsibilities and 
authorities occurred par excellence as a result of flaws in the organisational structure 
according to the interviewees. The importance of this is evident in that unclear 
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responsibilities affect the availability of information within a bank and, consequently, the 
quality of planning, decision-making, and accountability. 
It was suggested by some that top management wanted it that way, and made no effort to 
change as it served some other management purposes such as flexibility and allowing 
management to assign tasks to managers as they saw fit. However, what could be seen 
was that the managers interviewed did not feel satisfied with the state of affairs and that 
delayed and confused their efforts and the quality of the outcome. Added to that are the 
psychological effects that need to be considered. 
Wilson & Chua (1993, p. 368) write on the importance of the delineation of responsibility 
that 'a requisite for accountability is (i) a clear definition of the organizational structure; 
(ii) a precise specification of the individual responsibilities so each person knows his 
role' . 
5.11.3 Channels of Communication in JCB 
Based on the finding of the case study, a number of issues relating to channels of 
communications were found to have an effect on information needed for planning, 
decision-making, and control in terms ofthe flow, quantity, and quality of information. 
Respondents to the survey questions were asked whether they faced any problems with 
communication channels. The majority (61%) said they had no problems [Exhibit 5.22, 
Factors Positively Affecting Communication Channels]. 
Exhibit 5.22 
F actors oSltlvelY ectIng ommUfllcatlOn P .. I Afti C Ch I . JCB anne S In 
Factors positively affecting communication channels 
I Organisational structure 
2 Management style 
3 The calibre of staff at the bank 
Those answers give an opportunity to look into the factors that worked for satisfactory 
communication channels and the factors that were identified by 39% of the respondents to 
hinder the effectiveness of communication channels [see Exhibit 5.23, Factors Negatively 
Affecting Communication Channels in JCB]. 
One of the respondents commented on channels of communication by saying: 
'We do not have an efficient channel with top management to decide whether to agree or 
disagree' (interview 18). 
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This was the answer of an interviewee when asked whether (s)he found that his/her 
interpretation of changes in the external environment differed from those of top 
management. 
A second interview commented: 
'There is some delay in receiving information ... planning is an on-going process' 
(interview 8). 
Half of the 39 % who faced problems with communication channels believed the reasons 
behind that was due to the organisational structure of the bank. One third (33%) believed 
internal politics were also responsible for the problems with communication channels 
[Exhibit 5.23, Factors Negatively Affecting Communication Channels in JCB]. 
Exhibit 5.23 
Factors NellatIvelv AffectinlZ Communication Channels in JCB 
Frequency Factors 
I 6 times Organisational structure 
2 4 Internal politics 
3 1 Cultural factor 
4 I Psychological gap between the levels of management 
Exhibit 5.24 
Problems with Communication Channels In JCB 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Faced problems with communication 
channels 37% 50% 37% 50% 
Overall percentalZe 39% 
However, the phenomenon does not seem to be a characteristic of JCB only. Burns & 
Stalker (1994, p. 189) in their research in the late 1950's on Scottish electrical 
manufacturing companies remarked that: 'no concern, it is safe to say, is without political 
or social conflicts which generate, or contribute to, manifest inefficiencies of 
communication within the working organisation'. 
What Burns & Stalker say can be linked to the responses of the interviewees in the survey 
regarding their dissatisfaction with the communication channels through which reports 
and information was passed, and to the role which internal politics played in JCB. 
If we link what is discussed on communication channels with respondents' answers on 
elements decisive for the flow of information for effective goals setting [Exhibit 5.17, 
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Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information in JCBj, 40% 
identified communication channels as the second most frequently mentioned element 
after stable and well-defined responsibilities and authority. 
Looking at deposit managers' responses on communication chanilels we find that 63% 
of deposit managers faced no problems with communication channels, which is in line 
with the overall percentage of 61 %. The remaining 37 % who faced problems believed 
there were due to reasons such as internal politics, organisational structure, and cultural 
factors. 
For credit managers, 50 % said they did not face problems with communication 
channels. This is a lower percentage than the overall average (61 %) and of the deposit 
managers (63%). [See Exhibit, 5.24, Problems with Communication Channels in JCB]. 
Factors relating to organisational structure were named by four respondents including 
tinclear responsibilities and defects in the communication system. Three respondents 
blamed psychological and cultural reasons (such as, the psychological gap between 
management and employees, and internal politics) for the problems faced. 
Financial managers showed a similar pattern to deposit managers with 63% [5 out of 8 
financial managers] saying they faced no problems with communication channels. Two of 
those answered: 
10r the financial department all channels are open (interview 9) 
and '1 am afinancial manager, 1 do not have problems there' (interview 1). 
As for the three financial managers (37 %) who said that they faced problems, the reasons 
given were organisational structure (3 managers), unqualified staff (2 managers), cultural 
problems and internal politics (1 manager). 
Branch managers' opinions were close to those of credit managers, and (50%) said they 
faced no difficulties. Those who did complained about long and unclear channels. One 
manager complained that it was a problem having all communication with head office 
going through a single channel. Frequent changes in organisational structure as a factor 
was mentioned by one manager, which coincides with what was said by PB managers 
about the problems they faced with communication channels due to frequent changes in 
PB's organisational structure [see Section 4.1 0.1, Channels of communication at PB]. 
It was not observed in the survey as remarked by Burns & Stalker (1994, p. 160), that 
'channels of communications becoming attenuated' as a result of so many channels 
around the managers interviewed as was observed in the PB case study at top 
management level. One explanation could be that those interviewed for the survey were 
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mostly senior and not top managers [Exhibit 5.3, Distribution of Interviews According to 
Position]. However, one assistant general manager stated: 
'f need such reports but f do not want to bejloodedwithpaper ... '(interview 13). 
Ineffective communication channels could have grave implications for organisations and 
for the role which MAS is expected to play within organisations when 39% of the survey 
interviewees from eight banks and 55% of the interviewees in PB [see Section 4.12, 
Characteristics and Design ofMAS Reports at PB] clearly stating that they faced different 
problems with communication channels. :he implication of blockages and gaps in 
communication channels could affect management's performance in terms of planning, 
decision-making, and control (Bums & Stalker, 1994, p. 84; Hughes, 1965, p. 93; 
Hofstede, 1968, p. 297; Hall, 1972, p. 292; Pettigrew, 1972, p. 187) and ultimately on the 
OE of an organisation. 
From the answers of the survey interviewees and the discussion, what was found at PB 
was also found in the other Jordanian banks. The elements decisive for the flow of 
information applied to both PB and the survey population, namely the need for a clear 
delineation of responsibilities and authority of departments as well as clear channels of 
communication, and the effect that these factors had on their work in terms of 
effectiveness, efficiency, planning and control also applied in both situations. 
Departments with specialised functions emerged as a new finding in the survey. Although 
it was identified by 27% of the respondents it was of importance to branch managers 
since 50% identified it as result of the difficulties they faced when going back to head 
office through one formal single channel, (which was the Branches' Management 
Department) for consultations, advice, and information. 
5.12 The Design ofMAS in JCB 
In the case study of PB there were a number of findings relating to factors that affected 
the design of MAS. This current section looks into how the contingent factors that 
influenced the design of MAS at PB play a role in the design of MAS in JCB [see Exhibit 
4.14, Factors Affecting Design ofMAS; and discussion in Section 4.11.1, The Design of 
MASatPB]. 
5.12.1 Factors Affecting the Design ofMAS in JCB 
The survey did not extensively cover all of the 13 factors identified in Exhibit 4.14, 
Factors Affecting Design of MAS. Strategies of the organisations 1983, culture, 
interrelation with man and machine were not adequately covered in the questions used for 
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data collection in the survey as there. was a need to keep the research within manageable 
limits for a single researcher, in addition to time constraints. 
5.12.1.1 Corporate Culture in ICB 
The effect of corporate culture as a contingent variable (Hofstsede, 1968) manifested 
itself clearly in MAS at PB and in the survey population and is discussed in Section 5.30, 
Corporate Cultural on Design of MAS in )CB. 
5.12.1.2 Psychology and Problems ofMAS Users in JCB 
The psychology and problems of users (Mason & Mitroff, 1973) ofMAS was not taken 
into consideration in the design of the system at PB [see discussion in Section 4.11.1.6, 
Effects of Psychology of Users on MAS Design at PB; Section 4.12.8, Participation in 
MAS Reports Design at PB; Section 4.13.2.1, Psychologic.al Gap Between Managers and 
Computers at PB]. As a result the majority of the managers encountered problems with it. 
In the survey the responses of those who participated in the design of MAS differed from 
one function to another. The branch managers were the least involved in the process and 
the financial managers the most involved. Examples can be found in Exhibit 5.12, Need 
for More Information on the Internal Environment, where the type of information needed 
differs from one function to another. Another example is the different weightings given 
by the different function to elements in the organisational structure as shown in Exhibit 
5.21, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information per 
Function in ICB and the difference in the psychology and problems of users can also 
found in Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics of MAS Reports in ICB. 
Exhibit 5.25 
Ch aractenstlcs 0 fMASR . JCB e orts m 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Historical reports fTime horizon 
Overall percentage 90% 88% 63% 75% 100% 
More helpful in control orientation 
Overall percentage 60% 37% 67% 63% 100% 
Contain unnecessary detail 
Overall percentage 42% 25% 56%* 50% 37% 
Contain irrelevant information I 
OveralljJercentage 38% 25% 50% 25% 50% 
Do not have sharp focus 
Overall percentage 32% 12% 33%* 44%* 37% 
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I 
I 
I 
• In those marked instances the answers were: some reports lacked focus and some Dol I included the 
answers twice, once in 'agree' and again in 'disagree' and calculated the percentage out of 9 and not 8 
respondents as in the case of all other percentages. 
The credit managers were more demanding of the system than were the deposit managers 
[see for example Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were More Helpful in 
JCB; Exhibit 5.26, The Role of the IT System in MAS in JCB]. One reason might have 
been the financial risk that their jobs entail. Another explanation one can give is the 
different tasks which credit and deposit managers undertake require people v:ith different 
personality attributes. 
Exhibit 5.26 
e o eo t e sy~temm m Th R I f h IT S MAS' JCB 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Helped in planning 88% 25% 72%· 25% 
Overall percentage 55% 
Helped in decision-making 100% 75% 83%** 75% 
Overall percentage 75% 
Helped in control 100% 100% 72%' 100%' 
Overall percentage 90% 
• • Out of7 avaIlable answers 
• •• Out of 6 available answers 
Ansari (1977, p. 105) quotes Mason & Mitroff (1972) as suggesting more varied 
assumptions about a decision-maker's cognitive style so that information systems can be 
better matched with cognitive styles. The fact that both credit and branch managers were 
more dissatisfied with the organisational structure and MAS reports· shows that the 
criticism of the system did not come from certain levels in the hierarchy, but included 
both senior and middle managers. 
The design of MAS in JCB was affected by the psychology and problems of the users, 
and dissatisfied managers recognised its impact on the perfon.nance of their banks. This 
was seen in many areas as discussed at different points, such as the time horizon and 
orientation of information, in the frequency of reports and their formats; in setting goals 
and in performance evaluation. [See discussion in Section 5.13, Design and 
Characteristics ofMAS Reports in JCB; Section 4.12, Characteristics and Design ofMAS 
Reports at PS; and Section 4.11.1.6, Effects of Psychology of Users on MAS Design at 
PB]. 
5.12.1.3 Decision-Making Style in JCS 
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The effect of the decision-making style (Driver & Mock, 1975) of the compilers and 
movers ofMAS was seen in the answers of the respondents to questions that asked about 
the attitude of the management towards the dissemination of information and setting of 
goals [see discussion in Section 5.30, Corporate Culture in JCB; Exhibit 5.27, 
Management Commitment to Diffusion of Information in Jordanian Commercial Bank; 
Exhibit 5.28, Effects of Corporate Culture in JCB on the Role and Operation ofMAS]. 
Exhibit 5.27 
M anagement C ommltment to D'ffu . fInfi C I slono ormatlOn in J B 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Management is sufficiently committed to 
making information available 88% 63% 63% 50% 
Overall percentage 67% 
Management believe that there is 
information that ought not be diffused to 88% 88% 88% 100% 
senior managers 
Overall percentage 91 % 
Need for restricted information for 
planning and decision-making 25% 50% 50% 50% 
Overall percentage 47% 
Exhibit 5.28 
Effects of Corporate Culture in JCB on the Role and Operation ofMAS 
I. Effect on the quantity and quality of information for planning and decision-making 
2. Effect on the diffusion of information to managers 
3. Effect on communication channels 
4. Effect on the delineation of responsibilities and authority of departments 
5. Effect on customer-orientation of the banks . 
It showed a top-bottom style where goals where decided by top management for 
departmental and branch managers. This affected the ability of branch managers to 
achieve their goals and, even when they were able to achieve them, they felt demoralised 
[see for example Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB; and Section 5.16.3, Disagreement 
between Corporate and Departmenta1/branches' Goals and Individual Goals in JCB]. It 
also showed a conflict of personal goals with branch and departmental goals [see 
discussion in Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB; Section 5.16.2, 
Conflict between DepartmentallBranches' Goals and Corporate Goals in JCB; and 
Section 5; 16.3, Disagreement Between Corporate and Departmentallbranches' Goals and 
Individual Goals in JCB]. 
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The goal-setting process and the .lack of information provided on the external 
environment shows the management's decision-making style to be more tuned to control 
than to long-term planning. [See discussion in Section 5.9.2.1, Information on the Internal 
Environment in JCB; Section 5.17.2, Effects of Characteristics of MAS Reports on 
Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; Section 5.17.3, Effects of Management Style on 
Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; and Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS 
Reports were More Helpful in JCB). 
The decision-making style (as shown in discussing org'll1isational structure) heavily 
affected the centralisation of decision-making and the centralisation of information, and 
goal-setting. Information on the internal environments of the banks also shows the 
decision-making style of management, as information that credit and branch managers 
considered important to their work was not made available to them [see discussion in 
Section 5.9.2.4, Information on the Internal Environment in JCB; Section 5.16.1, Effects 
of Goal-Setting Process on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; Section 5.10.1.3, 
Structured Centralisation and Information Gatekeepers in JCBj. 
5.12.1.4 Organisational Structure in JCB 
The effects of organisational structure (Hopper, 1980) on the design and operation of 
MAS are strong as discussed in Section 5.11 Organisational Structure (see Section 
4.11.1.4, Effects of Organisational Structure on MAS Design at PB; Exhibit 5.16, 
Consequences of Centralisation of Information in JCB; Exhibit 5.15, Effects of 
Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCB; 
Exhibit 5.18, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information per 
Function in JCB; Exhibit 5.21, Causes of Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities 
in JCB; Exhibit 5.22, Factors Positively Affecting Communication Channels in Jordanian 
Commercial Bank; Exhibit 5.23, Factors Negatively Affecting Communication Channels 
in Jordanian Commercial Bank). The effects were in the areas of communication 
channels, the delineation of responsibilities, the centralisation of information, 
coordination, and pyramid-shaped levels of authority among others. These had a negative 
impact on the role ofMAS in enhancing OE. 
5.12.1.5 Cultural Factors in JCB 
The influence of the cultural factor (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983) on MAS was seen in the PB 
case study to affect goal setting [see Section 5.26, Cultural Effects on Planning and Goal-
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Setting in JCB; and Exhibit 5.6, Effects of Social Culture on Planning & Decision-
Making in JCB], communication, the delineation of responsibilities and authority [see 
Section 5.27, Cultural Effects on Organisational Structure in JCB; Section 5.28, Cultural 
Effects on the Diffusion of Information in JCB; Exhibit 5.29, Effects of Social Culture on 
Communication and the Diffusion of Information in JCB; and Exhibit 5.30, Effects of 
Social Culture on Organisational Structure in JCB], performance appraisal, planning and 
decision-making, and feedforward control. Although the cultural factor was not included 
in the survey as being too vast to address in addition to the research question, it still came 
up in the answers of the respondents on several occasions. It was also possible to gain 
some insights through some of the questions asked. 
5.12.1.6 Established Power Distribution in JCB 
The influence of established power distribution (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983) on the design of 
MAS was clear in the PB case study as it was in the survey population. This can be seen 
in the interface between the compilers and users of MAS reports and the effect wh!ch it 
had on the performance of the users as discussed in such areas as centralisation of 
information (67%) [see Section 5.10.1.2, Internal Politics in JCB; Exhibit 5.15, Effects of 
Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers and Internal Politics; and Section 
4.10.3, Internal Politics at PB]. Pfeffer (1977, p. 144) finds that the distribution of power 
and the preferences of those in power positions determine activities within an 
organisation which, in turn, is determined by 'uncertainties in the technology and 
environment faced by an organization' (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978, p. 69). 
What could be seen in Jordan Commercial Banks was that internal politics that existed at 
the banks [56% of the respondents], and information gatekeepers [47%] influenced the 
quantity and quality of information generated and diffused within the banks [Exhibit 5.15, 
Effects of Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in 
JCB]. 
The characteristics of MAS reports [Section 5.13, Characteristics and Design of MAS 
Reports in JCBl also bear witness to decisions taken by designers of the systems as to 
what, when, to whom, and how much should be reported. 
The established power distribution was clear again from the answers when respondents 
were asked what they thought were the main reasons that have affected the quality and 
quantity of MAS ' information [Q 10]. Among the reasons given were management style, 
cost, but most of all due to the IT system employed. All these reasons came as decisions 
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Exhibit 5.29 Effects of Social Culture on Communication and the Diffusion ofInformation in 
Jordanian Commercial Banks 
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down communication 
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Individualistic culture IL.-_-.> 
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Exhibit 5.30 
Effects of Social Culture on Organisational Structure in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
High power distance 
. culture 
[I] Centralisation of 
authority 
(2) Less delegation 
> 
(3) Excessive bureaucracy 
1.-_-'. [4) More use of top-
down channels of 
communication 
Individualistic culture \ L. ____ > [1) Unproductive committees 
o Less amenable organisational structure for flow of information D Diminishing role ofMAS in enhancing OE 
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from top and senior management [Exhibit 5.31, Factors Affecting Quantity and Quality of 
MAS Information in JCBj. Design ofMAS, therefore, 'should focus on those disturbance 
sources or interactions that are likely to affect system performance more than others' 
(Ansari, 1977, p. 108). 
Exhibit 5.31 
Main Factors Affecting; Quality and Quantity ofMAS Information in JCB 
Factor DM CM FM BM 
(N;30) (n.:8) (n=8) (n=8) In;8) 
1 IT system 63% 25% 75% 50% 
Overall percentage 53 % 
2 Inefficient communication 25% 37% 37% 25% 
channels 
Overall percentage 31 % 
3 Lack of national sources for 37% 25% 25% 25% 
specialised information 
Overall percentage 28% 
4 Inefficient information systems at 25% 12% 25% 50% 
the bank 
Overall percentage 28% 
5 Cost 12% 25% 25% 25% 
Overall percentage 22% 
6 Unqualified IT staff 25% 12% 12% 25% 
OveraHgercentage 19% 
7 Management style 12% 12% 12% 37% 
OveraHgefcentage 19% 
5.12.1. 7 Motivational Factors and Performance Appraisal System in JCB 
Motivational factors and performance appraisal system (Ashton et aI., 1995) [discussed in 
more detail in Section 5.20.2, Performance Evaluation in JCBj did not meet the needs and 
the motivational influences desired by the interviewees. A majority (69%) of the 
respondents were not satisfied with the performance appraisal systems adopted at their 
banks. The respondents voiced demotivation and demoralisation affecting the quality of 
their work in setting goals and achieving them [see discussion in Section 5.9.1, Goal-
Setting in JCBj. 
The financial motivation style such as profit sharing schemes and end-of-year bonuses 
affected the design of MAS in that financial measures relating to financial goals such as 
profits or revenue were the ones to be measured. This might be one, explanation of the 
predominantly financial information in the reports where 80% of those who had budgets 
budgeted financial goals only and 53% of all respondents reported to top management 
financial information only [Exhibit 5.32, Use of Financial and Non-Financial Information 
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in JCBj. I should point out here that non-financial infonnation related mainly to elements 
in the external environment such as competition and clients. Notwithstanding the above, 
culture might be another explanation for emphasising financial measures in the MAS 
practices inJCB (Hofstede 1991, p. 84). 
One of the reasons why the interviewees were not satisfied with the perfonnance 
appraisal system was subjectivity. A majority of 77% of the 69% respondents who were 
not satisfied with the perfonnance appraisal system [Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of Employee 
Perfonnance Evaluation in JCBj singled it out as the main reason, and 41 % of the 
dissatisfied interviewees said that the criteria by which they were evaluated were unclear. 
Unclear criteria could lead in turn to a heavy use of SUbjectivity. 
The survey interviewees were also not enthusiastic about working in teams and joint 
projects as their motivational needs were not properly addressed [Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of 
Employee Perfonnance Evaluation in JCBj. 
Exhibit 5.32 
Uses of Financial and Non-Financial Infonnation in JCB 
(N=30) 
Need for non-financial information 
Overall percentage 93 % 
Budgeted financial goals only 
Overall percentage 80% 
Budgeted financial and non-financial goals 
Overall percentage 23 % 
Reported financial infonnation only 
Overall percentage 53% 
Reported financial and non-financial infonnation 
Overall percentage 47% 
• Out of 6 respondents who had a budget 
•• Out of2 respondents who had a budget 
# Out of 8 respondents 
DM CM FM 
88%# 100%# 88%# 
67%" 83%* 25%** 
33%' 17%' 0%" 
50%# 63%# 63%# 
50%# 37%# 37%# 
BM 
100%# 
83%" 
17%" 
37%# 
63%# 
It seems that the designers of the system believed in the innate ability of superiors and 
management with regard to evaluating perfonnance and did not incorporate 'clear' and 
'comprehensive criteria' -as described by the respondents- into MAS. In the PB case 
study managers also found the criteria by which they were evaluated to be unclear and 
incomprehensive [Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Infonnation on Perfonnance 
Evaluation at PBj. 
Not setting clear measurements for perfonnance appraisal adversely affected the design 
of MAS in its role in enhancing perfonnance and led to feelings of frustration and 
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demotivation that affected OE in a number of ways as 88% of credit and branch managers 
and 63% of financial managers were not satisfied with their performance evaluation [see 
discussion in Section 5.24, Commitment of Line Managers to Achieve Goals in JCB]. 
Exhibit 5.33 
C' . fE ntena 0 mpIOyee er ormance va uatlon In P tI E I . JCB 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
Not satisfied with criteria 
Overall percentage 69% 37% 88% 63% 88% 
Subjective evaluation 
Overall percentage 77%** 100%** 43%** 60%** 86%** 
Unclear criteria 
Overall percentage 41 % .. 67%** 29%** 40%** 43%** 
Unfair criteria 
Overall percentage 36% ** 33%** 43%** 40%** 29%** 
Non-comprehensive criteria 
Overall percentage 36%" 67%*' 29%" 20%*' 43%" 
Achievement is mixed up with other 
managers 50% 100% 75% 100% 
Overall percentage 81 % 
Achievement gets mixed up due to the 
nature of banking work 25%' 13%' 0%' 38%* 
Overall percentage 19%' 
Achievement gets mixed up due to 
inadequate measures 100%* 100%* 100%* 63%' 
Overall percentage 92%' 
,. Percentages calculated out of those who were not satisfied With performance evaluation 
criteria 
, Percentages calculated out of those who said that achievement got mixed up 
Other elements in the MAS did not provide sufficiently for motivation such as the quality 
and quantity of information made available to users of MAS. The diffusion of information 
through organisational structures did not provide sufficient motivational influences nor 
did the goal setting processes. 
5.12.1.8 Technology in JCB 
Technology (in the sense of the IT system used by MAS) played an important part in the 
design of the system as described in the use of computers in MAS [see more discussion in 
Section 5.14, Use of Computers in MAS in JCB]. Flexibility of the computerised banking 
system and other packages to bridge the gaps in the main banking system affected the 
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design of MAS in the survey population. This was reflected in the lack of cross-
information and flexibility in the design and complexity of MAS information. 
On the other hand, networking made it possible to link departments and branches and 
exchange information on-line as well as positively affecting the role which MAS can 
have in generating and diffusing information. 
IT had a further influence on the design of MAS in centralising the generation of MAS 
reports in the IT departments with the close collaboration of the financial departments 
[see discussion in Section 4.1 1.1.3, Effects ofInforrnation Technology on MAS Design at 
PB]. 
5.12.1.9 Principles of Feedback and Feedforward Control in JCB 
Principles of feedback affected the periodicity of MAS reports used by the survey 
interviewees whether daily, weekly or otherwise. It also influenced the type of 
information collected in terms of focus and orientation [see more discussion in Section 
5.22, Adequate Feedback and Feedforward in JCB]. 
The principles of feedforward control (Wilson, 1998) were not evident in the survey 
population as 90% of the reports were historical or mostly historical [Exhibit 5.26, The 
Role of the IT System in MAS in JCB]. Information on the elements of the external 
environment were not adequately collected and diffused [see for example Exhibit 5.10, 
MAS Reports on the External Environment and Their Frequency; and Exhibit 5.8, Need 
for More Information on the External Environment]. As a result the MAS adopted did not 
reflect any of it. The design of MAS in JCB did not take into consideration the needs of 
feedforward control in aligning the three levels of corporate, departmental~ and individual 
goals. 
5.13 Design and Characteristics ofMAS Reports in JCB 
MAS reports are discussed separately due to the significance th~y hold within MAS. They 
are one of the main vehicles of diffusion of information traversing departments, branches, 
and levels in banks. What interests us at this point is looking at the types of information 
that MAS reports hold in order to assess the role of MAS in enhancing OE from yet 
another aspect 
From the PB case study there were a number of findings relating to the characteristics of 
MAS reports, the factors that influenced the design of MAS, and the use of computers in 
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JCB. The survey questionnaire addressed those fmdings via a number of questions (Q 6-
7,10-12,21- 27, and 34). 
As I have done in the previous section, I will compare analysed survey data with the 
findings from the case study in the three areas. 
I will look into the characteristics of MAS reports using the same model of Gordon et al. 
(1978) that I used in the case study in addition to some characteristics that were found to 
be of relevance from the PB case study. 
The model involves: format, data to be included, time horizon, orientation, and frequency 
of the reports. 
MAS reports, in addition to their obvious role in providing information for planning were 
identified by 88% of the respondents as the most frequently used means of control 
[Exhibit 5.34, Control Tools in JCBj. 
(N=30) Tool 
Reports 
Overall percentage 88% (PB 73%) 
Follow-up 
Overall percentage 44% 
System built-in controls 
Over percentage 28% (PB 27%) 
On-line infonnation 
Overall percentage 25% 
Visits 
Overall percentage 9% (PB 20%) 
Supervision 
Overall percentage 9% 
Results 
Over percentage 9% 
Budgets 
Overall percentage 9% 
5.13.1 Format 
Exhibit 5.34 
Control Tools in JCB 
DM 
(n=8) 
75% 
25% 
25% 
---
12% 
12% 
25% 
12% 
CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
75% 75% 75% 
63% 50% 37% 
37% 12% 37% 
37% 37% 25% 
-- 12% 12% 
--- 12% 12% 
12% 
--- ---
--- 25% ---
The format used for MAS reports in JCB was similar to what was described in the case 
study [see discussion in Section 4.12, Characteristics and Design of MAS Reports at PBj 
as predominantly figures and/or tables with only 30% of the survey managers interviewed 
receiving descriptive reports. One interviewee commenting on why MAS reports lacked 
adequate non-financial information, saying: 
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'We did not pay attention to all these issues (including non-financial information) as 
there were more pressing priorities' (interview 6). 
In Q 6 interviewees were asked whether they would look for information on the external 
environment in financial or non-financial form and, if MAS reports did not include 
enough non-financial information, how would non-financial information be useful to 
them? 93% of the respondents said they looked for information in non-financial form in 
addition to financial. Half of the interviewees believed that non-financial information 
explained financial information (50%), as can be seen from some interviewees' comments 
[Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-Financial Information]: 
Exhibit 5.35 
U ses 0 on- mancla n onnatton m eports fN F' . 11 fi . MAS R 
Frequency Uses 
I 14 times Understanding the environment 
2 12 Decision-making 
3 9 Planning for markets, clients, and products 
'Non-financial iriformation explains the financial and are indications for the foture' 
(interview 8). . 
And: 'Financial indicators cannot explain enough' (interview 18). 
And, in contrast: 
'1 do not work with descriptions ... 1 work with financial information to control and plan' 
(interview 3). 
As to how the respondents would have used non-financial information had it been 
provided to them, the most frequent answers were [see Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-
Financial Information in MAS Reports]: (1) in gaining a better aPllreciation of the 
meaning of financial information on the external environment factors (14 times); (2) in 
decision-making as non-financial information affect financial information (12 times); (3) 
in planning as non-financial information could show market trends, in targeting new 
clients, and in creating new products (9 times). 
The. uses mentioned emphasise the importance of non-financial information for enhancing 
planning and decision-making. In the PB case study 30% of the managers interviewed 
received reports that contained non-financial information, although all interviewees 
indicating their need for them. One survey interviewee commented: 
'[ get financial iriformation through formal channels, and non-financial information I get 
through personal contacts' (interview J 4). 
When we look a~ each function we find that deposit managers rarely agreed with such a 
high percentage on any other question, but 88% choose to get non-financial information 
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and not only financial information. The uses it would help them with were first and 
foremost: (I) planning be it for products or new clients (mentioned 5 times); (2) in 
decision-making as non-financial information affects and explains financial information 
(5 times). 
All Credit managers (100%) said they preferred to receive financial and non-financial 
information. The uses mentioned were: (I) improving the quality of their credit decisions 
and better assessing the credit risk involved (7 times); (2) planning as the non-fmancial 
inform:ttion helps in interpreting the market and explaining available financial 
information (8 times) as for example: 
'MAS reports I receive do not contain enough non-financial information ... ij we are 
talking about big amounts (credit facilities) then we insist on getting non-financial 
information on the client' (interview 13). 
Financial managers/controllers also chose to receive non-financial with financial 
information (88%), and would have used it for: 
(I) decision-making as it was with all the other managers because non-financial 
information helped explain and provide deeper analyses, as well as acting as a 
forewarning for future changes (8 times); (2) for setting goals (I time). 
Exhibit 5.36 
Need for Non-Financial Information in JCB 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n= 8) (n= 8) (n=8) (n= 8) 
Need for non-financial information 
Overall percentage 93% 88% 100% 88% 100% 
All branch managers (100%) said they needed both financial and non-financial 
information on the external environment, and it would have been helpful to them in: (1) 
planning as non-financial information explains financial information and is more capable 
of explaining the future impact of changes; (8 times), (2) in decision-making (5 times). 
From the answers the unanimity on the inclusion of non-financial as well as financial 
information in MAS reports comes out strongly. Those findings agree with MAR as 
'intelligence information' (so called by Simon 1977, p. 128) can only be available 'as 
man-readable natural language text'. When including non-financial information the 
reports would be forward-looking addressing the needs of planning and long-term 
decision-making as they are intended to be (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000, p. 224; Miller, 
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1993, P. 128). Miller (1993, p. 26) also warns against the propensity of most information 
systems for quantitative data which introduces biases and leads to eroding customer 
satisfaction when looking through the narrow perspective of financial information. 
5.13.2 Data to be Included in MAS Reports 
Information in the reports was collected from the various users of the system. It was the 
transactions data from branches collected through "banking systems that were bought and 
adapted to suit the needs of each commercial bank. The data then was processed using the 
main IT banking system or other software packages and reports generated and distributed 
to the users. 
The survey interviewees believed they did not receive enough information [see discussion 
in Section 5.9, Availability and Diffusion ofInformation in JCB]: 
' ... We have to rely on direct sales approach to colleCt what information we need' 
(interview 27). 
And: ' ... 1 only wish 1 could get background information even on rates of exchange' 
(interview 28). 
Some respondents referred to their dissatisfaction with the type of information as well as 
the lack of it: 
'Reporting is not comprehensive enough ... this requires of me a lot of manual work to do 
to consolidate data from different reports to reach meaningful information based on 
which 1 could make educated decisions' (interview 10). 
All interviewees [100%] needed information on the external environment and 67% 
needed wide-scope information [Exhibit 5.8, Need for Information on the External 
Environment in JCB]. However, 60% said they did not get it through MAS reports. On 
the internal environment 73% said they needed more information to serve them in 
planning [76%], coordination [14%], and control [14%]. [See Exhibit 5.12, Need for 
More Information on the Internal Environment; and Exhibit 5.13, Types of Internal 
Information Needed by the Survey Interviewees]. A similar observation, though in a 
different context, by McNair, Lynch & Cross (1990, p. 28) .on financial reports found 
'profit and loss statements, budgets and margin analyses have been too aggregated, too 
late and too one dimensional to be useful to operational managers'. 
To find out more about the characteristics of MAS reports, question 25 asked whether the 
MAS reports the interviewees received lacked sharp focus, which 68% disagreed. As to 
whether they contained irrelevant information for planning and control, 62% of the 
respondents disagreed, or whether the reports contained unnecessary details, 58% 
disagreed. Once again looking at the individual functions showed that deposit and 
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financial managers had a more favourable outlook on matters than did credit and branch 
managers, which influenced the overall percentage as when 50% of credit managers felt 
that MAS reports contained irrelevant information which shows that MAS reports did not 
meet their needs. [See Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics of MAS Reports in JCB]. This still 
partly supports these practices found in PB where reports were long and detailed and did 
not report by exception [see discussion in Section 4.12.7, Over-Information in MAS 
Reports at PB; and Section 4.12, Characteristics and Design ofMAS Reports at PB]. 
Deposit managers strongly disagreed (88%) with the statement that MAS reports lacked 
sharp focus, and that they had irrelevant information (75%), or unnecessary detail (75%). 
[See Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics ofMAS Reports in JCB]. 
Credit managers (67%) also did not feel that MAS reports lacked a sharp focus. while 
on the other hand, 50% said that the reports contained irrelevant information and 56% 
said they contained unnecessary detail. 
56% of the financial managers also disagreed that MAS reports lacked a sharp focus, or 
contained irrelevant information (75%), and 50% said they contained unnecessary detail. 
Branch managers showed the same pattern as the other functions: 63% said that the 
reports were focused but 63% also said they had unnecessary detail, and 50% said the 
reports contained irrelevant information. 
As to MAS reports being long, detailed and lacking in a sharp focus, the reports were 
found by the . users to have all the three characteristics but to varying degrees. The 
majority of the survey interviewees did not find them long with irrelevant and 
unnecessary information. The percentages of those respondents who did find them long 
and detailed ranged between 32% and 42%. [See Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics of MAS 
Reports in JCB]. 
In their recent study on profitability reporting in a British bank, Helliar et al. (2002, p. 36) 
remarked that bank management in a dynamic enviromnent needs to know about 
customer profitability and product profitability, by geographical areas and at a group 
level. The same idea was also discussed by Rezaee (1991, p. 28). Mabberley (1992, p. 
171) sees that 'one of the major challenges facing all financial institutions is the 
identification of unprofitable relationships and products'. 
What was discussed by researchers has a direct relevance to the needs of Jordanian banks. 
To give an example, it was mentioned by many credit managers that the construction 
sector was in decline due to the economic situation Jordan was going through. They 
continued to say that their managements asked them to stop extending credit facilities to 
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contractors. However, credit managers believed this does not mean that there were not 
still profitable clients in the construction business! But without profitability analysis it 
cannot be resolved either way. 
5.13.3 Focus ofMAS Reports 
Another characteristic is the focus of the MAS reports used in JCB. In the PB case study 
only 23 % of the managers who talked about the issue of reports' focus said the reports 
they received had a planning and decision-making focus. A majority of PB interviewees 
[77%] mentioned that the MAS reports they received were for feedback control purposes 
and were specific and narrow in focus [see discussion in Section 4.12, Characteristics and 
Design of MAS Reports at PB]. JCB showed a similar pattern though with higher 
percentages. [See Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics ofMAS Reports in JCB]. 
The majority of reports focus on feedback control which showed from the survey data, 
with 90% of the respondents finding MAS reports mostly 'historical' or 'all historical' 
[see discussion in section 5.13.4, Time Horizon of MAS Reports]. The pattern also 
showed the need for non-financial information (93%) [Section 5.13.4, Time Horizon of 
MAS Reports; Exhibit 5.36, Need for Non-Financial Information], which respondents 
would have used for planning and decision-making [Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-Financial 
Information], had it been available. 
The survey respondents' answers also showed that MAS reports were more helpful in 
control (60%), and that 47% actually received information on the external environment 
[Exhibit 5.10, MAS Reports on the External Environment and their Frequency], which 
they needed for analysing the external environment and planning [Exhibit 5.9 Uses of 
Information on the External Environment]. 
More information on the internal environment was needed (73%). [See Exhibit 5,\2 Need 
for Information on the Internal Environment]. Ultimately, in their responses to Q 34, only 
9% of the respondents found MAS reports helpful in planning. 
5.13.4 Time Horizon ofMAS Reports 
The time horizon of the MAS reports in JCB, as in the PB case study, was consequently 
ex post as 90% of the reports were mostly historical in nature. The same characteristic 
was shared by PB managers: all those who received MAS reports said they were 
historical [see Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics ofMAS Reports in JCB]. 
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Deposit managers (88%) follow the overall pattern with just one respondent saying that, 
of the reports (s)he received, 'few were historical'. 63% of credit managers/assistant 
managers said the reports they received were all or mostly historical. 75% of financial 
mangers received historical or mostly historical MAS reports. However, 100% of 
branch managers/assistant managers said the reports were historical or mostly historical. 
5.13.5 Orientation ofMAS Reports 
As for the orientation of the MAS reports, question 34 asked the respondents whether 
they found MAS reports more helpful in planning, decision-making, or control. A 
majority of 60% of the answers indicated that MAS reports were more helpful in control 
on the internal elements excluding the banks within their external environment [Exhibit 
5.37, Role of MAS Information in Planning, Decision-Making & Control]. The same 
orientation was also noted at PB where all reports dealt with feedback control [Section 
4.12, Characteristics and Design ofMAS Reports at PB]. 
I also asked the respondents in question 21 about the information and for MAS reports 
they accessed via their PCs through computer networks. The answers also pointed 
overwhelmingly towards feedback control with 91%, followed by short-term decision-
making (75%), and lastly planning (55%). [See Exhibit 5.26, The Role of IT System in 
MAS]. However, opinions differed by functions with 25% of credit and branch managers 
finding them helpful in planning. 
5.13.6 Frequency ofMAS Reports 
The users of the reports said that the frequency of the reports did not suit their needs, as 
data should be timely and relevant, which agrees with (Cleland, 1997, p. 22). 
' ... Some information 1 get late ... so 1 have to set different scenarios ... this affects my work 
adversely ... the timing of information is important' (interview 24). 
A second manager remarked on the delay of reports and what that meant to him, 
'There is some delay in receiving information ... planning is an ongoing process' 
(interview 8). 
And on decision-making: 
'I do not receive full information ... 1 get old reports 1 cannot use for decision-making' 
(interview 12). 
MAS reports were periodic as were the reports at PB. But 47% of the survey respondents 
said they needed ad hoc in addition to periodic reports [Exhibit 5.10, MAS Reports on the 
External Environment and their Frequency]. 
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Similar findings were reporting by Pierce & O'Dea (2003, p. 273) on the needs of 
managers for information 'that is more timely, broad, flexible and in better format than at 
present'. 
Otley (1985, p. 6) writes on how the frequency of reports addresses the needs of users of 
reports: 
'Accounting for decision-making involves the use of financial information, often collected 
with the specific decision in mind, on an ad hoc and non-routine basis. By contrast, 
accounting for control involves the regular production of general purpose information, 
designed to alert managers to situations where events may be deviating from previous 
expectations' . 
Granlund (2001, p. 150) agrees with what the interviewees complained about, and 
remarks that 'standard reporting procedures usually take most of the accountants' time, 
and involve generating reports that seldom receive much attention in executive meetings'. 
5.13.7 Managers' Participation in MAS Reports Design 
To gain an understanding of what and who influenced the design of MAS reports, 
question 23 asked to what degree did each respondent influence the design of the reports 
in terms of form and content? The respondents were split: 38% said their influence was 
either 'marginal' or 'non-existent'; 34% said that their influence was 'substantial'; and 
28% 'participated equally with the designers' [see Exhibit 5.38, Participation in MAS 
Reports Design]. In the case study 10 out of the 13 managers [77%] who received MAS 
reports said the compilers of the MAS reports designed them, and only 2 managers [15%] 
said they designed the reports they used. 
Exhibit 5.38 
S I urvey ntervlewees , p .. artlclpatlOn ID M AS Reports D . eSlgn . 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Substantial contribution to design 
Overall percentage 34% 37% 37% 37% 25% 
Equal participation with designers 
Overall percentage 28% 25% 25% 50% 12% 
Marginal/no participation 
Overall percentage 38% 37% 37% 12% 63% 
Then those who said that their participation was non-existent or marginal were asked in 
what ways non-participation affected their work. The most frequently given answers 
were: 
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(1) They suffered from delays, as reports did not offer the degree of accuracy or 
flexibility needed. '(W)hat reports] receive are useless' (interview 18). 
(2) The reports did not meet decision-making needs. 
As can be seen in the following comment, 'until now 1 am not able to take 
decisions 1 am happy with, due to the absence of an iriformation system ... MAS 
reports do not serve my purpose' (interview 12), and 'The people who prepare 
the reports do not know what we need as they do not get feedback from us' 
(ipterview 29). 
(3) Affected their ability to control. 
'by participating] would get better security controls' (interview 14). 
(4) The information did not have the needed time horizon, detail, and 
comprehensiveness. 
'Backward-looking reports are not useful ... in setting goals that are in harmony 
with the bank's strategy (interview 15). And, '] do not receive full information ... ] 
", 
get old reports 1 cannot use for decision-making' (interview 12). 
I would like to point out here that, during the interviews, I noticed that more senior 
fuanagers would say they contributed equally with the report designers whereas managers 
at a lower hierarchical level said their contribution was substantial [Exhibit 5.39, 
Participation of Survey Interviewees According to Position in their Banks]. However, 
when 38% said they did not participate or that their participation was marginal, this fact 
partially explains the high percentages of dissatisfaction with different aspects of MAS 
reports. Another possible explanation is that decisions on data to be. included in the 
reports and organisational structure were beyond the interviewees' powers. 
Exhibit 5.39 
p .. artlclpatIon 0 fS I urvey ntervlevvees A d' h . P .. . h' B k ceor mg to t elr oSltIon In t elr an s 
(N;30) Assistant general Departmenta) Branch & assistant 
managers managers departmental 
(n;4) (n;16) managers 
(n;IO) 
Substantial contribution 25% 31% 30% 
Marginal/no contribution -- . 44% 60% 
Equal contribution vvith the 75% 25% 10% 
designers 
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Analysed data from the survey showed that 38 % of the respondents did not participate in 
the design ofMAS reports. However, the participation of the majority of the respondents 
did not reflect itself in higher satisfaction with the reports. The dissatisfaction was found 
in many aspects throughout the discussion, in terms of format, orientation, and time 
horizon for example. A possible explanation is that participation has an impact on the 
extent to which MAS reports cater to the users' psychology but that, on its own, it does 
not lead to greater responsiveness to the users' needs. Culture and management style 
dictated organisational structure, and the availability and diffusion of information and 
these matters are beyond participation and beyond the authority of the managers 
interviewed in the four functions. 
King & Cleland (1975, p. 287) and Wetherbe (1991, p. 62) discussed how crucial it is to 
involve users of information systems on a continuous basis. Wetherbe (1991) believes 
that 'the mistake typically made in requirements determination is that managers are not 
allowed to determine and refine their conceptual requirements into detailed information 
requirements through trial and error' . 
However, Spicer & Ballew (1983, p. 91) warn that participation is not likely to improve 
. . 
the quality of decision-making except when there are synergistic effects. Nevertheless, 
Spicer & Ballew continue to say that participation mitigates conflicts among managers 
and improves the atmosphere as well as leading to a rather important state of commitment 
to overall firm objectives. Roslender (1992, p. 139) quotes Hopwood (1974) in saying 
that 'only the most naive observer could feel safe in the view that participative 
approaches are always more· effective than authoritarian styles .of management. 
Participation may raise morale but this is not the same as raising efficiency and 
productivity. In other words, there are no panaceas, there is no "one best way', the very 
essence of contingency thinking'. 
Deposit managers and credit managers had exactly the same pattern as the overall 
per rentage (37%) of those who substantially contributed to MAS reports design, whereas 
12 % (1 respondent) of the financial manager said (s)he was never consulted, but 63% of 
branch managers' contribution was marginal or non-existent [Exhibit 5.38, Survey 
Interviewees' Participation in MAS Reports Design]. 
Deposit ~,lmagers said it affected their efficiency as: (1) the reports had duplications; (2) 
did not provide the flexibility needed for manipulating data; (3) reposts were not detailed 
or comprehensive enough. 
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Credit managers said, had they participated they would have: (1) included other types 
of infonnation; (2) less restrictive reports; (3) saved time and effort; (4) and did not have 
the feelings offrustration and disappointment they were experiencing. 
'A lot of the reports are general in nature ... so [ do not seriously look into them' 
(interview 29). 
The above comment agrees with what Simon (1977, p. 126) writes on designing an 
infonnation system: 'a major task of an effective infonnation system is to filter 
infonnation, not to proliferate it' . 
The one financial manager who was newr consulted in the design said his participation 
would have meant: (1) better quality of report; (2) included different types of infonnation; 
(3) more detailed and comprehensive infonnation. 
'[ inherited the reports [ receive from the previous manager ... we need to update the 
reports ... the quality and components would then be more detailed and more 
comprehensive' (interview I5). 
Exhibit 5.40 
Effi ects 0 fN . MASR on-partiCIPatIOn III eports D . I JCB eSlgtl n 
Times Effect DM CM FM BM 
mentioned 
8 Delays work 2 2 4 
I Inaccurate reports I 
4 Inflexible reports 3 I 
4 Does not meet decision-making needs 3 I 
I Does not meet control needs I 
I Does not meet planning needs I 
3 Reports lack detail I I I 
2 Incomprehensive reports I I 
Branch managers said their non-participation had affected: (1) the quality of their 
decisions; (2) the quality of their control; (3) the ability to get comprehensive 
infonnation; (4) the accuracy of infonnation; and (5) the absence of reporting by 
exception. [See Exhibit 5.40, Effects of Non-participation in MAS Reports Design in 
JCB]. 
Managers of different functional areas and managers at different levels in the hierarchy 
have different agendas (as can be seen in the discussion above and in the comments of the 
respondents). Consequently, the better adapted the design of MAS to those needs, the 
better the achievement of their goals and the bigger the contribution to OE. Similar 
335 
findings are reported by Pierce & O'Dea (2003, p. 261) and Mia & Chenhall (1994, as 
quoted by Pierce & O'Dea, 2003, p. 261) on different perceptions of usefulness of 
information by managers who undertake different activities. 
Naturally the managers in the different functional areas in the survey did not act in 
isolation: their goals, plans, and tasks were interrelated as some of the interviewees made 
it clear that they need to know about what was happening in other departments. In the 
credit department they needed to know the structure of deposits. They wanted to know 
about new products and any changes in existing products in other departments or even 
sub-departments. All this calls for the cross-functional determination of information from 
all decision-makers in departments and sub-departments (Wetherbe, 1991, pp. 55, 64; 
Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000, pp. 221-222; Gross 1965, p. 8; Reid, 2000, p. 428). 
Bouwens & Abernethy (2000, p. 221) write that customisation 'requires the 
implementation of a sophisticated information system to ensure that managers have the 
information necessary to cope with continual changes in product design and processes'. 
The implementation of a strategy of private banking, which Jordanian banks are 
following suit international banks, puts more. pressure on the design ofMAS in JCB. 
It should be quite expected that, if MAS continue to have a role in enhancing OE, the 
design of the system needs to evolve continuously (Wetherbe, 1991, p. 64). However, it 
should not be believed that the system would be fully predictable or tightly controlled 
(Gross, 1965, p.196-197). 
In the PB case study it was very clear in the interview with the general manager that the 
MAS reports which he received were long, had more details than needed. and contained 
irrelevant information for the areas investigated. Emmanuel et al. (1990) observe the 
shortcomings of information provided by information system: 
'As any accounting system is an imperfect tool, it is the way in which senior managers make 
use of the information that will determine response of others in the organization, it is thus 
important that both accounting systems designers and senior managers are aware of both the 
technical limitations of accounting measurement procedures and the likely effects of the way 
in which managers use accounting information' (Emmanuel et aI., 1990, p. 186). 
5.14 The Use of Computers in MAS inJCB 
The importance of computers in collecting, processing, and diffusing information was 
discussed by many researchers (Hall, 1972. p. 33; Simon, 1977, p. 12; Bariff & Galbrith 
1978, pp. 18, 25; Langford, 1979, p. 53; Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 527; Bums & Stalker, 
1994, p. 19; Christiansen & Mouritsen, 1995, p. 216; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 3; Lau & 
Chan, 1998, p. 165; Reid.& Smith, 2000, p. 435; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 32) to mention 
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but a few. This section looks into the use of computers in MAS as nowadays being the 
main means for collecting, storing, processing, and transmitting information in MAS in 
addition to being one of the factors that influence its design. 
In the PB case study only 33 % of the managers who addressed the topic were satisfied 
with the support which the IT system gave them [Section 4.13, The Use of Computers in 
MAS at PB]. The main reasons given by PB managers were the unresponsiveness of IT 
systems to their needs, and lack of qualified IT staff. 
The IT system was used at PB as a data processing system and as a'1. 'information silo' 
with no cross-functional information or analysis apart from comparison of the current 
periods with a previous one or with a budgeted figure. It was also found that some 
managers were not quite comfortable with integrating computers into the way they carry 
on their work. 
The use of IT systems in providing information, whether in report form or by stored data 
on the system was investigated in questions 21 and 22 in the survey interview guide. 
More than half of the respondents (55%) replied that it was helpful in planning, although 
in the case of credit and branch managers it was 25%: 75% who said it was helpful in 
decision-making, while 90% said it was helpful in control [Exhibit 5.26, The Role of IT 
System in MASJ. 
However, if we look at the replies of the managers in each function again we find the 
respondents split along the same recurring pattern: 88% of the deposit managers said 
that having MAS reports and information available to them through their pes helped their 
work in planning, and 100% in decision-making and control. 
A small percentage (25%) of Credit managers found MAS information provided on-line 
helpful in planning, but 75% found it helpful in decision-making and 100% of the credit 
managers [all 8 respondents] found it helpful in control. 
Most of the financial managers/controllers [72%] said 'yes' - MAS information made 
available through their PCs was helpful in planning, and 83% found it helpful in decision-
making and 72% in control. 
Branch managers showed the same pattern as the interviewees in the other functions that 
what was available was least helpful in planning [25%], but 75% found it helpful in 
decision-making and 100% in control. 
In question 22, I wanted to know more about what they found to be missing in the system, 
which was important to them in order to be able to carry out their work satisfactorily. The 
frequently given answers were [Exhibit 5.41, Elements MAS Needs in IT System]: 
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Exhibit 5.41 
Elements MAS Needs to Have in the IT System to Provide Support for Planning, Decision-
M k' d I' JCB a 109 an Contro m 
Times mentioned Element 
1 9 times Integration of software 
2 7 Comprehensive network 
3 7 Detailed information 
4 6 Well-developed system 
5 6 Easier and quicker access 
6 4 Qualified IT staff 
7 3 Clients' profiles and profitability 
8 3 Data warehouse 
9 2 Flexible system 
(I) The need for a comprehensive network, (mentioned 7 times by respondents) 
'I need an on-line system to know if there is a problem in any of the branches ... this 
would help in dealing with the problems' (interview 15). 
And ' ... 1 cannot get the information from my PC as it is not part of the network' 
(interview 6). 
And: 'Top management does not believe [need a PC in my office' (interview 12). 
Some of the banks in the population's branches and departments were not networked. 
(2) The need to get more detailed information and not reports showing a summary 
of figures (7 times). 
' ... The printouts do not deal with individual clients - something I need this for credit 
decisions' (interview 6). 
(3) The need for easier and. quicker access to information as the currently used 
systems were not as user-friendly as the users needed them to be in some banks 
(6 times). 
(4) The capabilities of the IT system were under-used in JCB: 'we just use 40-45% 
of IT capabilities' (interview 6), and 'a lot of the capabilities of our iT system is 
not used' (interview 22). 
(5) The need for more developed computer systems to handle more cemplex 
situations in more complex environments (6 times). 
(6) Respondents talked about their need for information on clients' profiles and 
profitability (3 times). 
'I need iriformation on profitability and clients profiles without going through 
paperwork and statistics' (interview 4). 
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This need is of significance as discussed earlier [see Section 5.12, Characteristics 
and Design ofMAS Reports] due to the growing need for customisation and the 
change in markets and economic situations. 
(7) The need for a data warehouse (3 times). It has been a subject of debate by 
researchers that managers need to scan information of a wide-scope and nature 
(Wetherbe, 1991, p. 52; Vandenbosch & Huff, 1997, p. 83). In answer to Q 22 on 
how the interviewees envisaged the IT system could be more helpful to them, the 
need for a data warehouse was one of the things the managers aspired to have as 
it provides them with the opportunity to fmd out what they needed and for what 
use it would help them. 
(8) The need for a flexible computer system (2 times) as was explained by one of 
the interviewees: 
, We buy ready made programmes so we adapt the systems to suit our needs 
which means imposing some restrictions on what we can do (with reports) 
(interview 30). 
At times managers needed to do their own analysis in addition to supplement 
what is periodically provided to them. This type of analysis is important in 
planning and decision-making where uncertainty exists. Uncertainty is a fact of 
business life and managers need systems that are less structured to deal with 
unstructured situations (Driver & Mock, 1975, p. 492). 
(9) Need for better qualified IT staff who can use the system's capabilities more 
fully (4 times). 
(10) To integrate the different software packages (mentioned 9 times). JCB use 
different packages to serve different aspects of banking activates, which were 
purchased at different points in time that need to be connected by gateway links. 
The problem, as discussed earlier on this page in the quotation from interview 30, 
is that the packages were not linked and information in anyone package could not 
be accessed from another. 
This is important to save time, avoid re-keying data and cutting down errors as a 
result (Mabberley, 1992, p.IIO). Furthermore, integration helps in giving users a 
better overview of a situation for planning, decision-making and control. 
Looking at the individual functions, three of the deposit managers said they got what 
they needed from the computer system [Exhibit 5.26, The Role of the IT System in 
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MAS in JCBj. The most frequently mentioned ways in which the system can be more 
supportive to the other five managers were: 
(I) to use the capabilities of the system more efficiently (2 times); 
(2) to integrate computer packages by gateway link (I time); 
(3) to have all users on-line and be able to share information amongst them (2 
times); 
(4) to reduce number of employees and paper work (1 time); 
(5) improvement in the capabilities of the IT staff (I time). 
Credit managers' answers were: 
(I) the need for integration within the system to provide more detailed analyses on a 
product and client level that are under the control of different sub-departments, and on 
other departments' work (5 times) as the absence of that affected their work 
negatively; 
(2) the need to have clients' profiles centrally available to all users (I time); 
(3) the need for using the system's capabilities to the full (I time); 
(5) provide more training to IT staff (I time); 
(6) to be more helpful in control and provide information on each credit officer's 
performance and on accounts that exceed their credit limits 
(2 times). 
One financial manager said '[ have all that [ need' (interview 9). The others most 
frequent needs were: 
(I) easier and quicker access to getting information (3 times); 
(2) an integrated comprehensive system with all packages linked to one another (3 
times); 
(3) need for a data warehouse (1 time); 
(4) on-line network (I time); 
(5) flexibility in the system (I time); 
(6) better qualified staff (I time); 
(7) new software for specialised procedures (I time). 
Branch managers agreed with much of what the managers in the other three 
functions said. The improvements they wanted to see were: 
(I) a more comprehensive system (3 times); 
(2) the need to develop the system to provide more information internally and 
through getting accessto the Internet and Reuters financial information (3 times); 
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(3) more controls, better response time, and eliminate duplication (3 times); 
(4) more features (3 times); 
(5) easier access (1 time); 
(6) develop staff capabilities (I time). 
Findings from the PB case study indicated that MAS design was influenced by the 
technology used. What applied to the case study applied to the survey population. In both 
cases the manner in which information was collected and disseminated was greatly 
influenced by the use of computers in JCB and any new developments in this field and 
will continue to be so. Nowadays more banks have (or are working towards) the 
networking of branches and departments, creating databases, and making use of new 
packages to communicate information internationally and nationally. Among other MA 
researchers Christiansen & Mouristen (1995, p. 216) express a similar view that could 
apply to all organisations globally: 
'Computers play an important role in storing, processing, analysing, and channelling 
information in MAS as well as in other aspects of organisational life. In fact computers 
have become a critical factor for the survival of the firm'. 
IT systems supply the basis for accounting and information systems. Information systems 
have revolutionised financial services and hence increased the diversity and complexity 
of the services offered (Lau & Tan, 1998, p. 165). They also affected organisational 
contexts by changing the power structure between those who are providing data (the 
compilers and the movers) and those who are able or allowed to access and decipher 
information (Christiansen & Mouritsen, 1995, p. 220). 
This was evident in the responses of the interviewees, who talked about those new power 
centres that centralised information, as commented on in interview 9: '90% of reports 
come from the finance department '. [See similar opinions in PB case study in Exhibit 4.5, 
List ofMAS Reports Prepared by IT Department]. 
This decreased the effectiveness of MAS in achieving better DE by negatively affecting 
planning (63% of the respondents), decision-making (54%) and control (59%). [See 
Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and 
Internal Politics]. 
However, as Simon (1977, p.1l8) and Helliar et al. (2002) observe, that centralisation 
might be unavoidable: 
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'With the rising dependence of IT systems comes the rise in costs for state·of·the-art levels. 
This in turn may lead to the need for centralisation if savings are to be secured' (Helliar et aI., 
2002, p. 32). 
Bariff & Galbrith (1978, p. 17) believe otherwise that the use of computers has led to the 
decentralisation of responsibilities and reducing the 'monopoly top managers previously 
held' although it may lead to centralised data processing. This did not come out clearly as 
interviewees complained about being unable to access information about sub·departments 
within their departments as well as other departments [discussed in Section 5.10, 
Diffusion of Information in JCB]. This indicates that there were other factors working 
against the decentralisation of responsibilities. The influence of the cultural factor and 
management style might be such a factor [see discussion in Section 5.28, Cultural Effects 
on the Diffusion of Information in JCB] where the culture in Jordan is described by 
Hofstede (1991, p. 35) as a 'high power distance' culture were power is centralised in few 
hands and subordinates are expected to be told what to do. 
A second factor might be the man·machine interface where computerisation in banks -
and in all aspects of Jordanian life· is relatively new, so top and senior managers still hold 
to their old style of work. The weak man·machine interface was discussed by the 
managers interviewed in the case study. The only mention of it in the survey interviews 
was when an interviewee commented: 
'We need to qualifY head office departments first to be able to use the IT system' 
(interview 18). 
The managers interviewed complained about lacking information and the unavailability 
of detailed information but: 
'/ need such reports but / do not want to be flooded with paper ... but without information 
1 cannot survive' (interview 13). 
With the capabilities of automated information it is easy to get inundated with 
information, which also makes effective decision.making impossible (Langford, 1979, p. 
54; Bums & Stalker, 1994, p. 19). 
In the case study 33 % of PB interviewees were satisfied with the support which the IT 
system was giving them. In the survey population the lack of support mostly centred on 
planning and long·term decision-making [see Exhibit 5.26, The Role of the IT System in 
MAS in lCB]. The kind of support the survey interviewees looked for poses quite a 
challenge for IT staff at the banks. Hellair et al. (2002, p. 32) comment that more and 
more computer systems are infiltrating the work of banks and higher and higher the costs 
are rising almost in the footsteps of salaries. However, when I asked the respondents to 
identify the main reasons that affected the quality and quantity of information in MAS 
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I 
reports, cost came as reason number four preceded by the IT system itself used, the lack 
of a well-designed information system, and the lack of institutions specialised in 
researching and providing information. Management style was one other reason given, 
along with qualifications of the IT staff. 
PART III THE ROLE OF MAS IN PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING IN JCB 
A number of findings surfaced from the PB case study concerning the role of MAS in 
planning and decision-making. Those fmdings were the basis for the questions asked to 
the survey interviewees. This part analyses and discusses the answers of the interviewees 
on the case study findings. 
A number of characteristics made MAS at PB have a backward emphasis as opposed to 
having a forward outlook. This reflected on the kind of support users of the system 
received for planning and decision-making. In looking at MAS in the survey population, I 
follow the same findings as a framework for the following analysis and discussion: 
1. Identifying corporate goals vis-a-vis stakeholders 
2. Departmental goals aligned with corporate goals 
3. Sufficient relevant information on which to base future plans 
4. Diffusion of information across the organisation 
5. Clear and open channels of communication in all directions. 
5.15 Identifying Corporate Goals vis-a-vis Stakeholders 
It was argued in the PB case study that an organization needs a sense of direction if it is to 
serve management in achieving better planning and decision-making [see more discussion 
in Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals at PB; and Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB]. This is 
supported by many researchers (e.g. Seashore, 1965, p.26; Curmingham, 1977, p. 465; 
McNair et aI., 1990, p. 34; Mabberley, 1992, p. 101; Gordon &: Di Tomaso, 1992, p. 795; 
Palmer 1992, p. 182; Kaplan & Norton, 1996, p. 80, among others). 
Setting corporate and department goals is beyond the domain of MAS. However, what is 
argued is that, for the MAS to provide support and information to its users who ultimately 
seek to achieve corporate goals, and then MAS can only help in the attainment of OE by 
providing the information and support that could lead to the achieving corporate goals. It 
is also beyond the scope of this study to measure the plausibility and suitability of the 
corporate goals of lCB. 
343 
................ ------------------------
5.16 Departmental Goals Aligned with Corporate Goals 
The findings of the case study showed that 53% of PB managers were not involved in 
planning for their departments [Section 4.15.3, Departmental Goals at PB]. The PB case 
study findings indicated that the lack of alignment between corporate and departmental 
goals and managers' individual goals affected planning and goal achievement. In the 
survey it was revealed from the responses of the interviewees that 50 % of the 
respondents were informed about corporate goals en passant and some as late as 
December or January [see Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCR; Section 5.18, Clear 
Financial and Non-Financial Goals for Managers in JCB]. 
What followed from the manner in which the interviewees knew about the corporate 
goals was that 50% of the department and branch managers were not actively involved in 
setting departmental !branch goals, as was the case with 53% at PB. Some of the 
interviewees' answers can explain it: 
'1 have not got any targets to meet. Management has decided to cut down on corporate 
credit'. (interview 29). 
And: 'Branches' goals are set by top management and not by me '. (interview 12) 
And: 'The financial analysis and contra/department sets future plans for the whole bank' 
(interview 30). 
As discussed earlier in Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB, some financial managers said 
they did not have goals for their departments: 'a financial department has no goals of its 
own ' (interview 8). A similar approach was found in PB where only branches and 
revenue-earning departments had goals to meet. In spite of the important role which the 
finance and computer departments have in the design and operation of MAS and in 
supporting other departments to enhance their performance, the financial and IT 
/ 
departments did not in the majority of the banks have set goals to achieve nor did they 
have similar means to monitor their performance and achievements. 
It was also discussed earlier [Section 5.14, The Use of Computers in MAS at PB] that a 
frequently-mentioned reason for the dissatisfaction of the respondents with the reports 
and,·in particular, the credit and branch managers, was the need for the more effective use 
of the IT system capabilities [Exhibit 5 AI, Elements MAS Needs to Have in IT System to 
Provide Support for Planning, Decision-Making and Control in JCB]. 
5.16.1 Effects of the Goal-Setting Process on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB 
To ensure goal congruence and the alignment of corporate goals, an effective goal- setting 
process needs to be adopted. Goals in JCB were set centrally by top management in a top-
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bottom direction [Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB; and Section 4.15.5, Goal-Setting 
Process at PB]. This resulted in a number of difficulties that were discussed by the 
interviewees, such as a lack of conviction by the managers in the goals they were asked to 
achieve, which would have a substantial effect on the role MAS which can play in 
enhancing OE. 
The goals were either too difficult or too easy to achieve, as can be seen in the following: 
'Our line of work is risky so we are happy with the targets set by management' (interview 
16). 
And: 'We are able to achieve our goalsfor 2002 by June 2002' (interview 15). 
And : 'We always set targets above our capabilities so we feel that they are not easy to 
achieve' (interview 23). 
5.16.2 Conflict between DepartmentallBranches' Goals and Corporate Goals 
An overall percentage of the survey interviewees of 40% said there was a conflict 
between the two. This percentage would have been much higher if it was not influenced 
by the financial managers where all of the eight managers [l 00%] said there was no 
conflict [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCB]. 
Some of the interviewees commented on setting departmental goals: 
Top management is not really clear about what they want' (interview 15). 
And: 'I was never consulted in setting the goals of the department ... but 1 try to work and 
follow the team' (interview 19). 
Those who found no conflict between the two as 'departmental goals are subordinate to 
corporate goals' [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCB; and Section 5.9.1, Goal-
Setting in JCB] or as one manager explained it: 
The corporate goal is to maximize profits and we [his department] contribute 96% of the 
bank's profits' (interview 4). . 
A further reflection on misaligmnent of goals was found when interviewees were asked in 
question 8, whether their interpretation of changes in the external environment differed 
from that of top management, 47 % said 'yes' and another 17% said 'at times' totalling 
64% (25% of deposit managers, 63% credit managers, 88% 9f financial managers, and 
75% of branch managers). 
Weick (1977, p. 218) explains that 'environment is located in the mind of the actor and is 
imposed by him on streams of experience'. Each of the interviewees had hislher 
interpretation imposed on hislher experience many times removed from that of top 
management. First, as most did not get what information they needed (60%) through 
formal MAS channels, they were not fully aware of management's interpretation. Second, 
the interviewees got information through personal means and formed their own opinions. 
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Thirdly, channels of communication and committees were not adequately activated within 
the banks and there was no effective exchange of ideas among managers [see discussion 
under the role of committees in Section 5.17.1.5]. On top of that 50% were not involved 
in setting their departmental/branches' goals. Consequently, this could very well result in 
managers and management each pursuing hisfher interpretation in a different direction 
with the probability of not meeting along the way. 
Then I asked the interviewees in question 8 whether their interpretation of the external 
environment differed from that of top management: 63% said 'yes' it differed, or so at 
times (25% of deposit managers, 63% credit managers, 88% of financial managers, and 
75% of branch managers). When I asked about the reasons their interpretations differed, 
the most frequently given answers were: 
[1] management had information not available to the interviewees 
[mentioned 5 times]; 
[2] each had a different perspective [6 times]; 
[3] difference in education, background, and work experiences [4 times]. 
This percentage is quite high keeping in mind that almost three quarters of the 
interviewees were part of senior management and one quarter were middle managers 
[Exhibit 5.3, Distribution of Survey Interviews according to Position] and all the topics 
they mentioned affect OE, and the role ofMAS in enhancing OE. 
In question 9 fifteen respondents said the difference affected them in various ways [37% 
of deposit managers, 50% of credit managers, 75% of financial managers and 25% of 
branch managers] and some just said it affected them or did not affect without explaining 
why. 
The ways in which different interpretations affected their efforts in achieving corporate 
goals were specified as: 
[1] frustration and confusion [mentioned 3 times]; 
[2] losing clients [2 times]; 
[3] unsatisfactory work [2 times]; 
[4] quality of planning and decision-making [1 time]. 
What was said agrees with our findings in the PB case study where in the absence of 
information provided by MAS on the external environment, managers acted solely upon 
their personal interpretation of the changes in the variables, which might not be in unison 
with those of top management. 
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Looking at some of the answers of those who said the difference in interpretation did not 
affect their efforts in achieving corporate goals in turn gives some insight into the process 
of communication in the banks: 
[1] no effect as approval comes from top management' [interview 20, mentionedll 
times]; 
[2] managers discuss matters with management [mentioned 10 times]; 
[3] we learn from top management [1 time]. 
It is inte;esting to note that open channels between the levels of management had a 
positive impact on the interviewees. The difference in interpretation of changes in the 
elements in the external environment, in addition to the conflict in goals, gives some 
insight into the fact that PB and other JCB showed goal incongruence, which is a source 
of strategic misalignment, particularly when this was coupled with asymmetry of 
Information [as discussed in Section 5.17, Adequate Diffusion of Information across 
JCB]. 
5.16.3 Disagreement between Corporate and DepartmentallBranches' Goals and 
Individual Goals 
More than one third (37%) of the respondents felt there was a disagreement. Again the 
overall percentage was considerably influenced by deposit managers of whom only 13% 
said there was a disagreement whilst the other functions showed 63% and 50% non-
correspondence [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCB]. The results of the 
disagreement between corporate and departrnental/branches' goals and individual goals as 
described by them were demoralization, demotivation, and setting lower targets for 
themselves, which in turn would affect productivity and OE. 
'1 feel disappointed that my personal goals do not correspond with my departmental 
goals' (interview 19). 
This describes what is discussed by the survey interviewees and more clearly so for 
credit, financial, and branch managers as it describes what was found at PB. 
5.16.4 Sufficient Relevant Information on which to Base Future Plans 
All the respondents' replies indicated that they needed external type of information: an 
overall percentage of 73% needed more information on the internal environment, and 
76% said they needed wide scope information. The uses to which they would put that 
information were planning (new markets, setting goals, improving decision- making). 
[See Exhibits 5.8, Need for Information on the External Environment in JCB; Exhibit 5.9, 
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Uses of Information on the External Environment; and Exhibit 5.12, Need for more 
Information on the Internal Environment]. 
However, 63% said they did not actually receive that sort of information through MAS 
reports, or only received it 'to some extent'. Again here the overall percentage was 
brought down by deposit managers ofwhorn 63% said they got the information through 
MAS. In the meantime credit and branch managers showed a very low percentage of 12% 
and 25% [Exhibit 5.42, Forward Looking Information in MAS]. 
Some of the respondents commented on the quality of information they received, such· 
as: 
'The financial department provides contradictory information due to the lack of 
coordination between two senior managers' (interview 6). 
And: 'We have to rely on a direct sales approach to collect what information we need' 
(interview 27). 
And, as one respondent who was exasperated from lack of information: '[ wish [could get 
background information even on rates of exchange' (interview 28). 
One branch manager in desperation with the lack of information said: 
'Until now [ am not able to take decisions [ am happy with due to absence of an 
information system ... MAS reports do not serve my purpose' (interview 12). 
And: There is a gap between top management and middle management ... they are not 
convinced of the need for such information ... Top management is willing to sacrifice 
efficiency for secrecy' (interview 11). 
Exhibit 5.42 
F d Lo k' I fi MAS R orwar o mg n ormatton m eports 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Did not get the information through MAS 
reports 37% 88% 50% . 75% 
Overall average 63 % 
Others commented on the orientation of the information MAS provided by saying: 
They (how MAS reports serve in planning and decision-making) serve decisions on daily 
transactions' (interview 2). 
And, 'they tell me where [ stand' (interview 4). 
The· interviewees were also dissatisfied with the information on the internal environment 
they received through the formal reporting system. 73% of the respondents said they 
needed more information than that they were provided with and they needed it for 
planning and decision-making [Exhibit 5.13, Types ofInternal Information Needed by the 
Survey Interviewees; and Exhibit 5.14, Types of Internal Information Provided to the 
Survey Interviewees]. 
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By saying more the respondents meant different types of information than the kinds with 
which they were provided [see more discussion in Section 5.9.2.4, Information on the 
Internal Environment], and can be sensed from the explanations given below: 
(l) ' ... detailed information is needed for planning ... planning is not taken seriously in the 
bank' (interview 18). / .. 
And, 'a lot of the reports are general in nature ... so 1 do not seriously look into them' 
(interview 29). 
(2) 'MAS reports I receive do not contain enough non-financial information ... ifwe are 
talking about large amounts (credit facilities) then we insist on getting non-financial 
information on the client' (interview 13) [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial and Non-
Financial Information in lCB]. 
(3) 'Reporting is not comprehensive enough ... this requires of me a lot of manual work to 
consolidate data from different reports to produce meaningful information based on 
w~ich you could make educated decisions' (interview] 0). 
(4) '] get what] need but the timing affects me' (interview 24). 
And, yes ... but] need it (information on the internal environment) in advance' (interview 
2). 
Most of the MAS reports used by the commercial banks were historical in nature (90%). 
[See Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics of MAS Reports in JCB]. One respondent answered 
when asked how would (s)he use forward looking reports, forward looking reports are 
useful in setting goals that are in harmony with the bank's strategy' (interview ]5), which 
stresses the significance of the timing of information. A second example of the need for 
the provision of information for planning is the following: 
'] get what happened yesterday .. .for planning ... ] need more sophisticated reports' 
(interview 17). 
But that was hardly available when most of the reports were of a historical nature. As 
Wilson & Chua (1993, p. 67) wrote: 
'The past may help us in deciding how to proceed in the future, but there is no way in 
which we can influence the past, so there is a limit to the amount of effort that should be 
applied to it as opposed to planning for the future'. 
Other respondents also believed that they needed forward looking reports for: 
[1] planning and setting goals [mentioned 17 times]; 
[2] creating an awareness of the future [14 times]; 
[3] decision-making [6 times]. 
The majority of the interviewees (93%) responded that planning needs descriptive as well 
as financial information [Exhibit 5.36, Need for Non-Financial Information in JCB; and 
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Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial and. Non-Financial Information in Jordanian Banks]. At 
the opposite end a deposit manager said '] do not deal with descriptions ... ] deal with 
figures '. The genera.1 pattern agrees with our findings in the case study, that MAS in JCB 
emphasise financial information and measures and neglect non-financial information 
although bankers need them. The pattern of respondents' answers emphasises what Gross 
(1965, p. 214) says that 'technical calculations are never enough. Over reliance upon 
them can lead to administrative irrationality' . 
The existing MAS employed in JCB failed the interviewees in another aspect as 
interviewees did not get information they needed on the external environment through 
MAS reports. [See Exhibit 5.37, The Role ofMAS in Providing Information for Planning, 
Decision-Making and Control in JCB]. They said it would be useful to them for: 
understanding the environment, decision-making, and planning for markets, clients and 
products [see Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-Financial Information in MAS Reports]. 
In question 34 I asked the respondents whether the reports they received were more 
helpful to them in planning, decision-making or control: 72% said they were more helpful 
in control, and 25% said they were equally helpful in the three areas. A small percentage 
(9%) said they were more helpful in planning and (6%) for decision-making. [See Exhibit 
5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were More Helpful in JCB]. It is interesting to 
note that, out of the eight respondents [25%] who said the reports were equally helpful in 
all three areas, six respondents were deposit managers. 
Respondents did not find MAS reports as helpful in planning and decision-making as they 
were in control. Some of the reasons mentioned were: 
'Reports are designed to control daily operations' (interview 18), 
'Reports were not designed to serve planning' (interview 19). 
I then asked each respondent why did (s)he rank the three functions the way (s)he did. 
From the relevant answers given the most frequent were: 
[I] 'Because my job is primarily to control' (interviewI5) [m~ntioned 7 times]. 
[2] Information in MAS reports was not designed to serve planning [6 times]. 
[3] Information in MAS reports tells me where I stand [3 times]. 
[4] Information in MAS reports serves daily transactions [2 times]. 
What can be noted from the respondents' answers, and not only for this question, is that 
planning did not get as much attention from management as did control. In addition to 
what other researchers say about the lack of information typical of financial institutions, 
one explanation that contributed to this focuses on the cultural factors [Exhibit 5.29, 
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Effects of Social Culture on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB]. Jordan has a 
deterministic culture where religion and the concept of predetermined fate is widely 
embraced (Kirkman et al., 2001, p.23). On this Miroshink (2002, p. 527) writes that the 
effect of a culture can at times be played down: 
'According to experience managers generally cannot view culture affecting 
organizations' day-to-day operations. Very often managers see themselves as beyond 
passport, and good organizations as beyond nationality'. 
The discussion above underlines the importance of sufficient relevant information to for 
managers to base their future plans. However, it is worth mentioning here that with future 
uncertainty coupled with the unavailability of all relevant information in many instances 
managers have to apply an element of judgement in decision-making. 
'There is nothing about an organisation that is more important than its future ... Planning 
is as much a function of judgement as it is of information' (Wilson & Chua 1993, p. 67, p. 
185). 
5.17 Adequate Diffusion ofInformation across the Organization 
Referring back to our findings in the case study on the role of MAS in planning and 
decision-making at PB, diffusion of information within JCB was affected by three main 
elements: the organisational structure, characteristics of MAS reports, and management 
style which are discussed below. 
5.17.1 Effects of the Organisational Structure on Planning and Decision-making 
The PB case study showed five elements in the organisational structure to hinder the 
diffusion of information [Exhibit 4.13, Elements in Organisational Structure that Hinder 
the Flow ofInformation]. 
From the answers of the survey interviewees it was very interesting to note the striking 
similarity in the elements identified by them and the ones induced in the case study from 
the analysis of the data see [Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for 
Flow of Information in JCB; and Exhibit 5.19, Functions Organisational Structure of a 
Jordanian Commercial Bank Should Serve]. Although PB· underwent a number of 
organisational changes as the major shareholders and management of the bank changed 
over its life, the other banks were more stable in terms of ownership, management, and 
organisation. 
5.17.1.1 Work Procedures in JCB 
During the interviews at PB and from the responses of the surveyed managers, work 
procedures were found to be lacking, unclear, or continuously changing. Although the 
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interview guide did not include a direct question on work procedures, there was a more 
general question on the elements of organizational structure to allow more space for the 
respondents to discuss what they wanted to talk about. Five respondents clearly discussed 
the inability of the set work procedures to help in communication or coordination. 
The interviewees believed setting work procedures and updating them to be important in 
settling matters such as who would receive which reports, and who should be infonned or 
consulted on which issues. 
But it was not possible from the data collected to know more about the work procedures 
at JCB other than the survey interviewees' opinions on bureaucracy [see Section 5.27.1, 
Cultural Effects on Bureaucracy in Banks]. 
5.17.1.2 Effects of Channels of Communication on Planning and Decision-Making in 
JCB 
Our findings in the case study on the diffusion of infonnation that is conducive to a 
higher level of OE stipulated clear channels of communication and a stable organisational 
structure with clearly delineated responsibilities and authority [see Exhibit 4.13, Elements 
in Organisational Structure that Hinder the Flow of Infonnation]. 
Channels of communication both at PB and in the other commercial banks were criticised 
by the survey interviewees as discussed earlier under organisation structure [see Section 
5.11.1, Elements Decisive in Organisational Structure of JCB for the Flow of 
Information] : 
'There is some delay in receiving information. .. planning is an ongoing process' 
(interview 8). 
The shortcomings in channels of communication can be noted ~in a comment on a question 
on whether managers and top management had different interpretation of the external 
environment: 
'We do not have an efficient channel with top management to decide whether to agree or 
disagree' (interview 18). 
And, as commented by another assistant general manager: 
'/ personally believe that the flow of information from top to bottom is very important' 
(interview 13) .. 
The use of 'personally' has a special connotation in this context. The interviewee stressed 
it while answering the question and did not use the collective noun as if to stress his 
personal belief, which suggests that the same view might not have been held by others at 
the bank. 
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As discussed earlier in the chapter [Section 5.11.3, Channels of Communication], most of 
the interviewees did not face problems with communication channels. The 37% who 
faced problems with channels of communication blamed it on: 
1- the nature of the organisational structure [mentioned 6 times]; 
2- internal politics [4 times]; 
3- cultural factor [1 time]; 
4- psychological gap between managers and top management [1 time]. 
On the other hand, those (63%) who said that they did not face problems said it V.'aS 
because of the organisational structure, the management style, and the human factor. The 
same reasons were blamed for the failure of channels of communication as in the PB case 
study on the importance of organisational structure [Exhibit 5.17, Elements in 
Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information in JCB] and management 
style within MAS [see discussion in Section 5.27, Culture Effects on Organisation 
Structure in JCB]. 
5.17.1.3 Frequent Changes to Organizational Structure 
As explained in the historical background of PB [Section 4.1, Historical Background of 
PB], it had undergone many changes which left the organisational structure an 
amalgamation of the corporate cultures and organisational structures of consecutive 
managements. The other eight banks were more stable and none of them had similar 
serious frequent changes that affected the diffusion of information in PB. 
Nevertheless, in the survey two respondents in the same hank commented on the changes 
in the organisation structure of that bank [in interviews 29 and 30): 
' ... the reengineering at the bank has a negative effect on the organisational structure and 
on morale and work' (interview 29). 
'In third world countries a manager is appointed first and then a department is created' 
(interview 30). 
As a result it is not possible to make comparisons about changes in top management. 
Nevertheless, it is argued in Section 5.1 1.2, Delineation of Responsibilities and Authority 
of Departments, that JCB faced difficulties with the delineation of responsibilities and 
authority of departments which were unclear at times. The need for stable and well-
defined responsibilities and authority was identified by 47% of the respondents as being 
the most important element to enhance the diffusion of information [Exhibit 5.17, 
Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information]. 
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5.17.1.4 Effects of Coordination Problems on Planning and Decision-Making 
When the interviewees where asked about what elements they considered to be decisive 
for the diffusion of information, coordination among departments and managers was the 
third identified element by 37% of the survey interviewees as well as by PB managers. In 
one of the banks it was mentioned by three out of the four managers interviewed [see 
Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow of Information in 
JCB; and Exhibit 5.18 Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for Flow of 
information per Function in JCB]. Interviewees bdieved those elements were important 
because of the effect they would have on the effectiveness and efficiency with which they 
undertook their duties. 
It is quite likely that the interviewees in the different departments were describing their 
own experiences at work and the difficulties they faced due to a lack of coordination and 
the fragmentation of their efforts. A number of interviewees commented on the need for 
coordination among managers and departments by saying that their work complemented 
and depended on each other: 
'the work of employees complements each other' (interview 5). 
And as described in interview 3: 'the nature of banking work is institutional type work', 
referring to the chain like nature of their work with each manager depending on others in 
hislher department as well as other departments for himlher to do hislher work 
satisfactorily. To take one example, for a credit department to achieve its goals it 
depends on deposit managers to reach certain targets, and the work of a credit control 
department depends on the work of the credit and legal departments in executing their 
responsibilities towards credit clients in terms of credit worthiness, coIlaterals, and setting 
credit limits to mention some examples. 
Scapens (1994, pp. 310-311) agrees very much with what the interviewees said as 'central 
to productive organisation performance is coordination, and central to coordination is that 
individual members, knowing their jobs, correctly interpret arid respond to the messages 
they receive'. 
This sheds some light on the fact that it was not a problem restricted to the nature of 
banking work. Other reasons mentioned by the interviewees included: 
'The financial department provides contradictory information due to a lack of 
coordination between two senior managers' (interview 6). 
The manager in interview 4 gave an explanation for the lack of communication and 
coordination among managers as: 
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'Managers at the bank belong to different schools' and • ... more important is the human 
element'. . 
Co-ordination gains its significance as third most frequently identified element for a 
process -in the interviewees' opinions- as it leads to improved planning, feedback and 
follow up which all, in turn, leading to an enhancement of OE [Exhibit 5.18, Elements in 
Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow ofInformation per Function in JCB]. 
The lack of coordination affected the operation and role of MAS in planning and 
decision-making as it reflected itself in problems among departments and managers in 
their individual attempts to attain corporate goals and achieve OE - particularly for the 
very reason mentioned earlier in interview 5 and 3 that banking involves institutional type 
of work where no manager works in isolation of what other mangers and departments do, 
thereby affecting and being affected by their work. 
5.17.1.5 Committees inJCB 
PB management tried to overcome the lack of structure for coordination and unclear 
channels of communication, and centralisation of information, by an open-door policy 
and committees [see discussion on this in Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure 
Elements; and Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB]. 
However, what came out from the answers of PB managers was that committees cannot 
be used effectively in Jordanian banks due to cultural reasons. 
When survey interviewees were asked about committees [Q 43-44] some of the answers 
came as: 
'If you want to kill a matter form a committee to deal with it' (interview 2). 
'And: The problem with committees ... when you want to stall matters then form a 
committee' (interview 10). 
And: 'Culturally we do not come to committees with an attitude to discuss ... you know 
what is said: to kill a matter form a committee' (interview 12). 
And: 'They should be used for simple decisions and for gaining approval' (interview 10). 
ChenhaIl (2003, p. 145) quoting Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) who 'identified a need for 
higher levels of differentiation to cope with diverse and uncertain environments and that 
this causes potential integration problems which require sophisticated liaison mechanisms 
(integrative personnel, meetings, rather than rules and procedures). Such a structure for 
unstructured problems is also discussed in Section 4.11, The Characteristics and Design 
of MAS at PB, in dealing with unforeseen or infrequent situations that do not fit well 
within rigid structures. 
Building on their own experiences those interviewees said that: 
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[1] committees were not only unhelpful but a waste of time [mentioned 8 times out of the 
15 who said that committees were not helpful]; 
[2] committees lacked focus [3 times]. 
To look at the answers in their entirety, respondents were split down in the middle, with 
47 % saying they found committees helpful in their work [Exhibit 5.43, The Role of 
Committees in Jordanian Banks]. Branch managers were t least likely to find committees 
helpful to them (88%) in their work followed by credit managers (50%). 
A number of the respondents commented on when and how committees would be of help 
to them: 
1- 'Provided we have proper teamwork spirit, committees can be used to execute, achieve 
and discuss' (interview 23). 
2- 'If the committee gets appropriate authority its work will be successful' (interview 19). 
3- 'The set up of the committee is very important' (interview 14). 
4-'Committees are helpful provided they have freedom to decide' (interview 2). 
5- 'Committees should not be dominated by the chairman of the committee' (interview 2) 
6- 'it all depends how management sets them (committees) ... they should be used for 
simple decisions and for gaining approval' (interview 10). 
The points (1-5) mentioned by the interviewees suggest that the main criticism to 
committees was the way they were set up. There was a general agreement that credit 
committees functioned well in Jordanian banks and were helpful in credit decisions [see 
also discussion on committees in Section 5.27.2, Cultural Effects on Committees in JCB]. 
Exhibit 5.43 
The Role of Committees in JCB 
(N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) _(n=8) 1.n=8) 
Committees helpful 
Overall percenta.z.e 47% 63% 50% 63% 12% 
In answer in relation to which activities the respondents found the committees helpful 
[Q44], the most frequent answers were: 
[1] for joint decisions, particularly strategic decisions and decisions that call for many 
opinions and were ensuing responsibility is spread over the participants (18 times); 
[2] exchanging experiences and giving recommendations ( 6 times); 
[3] coordination (3 times). 
5.17.1.6 Effects of Centralisation on Planning and Decision-Making 
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Our findings on centralisation from the PB case study indicated that centralisation of 
information, gatekeepers and internal politics affected the availability of information. 
Centralisation of information is discussed at length in Section 5.10.1.1, Centralisation of 
Information in JCB. What is relevant here is that 67% of the respondents believed that 
there was formal centralisation of information in addition to internal politics (63%) and 
information gatekeepers (60%). Most of the respondents (63%) said it had a negative 
effect on planning, and 54% said it had a negative effect on decision-making [Exhibit 
5.16, Consequences ofCentraiisation ofInformation 
in JCB; and Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, Information 
Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics]. In both cases the most affected were the credit and 
branch managers. 
Such a difference, although in a different context, was observed by Mia & Chenhall 
(1994 as quoted by Chenhall 2003, p. 146) where they found 'marketing mangers used 
broad scope information more effectively than those in production' as marketing, 
compared to production, involves higher task uncertainty. 
5.17.2 Effects of Characteristics of MAS Reports on Planning and Decision-making 
The design of MAS involves designing MAS reports to act as tools and vehicles for the 
transferring and diffusion of information within the organisation. This places a special 
importance on the design and characteristics of MAS reports [see more discussion in 
Section 5.13, Characteristics and Design ofMAS Reports in JCB]. However, it would be 
pertinent to say here that the respondents were not satisfied with the frequency of the 
reports. An overall percentage of respondents (47%) and, in particular, branch managers 
(63%) would have preferred to receive ad hoc reports in addition to periodic reports, as 
there was not much value in information after it was needed [Exhibit 5.10, MAS Reports 
on the External Environment and their Frequency]. 
In terms of their format, the reports contained predominantly financial information. When 
respondents were asked about non-financial information, 94% said they needed non-
financial in addition to the financial information and, in particular credit and branch 
mangers (100%) [Exhibit 5.36, Need for Non-Financial Information in JCB]. 
The information in MAS reports had a control focus and the majority of respondents 
[77%] found them to be of limited help in planning and long-term decision-making and, 
in particular, credit and branch managers (88% and 63%) [Exhibit 5.42, Forward Looking 
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Infonnation in MAS Reports; and Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were 
More Helpful in ICB]. 
The time horizon was ex post with 90% of the reports being historical in nature. In 
contrast, when it came to planning, the interviewees needed forward-looking reports. 
As for orientation, 72% found them more helpful for feedback control purposes than for 
planning and decision-making [Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were more 
Helpful in ICB]. The overall percentage was brought down by deposit managers as 63% 
of credit managers and financial managers, .and 100% of branch managers, found them 
more helpful in feedback control. 38 % said reports contained irrelevant information 
while 50%, of credit and branch managers believed they did [Exhibit 525, Characteristics 
ofMAS Reports in ICB]. Credit managers were the largest group to say that reports have 
unnecessary detail, followed by financial managers (50%), while the overall percentage 
was 42%. One third of the respondents (32%) agreed that MAS reports lacked a sharp 
focus. On the whole, a substantial percentage of the survey interviewees found that MAS 
reports did not sufficiently meet their needs. 
5.17.3 Effects of Management Styles 6n Planning and Decision-Making 
Question 11 in the survey interview guide asked whether the respondents felt that top 
management was sufficiently committed to making infonnation available to managers: 
33% believed they were not [Exhibit 5.27, Management Commitment to the Diffusion of 
Infonnation in ICB] as some of the interviewees commented (all from the same bank): 
'They think what we have is enough ... they believe our work is in implementing and 
decision-making only' (interview 29). 
And, 'they believe we are processors who do not need to analyse information' (interview 
28). 
And, 'top managers are members of a family or friends ... so information is restricted to 
the close circle offamily members' (interview 30). 
Taking the example of two interviewees from a second bank: 
'It should be leflto me to decide whether I needed the information ... secrecy in an 
organisation is not right ... as a member of the team I should be involved' (interview /9). 
'Yes top management is not sufficiently committed". As for why, 'it is our top 
management style ... Head office puts obstacles in the wiry of the growth of my 
branch ... but again I do not have the overall picture' (interview 18). 
The most frequently given answers by the branch managers interviewed· 'when I asked 
what made them believe that their respective managements were committed to providing 
needed information, were: 
(1] the manage'ment style [mentioned 8 times]; 
[2] management provided them with what they asked for [2 times]; 
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[3] management was working on a database and was provided training and equipment 
needed [2 times]. 
If we contrast the above with question 12, 91 % said that their respective top management 
believed that there was information that should not be diffused to senior managers. When 
the respondents were asked whether they needed the 'restricted information' for planning 
and decision-making, 50% of the credit, financial, and branch managers said they needed 
it [Exhibit 5.27, Management Commitment to the Diffusion oflnformation in JCB]. 
Furthermore, the in~erviewees said if the information was made available to them it would 
have affected the quality of their planning and decision-making, and that it would have 
changed their approach to dealing with issues. 
All that is in line with our findings from the case study that PB managers did not get the 
information they needed for planning and decision-making because there were certain 
types of information in the bank that should not be diffused across the hierarchy. Gross 
(1965, p. 215) believes planning involves delicate considerations 'that may not always be 
publicly discussed with complete frankness'. This puts the issue to be resolved on an 
individual basis as a function of management style to decide what qualifies as delicate 
sensitive information and the evaluation of possible implications of whether or not to 
discuss it with senior managers. 
Part IV THE ROLE OF MAS IN CONTROL IN lCB 
Our findings from the PB case study in Exhibit 4.11 on the role of MAS in control 
included the following: 
1. unclear financial and non-financial goals for managers' activities; 
2. unsuitable and clear measurement/standards throughout the stages of 
implementation; 
3. inadequate organisational structure; 
4. inadequate flow of feedback and feed forward information; 
Throughout Part IV I will document replies of survey interviewees on questions that 
where prepared based on the case study findings. I will also compare the analysed survey 
information to the PB case study findings and other researchers' writings. As rightly 
indicated by Otley & Pollanen (2000, p. 483), 'control practices and their effects differ 
markedly across organisations and culture ... universal findings should not be expected'. 
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5.18 Clear Financial and Non-Financial Goals for Managers' Activities 
Earlier in this chapter corporate goals alignment with departmentallbranch goals and how 
they corresponded to the interviewee's personal goals is discussed [see Section 5.9.1, 
Goal-Setting in JCB]. From the analysed data it became clear that 50 % of the 
respondents were not involved in setting their departmentallbranch goals, and that an 
overall percentage of 40% felt that a conflict existed between departmentallbranch goals 
and corporate goals [Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCB], but more so for credit 
managers [50%] and branch managers [75%]. Furthermore, 63% of credit and branch 
managers and 50% of financial managers said their personal goals did not correspond to 
departmental and corporate goals. Lack of alignment among the three sets of goals was 
also expressed by the case study interviewees [see Section 4.15.3, Departmental Goals at 
PB; 4.15.4, Characteristics of Departmental Goals at PB]. 
The strategic alignment of goals is seen by Slagmulder (1997, pp. 103-104) as the: 
'Primal)' purpose of management control...to ensure that the behaviour and decisions of 
people are consistent with the organisation's goals and strategies'. 
It is argued that such a situation could hamper corporate goals achievement and OE 
(Reimann & Negandhi, 1975, p. 476; Kaplan & Norton, 1996, p. 76). The persisting 
question would be controlling what goals? It is what I discuss below as the function of 
control to bring about alignment with corporate goals and not to focus on feedback 
control and lose sight of what is the ultimate purpose of control i.e. enhancing OE. 
A credit manager commented when answering the question about the areas in which 
MAS reports were more useful to him: 
'Control is crucial to our work' (interview 25). 
And a branch manager said: 
'My work has more to do with control than decision-making or planning' (interview 26). 
Yes, feedback control is an important function in a commercial bank and in order to 
achieve more effective control over credit facilities, most Jordanian banks have 
specialised departments to deal with credit control and follow-up. However, not all 
departments in the survey population had goals. Service department and' cost centres 
(referring to his department) do not have goals' (interview 1), or 'a financial department 
does not have goals' (interview 18). The same attitude was found at PB where only 
revenue generating departments had goals [Section 4.15.3, Departmental Goals at PB]. 
Not having goals makes monitoring progress and measuring achievement ineffective. 
The difficulty in dealing with non-quantitative goals and measures should not mean their 
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exclusion. Wilson & Chua, (1993, p. 332) advocate that 'Standards can be set for non-
production items so variance analysis can be carried out for non-production items', as do 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 3) in emphasising the importance of clear control objectives for 
effective control. However, they note that 'in most organizations goals are ambiguous and 
subject to political compromise' which leads to using control in 'ensuring that agreed 
plans of action are implemented rather than the use of guiding objectives' (Emmanuel et 
al., 1990, p. 3). 
In discussing control within MAS I will revisit many of the factors discussed previously 
in planning and decision-making [see Exhibit 5.37, The Role of MAS Information in 
Planning, Decision-Making, & Control in JCB]. What is of concern to us here is both 
organisational and operational control. By organisational or management control we 
mean 'the process that links strategic planning with operational control which is 
concerned with down-to-earth activity of ensuring that immediate tasks are carried out' 
(Otley, 1995, p. 46). 
The goal-setting process is discussed amply in Section 5.9.1. What can be said at this 
point is that a number of issues raise the question about the effectiveness of MAS in 
feedforward control at the JCB, and consequently management control and OE. For 
example issues such as, the lack and/or late awareness of corporate goals [Section 5.9.1, 
Goal-Setting in JCB], the non-involvement of managers in setting departmental/branch 
goals [Section 5.16, Departmental Goals Aligued with Corporate Goals in JCB], and the 
incongruence and lack of alignment of the three sets of goals (corporate goals, 
departmentallbranch goals and individual goals) that managers were. entrusted with 
implementing and achieving [Section 5.16.2, Conflict between DepartmentallBranches' 
Goals and Corporate Goals in JCB; Section 5.16.3, Disagreement Between Corporate and 
Departmentallbranches' Goals and Individual Goals in JCB]. 
5.18.1 Financial and Non-Financial Goals in JCB 
The survey interviewees who had set goals had predominantly financial ones. The annual 
goals were stated in their budgets and when I asked them about which activities did they 
budget, 80% of those who prepared budgets said they had financial targets to meet and 
only 29% had both financial and non-financial targets [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial 
and Non-Financial Information and Goals in JCBj. 
A manager commented on his goals: 'the corporate goal is profit and we contribute 96% 
of the bank's profits '(interview 4). In the case study a similar use of financial goals and 
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measures was found. The budgets prepared at PB included almost entirely fmancial 
measures [Section 4.16 Forms and Areas of Control at PB]. 
When I asked the survey respondents what types of activities they reported to their 
superiors and top management [Q 40], 53% answered that they reported only financial 
activities such as expenses, revenues, and profits. The rest said they reported on both 
financial and non-financial activities, although 93% of the respondents commented on the 
importance of non-financial information [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial and Non-
Financial Information in JCB]. 
'Non-financial information explains the financial and are indicators for the .fUture' 
(interview 8). 
And, 'Non-financial information explains issues that financial information does not 
discuss' (interview 16). 
And, 'All new ideas start with non-financial information ... market trends ... new products' 
(interview JO). 
Not all Deposit managers had budgets, 67% (4 out of 6 respondents) of those who had 
budgets had only financial goals. As for what type of activities they reported to top 
management, 50% (4 out of 8 respondents) said they reported financial information on 
deposits only. Those who reported non-financial information reported information on 
competition, and information on clients [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial & Non-Financial 
Information in JCB, 501]. 
As for credit managers, 83% (5 out of 6 respondents) of those who had a budget had 
only financial goals. The same thing applied to what they reported to top management 
though to a slightly lesser degree, as 63% (5 out of 8 respondents) of the credit managers 
reported only financial matters to the neglect of non-financial and the effect that might 
have on the feedback to top management. The non-financial information reported 
included: information on changes in the markets and sectors, and the credit position of 
clients. 
Finance managers were responsible in most cases for preparing the banks' budget and 
did not have departmental budgets. The two financial managers who had a budget for 
their departments had only financial objectives, and 63% (5 out of 8 respondents) 
reported financial information to top management [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of Financial and 
Non-Financial Information in JCB]. They reported non-financial information such as 
branches' problems, departments' negligence, and tradings in the banks' shares. 
Of the six branch managers who had a budget, 83% said they had only or mostly 
financial goals to' meet in areas of credit, deposits and profits. 75% said they reported 
financial information to head office. They reported non-financial information such as any 
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abnormal matters, clients' opinions, and staff problems. The non-financial information 
three out of the five branch managers reported was concerning HR matters such as 
resignations or staff problems. 
This agrees with what I found with PB managers [Section 4.18.2.1, Reliance on Financial 
Measures in MAS Information at PB] in that JCB' managements exercise control over 
areas that are of a financial nature and relating to the financial performance of the banks. 
The emphasis on financial measures is not peculiar to Jordanian banks and the inclusion 
of the need for non-financial goals and measures as expressed by the PB intervi-:wees [see 
Exhibit 4.11] agrees with other researchers' findings. This emphasis is discussed by 
researchers such as KapJan & Norton (1996, p. 75) who draw attention to the fact that 
financial measures and targets 'bear little relation to the company's progress in achieving 
long-term strategic objectives'. Wilson & Chua (1993, p. 52) underline that 
'Organisations should not only measure those outputs that are easy to quantifY'. Argyris 
(1990, p. 503) adds that over-reliance on accounting information 'is often sold and 
defended as being objective and rigorous ... this claim is likely to fall short in practice'. 
Furthermore, financial measures tend to be backward-looking and slow to respond (Davis 
& O'Donnell, 1997, p. 19). 
This emphasis on financial goals and on financial aspects rather than qualitative 
performance is a general case in organisations (Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 316). McN air et 
al. (1990, p. 31), in addition to acknowledging the significance of non-financial 
information for performance measurement call for management accountants to help 
operating managers quantifY and .constantly update non-financial information as needed 
in support of improvement activities. 
Notwithstanding the above, Otley & Pollanen (2000, p. 495) see that 'there is evidence to 
suggest that the role of budgeting as a tool of managerial control is changing ... and that 
other, often non-financial performance measures are increasingly being used'. Such a 
move from financial measures could alleviate the negative effects of budgets described by 
Hofstede (1968, p. 80) where 'control systems have repeatedly proven to be self 
destroying when used in a direct, mechanical way'. 
5.19 Budgets in JCB 
Budgets were treated in JCB as annual plans with specific goals which are expected to be 
achieved within. the following financial year. The overall corporate goals for the 
following year in terms of deposits, credit, and profits will be divided among the branches 
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of the bank, and each branch achieving its budgeted goals would be achieving part of the 
corporate goal. However, 63% of the interviewees had a budget whereas the other 
departments and branches did not [Exhibit 5.44, Budgets and Goals Achievement in 
JCB]. In the PB case study, apart from the branch managers who all had budgets, \0 out 
of 12 managers who discussed budgets did not have budgets for their departments 
[Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB]. 
A budget provided the measure of performance. Those who achieved their budgets 
benefited from the profit sharing schemes -when applied in some of the banks- or were 
positively appraised with what that means in terms of financial and non-financial benefits. 
On the other hand, those who did not achieve their budgets faced uncomfortable 
situations. They received attention-drawing letters from heads of departments and top 
management according to the situation. 
Ezzame1 (1990, as quoted by Chenhall, 2003, p. 137) reported that 'high environmental 
uncertainty was associated with an emphasis on budgets for evaluation and required 
explanation of variances but also high participation and interpersonal interactions 
between superiors and subordinates'. However, in the case of PB, high participation and 
interpersonal interactions between head office and branches was not clear. 
The next question I asked the respondents was whether they thought that having a budget 
enhanced/would have enhanced their ability to achieve their goals [Q 37]. The majority of 
the respondents (66%) thought that having a budget would enhance goal achievement, 
although it was lower at 50% for credit and branch managers [Exhibit 5.44, Budgets and 
Goals Achievement in JCB]. 
'A budget motivates me to achieve goals ... and t%llow up on weak areas'. 
On the other hand a manager commented: 
'The rapid changes in Jordan make budgets redundant' (interview 4). 
The most pro budget group were the deposit managers where all respondents said a 
budget would enhance goal achievement, followed by 63% o{credit managers, then 50% 
of finance and branch managers. 
ulge san oas c levemen m 
Exhibit 5.44 
Bd t d G I A h' t' JCB 
(N=32) DM CM 
n=8 n=8 
Had a budget 
Overall percentage 63% 75% 75% 
A budget enhance/would enhance 
goal achievement 100% 63% 
FM BM 
n=8 n=8 
25% 75% 
50% 50% 
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Overall--,,-ercenta~e 66% 
Budgetary control tangibly improved 
goal achievement 74%" 
Overall percentage 67% 
• Out of2 respondents who had budgets 
** Out of 6 respondents who had budgets 
61%** 50%' 83%** 
Interviewees faced problems with the budgets whether used as a plan with short-tern 
targets or as measure of achievement. 
\. '/ believe that a budget should set goals but not decisions ... too many revisions make 
me feel why budget at all?' (interview 17). 
2. 'As we are unable to predict changes budgets become redundant'(interview 4). 
Other difficulties which interviewees had with budgets included: 
3. 'Budgets are prepared in October of each year which is too late and no information is 
made available to me for planning ... ' (interview 18). 
4. '/ do not even see the final copy of the budget after submitting it .. .! do not even have 
any measurements to measure my performance' (interview 18). 
5. '[ will know what [ want to do, provided there are proper assumptions and follow-up' 
(interview 14). 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, p. 178) caution against what has been mentioned by the survey 
interviewees above: 
'Standards based on what is necessary to achieve overall company objectives, although 
likely to represent challenging targets, suffer from the problem that they may be seen as 
unrealistic, particularly if the manager to whom they are given was not party to the 
process of setting those objectives'. 
Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 14) identity among the eight attributes they found to 
characterise most nearly the distinction of the excellent, innovative companies: 
'3. Autonomy and entrepreneurship ... They do not hold every one on so short a rein that 
he can't be creative' (Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 14) ... 
'4. Productivity through people' i.e. respect for the indiviqual' (Peters & Waterman, 
1995, p. 16). 
The game of the budget discussed in the case study at PB was also present in the other 
JCB: 
'We always overachieve ... we always exceed the budgeted expenses but we are always 
supported by top management' (interview 27). 
And, 'Look, there should be a budget so [ know what to do ... but if/achieve my target 
say 2 million dinars in a certain year, the following year they ask me for 4 million dinars' 
(interview 28). 
And, 'We were able to achieve our goals for 2001 by end of June' (interview 19). 
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And, 'The problem with the budget is that the financial control department used to write 
to branches asking them to set their budgets ... the problem was that the criteria were not 
clear .,. how to set goals it cannot be +10% of last year's goals ... things differ from one 
year to another' (interview 29). 
The budgets, as in the case study, were used solely for performance evaluation and for 
feedback but not for forecasting [Section 4.17, Conflict of Interest in Setting Goals and 
the Game of the Budget Control at PB]. 
Relating the survey findings to the work of other researchers, Spraakrnan & Cheng (p. 
100) see that budgets 'should not be rigid and should consider the fact that a change in 
condition, e.g. economic, requires a change in plans'. Otley & Pollanen (2000, p. 488) 
found in their empirical work that, although there was a considerably higher level of 
budgetary participation in their study compared to BrowneII's (1982) with regard to 
performance, and whereas Brownell found a positive and significant result, their study 
found a negative, albeit insignificant result. 
Brownell offered the explanation for the divergence in findings to 'the different cultural 
setting'. Brownell (1981, p. 844) summarised previous research and found that there is 
mixed evidence for a 'behavioural outcome resulting from participation in particular that 
of performance'. However, Milani (1975) and Morse & Reimer (1956) found only a weak 
link between the two, but Bryan & Locke (1967) and Stedry (1960) found a negative link 
(Brownell, 1981, p. 845). 
Brownell (1981) writes that Argyris (1952) concluded that the key to effective 
performance is in participation in budgets and acceptance of budget goals and that similar 
conclusions were reached by Becker & Green (1962), Bass & Leavitt (1963) and Kenis 
(1975). 
Hopwood (1972) 'found that a high budget emphasis in the superior's evaluative style 
was positively associated with subordinate job-related tension, and speculated that such 
tension would be dysfunctional for 
managerial performance' (Brownell & Dunk, 1991, p. 693). Brownell (1982) found a 
positive relationship between participation and performance. Otley (1987) 'found that 
job-related tension was associated with neither a budget -based superior evaluation style 
nor managerial performance' (Brownell & Dunk, 1991, p. 693). Nevertheless, Otleyand 
Pollanen (2000, p. 488) found a negative, albeit insignificant, result between participation 
and performance. 
Different reasons were given by researchers as to why and how participation has (or does 
not have) an effect on performance. Brownell (1981, p. 844) referred to certain 
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personalities having an internal or external locus of control and that 'it is conceivable that 
role descriptions can be modified (specifically in regard to participation) to suit the 
individual characteristics of role occupants'. However, such differing levels in budget 
participation by different managers could prove to be problematic in application in 
Jordan. In leB it could result in friction and rivalry among branch managers if some of 
them were given a more participatory role than others and trying to find the locus of 
control of departments and branch managers by banks' managements might not be 
successful. It needs to be said at this point that the majority of the interviewed managers 
were senior managers [Exhibit 5.3, Distribution of Survey Interviewees according to 
Position] and not middle managers as in the samples of most of the studies on 
participation discussed above. Those senior managers are expected to be more inclined to 
be 'internals' than having an external locus of control. 
Brownell & Mclnnes (1986, p. 597), in a later empirical study, measured participation in 
budget setting, motivation, and performance but failed to confirm that 'budgetary 
participation, through its effect on motivation, enhances managerial performance', but 
they found a strong relationship between. participation and managerial performance. 
Nevertheless, they conclude that participation, apart from its motivational effects, 'may 
lead to such things as the introduction of improvements, at the suggestion of the 
participating manager, to the organization's managerial process' (Brownell & McInnes, 
1986, pp. 597-598). Brownell & Dunk (1991, p. 702) also endorsed budgetary 
participation 'where the task difficulty is high, budget participation serves an important 
information exchange role even if not matched with budget emphasis'. 
Brownell & Dunk (1991) referred the divergence of findings among previous studies to 
the different settings in which the empirical work was conducted (Brownell & Dunk, 
1991, p. 695) or different culture (Brownell, 1981, p. 845) or using different measures of 
variables (Brownell & Dunk, 1991, p. 694). 
Lau & Tan (I 998, p.l80) found participation 'to be more effective in enhancing 
performance in high-task difficulty situations than in low-task difficulty situations' in 
both samples of Australian and Singaporean managers in financial institutions. Lau & 
Tan put the absence of divergent attitudes in the two cultures down to 'financial sector 
managers have wider international exposure and focus than managers in some other 
industries' (Lau & Tan, 1998, p. 174). The second explanation they gave was 'the gaining 
of educational qualifications overseas, producing a tendency toward an international 
convergence in the reported individualism scores through exposure to other nations and 
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international cultural influences' (Lau & Tan, 1998, p.173). This is not entirely the case 
for ICB as discussed in Section 4.21, Cultural Effects on MAS in Control at PB 
Harrison (1992, p. 12) found a similar convergence in the samples of middle managers in 
both Singapore and Australia. Harrison's findings showed an absence of differences 
between the two samples of middle managers in the two cultures due to a compensating 
effect since the two cultures were opposite in both power distance and individualism, 
although he did not offer an explanation of the effect of job-related tension on 
performance .. 
5.20 Setting Suitable and Clear Measurements throughout Execution 
Our findings in the case study showed that unsuitable performance measurements or 
standards were set at PB to act as benchmarks for measuring the performance and 
achievements of departments and managers throughout the different and continuous 
stages of implementation. This area was also covered in the survey interviews as 
discussed following .. 
5.20.1 Budgetary Control in JCB 
Budgets served a double purpose as short-term goals to be achieved and as measures of 
achievement through the process of budgetary control. Question 38 asked whether using 
budgetary control in each respondent's departmentlbranch resulted in a tangible 
improvement of goals achievement. The majority (67%) of those who had a budget and 
budgetary control at their banks said that budgetary control resulted in a tangible 
improvement [Exhibit 5.44, Budgets and Goals Achievement in JCB]. 
Some believed the way budgetary control was practised defeated its purpose as a result of 
the goals set: 
'/ am for budgets but not if they are imposed on me by the head office ... in principle / 
agree that budgetary control improves performance ... but particularly as budgets are 
imposed on us budgetary control cannot be effictive' (interview 18), 
Argyris (1990, pp. 508, 509) argues that not linking compensation to output 'encourages 
subordinates to make their efforts visible', particularly 'where the implementation of 
managerial controls is embarrassing or threatening to the players' it becomes less 
motivating to individuals and causes automatic reaction to produce defensive reactions. 
5.20.2 Performance Evaluation in JCB 
I asked the respondents whether they were satisfied with the criteria by which their 
performance was evaluated [Q 32]. Only 28% said 'yes' they were satisfied. When I 
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asked why they were not satisfied, the overwhelming response circled round problems 
with criteria and subjectivity [Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of Employee Performance Evaluation 
in lCB, p. 535]. 
Emmanuel et al. (1990, pp. 3-4) note that accounting information 'serves a central role in 
organizational control where it provides a means of quantifying overall performance. By 
contrast, in organizations where performance cannot be captured in accounting terms 
(e.g., public sector services) its role in control is much more restricted. However, even in 
business organizations having overall profit goals, accounting information is only an 
imperfect measure of performance and needs to be nsed with a degree of sensitivity and 
care'. 
Some of the interviewees talked about the shortcomings of the performance appraisal 
system such as: 
'J would like to be able to see each credit officer's performance or achievement 
... whether (s)he is making a profit on hislher portfolio ... in practice we find no procedure 
covering this' (interview 6). 
And, 'The evaluation is always from the perspective of the evaluator ... subjective' 
(interview 14). 
And, when a financial manager was asked he sighed and said, 'J am satisfied with the 
outcome ... but J really do not know how they evaluate me ' (interview 17). 
And, 'J got two promotions in one year ... J cannot complain' (interview 8). 
But three other branch managers complained that management would not allow them to 
discuss their evaluations whether of them as managers or of their branches. 
5.20.2.1 Subjectivity in JCB 
The majority of respondents (77%) who found performance evaluation unsatisfactory said 
subjectivity was a feature of performance appraisal systems in JCB [Exhibit 5.33; Criteria 
of Employee Performance Evaluation in JCB]. The same pattern recurred with deposit 
managers, as 37% of those who were not satisfied with performance appraisal said 
evaluation was subjective, whereas 88% of credit and branch managers and 63% of the 
financial managers believed performance evaluation was subjective. 
'The criteria are not comprehensive enough ... they change with the situation' (interview 
2). 
It is interesting to note here that, in the case of deposit managers, some of those who were 
satisfied with the criteria still thought evaluation was subjective. 
5.20.2.2 Performance Evaluation Criteria in JCB 
As in the PB case study, the criteria used to measure performance were the main source 
of dissatisfaction. They were found by PB managers to be unfair, unclear, and subjective 
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[Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of Perfonnance Evaluation in JCB]. The frequency of measuring 
perfonnance was discussed in the case study but mentioned by only one interviewee in 
the survey (interview 16). 
The problems with criteria used at the banks identified by the 22 respondents who said 
'No' they were not satisfied or 'Not much' [Q 32] were: 
a. 'the system of evaluation is competitive and not clear' (interview 12). Unclear criteria 
were the most frequently identified problem by 44% of the 22 respondents who said 'No' 
or 'Not much'. 
b. 'criteria do not take into consideration the different types of jobs' (interview 27). 
Inflexible criteria were mentioned by 36% of the respondents unsatisfied with the criteria 
ofperfonnance evaluation. 
c. Unfair criteria as found by 36% of the unsatisfied respondents, 
'1 amfairly compensated ... but this does not apply to others' (interview 23). 
And, 'the criteria do not take personal achievement into consideration' (interview 20). 
But other respondents thought differently: yes 1 am satisfied ... if one is honest and has a 
strong sense of belonging he will be satisfied' (interview 9). 
Still others solved their difficulties by: 'the CEO has hands on what goes on and 
p'ersonally sees and checks on everything and double checks whatever he is told' 
(interview 10). 
Some of those who were satisfied with the criteria said it was because incentives were 
linked to achievement. However, as mentioned above in interview 12, this 'may promote 
competition and encourage manipulation of actions' (Otley, 1995 p. 50). 
In a field survey of 42 sub-unit managers in a cross-section of Singapore companies to 
test the notion that job satisfaction is a function of the compensation schemes, 
infonnation asymmetry and MAS infonnation characteristics, Chia (2000, p. 379 quoting 
Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61) states that 'when information asymmetry is low, an output 
compensation scheme is likely to adversely affect job satisfaction since it will needlessly 
transfer risk to the agent who is assumed to be more risk averse than the principal'. Chia 
(2000, p. 261) concludes that 'top management should not only consider the 
compensation package of the sub-unit managers but also the MAS available to the 
. managers and the level of information asymmetry' . 
Respondents were not satisfied with the way their performance was evaluated, whether 
due to subjectivity or unsatisfactory criteria. Luckett & Eggleton (1991, p. 379) found 
that as: 
'a consequence of (the) different perceptions (evaluator and evaluated) about the 
credibility of the source is that subordinates may regard the feedback system as being 
unfair in some situations ... The consequence of this conflict between the credibility of the 
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source and the power of the source gives rise to potential dysfunctional behaviours, 
especially rigid bureaucratic behaviour'. 
After asking the respondents what they thought of the performance evaluation criteria, I 
asked [Q 33] whether their achievements got mixed up with those of other managers or 
departments. An overwhelming 81 % of the respondents believed that did happen. Some 
of those [19%] said, 'interdepartmental activities are not separable' (interview 2) and 
'banking is an institutional type of job' (interview 3) [Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of 
Performance Evaluation in JCB]. 
However, 92% of those who answered positively believed the problem lay in inadequate 
measures used at the banks whether those measures were unclear or just did not work, or 
were absent altogether. As one respondent explained: 'criteria do not deal with such 
issues' (interview 4). 
As a result 'When working in teams some managers like to claim achievements as their 
own' (interview 8). 
And 'he who talks more attracts more attention ... criteria are subjective and are not 
comprehensive' (interview 29). 
The problem of jointness as explained by Spicer & Ballew (1983, p.85) 'can make it 
difficult and expensive to determine marginal productiveness of individuals and groups'. 
An assistant general manager commented on employee performance evaluation criteria 
used at his bank by saying: 
'I set the criteria ... they are scientific and fair. They take into consideration the profits 
achieved, the audit reports and the targets met' (interview 7). 
However, a good deal of managers' work involves not only making profits and meeting 
targets. Non-financial measures such as customer loyalty, speed of service, and employee 
morale will be missed out. Furthermore, the above quotation (interview 7) does not 
mention support departments that did not have targets to meet or profit to show for their 
contribution to OE. 
Wilson & Chua (1993, p.289) write on the difficulty of performance appraisal of joint 
results which was criticised by the respondents: 
'A clear division of responsibilities is not always possible. In many instances, decisions 
are influenced by joint effects and it may be counter-productive to attempt to delineate 
clear lines of responsibility'. 
In addition to that budgets need to balance short-term achievements that are easier to 
express in financial form and have financial measurements with long-terni contributions 
(Otley & Pollanen 2000, p. 494). Bromwich & Bhimani (1989. p. 77) report on the 
difference in perceptions between what management accountants see their responsibilities 
to be and the perceptions of senior and middle managers in terms of control: 
371 
............... ---------------------
'the studies revealed a discrepancy between the role ascribed to management accountants 
by managers and the management accountants' own perception of their responsibilities. 
End-users looked to management accountants as suppliers of information service rather 
than as watchdogs which appears to be the task management accountants often saw 
themselves as attempting to fulfil' (Bromwich & Bhimani, 1989, p. 77). 
5.21 Adequate Organisational Structure in Control in JCB 
In the PB case study MAS reports were found to be used much more for feedback control 
[87%, 13 out of 15 managersj. In the survey almost three quarters of the interviewees 
(72%) said that MAS reports were more helpful to them in control than in planning or 
decision-making [Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were More Helpful in 
JCB]. 
But the effectiveness of feedback control in JCB was affected by the organisational 
structures of the banks. This is also a view with which a number of researchers agree, 
such as Otley (1995, p. 51); Mouritsen, (1995, p.300); Wilson & Chua (1993, p. 480); 
Spicer & Ballew, (1983, p. 87). 
'Organisational structure is a powerful mechanism to ensure that defined tasks are 
consistently performed; it can create difficulties by restricting managers' attention to their 
sub-area' (Otley, 1995, p. SI). 
The interviewees believed that there were· a number of problems with organisation 
structure that affected communication channels as 39% had various difficulties with 
communication lines, and 75% had different difficulties in delineation of responsibilities 
of departments, coordination, work procedures, and decentralisation. 
[See Section 5.10.1, Factors Hindering the Diffusion of Information in Jordanian 
Commercial Bank; Exhibit 5.24, Problems With Communication Channels in JCB; 
Exhibit 5.20, Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities in JCBj. 
Otley (1984, p. 127) observes that 'by the early 1970s there was a strong tradition of 
empirical work based on the premise that the structure of an organization was importantly 
affected by the characteristics of its external environment and by features of its internal 
technology, although there was still some scope for the exercise of managerial choice'. 
This to a large extent is what was observed in the survey. 
5.21.1 Effects of Centralisation on Control in JCB 
I specifically asked survey interviewees what effects centralisation of information had on 
control. An overall percentage of 59% said it had a negative effect, in particular, branch 
managers where the percentage was 75% and credit managers 50% [Exhibit 5.15, Effects 
of Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCBj. 
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The effects of centralisation of infonnation on control mentioned could be categorised 
under three main effects [Exhibit 5.45, Effects of Centralisation Gatekeepers, and Internal 
Politics on Control in JCB]: 
[i] control becomes ineffective [8 times]; 
[ii] delays work [mentioned 7 times]; 
[Hi] blocking ofinfonnation occurs [5 times]; 
[iv] less detailed infonnation [5 times]; 
The organisational structure in the banks provided the structure for operational control 
through centralisation and fonnalisation. To give an example, credit facilities were 
centralised and entailed extensive fonnalities as did the fixing of interest rates for 
deposits. This does not seem to agree with Reimann & Negandhi (1975, p. 480) whose 
findings in general show the more decentralisation the more fonnalisation. It should be 
mentioned that their work was based on organisations operating in a different culture. 
5.21.2 Effects of Channels of Communication on Control in JCB 
Channels of communication affect feedback as expressed by an interviewed assistant 
general manager [Exhibit 5.45, Effects of Centralisation of Infonnation, Gatekeepers and 
Internal Politics on Control in JCB; Exhibit 5.22, Factors Positively Affecting 
Communication Channels in JCB; Exhibit 5.23, Factors Negatively Affecting 
Communication Channels in JCB; Exhibit 5.24, Problems with Communication Channels 
in JCB; and discussion in Section 5.11.3, Channels of Communication in JCB]: 
Exhibit 5.45 
Effects of Centralisation ofInfonnation, Gatekeepers,And Internal Politics on Control in JCB 
(Overall percentage ofthose affected is 59%, Exhibit 5.15) . 
Effect DM' 
I Delays work 
Overall percentage 24% 
2 Blocking infonnation 
Overall percentage 17% 
3 Less detailed reports 
Overall percentage 17% 
4 Effectiveness of control is weakened 
Overall percentage 28% 
No effect 
Overall percentage 45% 
, Out of 7 respondents who said they were affected 
" Out of 8 respondents 
43% 
14% 
14% 
14% 
57% 
CM' FM' 
14% 29% 
14% 14% 
29% 14% 
29% 29% 
29% 57% 
BM" 
12% 
25% 
12% 
37% 
37% 
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'As assistant general manager I do not face any problems with communication channels 
but ... communicationfrom bottom-up I think there is' (interview 13). 
Another interviewee talked about how the general manager solved the problem of 
feedback outside the organisational structure: 
'We overcome centralisation of information by ... the general manager distributing the 
reports he gets ... because all reports are addressed to him' (interview 17). 
This agrees with Earl's (1983, p. 36) remark on how 'The MAS in particular continue to 
operate vertically, but lateral (or diagonal) Information flows are absent'. 
5.21.3 Effects of Co-ordination on Control in JCB 
Co-ordination is another issue relating to control, as 'Co-ordination is largely a function 
of control' (Reimann & Negandhi 1975, p. 476). 
From the survey data, co-ordination and functional specialisation were identified by the 
respondents as the third and fourth elements decisive for the flow of information preceded 
by communication channels and stable and well-delineated responsibilities and authority 
[Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organisation Structure Decisive for the Flow ofInformation]. 
The importance of co-ordination to organisations has been stressed by many researchers 
(e.g.Otley, 1995, p. 51; Emmanuel et at. 1990, p. 88, Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 121). 
Otley (1995, p. 51) emphasises the importance of co-ordination for organisational 
structure: 
'The central aspect offonnal organisational structure is differentiation (sub-units develop 
their own ways) and integration (co-ordinating sub-units) MAS plays a key role in this 
process'. 
5.22 Adequate Feedback and Feedforward Information in JCB 
Emmanuel et at. (1990, p. 6) note that many of the control mechanisms are .'in part, 
based upon the transmission of information. Integration, coordination and control cannot 
to be achieved without information. In every sense, information is the cement that binds 
the organization together and enables it to act in a coherent manner.' Traditionally, 
accountants have focused on feedback information. However, both feedback and 
feedforward control should be present in order to ensure organisational and operational 
control, as 'these two types of control complement' one another (Wilson & Chua, 1993, 
p. 47). Lynne (1995, p.240) explains the link between feedforward and feedback control 
by saying: 
'The real control is forward-looking operation of the system even though it may appear 
that the fonnal control is a feedback system'. 
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Survey interviewees found MAS more helpful in feedback control, whether it was 
infonnation provided by on-line PCs or MAS reports (90% of the respondents) compared 
to decision-making (75%) and planning (55%) [Exhibit 5.26, The Role of IT in MAS in 
JCB), or through MAS printed reports [Exhibit 5.11, Functions in which MAS Reports were 
more Helpful in JCB]. 
The effectiveness of both types of control hinges on availability and diffusion of 
information, which has been discussed at various points in this chapter [see for example 
Section 5.9.2, Information on the Internal and External Environments of JCB; and Section 
5.1 0, Diffusion ofInformation in JCB). 
The other difficulty which interviewees faced over the diffusion of information through 
the organisational structure of each bank [discussed lengthily in Section 5.11, 
Organisational Structure in JCB], undermined the effectiveness of feedforward control 
and operational control. 
The characteristics ofMAS reports [discussed in Section 5.13, Characteristics and Design 
of MAS Reports in JCB] reflected on the adequacy of control in terms of data included, 
format, time horizon, focus, and orientation although it was more helpful in feedback 
control than in feedforwad control. However, respondents had reservations about the 
information used for feedback regarding relevance with 50% of credit and branch 
managers finding reports lacking focus and containing unnecessary detail as believed by 
56% of credit mangers and 50% of financial managers [see Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics 
ofMAS Reports in JCB]. 
5.22.1 Tools for Feedback and Feedforward in JCB 
In the PB case study, the important organisational forms of controls used by managers in 
overseeing implementation oftheir departmental !branch goals were: 
[I] MAS reports (73%) and budgets (all branches had budgets but only some 
departments); [2] formal implementation procedures (mentioned by 27%); [3] field visits 
(20) %; [4] standardisation of procedures (13%). 
When the survey interviewees were asked the same questions on the forms of control they 
used [Q 35], a similar pattern emerged:[1] MAS reports was chosen by 88% of the 
interviewees; [2] persona! follow up (44%); [3] system built in controls and procedures 
(28%); [4] on-line information (25%); [5] personal supervision (16%); [6] field visits 
(9%); [7] results (9%); [8] budgets (9%). [See Exhibit 5.34, Control Tools in JCB]. 
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MAS reports were by far the most important tool of control used by lCB: 'Without 
reports I cannot plan, decide, or control' (interview 4). 
5.23 Commitment and Support of Top Management in lCB 
Commitment of top management in providing information is a crucial element for control 
as it is for planning and decision-making. The availability of information was discussed at 
length in Part II of this chapter, from which it could be concluded that the interviewees 
needed more information than was made available to them by management through MAS. 
Nevertheless, when asked whether they thought that management was sufficiently 
committed to making information available to managers [Q 11], 67% of the respondents 
said top management was committed [Exhibit 5.27, Management Commitment to the 
Diffusion of Information]. On the other hand, 91 % said that top management followed a 
policy of 'restricted information' about which senior managers ought not be informed. 
Half of the credit, financial and branch managers of those who believed there was 
'restricted information' needed it in planning and decision-making. [See Exhibit 5.27, 
Management Commitment to the Diffusion ofInformation in JCB]. 
Question 8 asked about the reasons top management had a different interpretation of the 
external environment to that of the interviewed managers. Out of the 15 respondents who 
said interpretations differed, 10 said the reason was that top management had information 
that was not available to the interviewees [see Section 5.16.2 on conflict between 
departmental and personal goals]. 
Commitment of top management has a number of dimensions, the management style, the 
corporate culture and the social culture, which are discussed in the internal and external 
cultures' effects on MAS in lCB [see Section 5.26, Cultural Effects on Planning and 
Goal-Setting in lCB; and Section 5.28, Cultural Effects on the Diffusion of Information 
in lCB). 
Commitment of management was found by Norris (2002,. p. 233) and Chenhall & 
Langfield-Smith (1998, p. 374) to have a decisive effect on introducing new methods of 
work. Burns & Stalker (1994, p. 34) help to explain the importance of management 
commitment when they remark that, power has been passing more and. more into the 
hands of the management. Burns & Stalker's comment is in parallel with the argument in 
this chapter that the role of MAS in enhancing OE by making information available 
through adequate organisation structure has to have management support. 
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Management has an important role to play as successful 'control requires leaders who can 
create conditions which motivate workers toward desired goals' (Ansari, 1977, p. 109). 
5.24 Commitment of Line Managers to Achieve Goals in JCB 
The other side of the commitment coin is the commitment of managers as 'manager-
subordinate interaction is viewed as the key to the effectiveness of a control system' 
(Ansari, 1977, p. 109). In the case study some PB managers talked about the mission they 
set out to accomplish and to which they were committed and motivated [see discussion in 
Section 4.23, Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB]. The survey did not aim to 
study the commitment of senior and middle managers. Nevertheless, questions 29 and 30 
on the congruence of departmental/branch goals and corporate goals and how the two 
correspond to the interviewees' individual goals [see discussion in Section 5.9.1, Goal-
Setting in JCB; and Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCBj, showed that, apart from 
the deposit managers, the other three functions showed a substantial incongruence in 63% 
of credit managers, 50% of financial managers, and 63 % of branch managers. 
When the respondents were asked which activities were affected by the non-alignment of 
goals, 44% mentioned negative effects such as demotivation and demoralisation, setting 
lower targets for themselves, and affecting the quality of their work. 
Another aspect worth looking at when discussing commitment is how satisfied the 
interviewees were with their performance valuation. Again 88% of credit and branch 
managers and 63% of financial managers were not satisfied [Exhibit 5.45, Effects of 
Centralisation, Information Gatekeepers and Internal Politics on Control in JCB]. 
PART V 
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CULTURES' EFFECTS ON MAS IN JCB 
5.25 Introduction 
When I prepared the interview guide for the PB case stu<;1y, I did not include direct 
questions on social culture and the role it played in the operation and design of MAS. I 
preferred to wait for the respondents to bring it up so as not to bias'their responses to my 
quotations. However, during the 16 in-depth interviews, in PB culture kept on coming up 
in the conversation with the interviewees. Twelve managers, including the general 
manager of PB, attributed certain attitudes or practices affecting the design, 
implementation, and operation of MAS to the social culture in Jordan. As a result I 
decided to allocate part of the case study chapter to discussing the internal and external 
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cultural effect on the design and operation of MAS [Chapter 4, Part V, The Effects of 
External and Internal Culture on MAS]. By external culture is meant social culture and 
by internal culture it is meant corporate culture and management style. 
In the survey I had to resist the temptation to go deeper in that direction. Unfortunately, 
as I realised, no matter how deserving the topic it will lead to substantial diversions. I 
tried to include two questions in the interview guide in the hope that they will tell 
something of the influence of the national culture on the design and operation ofMAS in 
JCB, building on the findings of the case study. When I started reading the answers to 
those two questions I had no choice but to give up trying to study the topic. It was too 
vast and intricate and requires and deserves a research study of its own. 
However, as culture kept on coming up in the answers from the survey interviewees as it 
did with PB managers, I decided to discuss it and try to get some meaning out of what 
was said in relation to how MAS design, implementation, and operation was affected. 
Culture, whether social, corporate or occupational, affects the manner in which MAS is 
used, and the role both users and movers of MAS expect it to play. 'Studying 
management accounting practice from the perspective that social structures are 
themselves both a condition and a consequence of social action requires an understanding 
of the relationships between the day-to-day social actions which constitute accounting 
practice and the dimensions of the social structures' (Scapens 1992, p. 370). 
Miroshink (2002) mentions that Kroeber & kluchholm (1952) catalogued more than 100 
different definitions of culture. However, Hall (1972, p. 182) noted that, up to 1972, 
culture and traditional factors have been largely ignored by organisational analysts, 
perhaps because they are difficult to codify. 
Culture can be described as a pattern of internal and external values that guide individuals 
and systems (Gross 1965, p. 211), or as patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting mental 
programs (Hofstede, 1991, pA). It was also described as the norms for acceptable 
behaviour and hence for acceptable objectives (Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 60). Kirkman et 
at. (2001, p. 16) quote Nancy Adler's (2002) definition of culture as 'something that: is 
shared by all (or almost all) members of a social group ... consciously and subconsciously 
held set of beliefs and norms'. 
The cultural environment encompasses: 'customs, norms, values,. beliefs, language, 
attitudes, motivation, social institutions, status symbols, religious beliefs' (Miroshink 
2002, p. 523). Ali of those had an impact on MAS in JCB. 
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Javidan & House (2001, p. 293) believe that, as there is no standard definition of culture, 
so there is 'no universal set of cultural dimensions'. However, researchers such as 
Hofstede (J 980), Smith et al. (1996), Javidan & House (200 I) among others tried to come 
up with certain dimensions that influence in a business context the ways in which 
employees communicate through the hierarchy, anticipate how others are likely to 
respond, and to set evaluation standards (Dresser & Carns 1969 in Miroshink 2002, p. 
526). 
In the PB case study cultural factors, whether social, occup~tional, or corporate cultures 
and sub-cultures, had positive and negative effects on the role which MAS played in 
enhancing OE. The effects were felt in the design, implementation, and operation of 
MAS. The following four areas were specifically mentioned by PB and survey 
interviewees as being affected by the social culture in Jordan and relating to MAS: 
1. planning and goal-setting process; 
2. organisational structure: centralisation, communication channels and teamwork; 
3. diffusion of infonnation within the banks; 
4. control and performance appraisal. 
5.26 Cultural Effects on Planning and Goal-Setting in JCB 
Our findings at PB indicated that decision-making, communication, setting goals and 
acceptance of authority in Jordanian banks is a reflection of the patriarchal Ilong power 
distance culture in Jordan. 
As discussed earlier [Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB], 50% of the interviewees were 
not involved in setting goals for their departmentslbranches: 
'Branches' goals are set by top management and not me ' (interview 12). 
And, The financial analysis and control department sets foture plans for the whole bank' 
(interview 30). 
As in the case study, planning was confined to top management [see case study chapter 
Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals of PB; and Section 4.15.5, (Joal-Setting Process at PB] 
through a top-down attitude and centralisation of setting goals that did not involve 
sufficient interaction and iteration between top management and departmental managers. 
Other levels of managers did not participate and, at times, did not feel the need to set 
goals relating to their own work: 
'Our line of work is very risky so we are happy with the targets set by top management' 
{interview 16}. 
The insufficient· involvement of those interviewed is a reflection of the Jordanian 
patriarchal society and a 'high power distance culture' (Hofstede, 1991, p, 35), which is 
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associated with concentration of authority (Hofstede 1991, p.142). In high power 
distance countries 'communication is almost always one way, top to bottom ... Input or 
feedback from subordinates is seldom solicited and in fact may be seen as impolite and 
disloyal' (Javidan & House, 2001, p.303). 
This explains what has been found in both investigations on the centralisation of 
decisions and authority as in the case of setting goals, where 50% of credit managers and 
75% of branch managers said there was a conflict between corporate goals and their 
departrnental/ branch goals [Exhibit 5.6, Effects of Social Culture on Planning and 
Decision-Making in JCB]. 
On the availability of information, 73% of the respondents said they needed more 
information on the internal environment; and 88% of credit managers, 50% of financial 
managers, and 75% of branch managers did not actually receive information on the 
external environment. All this reflected on the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
respondents [Exhibit 5.9, Uses of Information on the External Environment in JCB]. 
Respondents talked about their need for forward-looking reports as only 9% of the 
respondents said the reports they got were helpful in planning [Exhibit 5.11, Functions in 
which MAS Reports were more Helpful in JCB]. All this was found despite 62% of the 
respondents saying they participated in the design of the reports. 
The patriarchal high-distance culture was reflected in the phenomenon of 'restricted 
information' that was withheld by top management and not diffused to senior managers 
as stated by 91 % of the respondents. Half of the credit, financial, and branch managers 
said they needed that information in their work [Exhibit 5.27, Management Commitment 
to the Diffusion of Information in JCB]. 
What came out in the case study [Section 4.20, The Cultural Effects on MAS in Planning 
and Decision-Making at PB] and the survey is that MAS was unhelpful in planning and 
long-term planning in particular although Hofstede (1991, p. 113) ranked them as 
relatively strong on uncertainty avoidance. Hofstede (1980, p. 478) explains strong 
uncertainty avoidance among other things as 'the uncertainty in life as a continuous threat 
that must be fought. Higher anxiety and stress are experienced. Time is money'. This 
does not seem to describe accurately the Arab Islamic culture even in a business context. 
Hofstede's dimension in explaining cultures have been criticised for being too 
reductionist in describing a complex concept of culture (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; 
Chenhall, 2003, p. 154; Baskerville, 2003, p. I; Hopper, 2003, p. 19). 
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Javidan & House (2001, p. 295) ranked Kuwait - Jordan was not included in the study -
as having a medium uncertainty avoidance culture. However, there is another important 
factor, and that is religion, which largely counteracts uncertainty avoidance and has 
affected planning processes in JCB as referred to in the case study chapter [see Section 
4.20, The Cultural effects on MAS in Planning and Decision-Making at PB]. 
The 'man and universe dimension' is explained by Miroshink (2002, p. 529) as follows: 
'In the Arab countries (Middle East) and in Asia, religion is a very important component 
in any business ... Religion in such societies has a profound effect on how business is 
conducted' . 
What follows from this is a 'detenninistic dimension' which Kirkrnan et aI., 2001, p.20) 
explain it as: 
'The extent to which an employee believes that his or her outcomes or successes are due 
to forces that he or she cannot control.. .forces outside themselves (Le. God, fate, chance, 
or other people) have almost complete control over the outcomes of the events in their 
lives'. 
in the Arab culture -Jordan included- the concept of God's will shapes people's lives. 
Nothing can be done or achieved without the will of God, nothing will come to humans 
but what has been ordained by God, and no one should reject what has been ordained by 
the will of God. A free-will orientation is the opposite of that where 'managers and 
employees view long-range, strategic planning and goals setting as integral to achieving 
business success' (Kirkman et al. 200 I, p. 2 I). 
The detenninistic dimension of the culture must have by necessity affected the 
management's attitudes towards planning and long-tenn planning in particular in that not 
enough effort was exerted in that direction. 
Javidan & House (2001, pp. 293,294) describe the GLOBE project that involved ISO 
researchers collecting data from 18000 middle managers in 62 countries. The project 
investigated nine cultural attributes / dimensions (p. 293). On the future orientation 
dimension that 'refers to the extent to which a society encourages and rewards future 
orientated behaviors such as planning, investing in the future,. and delaying gratification' 
(p. 294). On this dimension Kuwait -as Jordan was not researched, but both countries 
belong to the Arab Islamic culture- was ranked amongst the least future-oriented 
countries (Javidan & House, 2001, Exhibit 6, p. 294). 
MAS's role in planning and decision-making in JCB was restricted mainly as result of the 
social culture in the country. Simon (1977, p. 97) advocates increasing participation to 
increase OE. One way for increasing participation is for it to be introduced slowly and 
gradually through the corporate culture of the banks along with a process of selective 
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recruitment. Most certainly it would not meet the needs of some of the managers who 
would be less receptive to change. Take, for example, Coch & French (1948) who 
provided the earliest evidence on the effect of participation in budgets and enhanced 
performance in a U.S. company (Brownell 1981, p. 845). However, BrownelI (1981) went 
on to say that French et al. (1960) failed to find the same evidence in a field study on a 
Norwegian company. 
In spite of the fmdings on the significance of budgetary participation contributing to 
enhancing OE, [see Section 5.19, Budgets in JCB] and the divergence of findings 
among the various studies, what was observed in the PB case study and the survey of 
JCB confirm this. 
5.27 Cultural Effects on Organisational Structure in JCB 
Centralisatfsion of authority was a reflection of the high power distance characteristics of 
the country's culture [Exhibit 5.30, Effects of Social Culture on Organisational Structure 
in JCB]: 
There is no delegation of responsibility or authority commensurate with the position an 
employee holds' (interview 28). . 
And,' authority is given to aftw people. In their absence work stops' (interview 18). 
And, 'in a one -man show in his absence work stops ... ' (interview 11). 
And, ' ... They (top management) think our work is in implementing and decision only' 
(interview 29) and 'they believe we are processors who do not need to analyse 
information' (interview 28). 
Channels of communication were mostly vertical and in one direction, top-bottom: 
'As an assistant general manager I do not face any problems with communication 
channels but communication from bottom upward I think there is' (interview 13). 
Among the factors that negatively affected communication channels were the cultural 
factors and the psychological gap between the levels of management [Exhibit 5.23, 
Factors Negatively Affecting Communication Channels in ICB]. Although it came at the 
bottom of the list of factors as they were identified by a smaller number of respondents, 
this does not undermine the effect of culture on the organisational structure as members 
of a high power distance culture in general do not challenge but accept the authority of 
their superiors, and 'avoid disagreement and believe that by-passing their bosses is 
insubordination' (Kirkman et aI. 2002, p. 18). 
5.27.1 Cultural Effects on Bureaucracy in JCB 
In the PB case study bureaucracy emerged as one of the factors that hampered the flow of 
information. It was also suggested by some PB managers that excessive bureaucracy was 
382 
a characteristic of all Jordaoian banks [see discussion in Section 4.10.5, Excessive 
Bureaucracy at PB]. This was reiterated in interviews 13 and 15 in the survey that cultural 
reasons are behind bureaucratic administrations. 
Questions 40 and 41 asked about bureaucracy in administrations and work procedures and 
what made the administration in the banks bureaucratic in the respondents' opinion. 
In question 41, after sharing with the respondents a definition of bureaucracy, I asked the 
survey interviewees whether they considered their respective banks to be bureaucratic and 
gave them a chance to rate them on a four-point scale. Seven respondents (23%) said that 
their administration were 'not bureaucratic', the rest of the interviewees (77%) described 
them as being bureaucratic to varying degrees ranging from 'partly bureaucratic' (54%) to 
'bureaucratic' (22%) to 'very bureaucratic' (1 %) [see Exhibit 5.46, Bureaucracy in JCB]. 
In interview 4 the manager interviewed gave an explanation: 
'We deal with staff and clients who prefer bureaucracy'. 
And 'It is (administration) partly bureaucratic due to social and cultural factors' 
(interview 13). 
In question 42 I asked the interviewees why it was that their administrations were 
bureaucratic. Their answers can be grouped in three main categories and all belong to 
culture, whether social, corporate or occupational [Exhibit 5.47, Causes of Bureaucracy in 
JeB]: 
(1) cultural reasons; 
(2) the nature of banking calls for bureaucracy to minimize and control financial risks; 
(3) centralisation of decision-making. 
A closer look at the answers of deposit managers shows that they tend not to agree with 
the overall opinion. The deposit managers were split in half as 4 respondents said 
administrations were 'not bureaucratic', and the other 50% described them as 
'bureaucratic' or 'partly bureaucratic'. 
Out of the half (4 respondents) who said administration was bureaucratic, two 
respondents said it was due to cultural reasons. 
All credit managers said that their administrations were 'partly bureaucratic'. The most 
frequent reason given was because clients and staff prefer bureaucracy, or cultural 
reasons. Other reasons given were that bureaucracy was needed to establish some order, 
or that, since work procedures were absent, so bureaucracy was needed. 
The financial managers' opinions came somewhere in between those of the deposit and 
credit managers as they did in most cases, but the majority still felt that administrations 
were bureaucratic (63%). The most frequent answer was the control needs call for 
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bureaucracy [see Exhibit 5.46, Bureaucracy in JCB; and Exhibit 5.47, Causes of 
Bureaucracy in JCB]. 
Branch managers showed, as they did in their previous answers that a gap separated 
them from management as 88% said administrations were bureaucratic to varying 
degrees. Only one branch manager described administration as 'not bureaucratic', and in 
that same bank two other managers interviewed described it as 'not bureaucratic'. 
Exhibit 5.46 
B ureaucracy 10 JC B 
Item (N=30) DM CM FM BM 
(n=8) (n=8) (n=8) (n=8) 
Bureaucratic administration 
Overall percentage 75% 50% 100% 63% 88% 
Exhibit 5.47 
auses 0 ureaucracym C fB . JCB 
Total times 
mentioned DM" CM" FM" BM" 
Cultural factors 7 2 4 1 
Centralisation of authority ·5 2 2 1 
Corporate culture 4 1 4 
Nature of banking 3 I 2 
Control needs 3 I 2 
Internal politics 2 1 1 
Lack of formalisation of procedures 2 1 1 
"Number of tImes mentIOned out of a populatIon of 8 
The reasons given by the branch managers mostly centred round the corporate culture. 
One respondent believed that the size of the bank was the reason. 
This fact naturally had implications for the quality and quality of information flowing 
through MAS reports for planning and decision-making. Requests for information by 
branch managers, for example, had to follow long lines of information through the 
Branches' Management Department at the head office and from there to other head office 
departments. 
5.27.2 Cultural Effects on Committees in JCB 
In the PB case study committees were used among other things to exchange information 
[Section 4.23.2, Conunittees at PB]. The opinions offered by the interviewees in JCB 
were not that conunittees did not work but that committees would stall or kill matters. 
The reason behind that was, in the opinions of the respondents, a cultural one [see more 
discussion in Section 5.17.L5, Committees in JCB): 
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'Culturally we do not come to committees with an attitude to discuss ... you know what is 
said: to kill an issue form a committee' (interview 12). 
And, 'In our culture committees are used to get seal of approval only and not to discuss' 
(interview 23). 
And, 'In our society committees stall matters' (interview 26). 
The research of Kirkman et al. (2001, p. 21) on teams in different cultures included 
observing, interviewing, and collecting survey data from 378 work teams in nine 
countries in eleven firms within different industries. They found that 'employee 
acceptance of teams and self-management was related to deeply held cultural values'. 
They also found that the most important cultural value that affects participation in 
teamwork was the individualism/collectivism dimension of a culture (Kirkman et al., 
2001, p. 16). 
Individualists prefer to work alone and prefer personal rewards and motivation rather 
than working in team and getting collective rewards and motivators (Kirkman'et aI., 2001, 
p. 16). Kirkman et al. ranked Arab countries as moderate on the individualism / 
collectivism dimension (Kirkman et aI., p. 23, Exhibit 5.3). 
In more individualistic countries like the U.S.A., Belgium, and Finland, team members 
complained of the level of coordination and communication. Teams in such cultures as 
found by Kirkman et al. lack the connectedness and sense of closeness between them 
(Kirkman et aI., 2001, p. 17). The researchers also found that employees who stayed away 
from self-managed work teams (SMWTs) 'were less satisfied with their jobs and less 
committed to their organisation than were employees who accepted SMWT aspects' 
(Kirkman et aI., 2001, p. 15). 
Committees in the survey population [see discussion in Section5.17.1.5; Committees in 
JCB) were used for decision-making and co-ordination [see Section 4.23.2, Committees 
at PB). However, an overall percentage of 47% described as helpful and in particular 
branch managers 12% only found them helpful [see Exhibit 5.43, Role of Committees in 
JCB) and was described by PB managers as unfruitful. 
The drawbacks of committees mentioned by the survey interviewees related to the lack of 
teamwork spirit, not having the authority and freedom to decide, were steered by their 
chairmen, the membership and terms of reference of committees, non-interactive 
discussions between committee members and their chairperson. All these are reflections 
of a culture which is high power distance and individualistic. 
Javidan & House (2001) added 'in-group collectivism' to Hofstede's (1991, p. 53) 
dimension of individualism/collectivism. In-group collectivism refers to 'the extent to 
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which members of a society take pride in membership in small groups such as their 
family and circle of close friends and the organization in which they are employed' 
(Javidan & House, 2001, pp. 297-298). 
Part of a country's national folklore is its proverbs. In Jordan some proverbs relate to 
business and shed some light on the individualistic/collectivistic dimension. Proverbs 
such as 'partnerships lead to parting' and 'play alone you will come back satisfied'. The 
survey interviewees in a business context were not dealing with their families or clans 
where their allegiances lay, but in a competitive environment of perso:lai achievements 
and promoting personal interests. They acted in a more individualistic way as this did not 
conflict with the interests of their 'in-groups'. 
What Javidan & House describe with 'in-groups' as favouring friends and family in 
recruitment and in allocating rewards and promotions was discussed in the case study 
[Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB]. This was not discussed in the survey interviews as 
the questions were set. One remark was made by a respondent as a reflection of the 'in-
group' dimension of the culture: 
'In third world countries w.e appoint a manager and then we create a department' 
(interview 30). 
This can provide an explanation for the answers given by the respondents that committees 
in general did not work well in JCB and did not further the role of MAS in enhancing OE 
by contributing to diffusion of information, enhancing decision-making processes, and 
. co-ordination. 
Credit committees were a clear exception and were described by credit managers as more 
successful than other committees. They provided a very useful structure to exchange 
information on credit applications and for spreading accountability among the members 
of the committee -particularly if the outcome was unsuccessful. 
5.28 Cultural Effects on the Diffusion ofInformation in JCB 
The organisational structure of the survey popUlation was characterised by structured 
centralisation of information (67%) [see Exhibit 5.15, Centralisation of Information, 
Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCB and their Effects], and unstructured 
forms as information gatekeepers (47%), and 63% of deposit, credit, and branch 
managers believed internal politics existed as well. All those phenomena had a substantial 
negative effect on the role of MAS in decision-making [54% of the respondents] and 
planning [63% of the respondents]. 
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Centralisation of information was described in interview 10 as: 
'It is a cultural issue .. .Jordanians like to keep information to themselves. It makes them 
feel powerful '. 
Social culture affected the diffusion of infonnation through organisational structures of 
the banks and their committees [see Section 5.17.1.5, Committees in JCB; and Section 
5.27.2, Cultural Effects on Committees in JCB; and Section 5.27, Cultural Effects on 
Organisational Structure in JCB] and through management's attitude towards the issue. 
Nevertheless, what can be said at this point is that the individualistic culture in Jordan 
affects the effectiveness of teamwork and committees [Exhibit 5.29, Effects of Social 
Culture on Communication and the Diffusion of Information in JCB], whereas the high 
power distance characteristic of Jordanian culture affects communication and the flow of 
information within the banks. 
5.29 Cultural Effects on Control and Performance Appraisal in JCB 
The findings of the survey showed that financial measures of achievement of financial 
goals such as profits, deposits, expenses, and credit were predominantly used, as was 
found in the case study. 
I asked the interviewees what type of activi ties they aimed to control and report to top 
management [Q 40]. An overall percentage of 80% of respondents said they monitored 
financial measures in their budgets [Exhibit 5.44, Budgets and Goal Achievement in JCB] 
and 57% reported only financial information to top management. 
Accounting, information, and management control systems reflect the culture of the 
designers and the users of those systems in' terms of what and how they measure 
implementation and achievement (Hofstede 1991, p. 5; Hopwood, 1978, P .8). 
Miroshink (2002, p.536) writes that Hofstede's masculinity! femininity dimension has 
important implications for motivation in the work place. Hofstede (1991, p. 84) 
positioned Arab countries as above average on the masculine dimension (p. 155), was 
reflected in both control and performance appraisal systems in the survey and case study. 
In answer to whether respondents were satisfied with the implemented system [see 
discussion in Section 5.20.2, Performance Evaluation in JCB; and Exhibit 5.33, Criteria 
of Performance Evaluation in JCB]. The cultural effect could be seen in that 77% of those 
who were not satisfied with the evaluation described it as subjective and described the 
evaluation criteria as unclear [41 %], unfair and non-comprehensive [36%]. Some of the 
respondents said they did not know how they were evaluated. When evaluation is 
subjective an employee in a high distance culture cannot (and is not expected to) press the 
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matter with his seniors. Understandably, this might affect the productivity of the 
interviewees and their enthusiasm for achieving corporate goals and enhancing OE 
(Exhibit 5.48, Effects of Social Culture on Control and Performance Evaluation in JCBj. 
It was discussed earlier [Exhibit 5.32, Use of Financial and Non-financial Information in 
JCBj that 80% of the respondents budgeted only for financial goals and 53% reported to 
management only financial information. 
The emphasis was on financial information and measures, although 93% of the 
respondents stressed the need for and importance of non-financial information that would 
facilitate better achievements for planning and control, and performance appraisal could 
be explained by the influence of a more masculine social culture. 
5.30 Corporate Culture in JCB 
A number of questions in the survey questionnaire served the double purpose of 
understanding the processes involved and the management style (for example Qs 4, 9, ll-
D, 18, 19, 23, 26). 
In response to a number of questions, the respondents answered that it was the 
management style. Hofstede (1991, p.236) believes that: 
'The organizational culture component is much less profound than is often claimed. It is 
more superficial manifestation like common symbols, heroes, and rituals'. 
Other researchers do not agree with Hofstede. Alexander (1994, p. 4) quotes Parsons in 
that 'the personality ... neither cultural coding nor social determinism precludes a role for 
psychological imperatives'. Furthermore, the general manager of an organis~tion exerts a 
powerful influence over its members in their conduct in many ways and not only through 
his overt authority. (Burns & Stalker, 1994, p. 212). 
Helliar et al. (2002, p. 45) describe the change in corporate culture in the bank they 
researched which resulted in 'a changed emphasis from financial accounting and 
reporting in 1989 to management accounting and management control in 1996'. Helliar et 
al. conclude by saying 'from these studies it appears that MAs's historical, social and 
organisational contexts are major influences on its design' (Helliar et aI., 2002, pp. 46 - 47). 
The influence of corporate culture can also be seen in what Kaplan & Norton (1992, p. 
77) believe: that measures of customer satisfaction and business performance are 
'derived' from the company's culture. Gordon & Di Tomaso (l992,p. 795) stress the 
importance of corporate culture and stress that if 'individual managers act according to 
their own preferences ... [theyj may suffer from missing important opportunities and from 
failing to develop selected opportunities in an orchestrated powerful manner'. 
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Exhibit S.48 Effects of Social Culture on Control and Performance Evaluation 
in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
[1] More emphasis on 
financial goals 
[2] More emphasis on 
quantitative measures 
[3] More use of subjectivity 
in performance evaluation 
nnr-\ Reduced effectiveness nnr-\ Uuy of control UUL--( Diminishing role of MAS in enhancing OE 
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Preston (1995, p. 284) has a similar view on the influence of corporate culture on control 
in organisations. When discussing the impact of culture on budgeting he explains how 
social structure influences the budgeting process: 
'In this respect the structure, and in particular processes including budgeting, may form 
part of the culture of the organisation, and indeed may be active in shaping the pattern of 
shared meanings, values and beliefs'. 
The survey respondents' opinion on what affected the quality and quantity of information 
in MAS reports used for planning, decision-making and control, identified management 
style among the reasons as a reflection of corporate culture (13%) [Exhibit 5.31, Factors 
Affecting Quality and Quantity of MAS Information in JCB]. Corporate culture affected 
also other aspects of the banks' organisations: question 12 asked whether top 
management believed that there was information that ought not to be diffused to all senior 
managers. An overall percentage of 87% of the respondents said 'yes' top management 
did believe so and, in particular, 27% of the respondents said it was management style 
that affected the unavailability of information (Exhibit 5.27, Management Commitment to 
the Diffusion of Information in JCB]. The survey respondents put the difficulties they 
faced with communication channels down to corporate culture as they did with the 
delineation of responsibilities and authority of departments. 
When I asked respondents about the causes of the difficulties they had with the 
delineation of responsibilities and authority, the first ranked answer was flaws in the 
organisational structure and the second cause was corporate culture [Exhibit 5.21, Causes 
of Problems in the Delineation of Responsibilities of Departments in JCB]. 
The most frequently mentioned cause of bureaucracy in JCB was culture followed by 
centralisation of organisation (which is arguably a reflection of social and corporate 
culture) and corporate culture [Exhibit 5.46, Bureaucracy in JCB]. 
Christiansen & Mouristen (1995, p. 229) talk about the influence which corporate culture 
has and that an 'accounting system is designed to fit the way problems are normally 
solved ... (it) must fit with the culture, i.e. the norms and value system that characterise 
the organisation'. This opinion is shared by Peters & Waterman (1995, p. 280) in saying 
'Every excellent company we studied is clear on what it stands for, and takes the process 
of value shaping seriously. In fact, we wonder whether it is possible to be an excellent 
company without clarity on values and without having the right sorts of values'. 
5.31 Summary of Chapter 5 
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The survey of JCB aimed at finding out whether the preliminary fmdings induced from a 
case study of one Jordanian commercial bank could also be found in the other eight JCB. 
The four functions of credit, deposits, finance and branches were targeted in each banle 
When analysing the data it came out clearly as it did in the case study that managers 
needed to scan wide-scope information [76%}, both qualitative and quantitative [93%}, on 
the external environment (100%}, through periodic and ad hoc reports [47%}. Managers 
needed comprehensive, detailed, analysed financial and non-financial information and not 
general information on the external environment, and they needed it in advance. Its 
unavailability affected setting goals and planning, decision-making, customer satisfaction, 
and growth thereby negatively affecting OE. Managers needed the information to analyse 
the external environment, look for new markets and improve customer service. Doing that 
they said it would increase their effectiveness in setting their goals and plans, and to 
improve decision-making. Not making such information available to the respondents via 
MAS resulted in senior managers having different interpretations from those of top 
management [63%]. They acted upon their personal interpretations which were not in 
IJnison with those of top management. This. affected planning, decision-making, goal 
achievement, strategies, customer service, quality of work, and feelings of frustration and 
confusion subsequently leading to a lower level of OE. 
Unless management sets clear goals vis-i-vis the different external and internal 
stakeholders, information collected, communicated, and analysed by MAS would not 
correspond to the set goals and would not enhance goals achievement [a necessary and 
requisite condition beyond the domain of MAS}. 
The survey findings also showed that the respondents needed more information on 
internal information, corporate goals, other departments in the bank, clients, as employee 
satisfaction and financial information improves managers' ability in planning and 
decision-making, control and co-ordination. 
However, managers (both in the case study and in the survey) did not get the information 
they needed for planning and decision-making because there were certain types of 
information that was treated as 'restricted information' [91 %} and which was not diffused 
across the hierarchy although it was needed [47%] for achieving goals, enhancing 
planning and decision-making, and feeling part of the team. The analysed data indicated 
that the management style, the social culture and not cost were the prime reasons for the 
unavailability of infonnation on the external and internal environment. 
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As a result of insufficient information and differing interpretations of the external 
environment, a lack of alignment between corporate and departmental goals [50% of 
credit managers and 75% of branch managers] and managers' individual goals [63% of 
credit and branch managers and 50% of fmancial managers] ensued. This affected 
managers by demotivating, demoralising, lowering the quality of their work, 
consequently, affecting planning and goal achievement. Furthermore, in both the survey 
and the case study, it was found that some support departments did not have set goals or 
plans of action. 
The decisive elements in an organisational structure to enhance the diffusion of 
information and, according to the fmdings in the survey, to enhance the flow of 
information were: stable organisational structure and well-delineated responsibilities and 
authority of departments [47%]; communication channels [40%]; co-ordination [37%]; 
departments with specialised functions [27%]; work procedures and decentralisation. An 
organisational structure with those elements would enhance effective and efficient 
performance, help planning and control, and enhance communication, which in turn lead 
to improved OE. The flow of information and decision-making was also found to be 
hindered by bureaucracy [75%], which in turn is a reflection of the high power distance 
culture in Jordan. 
Committees could be used, as suggested by the respondents, as a means of exchange of 
information, co-ordination, and joint decision-making to fill the gap which the 
organisation structure left but this was not possible as noted by 53% of the respondents 
largely due to the cultural factor. 
The analysis of the survey data showed that JCB gave more emphasis to feedback control 
than to feedforward although OE cannot be effectively achieved by one without the other. 
Budgets were used as a plan and a measure of performance mainly for revenue 
generating departments as only 25% of financial departments had their own budgets. 
JeB' .. managements were found to be mainly interested in exercising control over areas 
that were of a financial nature and relating to the fmancial performance of the banks. 
MAS reports were more helpful for users in control [60%] than in planning [9%] and 
decision-making [6%]. This also applied to the information that was available on-line as 
90% of the respondents found it helpful in control but much less so in planning and 
decision-making. 
Performance appraisal systems were found to be unsatisfactory and non-motivating by 
many respondents [69%].· The main reasons were subjectivity and unclear criteria. 
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Furthennore, achievements of managers got mixed up with each other [81%] due to 
incorrect points of measurement, time phase, and lack of cross departmental measures for 
goal achievement. MAS did not provide management with sufficient information for 
evaluation purposes and that led to feelings of dissatisfaction and rivalry between 
managers. 
The design of MAS adopted by the survey population was influenced by the power 
distribution at the banks seen in the centralisation of authority and internal politics [56%] 
with financial managers/controllers who were the compilers and initiat:>rs of MAS 
reports. Other factors that influenced the design were: the computer banking systems 
software, networking, packages compatibility, and the man-machine interface. 
The MAS reports used were characterised by containing mostly historical information 
[90%] which was predominantly financial in nature although respondents (93%] said they 
needed both financial and non-financial information. A second characteristic of MAS 
reports that came out was that 38% of the respondents found that MAS reports contained 
irrelevant information and unnecessary details [42%] and, to a lesser extent a lack of 
sharp focus [32%]. Participation in designing MAS reports [63% participated] on its own 
was not sufficient to provide adequate and satisfactory information due to social and 
corporate cultural effects. 
Social and corporate culture affected the design of MAS, it affected the type of 
information available, its diffusion through the channels of communication, and the 
control and evaluation systems adopted. 
The lack of interaction and iteration in processes of decision-making, . communication, 
and setting goals in JCB was found to be substantially affected by the patriarchal/long 
power distance culture in Jordan. 
One pattern that was noticed in almost all the topics discussed was that deposit managers 
seemed the most satisfied group with MAS followed by fmancial managers much more 
than. was the case with credit and branch managers. In some cases the two groups were at 
opposite ends. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CONTRIBUTION AND ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
In this last chapter we will firstly contextualize the research by discussing the prevailing 
situation in Jordan and relate this to the research findings. The chapter will then link the 
research findings from the PB case study and the survey of Jordanian commercial banks 
(JeBs) to four key research questions. These key research questions essentiaIly focus on the 
role ofMAS in enhancing OE in JCBs. 
Having discussed these research questions the chapter will then discuss the contribution of 
the research to knowledge in this area. 
The four research questions are as follows: 
• What kind of information does MAS generate in JCBs and what are the benefits to 
users? 
• Does MAS deal primarily in historic data, or are they forward looking? 
• How are MAS constructed in JCBs? 
• What are the specific contributions ofMAS to OE, in JCBs? 
Each of these questions will be discussed under a separate heading apart from the first two, 
which are discussed together. 
6.1 The Jordanian Context 
Jordan is not a high profile country, insomuch, as it is not a large country and its economic 
development and modernization are fairly recent. As a consequence, it has not been the 
subject of extensive research in terms of its management. Specifically, there has been little or 
no research into the operation of management systems in Jordanian banks. In this respect the 
thesis was right to pose a very fundamental question, namely: do ICBs have MAS? 
The research findings have revealed that JCBs do in fact have MAS and that they have 
functions and purposes, etc that are comparable, with certain caveats, to the recognized 
Western norm. These findings can be summarized as follows: 
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• The commitment of ICBs to MAS is based on the same implicit commitment to 
rationality and objectivity that is seen in the West. The commitment to MAS in the West, 
however, is more qualified [see Section 4.12.1, Financial Information at PB; 4.12.3, 
Orientation of Information at PB; Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PB; 
Section 4.18.2.1, Reliance on Financial Measures in MAS; 5.18, Clear Financial and 
Non-Financial Goals for Managers in JCB; Section 5.19, Budgets in JCBj. 
• As in the West, the use of MAS in JCBs, also recognizes that it may serve the needs of 
both decision-making and control. However, not all MAS and control systems 
characteristics are generalizable or even transferable across nations and this consideration 
gave the research added interest and relevance (Harrison, 1992, p. I). [See Section 5.19, 
Budgets in ICB; Section 5.16.4, Sufficient Relevant Information on which to Base Future 
Plans; Section 5.12.1.9, Principles of Feedback and Feedforward Control in JCB; Section 
4.12.2, Time Horizon of MAS at PB; Section 4.12.3, Orientation of Information at PB; 
Section 4.12.5, Frequency ofMAS Reports at PBj. 
• The reports and other data outputs of MAS come principally from finance departments in 
. collaboration with IT departments. As a consequence they are resource dependent on the 
organizations 'computer power' [see Section 5.12.1.8, Technology in JCB; Section 5.14, 
The Use of Computers in MAS in ICB; Section 4.11.!.3, Effects of Information 
Technology on MAS Design at PBj. 
• MAS users in this study, like those in the West, complained that they were not involved in 
designing the system and its output, [Section 5.13.7, Managers' Participation in MAS 
Reports Design in ICB; Section 4.10.4, Centralisation ofInformation at PB; Section 4.12.8, 
Participation in MAS Reports Design at PB]. 
6.2 What kind of Information does MAS Generate in JCBs and what are the Benefit to Users 
and Does MAS Deal Primarily in Historic Data or are they Forward Looking? 
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The research revealed that the interviewees believed that a broad range of qualitative and 
quantitative information on the external environment (economic, competition, customer 
satisfaction and customer needs) would increase their effectiveness and ability to set 
individual and corporate goals. 
The information provided on the external environment often did not include details users 
needed. MAS reports typically consisted of financial indicators which, although useful for 
control, were not appropriate for planning and strategic decision making. 
Available information in relation to the external and internal environments was mostly 
historical (in the case of PB 100% historical information, and 90% for the survey 
interviewees). Forward-looking information needed by the users was not available at lCBs 
(according to 88% of the credit managers and 75% ofthe branch managers). 
In addition, only 47% of the survey interviewees said that the MAS contained forward 
looking information on the external and internal environment. In the case study all ten 
managers got their information from personal contacts rather than through the MAS. 
Wide-Scope Information on the Internal and External Environments 
The majority of respondents [76%] expressed their need for wide-scope information on the 
external environment in order to assess the potential of the markets, setting goals and plans, 
and for improving their decision-making [see Exhibit 5.8, Need for Information on the 
External Environment in lCB; Section 4.7.2.2, Information on the External Environment at 
PB; Section 4.9, Diffusion ofInformation at PB; Section 4.15.5.2, Problems Relating to Lack 
of Information for Planning at PB; Section 4.15.6, The Role of MAS in Planning Product 
Innovation and Customer Satisfaction at PB]. 
The findings also showed that the interviewees wanted detailed and comprehensive 
information on the external and internal environments but typically only got summary 
information. In addition they wanted to see more analysis in the MAS reports that focuses on 
areas that had direct significance to their work, i.e. client and product profitability. The 
interviewees claimed that the unavailability of such information affected their ability to plan, 
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make decisions and anticipate future trends [see Exhibit 5.9, Uses of Information on the 
External Environment in JCS; Section 4.8.3, Information on CBJ Directives and Regulations; 
Section 4.10.4, Centralisation of Information at PS; Section 4.15.7, Role of MAS in 
Providing Non-Financial Information for Planners at PS; Section 4.9.1, Description of the 
Extent of Diffusion of Information at PS; Section 4.12.2, Time Horizon of MAS at PS; 
Section 4.12.3, Orientation ofInformation at PS; Section 4.12.5, Frequency of MAS Reports 
at PB; Section 4.15, The Role of MAS in Supporting Planning and Decision-Making at PB; 
Section 5.9.2.2, How Survey Interviewees Got Information; Section 5.9.2.3, Source of 
Information on the External Environment in JCSs; Section 5.16.4, Sufficient Relevant 
Information on which to Base Future Plans; Section 5.17.3, Effects of Management Style on 
Planning and Decision-Making in JCSs]. 
The unavailability of such information also resulted in a misinterpretation of the environment 
and this was reflected in departmental plans and budgets [see Section 4.16, Forms and Areas 
of Control at PS; Section 4.16.1, SudgetaryControl of Branches at PS; Section 5.20.1, 
Budgetary Control in JCB]. This is important because management in JCBs set goals and 
use them as benchmarks for performance evaluation. Accordingly, having relevant 
information relative to the external environment is crucial for running and controlling the 
business. [see Section 4.16.1, Budgetary Control of Branches at PS; and Section 5.20.2, 
Performance Evaluation in JCB]. 
The research also identified some negative effects associated with having to subjectively 
interpret data in the MAS and this, in particular, related to the changes in the extemal 
environment. As a consequence this affected the MAS users' ability to set and achieve 
corporate goals. This resulted in: [I] frustration and confusion; [2] the loss of clients; [3] 
unsatisfactory work; [4] a reduction in the quality of planning and decision-making [Exhibit 
5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCBs; Section 5.16.2, Conflict between DepartmentallBranches' 
Goals and Corporate Goals in JCBs]. 
A large majority of the survey interviewees indicated a need for more information on the 
intemal environment (75%) as did PS interviewees [see Exhibit 5.12, Need for More 
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Information on the Internal Environment; Exhibit 5.13, Types of Internal Information 
Needed by the Survey Interviewees; Section 5.9.2.4, Information on the Internal 
Environment in JCB; Section 5. I 6.4, Sufficient Relevant Information on which to Base 
Future Plans; Section 4. I 5.5.2, Problems Relating to the Lack of Information for Planning at 
PB; Section 5.17.3, Effects of Management Style on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; 
Section 4.10.1.1, Gaps in Communication at PB; Section 4.15.2, Corporate Goals ofPB]. 
Some 73% of the survey interviewees said that most of the information provided on the 
internal environment related to HR and administrative matters. The interviewees also claimed 
that there was little information on the work of other departments, and information on new 
and existing services [Exhibit 5.13, Types of Internal Information Needed by the Survey 
Interviewees; Exhibit 5.14, Types of Internal Information Provided to the Survey 
Interviewees]. As a consequence, there was little information in the MAS that was conducive 
to planning within the organisation. 
These findings generally support the work of Western researchers on the need and 
desirability of providing wide-scope information for planning (e.g. March, 1987, p. 162; 
Wetherbe & March, 1991, p. 55; Miller, 1993, p. 120; March as quoted by Peters & 
Waterman, 1995, p. 107; Otley 1995, p. 46; Wilson & Chua, 1996, p. 13; Vandenbosch & 
Huff, 1997, p. 82; Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000, p. 223; Pierce & O'Dea, 2003, p. 260). 
Information for Setting Goals 
The findings from the PB case study revealed that there was a weak link between the 
published goals of the bank and the goals of the PB interviewees [Exhibit 4.15, A 
Comparison of PB Interviewees' Answers with Corporate Goals as in Annual Reports (1994-
1998)]. Consequently, information needed to achieve these goals were not collected, 
processed and communicated. In turn this detracts from PBs ability to enhance OE [see 
Section 4.7.1, Why Information?; Section 4.7.2.1, Description of Availability of Information 
at PB; Section 4.8, External Environment Factors Affecting the Ability to Achieve Goals at 
PB; Section 4.15, The Role of MAS in supporting Planning and Decision-making at PB]. 
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Similarly in the survey, corporate goals were not clear to all of the interviewees nor was the 
information available to them through MAS reports conducive to planning [see Exhibit 5.7, 
Goal-Setting Process in JCB; Section 5.15, Identifying Corporate Goals vis-a.-vis 
Stakeholders; Section 5.16.4, Sufficient Relevant Information on which to Base Future 
Plans]. 
McMann & Nanni's (1995, p. 327) study of Japanese management practices arrived at 
similar conclusions and found that employees lacked an awareness of corporate goals. 
Nevertheless they rightly claimed that one of the principal objectives of the MAS was to " to 
reinforce strategy', so that "employees understand how they contribute to organizational 
objectives". 
The data in both the case study and the survey showed a lack of alignment between the three 
levels of goals: corporate, departmental, and individual. This became clear when the research 
findings indicated that 50% of the credit managers' and 75% of branch managers' perception 
of goals conflicted with the corporate goals [see Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in JCB; 
Section 4.15.3, Departmental Goals at PB; Section 4.15.4, Characteristics of Departmental 
Goals at PB; Section 4.15.4.2, Departmental Goals were not Discussed by Top Management 
. at PB; Section 5.16, Clear Departmental Goals Aligned with Corporate Goals in JCB; 
Section 5.16.2, Conflict between Departmental/Branches' Goals and Corporate Goals in 
JCB; Section 5.16.3, Disagreement Between Corporate and DepartmentallBranches' Goals 
and Individual Goals in JCBj. This demotivated and demoralised managers and resulted in 
the managers setting lower personal goals for themselves [see Section 4.15.4.3, Unclear 
Focal Roles of Departmental Goals at PB; Section 5.9.1, Goal-Setting in JCB; Section 5.16.1, 
Effects of the Goal-setting Process on Planning and Decision-making in JBC; Section 5.24, 
Commitment of Line Managers to Achieve Goals in JCBj. 
The lack of alignment between corporate goals and departmentallbranch goals were largely 
due to the insufficiency of information on: corporate goals, departments in lCBs, existing 
and new products, and customer and product profitability. The interviewees complained that 
the lack of information for setting departmental goals and plans had a negative effect on 
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organizational processes and OE [see Exhibit 5.12, Need for more Information on the 
Internal Environment; Exhibit 5.13, Types of Internal Information Needed by the Survey 
Interviewees; Exhibit 5.14, Types of Internal Information Provided to the Survey 
Interviewees; Exhibit 5.42, Forward Looking Information in MAS Reports; Section 4.15.2, 
Corporate' Goals of PB; Section 4.15.5.2, Problems Relating to Lack of Information for 
Planning at PB; Section 5.9.2.4, Information on the Internal Environment in JCB; Section 
5.16.4, Sufficient Relevant Information on which to Base Future Plans; Section 5.17.3, 
Effects of Management Style on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB}. 
This lack of alignment was also a result of a "top-down" corporate culture [see Section 4.20, 
The Cultural Effects on MAS in Planning and Decision-Making at PB; Section 5.26, Cultural 
Effects on Planning and Goal-Setting in JCB]. 
Forward-Looking Information 
The available information contained in MAS was mostly historical. For example, in the case 
of PB it was 100% and 90% for the survey interviewees [see Exhibit 5.8, Need for 
Information on the External Environment in JCB; Section 4.12.2, Time Horizon of MAS at 
PB; Section 4.15.1, How PB Managers Used Historical MAS Reports; Section 5.13.4, Time 
Horizon ofMAS Reports]. 
Eighty eight percent of credit managers and 75% of branch managers indicated that forward-
looking information was not available in JeBs as [Exhibit 5.42, Forward looking Information 
in MAS Reports]. 
The information relating to the external environment consisted mostly of financial indicators 
which were not much use for planning and strategic decision-making. However, it was 
recognised that this type of information was helpful for control purposes (80% in the survey 
budgeted financial goals and 53% reported financial information only) [Exhibit 5.32, Uses of 
Financial and Non-Financial Information in JCB; Section 4.12.1, Financial Information at 
PB; Section 4.12.4, Format of MAS Information at PB; Section 5.16.4, Sufficient Relevant 
Information on which to Base Future Plans]. The interviewees believed that there are critical 
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matters that figures cannot explain fully in a situation [see Section 4.15.7, The Role ofMAS 
in providing Non-Financial Information for Planners; Section 5.13.1, Format of MAS 
Reports]. 
The interviewees, not surprisingly, expressed a desire for more non financial information to 
be included in MAS because it was more conducive to: understanding the environment, more 
etTective decision making, planning markets and the identification of new client and product 
opportunities [Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-Financial Information in MAS Reports]. 
6.3 How are MAS Constructed in the Context of lCBs 
The findings of the research showed that: the social and corporate culture/management style 
influenced the type and quantity of MAS information in lCBs. In turn this had a direct effect 
on its diffusion within the organisation and detracted from good communication. In addition 
to this consideration it also detracted from lCBs ability to implement effective control and 
performance evaluation systems. 
In looking at MAS design (Exhibit 4.12, Factors affecting the Design of MAS), 12 
contingent variables have been identified by Western researchers as affecting the design of 
MAS. The findings of this research confirmed the importance of the following variables: 
social and corporate culture, distribution of power/internal politics, IT and the man-machine 
interface, and the decision-making stylet psychology of users. In particular, this research has 
emphasised and developed the importance of two variables: strategies o(the organisation, 
and the principles of feedback and feedforward control. 
The Effects of Social and Corporate Cultures on the Design ofMAS in JCB 
In lCBs cultural factors, i.e. social, occupational and corporate, had both positive and 
negative effects on the role of MAS in enhancing OE. The effects were felt in the design, 
implementation, and operation of MAS. The following four areas were specifically 
mentioned by the interviewees as being affected by the social culture in Jordan: (I) planning 
and goal-setting process; (2) organisational structure: centralisation, communication channels 
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and teamwork; (3) diffusion of information within the banks; (4) control and performance 
appraisal [Section 5.25, Introduction]. 
The findings of the research indicated that investing in MAS to provide the information 
needed by MAS users was not primarily influenced by the cost. Respondents revealed that 
what improved the usefulness of MAS were: the characteristics of the computer system 
[43%], the design ofMAS [33%], IT staff capabilities [23%], cost [17%], and management 
style [13%J [Exhibit 5.31, Factors Affecting the Quality and Quantity ofMAS Information in 
JCB; Section 4.7.2.1, Description of the Availability of Information at PS; Section 5.23, 
Commitment and Support of Top Management in JCB]. 
The effects of the social culture could be seen in the MAS design which placed more 
emphasis on feedback control. As such, the design of MAS was influenced by the 
deterministic and high power distance dimensions of the social culture in Jordan (Kirkman et 
al., 200 I, p. 20) [Section 4.20, The Cultural Effects on MAS in Planning and Decision-
Making at PB; Section 5.26 Cultural Effects on Planning and Goal-Setting in JCBj. This 
consideration affected the type of information contained in MAS, its frequency, and also its 
form [see Section 6.2j. 
In the survey 62 % of the interviewees claimed to have participated in the design of MAS 
reports [Exhibit 5.38, Survey Interviewees' Participation in MAS ReportsDesign; Section 
5.13.7, Managers' Participation in MAS Reports Design in JCBj. Nevertheless, both the 
survey and PB interviewees found that MAS information did not meet their needs in terms of 
inappropriate information and timing of the reports [Exhibit 5.25, Characteristics of MAS 
Reports in JCBj. A third factor related to corporate culture, which in addition to the personal 
character and disposition of top managers, is also shaped by a country's culture. Accordingly, 
the research has shown that top management in JCSs predominately decide on the type and 
quantity of information to be provided to MAS users. However, the users themselves have 
very little input or say in the design of MAS [See Section 4.23, Effects of Corporate Culture 
on MAS at PB; and Section 5.30, Corporate Culture in JCB]. 
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The research findings showed that the exclusion of users from the design process adversely 
affected them in the following ways: inappropriate time spent on tasks, the provision of 
inappropriate information, which meant that it did not facilitate effective decision making 
and detracted from managers ability to control the business [see Exhibit 5.40, Effects of Non-
participation in MAS Reports Design in JCB; Section 5.13.7, Managers' Participation in 
MAS Reports Design in JCB; and Section 4.12.8, Participation in MAS Reports Design at 
PB]. This finding was perhaps surprising because Western researchers have long recognized 
the importance of involving users in the design of MAS in order to avoid conflicts of interest 
and raise morale (King & Cleland, 1975, p. 287; Wetherbe, 1991, p. 62, Spicer & Ballew, 
1983, p. 91; Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000, pp. 221-222; Gross 1965, p. 8; Reid, 2000, p. 428; 
March, 1987, p. 154,etc.). 
Some interviewees believed that committees would not be successful in JCBs, due to the 
absence of conditions necessary for their effective functioning. This can be attributed to the 
individualistic attitude of managers and to the centralization of authority in most Jordanian 
businesses. In turn, both these factors are, once again, influenced by cultural considerations 
in Jordan [see Section 4.23.2, Committees at PB; Section 5.27.2, Cultural Effects on 
Committees in JCBj. 
The effects of culture on considerations, such as, the availability and communication of 
infonnation, the organisational structure of banks, and performance appraisal systems has 
been documented by other researchers in the West (Mason & Mitroff, 1973, p. 483; Bums & 
Stalker, 1994, p. 212; Collins, 1982, p. 117; Hopwood, 1978, p. 8; Puxty, 1993, p. 136; Miles 
& Huberman, 1994, p. \02; Alexander, 1994, p. 4; Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 18; Preston, 1995, 
p. 284; Helliar et aI., 2002, pp. 46-47; Miroshink, 2002, p. 530 among others). 
The Impact of Established Power Distribution in JeB on MAS Design 
The design of MAS in mcs can be regarded as a political activity within the banks and, 
accordingly, influenced by the established power distribution. Some of PB's managers were 
unable to get the information they needed, (not because it was unavailable or due to flaws in 
the channels of communication) because it was blocked by some managers. In other words, 
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information gatekeepers who officially centralised information at PB, decide who gets what 
information [see Section 4.10.4, Centralisation ofInformation at PB; Section 4.10.3, Internal 
Politics at PB; and Section 5.12.1.6, Established Power Distribution in JCB]. 
Centralisation, irrespective of whether it derives from the formal organisational structure, the 
existence of self-appointed information gatekeepers, or internal politics, affects the quality 
and availability of information. In this respect, it affects the ability of managers to plan and 
control and, therefore, can have a negative affect on OE. In general, PB managers did not get 
the information they needed, unless they were in a position to influence or manipulate the 
internal politics of the business. [see Section 4.10.4, Internal Politics at PB; Section 4.13.2.3, 
The Restructuring Stage at PB]. The survey interviewees (63% of deposit, branch, and credit 
managers) believed that this was an important consideration [Exhibit 5.15, Effects of 
Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and Internal Politics in JCB; Section 
5.10.1.3, Structured Centralisation ofInformation and Information Gatekeepers]. 
The centralisation of information, which led to power play and internal politicking, and self 
appointed information gatekeepers, influenced the quantity and quality of information within 
JCBs. The interviewees, accordingly, believed that this had a negative effect on planning (63 
. % and, in particular, credit managers 88%), decision-making (54% and, in particular, branch 
managers 63%), and control (59% and, in particular, branch managers 75%). The 
centralization of information can also be examined in terms of its affect on control. In 
essence control becomes ineffective, work is delayed and information is blocked or contains 
less detail [Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralization Gatekeepers and Internal Politics on 
Control in JCB]. 
The influence of power distribution and internal politics on MAS design is also 
acknowledged by researchers in the West (e.g. Markus & Pfeffer, 1983, p. 208; Bariff & 
Galbrith, 1987, p. IS; Pfeffer, 1977, p. 144; Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 449; Miller, 1993, 
p. 126; Bums & Stalker, 1994, pp. 146, 152; Granlund, 2001, p. 162; Soin et aI., 2002, p. 
252;). 
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The Impact oflT in lCBs on MAS Design 
lCB Management was not fully convinced about the potential of computers. Another 
consideration, borne out by the findings of the research, related to the fact that the degree of 
IT usage in a bank is greatly influenced by the way users interact with the system [see 
Exhibit 5.31, Factors Affecting Quality and Quantity of MAS Information in lCB; Section 
4.11.1.3, Effects of Information Technology on MAS Design at PB; Section 4.13.2.2, 
Ineffective Use of IT at PB; Section 5.12.1.8, Technology in lCB; Section 5.14, The Use of 
Computers in MAS in lCB; Section 4.13.2.1, Psychological Gap between Managers and 
Computers at PB]. The research findings relating to the effects ofIT on information systems 
generally concur with those of other researchers in the West (e.g. MabberJey, 1992, p. 109; 
Ashton et aI., 1995, p. 3; Christiansen & Mouristen, 1995, pp. 215, 220; Lau & Tan, 1998, p. 
165). 
The results from the interviews showed that they had a number of specific difficulties 
regarding IT. These difficulties related to: accessing information, the flexibility of the 
system, and integration of software packages. The interviewees believed that the IT system 
could enhance the role of MAS in lCBs by providing MAS users with the necessary level of 
analysis and flexibility in using information [see Section 4.13.2, Factors that Hindered the 
Use of IT in MAS; and Section 5.14, The Use of Computers in MAS in lCB; Section 
5.12.1.8, Technology in lCB]. 
The PB managers emphasised the unresponsiveness ofIT systems to their needs, and the lack 
of qualified IT staff. In the survey only 25% of the credit and branch managers said that the 
IT systems helped them in planning, which ultimately affected OE [Exhibit 5.26, The Role of 
the IT System in MAS in lCB; Section 4.11.1.3, Effects ofInformation Technology on MAS 
Design at PB; Section 4.13.2.2, Ineffective Use ofIT system at PB;J. 
The research findings also showed that in terms ofthe IT systems, there were some important 
elements that MAS needed to have in order to provide support for users in planning, 
decision-making and control. These elements included the integration of software packages, 
having a comprehensive network linking departments and branches, a well-developed system 
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capable of providing a data warehouse of infonnation and flexible reporting, qualified IT 
staff, and easy and quick access to different components of the system [Exhibit 5.41, 
Elements MAS Needs to Have in IT System to Provide Support for Planning, Decision-
Making and Control in JCB; Section 5.14, The Use of Computers in MAS in JCB; Section 
4.13.2.2, Ineffective Use of IT System Capabilities at PB]. 
Whilst discussing the benefits of IT, it should also be pointed that it can also have negative 
influences on MAS design because it encourages centralisation of infonnation (Langford, 
1979, p. 54. This is interesting because in JCBs MAS reports tend to be generated by IT 
departments working in close collaboration with financial departments [see Section 4.11.1.3, 
Effects oflnfonnation Technology on MAS Design at PB]. 
The Decision-Making Styles ofMAS Users in JCB 
The research findings showed that MAS users in JCBs had different decision-making styles. 
These differences stem not only from psychological differences but also from the different 
positions and roles in the organisation. For example, Exhibit 5.11 [Functions in which MAS 
Reports were more Helpful in JCBs] profiles the answers of the interviewees to the question 
as to whether MAS reports were more helpful in planning, decision-making or control. 
Seventy five percent of the deposit managers in the survey replied that MAS reports were 
equally helpful in all three areas compared to none for credit and branch mangers, and only 
25% for financial managers. This cannot be explained exclusively in tenns of a bias on the 
designers' part to the needs of deposit mangers but rather reflects the different psychology 
and functions of the various categories of respondent. 
This consideration is also reflected in the difference of opinion amongst financial and deposit 
managers, and credit and branch managers. Whereas 50% of the financial and deposit 
managers said they needed more infonnation on the internal environment, 88% of credit 
managers and 75% of the branch managers said they needed more infonnation on the internal 
environment. The managers in the four functions were obviously, looking for different things 
in the MAS reports in order to complete their different jobs [Exhibit 5.12, Need for more 
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Information on the Internal Environment; and Section 5.9.2.4, Information on the Internal 
Environment in JCBj. In this respect, it is worth noting that there was a noticeable pattern in 
almost all of the topics discussed in that deposit managers seemed the most satisfied group 
followed by financial managers. In contrast, credit and branch managers appeared to be the 
least satisfied. 
This can be linked to the fact that the majority of PB interviewees (77%) did not participate 
in MAS reports design. This consideration led them to focus on matters that the designers 
and compilers of MAS information should include, such as, historical internal data and the 
need to focus on feedback control. The survey interviewees who were not involved in MAS 
design also expressed similar opinions such as: a lack of detail, difficult to understand 
information, and that they did not meet their decision-making needs [Exhibit 5.40, Effects of 
Non-Participation in MAS Reports Design in JCBj. 
The differing decision-making styles and psychology of users can also be seen in the fact that 
the respondents had different views on time horizons, orientation, formats, and frequency of 
MAS information [See Section 4.11.1.6, Effects of Psychology of Users on MAS Design at 
PB; Section 5.12.1.2, Psychology and Problems of Users in JCBj. The PB and survey 
interviewees (38%) complained of being overloaded with irrelevant information and 
unnecessary details (42%), and they were also unable to obtain the information they needed 
promptly [Section 4.12.7, Over-Information in MAS Reports at PB; 4.12.8, Participation in 
MAS Reports Design at PB; Section 5.13.7, Managers' Participation in MAS Reports Design 
in JCBj. March (1987, pp. 156-157), in his discussion of the elusive link between 
information and decision-making, emphasises the importance of incorporating the user's 
needs into the design of MAS. He also claims that an information system inadequately 
designed will not be conducive to enhancing 0 E. 
This observation concurs with Simon's statement (1977, p. 50): 'Organization structure over 
and above standard operating procedures is itself a partial specification of decision-making 
programs'. Luckett & Eggleton (1991, p. 373) add a third influence, namely, 'the nature of 
the tasks themselves'. All these factors were found in this research to influence the design of 
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MAS. Other researchers in the West agree with these findings (e.g. Driver & Mock, 1975; 
Mason & Mitroff, 1973; March, 1978, p. 162). 
The Role of Organisational Structure in the Design and Operation of MAS 
The design and operation of MAS is in many ways interrelated with the way in which the 
organisational structure is designed (Hopwood, 1978,p. 8; Spicer & Ballew, 1983, p. 88; 
Lewin & Minton, 1986, p. 528; Miller, 1993, p. 124; Wilson & Chua 1993, p. 480; Otley, 
1995, p. 51; Preston, 1995, pp. 275, 279; Reid & Smith 2000, p. 430; Helliar et aI., 2002, p. 
35; Chenhall, 2003, p. 148). Mason & Mitroff(1973, p. 483) went further in saying that 'an 
organization's structure and its information system are in reality just two sides of the same 
coin' perhaps to accentuate the bilateral influence between the two' 
The research interviewees mentioned organizational structure, internal politics, the 
psychological gap between the different levels of management, and the cultural 
considerations, as factors which they believed had negative effects on the functioning of 
communication channels. [Exhibit 5.24, Problems With Communication Channels in JCB; 
Exhibit 5.23, Factors Negatively Affecting Communication Channels in JCB; Section 4.10.3, 
Internal Politics at PB; Section 5.10.1.2, Internal Politics in JCB; and Section 5.10.1.3, 
Structured Centralization and Ioformation Gatekeepers in JCB]. A number of factors that 
hinder the flow of information were found to be related to the organizational structure in 
]CBs [see Section 4.10, Factors Hindering the Diffusion ofInformation atPB; and Section 
5.10.1, Factors Hindering the Diffusion ofInforrnation in JCB]. 
In this respect, the research findings showed that: unclear communication channels, lack of 
differentiation on responsibilities and authoriry of departments, and frequently changing 
organizational structures all have a negative effect on the flow of information and the 
effective goal-setting process of managers. Similarly, centralisation of information, 
information gatekeepers and internal politics affect the availability of information and 
adversely affect OE. 
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The analysis of the research information showed that the interviewees identified a 
number of decisive factors relating to organisational structure, which were conducive to a 
better flow of MAS information. These factors included: stable and well-defined 
responsibilities and authority of departments, clear communication channels, the co-
ordination of activities, departments with specialized functions, work procedures, and 
decentralization of authority and information [Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organization 
Structure Decisive for Flow of information in ICB] these are discussed following. 
Continually changing organisational structures affected the flow of information and confused 
PB managers as to who was responsible for what. This came as a result of changes in 
management and the creation of new departments. Under these circumstances, the users did 
not get the information they needed [see Section 4.5, Restructuring Stage at PB]. 
The survey interviewees expressed particular concern about knowing who was responsible 
for what functions and where they could get information. This was especially the case, when 
the information was not of a standard type. Overall, 75% of the survey interviewees 
identified well-defined responsibilities and authority as a decisive element in the free flow of 
information within an organisation [Exhibit 5.17, Elements in Organization Structure 
Decisive for the Flow of Information in ICB; Section 5.17.1.3, Frequent Changes to 
organizational structure]. Again 77% ofPB interviews found the delineation of departments' 
responsibilities not clear This led to delays in work and not being unable to get information 
[Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB]. Western researchers (e.g. 
Emmanuel et ai., 1990, p. 38; Luckett & Eggleton, 1991, p. 373; Bums & Stalker, 1994, p. 
97) typically concur with this finding 
Communication channels were identified by PB interviewees as an important element and 
the survey revealed that this was the second most important element in the organisational 
structure to affect the flow of information. Some respondents emphasised lateral 
communication and others vertical communication. One respondent believed that there 
should be, in addition to the standard channels of communication, specialised channels to be 
used when special needs arise [Section 4.1 0.1, Channels of Communication at PB]. 
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Interviewees identified the lack of clear communication channels as a major problem. They 
were not clear to users needing information. This was especially the case when bottlenecks 
existed due to centralisation [Exhibit 5.24, Problems With Communication Channels in JCB; 
Section 5.11.3, Channels of Communication in lCB; Section 5.17.1.2, Effects of Channels of 
Communication on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; and Section 5.21.2,. Effects of 
Channels of Communication on Control in JCB).The single channel to head office also meant 
that specialised information which branch managers needed was not readily available. 
Abernethy & Brownell (199, p. 192) and McMann & Nanni (1995, pp. 331,332, 327) express 
similar ideas on organisation structure, such as, better top-to-bottom communication, side-to-
side integration, and the use of team structure 'to strengthen the quality of communication 
and reinforce a global (not local) purpose'. 
Interviewees in JCBs talked about the need for co-ordination, and the findings of the research 
also highlighted co-ordination problems [see Section 5.11.1, Elements Decisive in 
Organizational Structure of JCB for the Flow of Information; Section 4.15.4.2, Departmental 
Goals were not Discussed by Top Management at PB; and Section 4.1 0.7, Other 
Organizational Structure Elements at PB]. The survey interviewees identified co-ordination 
. as the third most important element to improve the flow of information. The Co-ordination 
among departments in the banks was closely related to other elements in the organization 
structure namely: clear work procedures, clear communication lines, and well-defined 
responsibilities and authorities of departments. 
Interviewees realialised what impact co-ordination could have in enhancing corporate goals 
and the achievement of corporate goals and OE [see Section 4.10.7, Other Organizational 
Structure Elements at PB; Section 5.17.1.4, Effects of Co-ordimition Problems on Planning 
and Decision-Making in JCB; and Section 5.21.3, Effects of Co-ordination on Control in 
JCB]. Committees were suggested by the interviewees as a means of achieving better co-
ordination. This finding concurs with Simon (1997), Cunningham (1977), Scapens (1994), 
Bums and Stalker (1994), etc.work on the importance of co-ordination. 
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The interviewees talked about the need for departments with specialised functions. This was 
because they encountered difficulties in getting information in specialised areas (relating to 
both the internal and external environments). Branch managers were the group who believed 
they needed it most [50%]. Almost one third of the survey interviewees identified this factor 
as a significant element in enhancing the flow of information [see Section 5.1 J.l, Elements 
Decisive in Organizational Structure of ICB for the Flow of Information; and Exhibit 5.18, 
Elements in Organization Structure Decisive for Flow of Information per Function in ICB]. 
The most frequently mentioned need was for a research department to provide the necessary 
information. 
Work procedures were identified as another decisive element for improving the flow of 
information. In essence, the interviewees claimed that they would help employees in dealing 
with situations that are non-routine or unclear. The reasons given by the interviewees for 
identifying work procedures was that it would help to clarify what, how, and when things 
needed to be done, and by whom [see Section 4.10.6, Lack of Documented Procedures at PB; 
Section 5.17.1.1 Effects of Work Procedures on Planning and Decision-Making in ICB]. 
Researchers in the West agree with what the interviewees said on work procedures. See, for 
example, Bums & Scapens (2000, p. 6), Scapens (1994, p. 313), Waterhouse & Tiessen 
(1978, p. 70), Hughes (1965, p. 51), etc 
Interviewees in both the case study and the survey differentiated between two types of 
centralisation of authority in their banks: formal centralisation within certain departments in 
the banks, and informal centralisation that operated among self-appointed information 
gatekeepers [see Section 4.10.2, Feelings ofInsecurity at PB; Section 4.1 0.3, Internal Politics 
at PB; Section 5.10.1.2, Internal Politics in ICB; Section 5.10.C3, Structured Centralisation 
. and Information Gatekeepers in ICB]. Interviewees believed that the centralisation of 
information was caused by negative relations between departments and branches, and 
because of the existence of rivalry and cultural reasons. Interviewees believed that one of the 
main reasons behind the centralisation of power and information within JCBs was the social 
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culture [see Section 4.22, Effects of External Culture on Organisational Structure; Exhibit 
5.30, Effects of Social Culture on Organizational Structure in JCB]. 
JCBs appeared to be especially characterised by the centralisation of authority and 
information [see Section 4.10.4, Centralisation of Information at PB; Section 4.10.7, Other 
Organizational Structure Elements under Centralisation of Authority]. Baiman (1981, p. 192) 
believes that 'in decentralized firms information as well as decisions are decentralized', and 
this seemed to be the case with JCB where authority as well information was centralised. 
Managers had negative opinions about the centralisation of authority and claimed that the 
centralisation of decision-making intensified bureaucracy in their banks [see Section 4.1 0.7, 
Other Organizational Structure Elements at PB under Centralisation of Authority; Section 
5.17.1.6, Effects of Centralisation on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; Section 5.21.1, 
Effects of Characteristics ofMAS Reports on Planning and Decision-Making in JCB; Section 
5.21.2, Effects of Channels of Communication on Control in JCB). 
According to the interviewees, centralisation affected the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
managers. In particular, it affected control, communication, planning, and delayed work and 
follow up. In general, it had a negative affect on the quality of information in MAS reports 
[see Exhibit 5.15, Effects of Centralisation of Information, Information Gatekeepers, and 
Internal Politics in JCB; Exhibit 5.16, Consequences of Centralisation ofInformation in JCB; 
Section 4.10.7, Other Organisational Structure Elements at PB under Centralisation of 
Authority; Section 5.17.1.6, Effects of Centralisation on Planning and Decision-Making in 
JCB and Section 5.21.1, The Effects of Centralisation on Control in JCB). Researchers in the 
West generally agree with this finding. See, for example, Argyris, 1971, p. B-279; Scapens, 
1985, p. 449; Pettigrew, 1972, pp. 188-189; Miller, 1993, p. 126; Pondy, 1981 p. 233; Pond, 
2000, pp. 2,10; Hopper, 1980, p. 408; Peters & Waterman, 1995, p. 201, etc. 
Bureaucracy was another factor that hindered the flow of information and compounded the 
effect of centralisation and 75% believed that their administrations were bureaucratic [see 
Exhibit 5.46, Bureaucracy in JCB; Section 4.10.5, Excessive Bureaucracy at PB; Section 
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5.27.1, Cultural Effects on Bureaucracy in JCB;]. They also believed that one of the reasons 
their administrations were bureaucratic was due to the culture in Jordan (Exhibit 5.47, Causes 
of Bureaucracy in JCB]. 
6.4 The Specific Contributions ofMAS to OE in JCBs 
This research adopts goal achievement as a criterion for assessing OE. Achieving goals in 
organisations is dependent on planning and control functions. MAS, in addition to other 
information systems in organisations, play a part in enhancing planning and control. 
Therefore, one might infer that better MAS would lead to better planning, control, 
performance measurement and ultimately to a higher degree of OE. It is also fair to assume 
that inadequately designed and implemented MAS would impede OE. The extant literature 
supports this view of the link between MAS and OE. However, the literature also 
acknowledges the difficulty in measuring the impact of MAS on OE [see Section 3.22.5, 
Goal Achievement as a Criterion for Assessing OE; Section 3.24, The Goal Model in 
Evaluating OE; Section 3.26, Measurements o[OE]. 
Studying MAS in organisations cannot be conducted as a laboratory experiment, nor can the 
effects of MAS be studied in isolation relative to other systems in the organisation. All this 
makes measuring the effects of MAS on OE a formidable task. The alternative option is to 
infer the MAS-OE link by assuming that goal achievement requires planning, monitoring, 
and control. MAS have a role in all these processes; therefore, enhancing MAS should lead 
to enhanced planning, monitoring and control and lead a higher level of OE. 
In the discussion of the PB case study an attempt was made to measure the improvement in 
OE, using multiple measures, linked to the improvements in MAS after the new management 
team took over. The enhancement in OE was realised and m"easured mainly in financial 
terms. The improvement was prominently in control areas and produced tangible results in 
market share and asset value (Section 4.24, Epilogue]. However, in addition to the 
improvements in MAS, managerial skills, other systems and procedures also improved as a 
consequence of introducing new management. Consequently, and this is also suggested by 
the literature, the link between MAS and OE is a qualified one. 
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As discussed in sections 6.2 and 6.3, interviewees expressed a number of criticisms of the 
MAS employed in their banks which they felt weakened their performance and undermined 
OE. The majority felt they needed more comprehensive, qualitative, and detailed information 
[see Section 6.2, The kind and Characteristics oflnformation MAS Generate in JCB and to 
the Benefit of What Users]. This proinpted the question as to why they wanted this type of 
information and what they would have done with it. Perhaps, not surprisingly, these sort of 
issues have been highlighted by the Western literature [see Section 6.2]. 
Some of the insights provided by the interviewees in relation to planning, monitoring, and 
control should be useful for senior management in ICBs. In particular, the interviewees 
highlighted the fact that: corporate goals were unclear and at times unknown to them. 
Accordingly, any future action taken by management might not be related to the corporate 
goals of the organisation. [Exhibit 4.16, A Comparison of PB Interviewees' Answers with 
Corporate Goals as in Annual Reports (1994-1998); Exhibit 5.7, Goal-Setting Process in 
JCB]. 
Senior management in JCBs, therefore, need to take into account the views of interviewees, 
i.e. users, and respond to the fact that they found MAS more helpful in feedback control than 
feedforward control [see Section 6.2]. Similarly, they also need to take into account what 
MAS users (100% of them) said about the importance of more comprehensive information 
on the internal and external environment. This encompassed the need for financial and non 
financial forward looking information on the environment to plan and control the business 
and the inclusion of more easy to understand information in order to facilitate decision 
making [Exhibit 5.35, Uses of Non-Financial Information in MAS Reports; and Section 6.2]. 
The absence of this type of information not only detracted from the efficiency of managers 
but also increased levels of frustration and confusion, which could lead to a loss of business 
[see Section 6.2]. In this respect senior management should introduce more bottom-up 
communication in processes such as goal-setting, decision-making, and evaluation of existing 
systems and processes. 
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Regard ing performance evaluation, managements needs to be aware that the interviewees felt 
the measurements used for goal achievement needed further consideration. The 
measurements were viewed as being unclear, unfair and incapable of reflecting actual 
performance regarding both the long- and short-term goals of PB. This understandably would 
have consequences for morale and goal achievement [see Exhibit 5.33, Criteria of 
Performance Evaluation in JCB; Section 4.18, Role of MAS in Providing Information on 
Performance Evaluation at PS; Section 5.20.2.2, Performance Evaluation Criteria in JCB]. 
The interviewees believed MAS could be enhanced by strengthening the IT systems in the 
JCBs. They identified issues that management might want to look into such as improving 
access to different components of the system, raising the qualifications of the IT staff, 
introducing a comprehensive network to connect all branches and departments, and working 
on a better integration of computer software packages. [see Section 6.3). 
In this respect, senior management might find it useful to examine the managers' criticism of 
organisational structures regarding what works and what does not. The managers from their 
own past experiences, identified elements in organisational structures that could enhance or 
impede the operation and design of MAS and consequently OE [see Section 6.3). In this 
respect, lack of clearly defined responsibilities relating to departments and individuals, 
centralisation of authority and information, and poor co-ordination, etc were all emphasised 
by the respondents. 
A number of the issues discussed in this section indicate that there is a real need for greater 
participation in the decision-making process. Senior management might, for example, want 
to explore new ways of activating the use of committees. In this respect, it might be pertinent 
to add that mUlti-purpose meetings with people drawn from different organizational levels 
and departments are rather less common in Jordan than elsewhere. In particular, management 
might find it beneficial to examine the functioning of Credit Committees [see Section 4.23.2, 
Committees at PB; Section 5.17.1.5, Committees in JCB). 
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When discussing the design of MAS in leBs interviewees discussed how certain managers 
influenced and manipulated the MAS design. Management needs to be aware that MAS 
design is a political activity influenced by the established power distribution and by internal 
politics. The combined participation of users and initiators can be one way of achieving more 
harmony and avoid a conflict of interest situation amongst managers. Better accessibility to 
information by the creation of comprehensive data bases would also be conducive to the 
design of more effective MAS [see Section 6.3]. 
Finally, senior management need to understand the difference in decision-making styles and 
the psychology of users in MAS design. As the research showed this consideration had 
important implications for time horizons, orientation, formats, and the frequency of MAS 
information. 
6.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
This research contributes to the body ofMAS literature in the following ways: 
(I) To the best of my knowledge, no other research on the role of MAS in enhancing OE in 
leBs exists. The research also provides a basis for further research on the role and design of 
MAS in leBs(e.g. Shields, 1997, p. 26; Zimmerman, 2001, p. 412; Ittner & Larcker, 2002, p. 
789). 
(2) The research also provides specific insight into the following points: 
(i) A description of the MAS employed and their workings in lCBs; 
(ii) Insight into the impact of users and designers on MAS; 
(iii) Insight into the impact of MAS on the users; 
(iv) Insight into the impact of MAS on OE 
In providing a description of MAS employed in leBs, the research sheds light on actual 
practices, and provides a potential bridge between theory and practice (see Jones, 1992, p. 
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250; Palmer, 1992, p. 181; Wilson & Chua, 1993, p. 403; Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994, p. 
149; Ashton at aI., 1995, p. 9; Parker, 1999, p. 27). 
(3) The research confirms the findings of previous research on the contingent variables that 
affect MAS. As a result of this research, an additional variable has been added, namely, the 
combined participation of users and initiators o(MAS. 
Some variables of MAS design observed in this research are not in themselves unique to the 
context of JCBs. However, the research has shown how cultural considerations can have an 
impact on the design of MAS and ultimately, therefore, how they can impact on OE. [see 
Exhibit 5.28, Effects of Corporate Culture in JCB on the Role and Operation of MAS; 
Section 4.22, Effects of External Culture on Organisational Structure at PB; Section 4.23, 
Effects of Corporate Culture on MAS at PB; Section 5.27, Cultural Effects on Organizational 
Structure in JCB; Section 5.30, Corporate Culture in JCBj. Similarly, other variables of 
MAS design (such as organisational strategies, and principles of feedback and feedforward 
control) are developed in this research .. 
(4) This research identifies certain considerations relating to organisational structure, which 
if addressed could potentially improve MAS and have a beneficial impact on OE. For 
example, there appears to be a need for decentralisation of information and a more inclusive 
style of management. 
(5) Although the focus of this research is not on cultural issues in organizational life, it does 
acknowledge culture as a variable which affects MAS design, implementation and operation. 
Within this broad scope the study offers explanations of social culture's impact on MAS 
design, implementation, and operation. It confirms the effects 'of the large-power distance 
dimension and of the masculine/feminine dimension [see Section 6.3]. 
The analyses of the data indicated that the 'deterministic dimension' (Kirkman et aI., 2001, p. 
20; Miroshink, 2002, p. 529) explains the interviewees' approaches to planning rather than 
the 'high uncertainty avoidance' dimension as suggested by Hofstede (1991, p. 113). This 
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research, accordingly, offers insights into why the strong 'in-group' dimension in Jordan 
(Hofstede 1991, p. 54, Fig. 3.1) did not affect committees and team work [see Section 5.27.2, 
Cultural Effects on Committees in JCB]. In this context this research offers some insights 
into the ways in which internal and external cultures affect the adoption of MAS. 
(6) This research also extends the Gordon et al. (1978, p. 207) model used in discussing the 
characteristics of information in MAS reports. This research adds new characteristics, which 
were indicated by the collected data, namely: financial information [Section 4.12.1]; age of 
MAS reports [Section 4.12.6]; and excessive information in MAS reports [Section 4.12.7]. 
Last Thoughts 
There is little in the way of formal management research in Jordan. Not only do we not know 
of a similar study of JCBs, it is difficult to find comparable studies on organizational and 
management dynamics in any sector or industry in Jordan. Against this background we hope 
that the present study will be seen as a useful and honest contribution to understanding and 
knowledge of Jordan. 
The research also faced up to the tensions of applying an essentially western model of MAS 
. to an Arab country. My view is that it is appropriate for developing countries to adopt and 
adapt western MAS. Indeed, it could be argued that the western model, based as it is on 
accumulated practice and a substantial research literature, is 'the only game in town' . Also, it 
is clear from the study that although MAS works in lCBs, it does not work in quite the same 
way as in the west. However, it is also argued that: 
o the differences in effectiveness between Jordan and the West are matters of degrees 
rather than anything more substantial 
o the criticisms voiced by our interviewees are also heard in the West 
o the thesis does not constitute a general ised critique of Arab management. Rather it 
recognises that it has distinctive strengths and faces demanding challenges. 
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o The research also identified some context specific reason for the interviewees' 
demands for wide-scope, external and non-financial information. These related to the 
paucity of accessible and reasonably reliable data in Jordan. This reflection is 
important and does suggest ways in which a western model can be adapted. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of organisations and management practice are no more 
static in the Middle East than they are in the West. The fact that our interviewees 
voice their criticisms so readily shows readiness to change. 
Finally, it is difficult to prove the MAS-OE link and even more difficult to measure it. But 
such a link is supported by inference in the literature, and by common sense. If this link is 
accepted, even in a qualified way, we hope that our findings may help those who run JeBs to 
get some enhancement of OE and other gains. 
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Attention of: ........... . 
From: Barihan Sherin Nabil 
Dear sir/Madam, 
I would like to give you a quick idea about the research topic prior to our meeting on 
(day and date), and wish to thank you for giving me two hours of your time. The 
research is part of working towards a Ph.D. degree in accounting with Loughborough 
University - Britain. 
Title of the research: The Role of Management accounting systems in Enhancing 
Oganisational Effectiveness in Jordanian Banks. 
Duration of the study: 2 -3 months 
Definitions: 
Management accounting: comprises techniques and processes that with the aim of 
providing financial and non-financial information for people in organizations to 
enable them to take better decisions to enhance the organizational effectiveness in an 
organization. 
A management accounting system: is a group of procedures with which financial and 
non-financial infonnation is collected from within and outside the organization. It 
comprises means of gathering, storing, processing, preparing, and communicating 
management accounting infolmation to decision-makers. 
Areas to be covered in the meeting: 
Management accounting reports 
Planning 
Decision-making processes 
Control 
Channels of communication. 
Phoenix Bank Case Study Interview Guide 
Topics to cover: 
(a) Types and purposes of MAS reports, characteristics of contents of these 
reports, preparer(s) and receiver(s). The relation of reports to external and internal 
factors affectirig MAS design as in the research plan. 
(b) Procedures and style of decision-making and related information needs. 
(c) Horizontal and vertical communication lines and its relation to size of the 
organisation, and technology used. 
(d) Systems of control, types of MAS control reports, characteristics of 
information in control reports. 
(e) Bureaucracy, formalisation, and standardisation in the bank. Centralisation and 
decentralisation of departments and branches. 
(f) Technology used in collecting, storing, and retrieving data. Technology used in 
preparation and communication of MAS reports taking into consideration cost and 
volume of information and size of the organisation. 
(g) What are the bank's reasons and assumptions for choosing what is described 
above, and what management expects of current MAS in terms of organisational 
effectiveness. 
(h) How effective was MAS employed by the bank in achieving targets in budgets 
and corporate goals in the past. 
Prior to each interview general information to be filled before hand: date and hour of 
interview, name of interviewee, branch or department, age and number of years with 
the bank, and official title. 
I will start each interview with a short presentation covering the following: 
An idea on the purpose of the study. 
Interviews will not be carried with all bank managers for the purpose of the study 
Stress confidentiality of opinions, and that no company information will made 
available to outsiders without manager's approval. 
The study will deal with group opinions rather than single opinions. No 
identification of personal opinions communicated during interview. 
Feedback could be given at the end of the case study 
Ask if (s )he has any questions before we start. 
External environment theme 
1- What factors in the environment of the bank affect you? 
2- What do you consider the most hazardous aspect of the external environment? 
Planning & decision-making theme 
3- What effects do reports have on helping you in (1) setting corporate plans, (2) 
future goals? 
4- Do you feel that management reports give you a satisfactory idea on where are 
you now in relation to: (1) your operational or corporate goals achievement? 
(2) In drawing your attention to problem areas? 
(3) in finding solutions to problems? 
(4) In deciding on available alternatives? 
5- In trying to obtain information concerning the areas mentioned above, would you 
usually try and get focused information before taking a decision, or do you feel 
you need to have a wide-scope of information about the situation facing you? 
Would you possibly consider different solutions (Driver & Mock decision making 
style matrix)? 
6- To what extent do you study the information you receive before taking a 
decision? Intuition or personal perception contribute/not contribute to your 
decisions? Why? 
7- What attracts a customer? How do you get information on that? 
8- What type of customers do you try to attract? 
9- What are the characteristics of these reports? Format, form, orientation, time 
horizon, and frequency. 
10- In planning what qualities do you look for in reports? Do you find it? 
11- What plans do you prepare or revise annually that are of direct concern to you? 
What procedures do they follow (stages, who is consulted, committees .. )? 
12- What do you consider a major issue when preparing those plans? 
13- What type of reports do you receive for planning? Who provides them? 
14- How do you evaluate them? Would their absence affect you? 
15- Do you chase after information? 
16- Which aspects of the bank's operations do you feel need to be budgeted for? Who 
decides on targets? Who proposes the budget? Do you discuss the budget with 
your subordinates? In what ways? 
17- What are the goals of the bank both short-term and long-term? 
18-How do you evaluate the bank's performance according to 1997-2001 plan? What 
were the problems of implementation? 
19- How do you measure non-financial aspects of your work such as customer 
satisfaction or employee satisfaction? 
Control theme 
20- How do you evaluate branches and departments? 
21- What do you stress more in branches' performance, (meeting budgets irrespective, 
or is your concern cost control rather than meeting the budget)? 
22- How do you see the role of budgetary control (standards, variances)? Which do 
you stress more in budgetary control score keeping or providing information and 
liaison? What would you like to see changed and why? 
23- Do you receive reports on the reasons why some branches are more profitable 
than others? And how can results be improved? Who provides such information? 
How do you evaluate it? 
24- How do you use the annual budget and annual report prepared by the AGM/FP? 
25- When you get the figures and you see a serious under attainment what do you do 
next? 
26- For control purposes what qualities in the information do you look for? Do you 
find it? 
Organisational structure theme 
27- Could you explain to me the characteristics of your organisational structure? (to 
what extent are bank processes formalised, centralised, jointness of performance, 
fit of authority and responsibility) 
28- Which of the characteristics you mentioned would you consider as strong points 
and weak points of the current organisational structure? 
29- How does such an organisational structure affect MAS positively and negatively? 
30- Do you feel that most information in the bank is centralised and closely guarded 
by certain units or individuals? Is it a result of organisational structure or 
organisational politics, or your personal directives? 
31- In general, how much say or influence and what kind of influence do you feel 
each of the following persons or groups have on what goes in the bank (top 
management, branch managers, department managers, employees, staff-
departments)? 
Channels of communication theme 
32- Do you feel that reports are distributed to the right people at the right level? What 
gaps do you perceive? And why do such gaps exist? 
33- How do you communicate with different departments? 
34- Do you prefer that all communication upward or downward go through a single 
channel following the command lines? Your reasons? How does this affect bank 
performance? 
35- Role of Committees? 
36- What degree of emphasis do you place on written communication in comparison 
to verbal communication? 
37- How about a redundant channel of information to avert subordinates biasing 
information? Do you feel you need it, and why? Why do you feel you need to 
assign jobs to managers that are not part of their position responsibilities? 
38- How wholesome/problematic do you feel are the relationships between 
departments at head office and branch managers and among managers 
themselves? Reasons? How does it affect the ability of the bank in achieving its 
targets? 
Technology theme 
39- For an organisation of this size, do you feel that the technology used help~ in the 
co-ordination and control of work? 
40- What are your complaints of the technology used for collecting, storing, 
processing, and communicating information? Is it sufficient enough for your 
needs? How do you think it can be improved? 
41- Are these problems specific to the bank or does the whole business community 
suffer from them? 
* * * In your opinion what part of MAS functions best in the bank? What part 
functions least well? What are your reasons? How does it affect bank performance? 
How do you think the drawbacks can be eliminated? 
Interview Guide on the Role ofMAS in Enhancing 
Organisational Effectiveness in Jordanian Commercial Banks 
1- If you consider any factor or influence outside the bank (economic, competition, political, 
cultural) as part of the external environment, do you require reports that provide you with 
information dealing with external factors? 
2- Do you find MAS reports whether periodical or ad hoc that concentrate on a few variables 
more helpful to you in setting plans to achieve your goals than reports that have a wide scope? 
3- In what way would you find getting information on factors in the external environment 
helpful to you in achieving corporate goals? 
4- Do you actually receive such information through current MAS reports? 
1- Yes 
2- no 
3- to a satisfactory extent 
4- to some extent 
5- Do you feel you need to have infonnation on tbe external environment 
(I) periodically? 
(2) on ad hoc basis? 
(3) it is of no interest to me 
6- In what formes) do you look for information on factors in the external environment? 
1- financial information only 
2- non- financial information 
3- both 
4- Other, and why? 
7- If you find that MAS reports do not contain enough non-financial information, how is 
non-financial information useful to you? 
8- Do you find that your personal interpretations of the factors in the external environment 
are different from those of top management? and if so why? 
9- In what ways do differences in interpretations and understanding of the influence of the 
factors in the external environment affect your efforts in achieving corporate goals? 
10- Could you identify the main reasons that affect the quality and quantity of information in 
MAS reports? 
1-
2-
3-
11- Do you feel that top management is not sufficiently committed to making information 
available to different levels of managers? 
And if so why? 
12- Does top management at your bank believe that there is information that ought not be 
diffused to all senior managers? 
13- Do you find that you need such information labeled by top management as 'restricted 
information' in planning and decision making? And if so why? 
14- What activities in the internal environment are you provided with the necessary 
information about? 
1-
2-
3-
15- Do you find that information on (the activities chosen above) helps you in planning and 
decision making? Why? 
16- What other information on the internal environment do you feel you need to have for 
planning and decision making? And if so why? 
17- When you want to set a goal for your department, in your opinion which elements ofthe 
organisational structure help in the smooth flow of information you would need for effective 
goal setting? 
Why are those elements of particular importance? 
18- What problem do you face with 
(I) communication channels? why? 
(2) delineation of responsibilities? Why? 
19- Do you bel ieve that any of the following phenomena exist at the bank: 
1- Centralisation of information 
2- Information gatekeepers 
3- Internal politics 
20- How do the above mentioned phenomena affect your work in planning? decision making? 
control? 
21- Do you feel that having/not having MAS reports or data base available to you through 
your PC affect your work in terms of planning? decision making? and control? 
22- In what ways do you envisage the computer system at the bank can be of more help to 
you in your work than it is actually doing? 
23- To what degree did you influence the design of the MAS reports that you receive in terms 
of form and content? 
(1) I was never consulted in the design 
(2) my contribution has been marginal 
(3) the designers ofthe reports and I contributed equally 
(4) my contribution was substantial 
24- In what ways do you feel that if you do not/did not participate in the design of the MAS 
reports used in communicating information within MAS your work would be affected? 
25- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
(I) The MAS reports I receive lack sharp focus. 
Agree / disagree 
(2) The MAS reports I receive contain irrelevant information to planning and control. 
Agree / disagree 
(3) The MAS reports I receive contain unnecessary details. 
Agree / disagree 
26- Do you find that the MAS reports that you receive are: 
(I) all historical reports 
(2) mostly historical reports 
(3) few of the reports are of a historical nature 
27- How would forward looking MAS reports be useful to you in your work? 
1-
2-
3-
28- How are corporate goals communicated to you? 
29- Do you believe that a conflict exists between achieving the goals of your department and 
corporate goals? And if so why? 
30- Do you feel that your departmental goals correspond with your own individual goals? 
And why? 
31- Which activities do you feel are affected by a conflict among achieving your own goals, 
your departmental goals, and corporate goals? 
How are they affected? 
32- Are you satisfied with the criteria by which your performance is evaluated? And why? 
33- When your work at one point depends on or continues the work of other managers; do 
you find that performance appraisal measures are not clearly defined at the bank whereby 
your achievement could be mixed-up with other managers' achievements? And if so why? 
34- Do you find the information communicated to you through MAS more helpful in control 
than in planning and decision making? 
Why do you think it is so? 
35- Could you specifY and rank the main means of control at the bank according to their 
importance in monitoring implementation of plans and decisions? 
Rank Means 
1-
2-
3-
4-
36- Do you prepare a budget for you department? 
37- Do you think that having a budget for you department enhances your ability of goal 
achievement? 
And if so why? 
38- Do you experience a tangible improvement in goal achievement yourself when budgets 
are coupled with budgetary control? 
39- What activities in your work do you budget for? 
1-
2-
3-
4-
And do you feel that budgeting for these activities IS sufficient for implementing and 
controlling plans? 
40- Which activities do you aim to control and report on to top management? 
1-
2-
3-
and why? 
41- If we define bureaucracy as an inflexible and non-adaptive system of administration, 
would you describe administration at the bank as 
(I) very bureaucratic 
(2) bureaucratic 
(3) partly bureaucratic 
(4) not bureaucratic 
(If the answer to the above question was that administration at the bank is bureaucratic) 
42-ln your opinion why is it bureaucratic? 
43- Do you find I or would you find having committees helpful to you in your work? 
And if so why? 
44- For which activities do/would you find committees helpful? 
1-
2-
3-
45- To what degree do you influence setting your department/branch goal? 
(I) does not influence at all 
(2) to a small degree 
(3) most of the time 
(4) all of the time 
46- How accepting are your superiors to your opinions on matters related to your department 
/branch? 
(I) very res pons ive 
(2) most of the time responsive 
(3) sometimes 
(4) rarely 
(5) my superiors do not want to hear my opinions 
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